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The two most monstrous and closely intertwined crimes committed by Nazi 
Germany, the Holocaust and the “war of extermination” against the Soviet Union, gave 
rise to two diametrically opposed official memories of the Nazi past in both Germanys: 
while over the years the annihilation of over six million Jews gained the most prominent 
position in West German memory of the war, official memory in East Germany centered 
around the Nazi war against the Soviet Union. 
The divided political memory of the latter, the Eastern Front war, is the subject of this 
dissertation. It analyzes and contextualizes the ways in which these memories emerged in 
postwar German political culture as old alliances crumbled and new alliances formed in 
the unfolding Cold War. This study thus represents an important contribution to the 
history of German Vergangenheitsbewältigung. As the first comprehensive analysis of 
the Eastern Front memory it focuses on the intersection of memory and politics, of 
“meaning and power” (Herf). The politics of memory, i.e. the effort to place a narrative 
of past events into the service of a present political cause dominated both Germanys. Yet, 
the analysis pays close attention to the individual biographies of the protagonists arguing 
that the often selective and ambiguous commemoration of the Eastern Front was not only 
the result of an ideology-driven instrumentalization of history in the shadow of the Cold 
War. Rather, it also rooted in the manifold individual encounters with the horrors of 
genocidal war on the various fronts of this unparalleled conflict.
In case of the East German communists’ master narrative, the hitherto neglected 
centrality of the Eastern Front significantly alters the perception, that the German 
Democratic Republic was built upon an “antifascist founding myth.” Rather the political 
memory of “Operation Barbarossa” was the central ingredient in the communist founding 
narrative crafted in order to legitimate the establishment of a socialist dictatorship allied 
in unconditional “friendship” with the Soviet Union. This calculated presence of the 
Eastern Front war stands in contrast to an enduring absence of the same event in West 
Germany. Here it served as rallying point against the perceived continuing “Bolshevist 
menace”, both deriving from and sustaining the antitotalitarian consensus of the young 
Federal Republic. On either side of the Iron Curtain, the Eastern Front memory thus 
played a crucial role in a political culture of fear which pervaded both Germanys in the 
aftermath of World War II.
Yet, the respective founding narratives – German-Soviet friendship in the East, 
antitotalitarianism in the West – as well as the dominant mutually hostile Cold War 
context allowed the political elites to evade the question of individual guilt and to neglect 
the nexus between genocidal war and the Holocaust. The “myth of a clean Wehrmacht” 
facilitated in both Germanys the lasting separation of those two central lieux de mémoire
which to this day embody the tremendous German sufferings and the unprecedented 
German crimes committed during World War II: Stalingrad and Auschwitz.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: War, Politics and the Study of Memory
2
I. The Eastern Front Memory in Postwar German Political Culture
War is the central theme of Germany’s twentieth century. While the first half of the 
century saw unprecedented violence and destruction caused successively by the 
Kaiserreich and the Third Reich, the second half was no less influenced by the 
consequences of these wars and the realities of the resulting Cold War: total defeat, utter 
devastation, a divided nation under Allied occupation, and a second dictatorship on 
German soil. Naturally, studying modern German political-intellectual history entails 
dealing with war, its social, political, and cultural consequences as well as the memories 
and narratives it inspired in the aftermath.
The two most terrible, closely intertwined crimes committed by Germans during 
World War II, the Holocaust and the war against the Soviet Union, gave rise to two 
diametrically opposed official memories of the Nazi past in both postwar Germanys:
while over the years the annihilation of about six million Jews gained the most prominent 
position in the memory of the war in West Germany, official memory in East Germany 
centered around the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union. This fundamental difference 
derived to a great extent, but by far not only, from the realities of the Cold War, i.e. the 
West German alliance with the West and the integration of East Germany into the Soviet 
sphere of influence. It also resulted from a multitude of personal, political and ideological 
motives of those postwar politicians who came to dominate the political landscapes in 
divided Germany. 
This comparative, political-intellectual study of governmental institutions, political
parties, mass and veteran organizations, the historical professions as well as the speeches 
and writings of political leaders and public intellectuals, examines when and how the 
3
Eastern Front war was discussed in public discourses about the past. It is concerned with 
the “public use of history.”
1
It investigates the relationship between memory and politics 
by seeking to elucidate how memory forms and informs political culture, and vice versa.
As I will demonstrate, the war against the Soviet Union – and its contested memory 
– was one of the most important and most contested themes forming and informing post-
war German politics and society. At the center of the analysis stands the legacy of this 
war, a conflict often referred to as the Eastern Front and considered the costliest 
battlefield of World War II. The Eastern Front embodies the basic feature of postwar 
German memory: the conflict between the many sufferings endured by Germans on the 
one hand, and the historic crimes committed by Germans on the other. After the end of 
the war in 1945, any attempt to come to terms with this ambivalent legacy was further 
complicated by the growing political and ideological divide in the wake of the unfolding 
Cold War. Thus, the historical and political context in which a divided Eastern Front 
memory emerged was extremely complex. In East Germany, it was the calculated public 
presence of the Eastern Front memory, in West Germany its enduring absence, which 
bestowed the legacy of “Operation Barbarossa” with a tremendous potential for 
continuous (re-)negotiation and contestation. 
Hitherto, historiography has neglected the crucial and ambivalent role of the Eastern 
Front memory in postwar German political culture. My dissertation represents the first 
systematic effort to trace comprehensively as well as comparatively the genesis of the 
Eastern Front memory in postwar Germany based on evidence from various archives and 
1
 Jürgen Habermas, Jeremy Leaman, “Concerning the Public Use of History,” New German Critique, No. 
44: Special Issue on the Historikerstreit, (1988), 40-50.
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published sources. Moreover, the critical reading and analysis of the texts, speeches and 
debates dealing with the legacies of “Operation Barbarossa” – the Nazi term for the 
invasion of the Soviet Union – can contribute significantly to our understanding of post-
war German political culture. Particularly, the politics of fear characterizing both postwar 
German political cultures were built on and nurtured by respectively opportunistic 
interpretations and representations of the Eastern Front war. Even though what was 
articulated and debated about the Eastern Front differed greatly, looking at the past was a 
(conscientiously) selective undertaking in either Germany. After the remarkable 
Nuremberg Interregnum during which the causes and consequences of the Nazi invasion 
of the Soviet Union were discussed publicly and en detail, the “search for a usable past”
2
for many years did not entail a confrontation of the full historical truth on both sides of 
the Iron Curtain. 
This study thus is an attempt to systematically investigate the formation and 
transformations of a complex and multi-layered set of memories and discourses at the  
heart of which one of the central features of German memory lies: the “stigma of 
violence” which derives from the conflict between memories of German crimes and 
German sufferings.
3
 The battle of Stalingrad with which this study begins has since then 
become a symbol for the latter. Therefore, Stalingrad is treated here not only as historical 
event but is also understood as the most important metaphor codifying to many Germans 
(in East and West) the total defeat of their country in World War II. The battle itself 
2
Robert G. Moeller, War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).
3
 Cf. Michael Geyer, “The Place of the Second World War in German Memory and History,” New German 
Critique, no. 71 (1997), 5-40.
5
during which about 195,000 German soldiers perished – 60,000 died during the battle, 
25,000 were injured and flown out by the German Luftwaffe, 110,000 went into Soviet 
captivity, and of those only 5,000 returned home after the war
4
– this battle was never 
remembered as a military event only. It became a symbol for the suffering, perceived 
senselessness and extreme brutality of the war on the Eastern Front. At the same time, 
however, remembering the dead of Stalingrad made it possible to elude – at least 
temporarily – the question of war crimes committed on Soviet territory. In postwar 
Germany, the politics of memory with regards to the memory of the war against the 
Soviet Union reflect this oscillation between memories of sufferings and crimes. In 
distinct ways and for varying reasons, the political elites have debated the dualism 
deriving from the “stigma of violence,” and thus contributed to the permanent inscription 
of the war’s memory in East and West German political culture. 
One of my central concerns is therefore the intersection of memory and politics, of 
“meaning and power,”
5
 and it is in this sense that I seek to enrich the study of memory 
and political culture. The politics of memory, i.e. the effort to place a certain narrative of 
events happening in the past into the service of a present political cause, dominated the 
political sphere in both postwar Germanys. In the Eastern part, the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR), the Eastern Front war became the central historical event in the leading 
party’s view of World War II. The communists gathered in the Communist Party of 
Germany (KPD) until 1946, and thereafter in the Socialist Unity Party (SED), forged a 
4
Rüdiger Overmans, Soldaten hinter Stacheldraht. Deutsche Kriegsgefangene des Zweiten Weltkriegs
(München: Ullstein, 2002), 38.
5
Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory. The Nazi Past in the two Germanys. (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard 
University Press, 1997), 9.
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master narrative which included facts that in the West took years to find public 
acknowledgement: above all, the scale of suffering among Soviet POWs, the non-Jewish 
Soviet civilian population, and the Wehrmacht’s involvement in war crimes. For the SED 
led by Walter Ulbricht, a front-line veteran of the antifascist movement in the Soviet 
Union, the Eastern Front memory constituted a key source promising political legitimacy. 
The party forged a narrative of the Eastern Front that underlined the Soviet Union’s role 
as Hitler’s prime victim, enemy and conqueror. This narrative one-sidedly denounced the 
crimes of the Wehrmacht against “Soviet citizens” while marginalizing other aspects 
such as the mass murder of the Jews, or the Western Front, or the wartime alliance 
between the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain. 
The memory of the Eastern Front in the Western Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG) long neglected the criminal legacy of the Nazi “war of extermination” until a 
genuine interest in the events emerged since the 1960s, and particularly in the wake of 
Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik. This shift, as I will demonstrate, was crucial for the success of 
Ostpolitik which brought about a lasting improvement of relations between West 
Germany and the Soviet Union.
Yet, exploring the intersection of memory and politics requires to examine more than 
official statements and master narratives. It also must entail examining the biographical 
background of those political leaders who were in a position to formulate them, and 
assessing the impact personal experiences had on the formation of political memories. 
The major protagonists in this study are the East German communists led first by Walter 
Ulbricht and Wilhelm Pieck, and since 1971 by Ulbricht’s successor Erich Honecker, 
most of whom were long-time KPD members and veterans of the antifascist resistance:
7
Anton Ackermann, Alexander Abusch, Albert Norden, Johannes R. Becher and Rudolf 
Herrnstadt. Aside from the influential positions these men held in various branches of the 
SED-state, they were also formally or informally involved in the “Association for 
German-Soviet Friendship” (DSF), a mass organization founded in 1947 in order to 
institutionalize and intensify the efforts to imbue East Germans with a lasting sympathy 
for the Soviet people and its alleged exemplary achievements. A second group of 
protagonists in the East German story are the “Stalingraders,” former Wehrmacht soldiers 
and officers whose asserted transformative experience of “reflection and return” 
(“Einkehr und Umkehr”) in Soviet captivity served as the starting point for their 
commitment to a socialist Germany as “fighters for peace.” As military antifascists, men 
like Wilhelm Adam, Vincenz Müller, Otto Korfes and Heinrich Homann joined the 
socialist project established by the civilian veterans around Ulbricht and Pieck. The 
founding of the National Democratic Party of Germany (NDPD) as “bloc party” within 
the SED-led “national front” in 1948 was a milestone in this process of political 
integration and ideological domestication. It further culminated in the establishment of 
the (GDR’s only) veteran organization, the “Working Group of former Officers” (AeO) 
in 1958, an elitist circle of Wehrmacht veterans whose members often belonged to the 
NDPD, or the SED, and the DSF. 
On the West German side, the main protagonists are the leading politicians, the 
chancellors, foreign ministers and federal presidents from Konrad Adenauer to Helmut 
Kohl, Clemens von Brentano to Dietrich Genscher, and Theodor Heuss to Richard von 
Weizsäcker – all of whose biographies are linked to the experience and aftermath of 
World War II. The two most important challengers of the political consensus built during 
8
the Adenauer years – marginalizing the Eastern Front and neglecting the Soviet Union’s 
war sacrifices and crucial contribution to Hitler’s defeat – were the chancellors Willy 
Brandt and Helmut Schmidt. Both, in the widest sense, shared the veteran experience 
with their East German “counterparts” Honecker and Ulbricht respectively. Brandt was a 
soldier in the Norwegian resistance, Schmidt fought and witnessed the Eastern Front war 
as Wehrmacht officer. To a lesser extent Wehrmacht veterans outside the political 
establishement in Bonn, especially prominent and influential retired generals such as 
Erich von Manstein, played a key role as well. For in general, it were mostly the political 
elites and the veteran communities on either side of the Iron Curtain who publicly 
formulated and debated the political memory of the Eastern Front war and thus made a 
lasting and meaningful albeit often ambiguous contribution to the genesis of the official 
World War II memories in the political culture of divided Germany.
By paying close attention to the biographical background of these protagonists, my 
work seeks to contribute to the very recent tradition of viewing political memory as more 
than the result of ideology and political calculation, but also as the product of individual 
experience, world view and personal convictions. This seems particularly fruitful with 
regards to the East German case. As Catherine Epstein has recently shown, the 
experience of “fascism” and war during the first half of the twentieth century has had a 
decisive impact on the way communists shaped their worlds once they had attained 
9
political power. It also explains to some extent their unwavering, often unscrupulous 
dedication to the communist cause.
6
The communist memory of the war against the Soviet Union and its political-
ideological exploitation in East Germany is an excellent case in point. Even though this is 
a comparative study, my primary research focused on the little explored East German 
case. The political memory of the Eastern Front was an important aspect of the SED’s 
constant effort to place the past in the service of the present. The invocation of the 
“lessons of ‘Barbarossa’” in connection with major events and political decisions, e.g. the 
June uprising in 1953, the creation of armed forces, or the building of the wall in 1961, 
illustrates the ideology-driven instrumentalization of history. Moreover, the communists 
sought to transplant this history into the present. In a constant fear-and-threat campaign, 
particularly during the 1950s, they claimed that the “imperialist West” conspired to 
launch “another Barbarossa” – a repetition of history which this time would lead to 
nuclear war. In contrast, the SED claimed that history’s lessons were being implemented 
in the GDR with the project of German-Soviet friendship as a prinicpal raison d’etre. The 
fact, that the war between Germany and the Soviet Union was essential and politically 
much more relevant for the formation of the GDR’s self-image than the rather moralizing 
notion of an “antifascist founding myth,” has long been neglected in the historiography 
on East Germany. It is nonetheless insufficient to point out that the calculated canonical 
presence of the Eastern Front was the product of an opportunistic interpretation of history 
intended to legitimate and sustain a “proletarian dictatorship” in Germany. Aside from its 
6
 Catherine Epstein, Last Revolutionaries. German Communists and their Century (Cambridge, MA.: 
Harvard University Press, 2003).
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instrumental nature, this study argues, it was also the result of a worldview shaped by the 
personal memories of many East German communists coming from the antifascist 
resistance. This study pays attention to both crucial contexts.
Returning to a comparative perspective, it cannot be overemphasized that despite the 
division of the Eastern Front memory in postwar Germany, its basis was a shared past 
experience. For most Germans, World War II happened on the Eastern Front. The battle 
of Stalingrad was perceived not only as the turning point of the entire war, it came to 
symbolize mass death and senseless suffering. The for German society undeniably 
traumatic events following the battle of Stalingrad until the end of the war – between 
January 1943 and May 1945 over four million German soldiers or 78 percent of the total 
losses were killed on the Eastern Front – inspired diverse and contested memories of this 
horrendous past.
7
 The central themes in these memories circled (or can be expected to 
have circled) around questions of guilt, responsibility, the “own” victims and the 
“others.” The unfathomable barbarity, which characterized the war against the Soviet 
Union unlike any other battle field of World War II, was not only the source of its 
suppression and evasion but also the reason why it remains unforgotten. Moreover, there 
is no question that without the war on the Eastern Front, the „final solution“ could not 
have been carried out the way it was.
8
 At the least, Wehrmacht authorities in the occupied 
7
 On these numbers cf. Rüdiger Overmans, Deutsche Militärische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg 
(München: Oldenbourg, 2000). Detailed on the German losses on the Eastern Front, see below Chapter 2. I.
8
Cf. for example, Omer Bartov, Germany's War and the Holocaust: Disputed Histories (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2003). Christopher Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi 
Jewish Policy, September 1939 – March 1942 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004). Lucjan 
Dobroszycki and Jeffrey S. Gurock, eds., The Holocaust in the Soviet Union: Studies and Sources on the 
Destruction o f the Jews in the Nazi-Occupied Territories of the USSR, 1941-1945 (Armonk, New York; 
London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 1993). Hannes Heer, Klaus Naumann, eds., Vernichtungskrieg: 
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territories secured the rounding up of Eastern Europe’s Jews; at the worst, Wehrmacht 
soldiers participated in executions of “partisans” and mass shootings of Jews and other 
civilians. The war on the Eastern Front was first of all a “war against the Jews,” i.e. 
against “Jewish Bolshevism.
9
 The memory of the sufferings of German soldiers on the 
Eastern Front thus always conflicted – openly or subconsciously – with an uncomfortable 
truth: it was the war against the Soviet Union which enabled the Nazi regime to execute 
the systematic mass murder of millions of Jews.
Coming to terms with this uncomfortable truth was and remains a necessary, 
tremendously difficult, ultimatley perhaps even impossible undertaking. And the political 
and ideological divison of Germany after World War II further complicated this process. 
In the two German states two most different general approaches to the past dominated the 
attempts to master the past.
10
 In the East, the SED successfully built a positive historical 
narrative that underscored the German communists’ share in the Red Army’s victory over 
Nazi Germany. At the same time, it understood “fascism” as the most aggressive variant 
of capitalism/imperialism and claimed that with the building of socialism the basis for 
Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944. (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1995). Rolf- Dieter Müller and 
Gerhard R. Überschaer, Hitler's War in the East, 1941-1945. A Critical Assessment (Providence: Berghahn 
Books, 1997).
9
 Lucy Dawidowicz, The War against the Jews, 1933-1945 (New York: Bantam, 1976). For a summary of 
the vast literature dealing with the context, planning and execution of the “final solution” see Michael 
Marrus, “The History of the Holocaust: A Survey of Recent Literature,” Journal of Modern History, 59, 1 
(1987), 114-160. And by Omer Bartov, “Defining Enemies, Making Victims: Germans, Jews and the 
Holocaust,” American Historical Review, 103, 3 (1998), 771-816. 
10
 Cf. the brief and succinct recent overview by Christoph Classen, “Fremdheit gegenüber der eigenen 
Geschichte. Zum öffentlichen Umgang mit dem Nationalsozialismus in beiden deutschen Staaten,” in Jan 
C. Behrends, Thomas Lindenberger, Patrice G. Poutrous, eds., Fremde und Fremdsein in der DDR. Zu 
historischen Ursachen der Fremdenfeindlichkeit in Ostdeutschland. (Berlin: Metropol, 2003), 101-126.
12
fascism was rooted out once and for all. West German political culture and self-image 
rested on a negative identification with the past, i.e. on the delayed but sincere realization 
and acceptance of responsibility for the Holocaust. In an influential essay, Rainer M. 
Lepsius has aptly described these processes as “externalization” in the East, and 
“internalization” in the West.
11
They are each closely connected to the central elements of 
the respective founding narratives – communist antifascism in the GDR, and democratic 
antitotalitarianism in the FRG.
With these general observations in mind, it can be inferred from the already existing 
historiography that the battle of Stalingrad and the war on the Eastern Front were integral 
parts of the postwar memorial cultures in divided Germany. In the Federal Republic, the 
Eastern Front initially codified the death, injury or imprisonment of millions of 
Wehrmacht soldiers in Hitler’s war against the Soviet Union. This memory of the soldier 
as victim during the late 1940s and 1950s was mainly shaped and articulated by a 
plethora of memoirs from former generals, by the so-called Landserhefte (dime novels 
for veterans) and the many media reports about the fate of German POWS in the Soviet 
Union.
12
 Even the political mainstream subscribed wholeheartedly to the myth of a “clean 
11
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Wehrmacht” that had fought dutifully and honorably in the service of the fatherland. 
Only during the late 1960s and 1970s, historical scholarship began to focus on the Nazi 
plans for the conquest of the Soviet Union in general, and the role of the Wehrmacht in 
the execution of these plans, in particular.
13
 Furthermore, the political rapprochement with 
the Soviet Union under Willy Brandt, first as foreign minister, then as chancellor, 
contributed to a more differentiated and more critical view of “Operation Barbarossa.” 
This critical memory of the Eastern Front emerged even later than the West German 
Holocaust memory.
14
 It was not until the later 1980s, that political leaders addressed the 
true dimensions of the crimes committed during the “war of extermination” in the East. It 
has even been argued that there was a connection between the Holocaust entering West 
German memory since the late 1960s, and the lasting absence of the Eastern Front war: 
“Auschwitz was admitted by all Germans as ‘unfathomable crime’ – therefore the quicker 
and more thoroughly the war against the Soviet Union (and the guilt connected to it) was 
suppressed.”
15
Memoiren der deutschen Offiziere,“ in: Hannes Heer, Klaus Naumann, eds., Vernichtungskrieg: 
Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944  (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1995), 620-633. Moeller, War 
Stories. Oliver von Wrochem, „Stalingrad erinnern. Zur Historisierung eines Mythos,“ in Zeithistorische 
Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History, Online-Edition, vol. 1, 2 (2004), URL: 
http://www.zeithistorische-forschungen.de/16126041-Wrochem-2-2004 (this article also reviews the 
valuable exhibition catalogue Stalingrad erinnern. Stalingrad im deutschen und im russischen Gedächtnis
published by the Deutsch-Russische Museum Berlin-Karlshorst, ed. Peter Jahn (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2003)).
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 Important in German historiography Andreas Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie: Politik und Kriegsführung, 
1940-1941 (Frankfurt/Main: Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1965); Manfred Messerschmidt, 
Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat. Zeit der Indoktrination (Hamburg: Deckers Verlag, 1969). And Christian 
Streit, Keine Kameraden. Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941-1945 (Stuttgart: 
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1978). 
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 On the memory of the Holocaust in West Germany, Herf, Divided Memory, 267-362.
15
 Wolfram Wette, “Erobern, zerstören, auslöschen. Die verdrängte Last von 1941: Der Rußland Feldzug 
war ein Raub- und Vernichtungskrieg von Anfang an,” Die Zeit, November 20, 1987, 51.
14
In the GDR, the SED established a narrative which claimed that the Wehrmacht’s
invasion of the Soviet Union constituted the greatest crime committed by the “Hitler-
clique.” Having learned the “right lessons” from history, East Germany was to become 
the Soviet Union’s “eternal” friend and ally. Hitherto, historians have argued that the 
SED relied on the “antifascist founding myth” to legitimize the establishment of a 
socialist state in East Germany.
16
 My study suggests that the SED’s claim of an organic, 
historically generated German-Soviet friendship not only complemented the antifascist 
narrative but it constituted the other, equally central founding narrative of the GDR. Both 
elements, of course, derive from the same historical master narrative: the Soviet Union 
had been Hitler’s prime victim and conqueror, and the Red Army along with German 
communists had been the driving forces in the antifascist struggle. The battle of 
Stalingrad was a central event in this narrative symbolizing the beginning of the end of 
the Nazi regime. The Red Army’s victory proved once and for all the historical – that is 
the ideological, military, economic and moral – supremacy of Soviet communism. To the 
East German communists, the Eastern Front war thus represented a true “Hegelian 
moment:” with the victory of the Red Army and the subsequent rise of the Soviet Union 
as a world power, the Weltgeist had found its fulfillment at the end of World War II, just 
as the German philosopher Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel had claimed the Weltgeist 
16
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had materialized in Prussia in the nineteenth century.
17
 Stalingrad was the pivotal moment 
in this Hegelian moment, history’s culmination point, the ultimate turning point. The 
SED’s official narrative presented the National Committee Free Germany (NKFD), the 
anti-Hitler movement founded on the Eastern Front by German exile communists and 
captured Wehrmacht officers after the defeat at Stalingrad in 1943, as the origin of a 
collective, antifascist transformation movement, which every remorseful soldier and 
citizen could join after total defeat in 1945. By supporting the establishment of a socialist 
state in the Soviet occupation zone, the veterans of the Eastern Front war could make up 
for the historic crimes committed in its course.
18
 Hence, this narrative addressed the 
criminal nature of the Eastern Front war in very general terms. At the same time it
offered former Wehrmacht soldiers – and every East German willing to join the socialist 
project – collective redemption. In this “red version”
19
 of the “Wehrmacht myth,” the 
ordinary soldier was just as innocent as in the West German counterpart.
It was not until after Germany’s reunification in 1990, that the war on the Eastern 
Front and the role of the Wehrmacht in the war of extermination received late but 
surprisingly intense public attention during the debates over a photo exhibition which 
17
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presented shocking visual evidence for the participation of the Wehrmacht in Nazi war 
crimes on the Eastern Front.
20
The long-term approach enables us to view recent German history from a 
comparative yet integrative perspective, acknowledging the fact that the two Germanys 
were parts of one nation. It realizes a the very recent suggestion to no longer address 
either the East German or the West German case; it moves beyond the writing of a 
divided history of divided Germany.
21
 However, the analysis will never lose view of the 
fact that the conditions for the public discourses about the past differed fundamentally 
due to the two contrasting political systems – democracy in the West, dictatorship in the 
East. Still, a comparison enables us to identify striking similarities in the way political 
thought, discussions and actions were influenced by the elites’ use and misuse of history. 
It allows for some general observations on the “public use of history,” i.e. the way 
political leaders chose to address the intricate connections between past and present, 
history and memory, guilt and suffering. In this sense, then, this is a comparative study of 
20
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the “contingencies and choices that accompanied the emergence of the political memory” 
of the Eastern Front focusing on those junctures where “meaning and power intersect.”
22
Further, the chronological scope of this dissertation arises from one fundamental 
assumption underlying this study: although two different states emerged after the war –
along with two distinct political systems, political cultures, and societies – 1945 was no 
“zero hour.” The Nazi state collapsed but the population did not change over night. This 
historical continuity amidst radical historical change is an important aspect of postwar 
German history. My narrative thus begins with the National Socialist master narrative of 
the Eastern Front war and the battle of Stalingrad, and follows the story up until the years 
of Détente, a time during which not only German-German-Soviet relations changed 
fundamentally but also the views, interpretations and questions asked of the past. The end 
of the Cold War in 1989 and German unification in 1990 mark the end of this study even 
though I occasionally refer to the post-unification debates about the Wehrmacht’s warfare 
on the Eastern Front stirred by the controversial exhibit “War of Extermination. Crimes 
of the Wehrmacht, 1941-1944” during the 1990s.
23
II. Historiography and Approach
The following paragraphs provide a pointed discussion of the relevant scholarship, 
the historiographical debates this study seeks to address as well as some theoretical and 
22
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23
 Hannes Heer, Klaus Naumann, eds., War of Extermination: The German Military in World War II, 1941-
1944 (New York: Berghahn, 2000). The catalogue of the exhibit was published under the title 
Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 1941-1944. Ausstellungskatalog (Hamburg: Hamburger 
Edition, 1996).
18
methodological reflections. There is certainly still a need to constructively expound –
both in theoretical and methodological terms – the study of memory. Much of the 
historical work done during the two decades has not ventured to go beyond a descriptive 
analysis of memory artifacts such as texts, pictures, monuments, rituals, places, ect.
24
 My 
work is not yet another one of these studies despite the fact many of them are important 
contributions to our understanding of modern cultural and political-intellectual history. 
The body of literature dealing with history and memory is vast.
25
 It can generally be 
classified into two genres following two different approaches. On the one hand, much of 
the recent work on the issue of history and memory has been of conceptual or essayist 
nature, focusing mostly on the summary, commentary or interpretation of debates dealing 
with the past, the past in the present, and presents past.
26
 On the other hand, there is a 
growing number of works dealing with the construction of memory and its political-
24
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cultural implications based on extensive archival research. Most of the latter have been 
dedicated to the study of the Holocaust memory in Germany,
27
 to the “politics of the past” 
(Vergangenheitspolitik) and the judicial reckoning with the Nazi past.
28
The history of the 
Eastern Front memory in East Germany must be placed within the growing scholarship 
on the speficity of memory formation and political culture in the former communist 
societies, especially the Soviet Union.
29
 In addition, and transcending the boundries 
between dictatorial and democratic societies, a number of multinational studies about the 
connection between memory and power
30
 as well as comparative analyses of national 
memorial cultures in postwar Europe
31
 have contributed innovatively to memory studies. 
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The memory of war, and in particular the politics of war commemoration, receive 
growing attention among scholars concerned with the social and political implications of 
modern violence.
32
 Finally, the end of the Cold War has inspired a comparative interest in 
the various national debates pertaining historical truth, memory, democracy, and justice 
in Europe as a result of which a number of excellent national studies on memory and 
society have been published.
33
Despite the obvious centrality of the war on the Eastern Front in the history of the 
Third Reich, the process of its retrospective political, societal and historiographical 
reckoning has not yet been the subject of comprehensive historical research. Obviously, 
the recent discussions about the criminal conduct of the Wehrmacht in the war of 
extermination are relevant for this project, and much excellent and critical research has 
been done on Hitler’s army and the Eastern Front.
34
 These studies focus largely and with 
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good reason on the event itself and not on its immediate aftermath and long-term 
legacies. Still, in his seminal studies on the Eastern Front and the barbarization of 
warfare, Omer Bartov has pointed to the fact that it was this war which has shaped 
postwar (West) German memory most crucially: “the war in the East constituted not only 
the climax of the Nazi regime, but also the most important element of its postwar 
memory.”
35
Thusfar this important observation has not yielded a detailed historical 
analysis of the Eastern Front memory’s role in postwar German society. In the East 
German case, this dissertation represents the first attempt at all to trace the genesis and to 
investigate the functions of the memory of the war against the Soviet Union in the SED’s 
politics of the past. And even though there are a few scattered works
36
 which allude to the 
marginal role of the Eastern Front’s criminal legacies in the political culture of the 
Federal Republic, this study also constitutes the first systematic account of the West 
German Eastern Front memory.
35
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The battle of Stalingrad itself has been the subject of a few studies albeit with a focus 
on its myth-making potential, the postwar “metamorphoses” of this “German myth” and 
its metaphorical function as “sign of history”
37
 and lieu de mémoire.
38
 The general 
implications of the experience of World War II for political and military culture as well 
as its impact on popular mentalities in both postwar German states have found more 
attention than the actual emergence, content and instrumentalizations of the Eastern Front 
memory.
39
 The intersection of memory and politics has only recently received broader 
attention among historians interested in the relationship between ideas and actions.
40
Popular forms of remembrance, such as literature and film, have also been the subjects of 
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Methodologically, I seek to combine the history of ideas with political-cultural 
history. Stuart H. Hughes defines intellectual history as dealing with “thoughts and 
emotions of men – with reasoned argument and with passionate outburst alike.” 
Following his lead, this study is concerned with “the whole range of human expression” 
as manifested in writing, speech, practice and tradition.
42
 Yet, I suggest to open Hughes’ 
understanding of intellectual history to the political dimension for it can be much more 
than a “way of treating [the historical] material from the standpoint of the thought rather 
than of the deed.”
43
 What makes political-intellectual history so appealing, after all, is the 
synthetic understanding of human thought and action. In this particular case, the focus on 
the intersection of war, memory and politics takes the story beyond the mere descriptive 
analysis of memorial sites and rites. 
In his contribution to the conceptual foundations of political-intellectual history, 
François Furet, following in Hughes’ footsteps, distinguished between two approaches to 
history, namely a „periodized history, chronological narrative” which aims at the 
“reconstruction of human experience – an “empiricism of ‘facts’ as opposed to 
preconceived ideas.“ The second approach, of which Furet himself was a strong 
„Volkstümliche Erinnerung und deutsche Identität nach dem 2. Weltkrieg,“ in Martin Sabrow, Konrad 
Jarausch, eds., Verletztes Gedächtnis. Erinnerungskultur und Zeitgeschichte im Konflikt (Frankfurt/Main: 
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advocate, is a „problem-oriented history, the analytical examination of a single question 
over reputedly heterogeneous periods, the interpretation of human experience with the aid 
of a theory or idea,“
44
 the latter of which are often borrowed from other disciplines. It is 
such an understanding of history that inspires this study, the way I ask questions and 
formulate problems. For Furet, history as a social science can only advance if a historical 
work „builds its data explicitly on the basis of conceptually developed questions,“ if it 
“pays far closer attention to the formulation and reformulation of problems, and  [makes] 
a far clearer distinction in historical writing between documentary evidence and 
interpretation.“
45
 This set of rules, Furet acknowledges, „is not enough to define a good 
conceptual history, for it does not guarantee a choice of sound analytical tools; but it does 
lay down a minimum requirement.” And, it can be an essential methodological approach 
for it “accepts the limits of historical objectivity” and abandons “the fallacy of ‚bringing 
the past back to life,‘ or the temptation to tell a mere story.“
46
This dissertation does not represent an attempt to merely tell the story of the post-
war memory of the war on the Eastern Front in East and West Germany. Following Furet, 
it is based on a “searching formulation of a question:”
47
 it seeks to unearth and analyze the 
44
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connections between war, memory and politics in the broadest sense: I not only explore 
the genesis of the Eastern Front memories in post-war Germany. I further ask how these 
memories of a (self-inflicted) catastrophe shaped public discourses about the past and in 
which way these memories informed political thought and actions, or served as 
ideological resource in the quest for political legitimacy.
Apart from Hughes’ and Furet’s theoretical reflections on writing the history of ideas 
in general, Alon Confino and Peter Fritzsche have recently made an important conceptual 
contribution to the study of memory in particular. They propose to focus more on “how 
memory forms social relations”, and to seek understanding of “the practical uses of the 
category ‘memory’, the way it comes to structure perception, to inform thought, to 
construct identities, to determine politics, and to explain situations.”
48
 This perspective 
indeed promises to enrich the study of memory as it places memory within the larger 
socio-political context. Yet, the opposite perspective is equally relevant: inquiring which 
factors determine the formation and content of political memory, thus paying attention to 
individual historical experience, ideological beliefs, group mentalities, political needs of 
the day and political culture alike is just as important. 
In order to realize such an undertaking one needs to clarify the terms and concepts 
used. The notion of a “collective memory” has been widely discussed, yet often there is 
very little effort to conceptualize or even define what is meant by that. Even though 
Aleida Assmann, Harald Welzer, and others have made important theoretical 
contributions to the study of collective memory, I refrain from claiming to decipher the 
48
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“collective” or “social” memory of the Eastern Front in postwar Germany.
49
 Rather, I use 
the term “political memory” to signify that I am primarily concerned with the narratives 
forged and communicated publicly by the political elite.
50
 Naturally, political memory 
shapes collective memory, and vice versa. Yet, it is important to point to the limitations 
of the empirical study of collective memory. It is impossible to reconstruct what an entire 
“society” thought, remembered, narrated about the past. Moreover, in focusing on the 
political aspect, I stress the fact that “political memory” is more than about 
commemorating the past. It is political preceisely because it transports a certain historical 
knowledge into the public sphere. During the Nuremberg Interregnum, for example, most 
Germans knew about the realities and legacies of the Eastern Front war because the 
Allied war crimes trials presented a well-documented case against the Nazi and 
Wehrmacht leadership for conspiring to wage aggressive war, violating international law, 
and committing war crimes and crimes against humanity (by far not limited to the Eastern 
war). Yet, with the formal division of Germany and the beginning of the Cold War these 
facts, or certain aspects thereof, vanished from political memory and public conscience in 
both Germanys. The history of the Eastern Front memory in postwar Germany is the 
history of a political memory because its principal purpose was not to mourn the dead, to 
49
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commemorate past events for the sake of not forgetting them, but to serve certain 
political interests. Political leaders chose to selectively communicate historical 
knowledge about the Eastern Front, and thus “shaped the way society thinks about its 
past,”
51
 thereby molding its collective memory. For that reason, my study also examines 
the trends in historiography on the Eastern Front war, and wherever possible, traces the 
impact historical knowledge had on the public discourse over the past. It should become 
clear, in view of the existing World War II historiography, what could and should have 
been known and communicated by the political elites in East and West, each insisting to 
have fully addressed and overcome the Nazi past.
Since in my understanding political memory entails not only commemorating the 
past but publicly communicating historical knowledge, a few words on the term 
“propaganda” seem in place.
52
 Especially with regards to the East German narratives, I 
occasionally and conscientiously use the word propaganda. However, it is important to 
distinguish the SED’s concerted propaganda campaigns launched, for example, in context 
of important anniversaries or political decisions, from the communists’ continuous effort 
to establish and maintain a certain historical world-view among East German citizens –
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this effort as “history propaganda,”
53
 and as in other communist parties across Eastern 
Europe the concept had an expressively positive connotation for it served the 
“enlightenment” and “conscience formation” of the masses.
54
 I am cautious in using this 
term because it implies that most of the propagated information were potentially flawed. 
It also, in my view, hinders what Martin Sabrow has called “engaging in the peculiar 
communist mind-set,” the “world of meaning (Sinnwelt).”
55
 In essence, Sabrow simply 
stresses that communist historical narratives ought to be taken seriously as they 
constituted more than just “propaganda,” and that a genuine interest in the genesis and 
content of these narratives requires reconstructing them instead of dismissing them in 
hindsight of communism’s ideological and material demise. Last but not least, more than 
half a century ago, the writer George Orwell has already pointed to the “positive” 
intentions of those seeking to spread a certain world view or view of history by way of 
propaganda: in aspiring to “control your thoughts,” a totalitarian regime not only “forbids 
you to express – even to think – certain thoughts, but it dictates what you shall think, it 
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creates an ideology for you, it tries to govern your emotional life as well as setting up a 
mode of conduct.”
56
 At least in that sense, the SED regime was totalitarian because it 
aspired a monopoly over how people remembered World War II. Ulbricht and his 
followers were equally aware of memory’s potential to influence human emotions and to 
forge a sense of identity. 
The story of the Eastern Front memory in the GDR is so complex because the SED 
understood how to play with historical facts, with a selective historical reality aimed at 
inspiring a lasting compassion and political bias for the Soviet Union among East 
Germans. True, the Eastern Front was the costliest, decisive front in World War II, the 
Soviet Union incurred most losses, many German industrialists profited from Hitler’s 
“war of conquest and extermination” (Raub- und Vernichtungsfeldzug) and thus were 
accomplices in Nazi war crimes, and the German communists indeed fought a 
courageous battle against Hitler’s regime. Yet, the SED selectively put together these and 
other elements to compose a memory of the Eastern Front war which had little room for 
Jewish victims, the non-Communist resistance, the Western allies’ contribution or the 
crimes of the Red Army. Still, only rarely, this “propaganda” produced and spread 
fabrications. More commonly it operated with distortions, omissions, and exaggerations 
to make the past fit (into) the present. 
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Returning to the German-German perspective, these considerations point to the role 
of political culture – characterized not only by two differing political systems, but also by 
two divergent “historical Sinnwelten” with specific modes of appropriating the past – in 
the formation of political memory.
57
 Maurice Halbwachs has stressed that the formation 
of memory is not a “clinical” process but takes place within individual and societal 
boundaries and under the influence of respective preconceptions of reality, values, 
traditions, customs, ect. Collective memory operates within certain “social frameworks,” 
it “reconstructs its various recollections to accord with contemporary ideas and 
preoccupations.”
58
  If collective memory – and in this study the political memory in a 
already-defined narrower sense – is treated as a social phenomenon it is also possible to 
say something about its role in a society’s political culture because the two are closely 
connected and, in fact, are mutually conditional. 
The concept of political culture has its roots in American civic culture studies of the 
1940s and 1950s.
59
 Gabriel A. Almond, one of the fathers of the concept, defined political 
culture as “a particular pattern of orientations to political action.”
60
 In The Civic Culture, 
Almond and Verba proposed a “scientific theory of democracy” and suggested that by 
measuring the population’s “attitudes toward the political system,” political scientists 
57
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would be able to identify the “operating characteristics of the democratic polity itself.”
61
The strong emphasis on quantitative analysis, and the relatively limited understanding of 
political culture as a set of subjective “beliefs about political reality, feelings with respect 
to politics and commitments to political values”
62
 was soon criticized within the political 
science profession as well as in neighboring disciplines such as history, cultural studies, 
and sociology. One main accusation was that the Almond/Verba model “completely 
omitted history and politics from their construction of political culture.”
63
 The study of 
German political culture, in particular, has led to the extension and sophistication of the 
concept, adding to the empirical-descriptive understanding of political culture a 
“theoretical-normative dimension.”
64
 Scholars like Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Ralf 
Rytlewski have widened the concept by arguing that studying changes in political culture 
encompasses paying attention not only to “beliefs and attitudes, but also [to] the 
interpretations of history and politics of the groups and persons involved.”
65
 If society is 
made up of three subsystems, the social-cultural, the economic and the political system, 
then one will find that the social-cultural system reflects the “basic values of each society 
and gives meaning to its existence:” “common rituals and symbols can be observed 
61
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which give meaning to political life by referring to constitutive historical events in the 
light of some universally claimed values.”
66
 These values not only contain the basic “rules 
for the resolutions of conflicts in society (e.g., in a more consensual or more antagonistic 
way) and of decision making (for example, in an authoritarian or more democratic 
manner) in the political system,” but they also closely “interact with the basis of 
legitimacy of the political system proper.” In other words, “the ‘core’ of political culture 
can be found in the sources and the extent of legitimacy of the political system.”
67
 The 
emphasis on the role which historical experiences and their public memory play for the 
formation of cultural values, and the generation and maintenance of political legitimacy 
draws attention to the interdependence of memory and political legitimacy. These 
interrelated parameters constitute the theoretical framework for my analysis of the 
Eastern Front memory in postwar German political culture. Far from treating memory 
simplicistically as an “independent variable determining political culture and ultimately 
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Some concrete remarks regarding the practical application of these conceptual ideas 
seem in place. Based on the considerations above, I define political culture as a society’s 
dominant mode of discussing and resolving political problems, of communicating and 
(re)negotiating current values and convictions in light of collective traditions and social 
conventions, and of debating historical experiences in their full or partial perception and 
reflection. This mode of communication is, of course, determined by such fundamental 
factors as the political system, the distribution of power, knowledge and material 
resources in a society, and the degree of popular participation in matters of communal 
interest.
69
 The representation, interpretation and (mostly opportunistic) invocation of the 
past is naturally one of the main concerns of the political and intellectual elites, and for 
that reason my main interest rests on these groups. 
The intersection of memory and political legitimacy can be exemplified with one 
central motif shaping the discourses over the place of the Second World War in both 
postwar Germanys: fear. In both German states, fear became a central component of the 
respective political cultures. The SED nurtured an atmposhere of fear by constantly 
pointing to the threat of “another Barbarossa” looming in the West, and the West German 
political establishment maintained a similarly fearful atmosphere by warning of the 
continuous threat posed by expansionist “Bolshevism” in the East. The war on the 
69
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Eastern Front – in whatever form it was retold and remembered – served as the source of 
this fear and constituted an important historical reference point for political leaders on 
both sides insofar as a “usable” memory thereof promised political legitimacy and factual 
power. 
The SED regime constantly referred to the “lessons” of World War II and 
simoultaneously established a rhetoric of peace (“Never again!” – “Nie wieder!”) and a 
rhetoric militant pacifism (“Resist the beginnings!” – “Wehret den Anfängen”). Sigrid 
Meuschel has highlighted the importance of historical motifs in these key concepts of the 
SED doctrine. She has pointed out the intricate connection between efforts to secure the 
interpretative monopoly over history and the East German communists’ struggle for 
legitimacy in the early years of their rule.
70
 The SED, resuming older German anti-
modern and anti-liberal sentiments, cultivated a political culture based mainly on 
“Angst,” most of all on a fear of the main enemy, heterogeneity, of the chaos of 
modernity embodied by Western decadent civilization. The SED’s politics of history 
aimed at maintaining this atmosphere of fear, because it both nurtured and legitimized in 
70
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spirit and in practice the fundamental principles of communist rule in East Germany: 
force, struggle, discipline, and obedience to the authority of those fighting for a better 
future.
71
 I argue that for the maintenance of this public, fearful mindset it was crucial for 
the SED to invoke a homogenous,  coherent memory of the war against the Soviet Union. 
Because learning the “right lessons” from the Eastern Front war offered the pretext for an 
unrelenting twofold fear-and threat-campaign, firstly aimed against the West, which was 
accused of preparing for another “Day X,” another crusade against the Soviet Union, 
another World War, and secondly against domestic “neo-fascist” resistance against the 
socialist dictatorship. On the Cold War front, the SED denounced Adenauer’s “policy of 
strength,” i.e. the Federal Republic’s Westbindung and NATO-integration, based on this 
interpretation of the Eastern Front war. On the domestic front, the regime applied this 
reasoning most explicitly on the uprisings in June of 1953, and on the building of the wall 
in 1961. In both instances historical coincidence created a superb opportunity to connect 
the “lessons of June, 22, 1941” with the events happening in the early summer of 1953, 
and in the later summer of 1961. In both cases, the SED deployed the political memory of 
the Eastern Front war in the worst sense of the word.
As already indicated, the element of fear in German political culture was not limited 
to the Eastern part of Germany. Fear of the “other” totalitarian threat posed by the Soviet 
Union was an essential element of West German political culture during the 1950s and 
1960s, and even beyond. Yet, here the war against the Soviet Union functioned not as 




political rhetoric focused on the continuing threat posed by “Soviet Bolshevism” and 
“world communism.” Even though it seems difficult to assess the degree to which this 
rhetoric was rooted in the National Socialist propaganda about the “Russians” and the 
“Bolshevist threat to Western civilization,” and to what extent it hindered a genuine 
interest in the Eastern Front legacy, the issue of ideological continuities will nonetheless 
be the subject of critical investigation in the course of my study. 
I want to conclude my theoretical remarks by briefly considering the implications of 
studying the political memory of events which were experienced by individuals, and 
which are thus also remembered individually. Whilst I am mostly concerned with the 
public expression and political implications of the Eastern Front memory, the individual 
war memories cannot and should not be left aside all together. War veterans in particular, 
usually feel the “need to ‘bear witness’” and to make sense of their war experience.
72
 Yet, 
since individual memories are often communicated by and in groups – defined by shared 
experience, profession, social status, political views – this work contains a number of 
focused studies addressing the Eastern Front memory of certain groups – veterans, 
historians, and literary artists. It might then become possible to connect the moral-
political aspects of the Eastern Front memory in divided Germany with the societal and 
personal implications of the war’s interpretation and remembrance. To some extent, I 
thus follow a recent suggestion to juxtapose memory formed “above” with the memories 
72
 Joanna Bourke, “Introduction ‘Remembering’ War,” 480.
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from “below” in order to come closer to comprehending an entire nations’ attempts at 
mastering its “shattered past.”
73
III. Sources
The range of primary sources for this undertaking is extensive, and it must be both 
diverse and limited in terms of origin, form, scope and content. My source base includes 
the relevant published and archival records on the government level (especially of the 
Adenauer and Brandt administrations in the West; SED’s party apparatus, the Central 
Committee (ZK), and Politburo in the GDR), parliamentary records, and the speeches and 
writings of the key political players. Furthermore, I have consulted the records of a major 
mass organization in the GDR – the Association for German-Soviet Friendship (DSF). 
The DSF, founded in 1947 in the Soviet Occupation Zone “for the study of Soviet 
culture,” was the second largest mass organization in the GDR and by 1989 counted 6.3 
million nominal members (every third citizen).
74
  The primary function of the DSF was to 
reeducate East Germans and instill in them a positive image of and genuine respect for 
the Soviet Union, its peoples and culture. The way the DSF fulfilled these tasks in 
context of the Eastern Front legacy has not yet been studied in depth.
75
 In addition, I have 
73
 Jarausch and Geyer view German memory as fractured, and argue that it can be reconstructed by looking 
at the way the resulting varying memories are formed: first, they identify individual life stories focused 
normally on suffering and survival; secondly, collective or group recollections inspire sometimes 
congruent, sometimes incompatible patterns of remembrance; and finally, a nation’s “public memorial 
culture” reflects how society as a whole remembers its past. See Konrad Jarausch, Michael Geyer, 
Shattered Pasts: Reconstructing German Histories. (Princeton, Oxford, 2003), esp. chapter 11.
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 A general overview over the DSF’s history provides Jan C. Behrends, “Sowjetische ‘Freunde’ und 
fremde ‘Russen’. Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft zwischen Ideologie und Alltag (1949-1990),“ in 
Behrends, Lindenberger, Poutrous, eds., Fremde und Fremdsein in der DDR, 74-98.
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 In West Germany no such organization, which could serve as counterpart existed. In the course of my 
research I have discovered, however, that DSF had a West German branch, founded in 1950. The leaders of 
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consulted the records and publications of the little known “Working Group of former 
Officers” (Arbeitsgemeinschaft ehemaliger Offiziere, AeO) – a SED-sanctioned 
organization of former high-ranking Wehrmacht officers and Eastern Front  veterans who 
became important messengers of the official Eastern Front memory in the GDR. In order 
to reconstruct West German veteran memories of the Eastern Front, I have systematically 
read and analyized two of their main publications, Soldat im Volk and Wehrkunde.
Aside from the SED’s party archive, my study also refers to the archival records of 
the National Democratic Party of Germany (NDPD) which – contained within the SED-
led “National Front” – served as a “collecting basin”
76
 for former Nazi party members 
and Wehrmacht veterans in the GDR. For the analysis of what I call the “Rites of June” 
and the “Rites of November,”
77
 i.e. the ritualized commemoration of the beginning of 
“Operation Barbarossa” in East and West Germany, I have examined speeches, 
ceremonies, and press reports surrounding important anniversaries. 
Last but not least, I have also attempted to pay attention to the way the political 
memory of the Eastern Front changed “public opinion” over the years with regards to the 
war against the Soviet Union as well as the image of “Russians” in both post-war 
Germanys. The study of “public opinion” and images of the enemy (Feindbilder) is a 
the DSF-West were arrested in 1953 and charged with “preparation of high treason” before the FRG’s 
highest court at that time, the Bundesgerichtshof. See BA/SAPMO DY 32/10054, materials of the 5
th
congress of the DSF, 8-10 December 1955, p. 58.
76
Dietrich Staritz, „National-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands (NDPD),“ in Martin Broszat, Hermann 
Weber, eds., SBZ-Handbuch. Staatliche Verwaltungen, Parteien, gesellschaftliche Organisationen und ihre 
Führungskräfte in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands 1945-1949 (München: Oldenbourg, 
1993), 574-583, quote on 574.
77
In the GDR, the Eastern Front war was mainly commemorated on June 22. In the FRG, politicians 
referred to the war, if at all, during the ceremonies held to commemorate the nation’s dead – every 
November on the Volkstrauertag („National Day of Mourning“).
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contested field, and a critical reading of the sources (i.e. the opinion polls available for 
both Germanys) is required.
78
 Especially in the East German case, the thus far largely 
ignored comprehensive polls taken by the SED ZK’s Institute for Opinion Research 
between 1964 and 1978, and by the more “independent” Institute for Youth Research 
between 1966 and 1990, must be treated with caution. Nonetheless, the results of these 
scientifically standardized polls provide us with a refreshing and unique view into the 
minds of ordinary East Germans. Contrasting them with the West German Allensbach 
polls reveals that even the latter was far from “objective” public opinion research. The 
kinds of questions asked – none, in the West, ever addressing the Eastern Front war –
speak to the predominance of the Cold War paradigm. 
Apart from these primary sources, this study is based on an extensive reading of both 
German and English scholarly literature. Without frequent reference to the valuable 
78
 For the GDR, I have also searched the records of the Ministry of State Security (MfS) expecting to find 
extensive material on the MfS’s activities in connection with the surveillance and documentation of 
attitudes and opinions about the Soviet Union particularly close to important anniversaries and ceremonies 
remembering World War II. Yet, to my surprise, this search has not yielded much relevant material aside 
from a few documents on occasional “attacks” on Soviet cemeteries, or anti-Soviet slogans, and loads of 
papers detailing the organization and execution of “protection measures” securing mass demonstrations and 
parades on historical anniversaries such as May 8. The most noteworthy incident I found was a bomb attack 
on the Central House of German-Soviet Friendship in Berlin, “Unter den Linden” in 1962. No one was 
hurt. The MfS suspected the perpetrators in West-Berlin, but apparently never got hold of them. Cf. the 
report “Ermittlungen und Ergebnisse zur Detonation einer Zeitbombe in den Ausstellungsräumen des 
Zentralen Hauses der GSDF unter den Linden,” BSTU, ZKG, 7612.
That MfS records nevertheless can offer valuable insight into “public opinion” among East Germans, I have 
demonstrated in my masters thesis, i.e. with regards to East German reactions to the release and return of 
German POWs – “war convicts” as the SED called them after 1949 – from the Soviet Union in the 1950s. 
Cf., Christina Mayer, “Friends or Enemies: The Return of German Prisoners of War from the Soviet Union 
and their Reintegration into a Socialist Society in East Germany, 1945-1955.” (MA thesis manuscript, Ohio 
University, Athens, OH, 2002).
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research already done on various aspects of my subject it would have been impossible to 
cover the period from 1943 to 1989 from a comparative perspective. 
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Chapter 2 
Towards Total Defeat: Nazi Propaganda and the Other Narratives of 
the Eastern Front War, 1941-1945
„…And what got the soldier’s wife
from the wide Russian lands?
From the wide Russian lands she got the widow’s veil,
to the funeral the widow’s veil,
that’s what she got from the Russian lands.”
From Bertholt Brecht’s Und was bekam des Soldaten Weib? (1942)
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I. The Battle of Stalingrad and the War on the Eastern Front                                           
in Nazi Propaganda, 1941-1945
The legacy of the propaganda war that accompanied the National Socialist crusade 
against Europe between 1939 and 1945 was, despite its effectiveness and omnipresence, 
ambivalent. The relentless efforts of Joseph Goebbels’ Propaganda Ministry to create a 
sworn-together “national community” (Volksgemeinschaft) sharing not only common 
racial ancestry but also the same moral and political worldview, nonetheless left the 
German people atomized and isolated at the end of the Third Reich in 1945. As the alert 
contemporary philosopher Karl Jaspers (1883-1969) observed at the time: what Germans 
had in common was “non-community.” For after the collapse of the Nazi regime they 
“may have only negative basic features in common: membership in a nation utterly 
beaten and at the victor’s mercy; lack of common ground linking us all; dispersal – each 
one is essentially on his own, and yet each one is individually helpless.” Jaspers summed 
up these observations by pointing to the paradoxical legacy of the twelve-year long Nazi 
propaganda war. Despite the drive towards ideological uniformity, public opinion in 
Germany was quite scattered: “In the silence beneath the leveling public propaganda talk 
of the twelve years, we [Germans] struck very different inner attitudes.”
1
 Beneath the 
uniformity of the Nazi propaganda war, and as a result of the widely differing individual 
experiences, a plurality of opinions, attitudes and world views prevailed. 
What Jaspers described in his famous 1946 lecture, The Question of German Guilt,
contains the main issues to be tackled with in this chapter. It will examine the various 
1
 Karl Jaspers, The Question of German Guilt (New York: Dial Press, 1947), 18.
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narratives of the battle of Stalingrad and the war on the Eastern Front in and outside 
Germany by focusing on the official Nazi propaganda effort, the counter-narratives from 
both within Germany and abroad, and the reception of these competing narratives among 
the German population. In contrast to the Holocaust memory, the memory of Stalingrad 
refers to a historical event that symbolized both, Nazi Germany’s aggressiveness and 
failure. It thus encapsulated the main elements of the Eastern Front perception among 
Germans during the war. It was the most audacious but also the costliest front of World 
War II. Even though the Nazi leadership kept the staggering numbers of fallen soldiers on 
the Eastern Front secret, the population naturally felt the impact of these horrendous 
losses. 
It should be recalled that over half of the 5.3 million German soldiers killed in World 
War II died on the Eastern Front (2.7 million or 51 percent, compared to 6.4 percent on 
the Western Front). In his important study on German military losses, Rüdiger Overmans 
distinguished between the fighting on the Eastern Front, lasting from September 1, 1939 
until December 31, 1944, and the so-called final battles (Endkämpfe) in the East and 
West lasting from January 1, 1945 until May 9, 1945. He thus added to the Eastern Front 
casualties about 800,000 soldiers who died during the Endkämpfe in the East.
2
  Thus, 
overall 3.5 million soldiers or 66 percent of all German military casualties died during the 
fighting on the Eastern Front. If one further adds to this number those German POWs 
who died in Soviet captivity, about four million German soldiers perished on the Eastern 
2
 Overall, he estimates that 1,230 000 million soldiers died during the Endkämpfe (January 1, 1945 to May 
9, 1945), two thirds (about 811,000) of which on the Eastern Front alone. See Overmans, Deutsche 
Militärische Verluste, 265.
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Front. Hence, 75 percent of all losses including killed POWs occurred on the Eastern 
Front, compared to 20 percent in the West, and another 10 percent on other fronts.
3
 Most 
of these losses occurred after the attack against the Soviet Union in 1941: between 
September 1, 1939 and June 22, 1941, “only” 130,000 German soldiers perished; 
however, during the last ten months of the war alone, as many soldiers died as during the 
previous four years together – 300,000 to 400,000 men per month. Limited to the Eastern 
Front this meant that between June 22, 1941 and July 1944, about 2,000 soldiers died 
each day; during the Endkämpfe between January and May 1945 the numbers increased 
to an average of 5000 men dying every day in the fights against the advancing Red 
Army.
4
These losses had a tremendous impact on German society. Germans perceived and 
later remembered the Eastern Front as the costliest battle field of the entire war.
5
 Yet, in 
order to trace the origins of its memory, it is necessary to reach back to the very 
beginning of what the National Socialists called “Operation Barbarossa.” Although a 
number of scholars have studied the propaganda campaign accompanying the war on the 
Eastern Front as well as its impact on the German army and home front, this chapter 
builds upon the most important published primary sources and suggests new 
interpretations. Two main arguments have long been made with regards to the German 
3
Ibid., with „other fronts“ Overmans refers mainly to the losses incurred during the fighting on the German 
home land, and to navy losses for which it is difficult to determine a corresponding land front. 
4
In fact, more than half of all military losses occurred after the failed assassination of Hitler in July 1944:  
300,000 to 400,000 soldiers died per month. The single most costly battle was not Stalingrad with 60,000 
killed in action, and 110,000 soldiers dying in captivity, but the battles during the summer months of 1944 
in the Southern Ukraine. In August 1944, 277,465 soldiers died on that front, the highest monthly casualty 
rate on the Eastern Front before the Endkämpfe.
5
Bartov, Hitler’s Army, 182ff.
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population’s attitude towards the war against the Soviet Union and the striking impact the 
battle of Stalingrad has had on the relationship between the Fuhrer and his people. First, 
this chapter takes issue with the view that following the Blitzkrieg successes of the years 
1939 and 1940, Germans were far from enthusiastic about “Operation Barbarossa” 
launched on June 22, 1941 – an operation the population was neither practically nor 
propagandistically prepared for by the regime.
6
 Consequently, many reacted with 
surprise, even shock, and worried about the prospects of winning this war.
7
 Yet, even 
though the Nazi leadership had not “prepared” the German population for the war against 
the Soviet Union as an immanent military undertaking, there was, as the sources will 
show, a wide acceptance and sense of rightfulness for this war which should be explained 
in light of the Nazis’ most effective ideological campaign against the “Jewish-Bolshevist 
world conspiracy” since the early 1920s.
8
The second argument pertains to the defeat of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad, namely 
to its perceived symbolic power as the epiphany of the heroic and costly fight on the 
Eastern Front. It holds that once the battle of Stalingrad was over, Germans lost faith both 
6
 Wolfram Wette, „Die propagandistische Begleitmusik zum deutschen Überfall auf die Sowjetunion am 
22. Juni 1941“ in Gerd R. Ueberschär and Wolfram Wette, eds., Der deutsche Überfall auf die 
Sowjetunion: „Unternehmen Barbarossa“ 1941 (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 1999), 45-52.
7
 Ibid, 45. Hans Mommsen, „Der Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion und die deutsche Gesellschaft,“ in Bianka 
Pietrow-Ennker, ed., Präventivkrieg? Der deutsche Angriff auf die Sowjetunion (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 
2000), 56-73. Norbert Frei, „Der totale Krieg und die Deutschen“, in Norbert Frei, Hermann Kling, eds., 
Der nationalsozialistische Krieg (Frankfurt/Main, New York: Campus Verlag, 1990), 283-285.
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in their Fuhrer and in the possibility of winning this war.
9
 Stalingrad has since been 
perceived as the turning point of the war. War-weariness, “defeatism” and the every-day 
perils of the air-war in Germany’s bomb-stricken cities were, so the argument goes, the 
main sentiments on the home front after the defeat on the Volga. Indeed, Security Service 
(SD) intelligence from the Reich during that time (January until March 1943) was full of 
such reports. However, what can also be inferred from the same reports was a continuing 
belief among many Germans that another summer-offensive of the Wehrmacht and a 
mobilization of all – supposedly hitherto unused – resources would bring final victory on 
the Eastern Front. The fear of a Soviet invasion and the deep-seated faith in the 
historically lawful inevitability of Bolshevism’s ultimate defeat kept the home front on 
Hitler’s side.
10
The resolution of both these arguments has major implications for the analysis of the 
Eastern Front war in German memory after 1945. By stressing the continuities between 
the war and postwar era in German political culture, this chapter serves as the departure 
point from which the memory of the war on the Eastern Front will be traced through the 
occupation years and the division of Germany. Even if we accept Jaspers’ dictum of a 
scattered nation that had nothing in common but its “non-community,” the experience of 
war was the unifying factor for German post-war society. Since June 1941 the Eastern 
9
 Jay W. Baird, „The myth of Stalingrad“, Contemporary History, vol. 4, no. 3 (1969), 187-204. Marlis 
Steinert, „Stalingrad und die deutsche Gesellschaft“ in Jürgen Förster, ed., Stalingrad. Ereignis, Wirkung, 
Symbol (München: Piper, 1992), 171-185. Bernhard R. Kroener, „’Nun Volk, steh auf…!’ Stalingrad und 
der ‚totale’ Krieg 1942-1943“, in ibid, 151-170. Wolfram Wette, „Das Massensterben als ‚Heldenepos.’ 
Stalingrad in der NS-Propaganda,“ in Wette, Ueberschär, eds., Stalingrad, 43-60. Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 
1936-1945: Nemesis (New York: Norton, 2000), 543-557.
10
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Front was the main theatre of the entire war in German hearts and minds – a centrality, 
though quite obvious, that has been much neglected in the historiography on the World 
War II memory in Germany. German memory of World War II was primarily shaped by 
popular perceptions, beliefs and opinions about what had happened on the Eastern Front, 
why it had happened and to what effect. It is thus crucial to closely examine the various 
narratives that were propagated on the German home and military fronts from within the 
National Socialist propaganda apparatus as well as from external sources such as enemy 
radio stations that could be overheard inside Germany (BBC), or leaflets printed on the 
Eastern Front by exiled German communists and the Red Army. Rather than claiming to 
fully reconstruct the general contemporary perception of the war in the East, I recall and 
detail a variety of counter-narratives which had the potential to shape those collective 
perceptions. Yet, even if these “other narratives” are treated here almost at equal length, 
there is no question that they represented no real alternative to the much more effective 
daily propaganda produced by the Nazi regime under the conditions of a monopolized 
press and media.
“BARBAROSSA” - DEFENDING GERMANY, SAVING EUROPE
On Sunday, June 22, 1941, at 3 o’clock in the morning, Germany launched what 
Adolf Hitler called the “greatest struggle of world history.” About 3.6 million German 
and axis soldiers, around 3.600 tanks, and over 2.700 air planes opened the war against 
the Soviet Union on the Eastern Front.
11
 After a two-year period of complete official 
11
 Gerd R. Ueberschär, „Das Scheitern des Unternehmen ‚Barbarossa’“, in Ueberschär, Wette, eds., 
„Unternehmen Barbarossa,“145, fn. 18. Hitler referred to the war on the Eastern Front as „the greatest 
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silence with regards to German-Soviet relations following the Nazi-Soviet-Pact of 1939, 
the NS propaganda apparatus immediately began justifying the attack against the hitherto 
allied Soviet Union.
12
 Hitler’s proclamation to the German people and the soldiers on the 
Eastern Front on the morning of the attack encapsulates the National Socialist master 
narrative of “Operation Barbarossa.” Four main motifs ran through this propaganda 
campaign: Germany was the savior of Europe and Western civilization from the 
destructive powers of the Jewish-Bolshevist clique in Moscow; the war against the Soviet 
Union was a struggle for life or death; in its magnitude this historic military conflict was 
unprecedented; and this war was forced upon the German nation now fighting for its very 
existence. Each of these claims was to remain an influential part of the postwar views of 
the war on the Eastern Front. In fact, the postwar “divided memory”
13
 of this war in East 
and West Germany cannot be understood properly without considering the Nazis’ efforts 
to stylize the invasion of June 1941 as the most important military campaign in German 
history. It is thus worthwhile quoting Hitler’s proclamation on the outset of this 
campaign:
Soldiers on the Eastern Front! Burdened with grave worries, obliged to months-long silence, the 
hour has now come, at which I can speak candidly to you, my soldiers. ... Never has the German 
people harboured any hostile feelings against the peoples of Russia. Only since the last two decades 
has the Jewish-Bolshevist leadership in Moscow attempted to not only set Germany on fire but all of 
Europe. It was not Germany that brought its national socialist world view to Russia but the Jewish-
Bolshevist leadership in Moscow which has tried incessantly to impose their regime on our and the 
other European peoples, and this not only in spirit but in terms of power. ... Now the time has come 
where any further looking on would not only be a sinful lapse but a crime against the German 
struggle of world history” in his speech of 3 October 1941 in Berlin’s sport palace – remarkably his first 
speech since May 1941 – characterizing the “preventive war” now under way in order to crush world 
Jewry. See Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 1936-1945: Nemesis, 431f.
12
 On the pre-1941 ambivalence Nazi-Propaganda about Bolshevism, see Gerd Koenen, Der Russland-
Komplex. Die Deutschen und der Osten (1900-1945) (München: C.H. Beck, 2005), esp. 411-435.
13
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people, yes against all of Europe. ... At this moment, soldiers on the Eastern Front, an invasion is 
under way which in its extent and scope is the greatest the world has ever seen. ... 
German soldiers! With this you enter a tough fight burdened with responsibility. Because: The fate 
of Europe, the future of the German Reich, the existence of our people, now lay in your hand alone. 
May God help us all in this struggle!
14
As the Hitler biographer Ian Kershaw has shown, not only Wehrmacht troops could 
be motivated by such reasoning at the dawn of the Soviet Union’s invasion. Active Nazis, 
most among the non-Nazi elite, and a majority of the population supported this “most 
destructive and barbaric war in history” after the initial shock among ordinary people was 
overcome.
15
The central argument with which the regime justified the invasion of the Soviet 
Union was that of a preventive war.
16
 While it has been argued that Hitler and his 
propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels (1897-1945) actually believed in the necessity to 
fight a preventive war against the USSR before it would overrun and destroy Western 
Europe,
17
 official announcements following June 22, 1941 indicate that the Nazi 
leadership was aware of the fact, that the general population needed to be convinced of 
the argument of a preventive war. On June 23, one day after the invasion had started, 
Goebbels instructed the Reich’s journalists in a secret meeting to “intensively deal with 
the criminal Bolshevist double game which has provoked the overwhelming mobilization 
14
 “Hitler’s speech to the ‘Soldiers on the Eastern Front’”, June 22, 1941, quoted in Ibid. „Unternehmen 
Barbarossa“, 319-323 [emphasis in original]. This speech was distributed via 800,000 leaflets among 
German soldiers, and was identical with the official proclamation by the Fuhrer to the German people read 
by propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels and broadcast on national radio on Sunday, June 22, 1941, 5:30 
am. See Wolfram Wette, „Die propagandistische Begleitmusik,“ 50f.
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Ueberschär and Lev A. Bezymenski, eds., Der deutsche Überfall auf die Sowjetunion. Die Kontroverse um 
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of the German million-men army from the North Cape to the Black Sea.” To Goebbels 
this was of immense importance since, as a consequence of the invasion’s secrecy, “the 
inner preparation of the German people for this turnaround [Wende]” could not have 
started earlier.
18
 The master narrative of the war on the Eastern Front thus was basically a 
construction of untruths. 
Its second central feature was a sense of (racial) superiority which compelled most in 
the Nazi elite to believe in, and many in the German population to hope for, a quick and 
complete victory over the Red Army. Falsification and arrogance were the two main 
sentiments sustaining the Wehrmacht attack against the Soviet Union in the name of the 
German people – both elements were not new to Nazi policies, but their propagandistic 
exhilaration in 1941 set the stage for the all-or-nothing struggle in the East: Germany 
would either win or perish.
Thus, the severity of the military setbacks on the Eastern Front over the course of the 
following four years was aggrandized by the initial optimism, arrogance, and sense of 
righteousness within many parts of the German elite, the military, and among ordinary 
people. Playing on a German saying brings this insight to the point: “the higher you rise, 
the further you fall (Hochmut kommt vor dem Fall).” Despite the fact that in June 1941 
Germans were unenthusiastic about a new front in the East, there existed a firm if 
skeptical optimism that this war was justified, necessary, and ultimately winnable for 
Germany. This view was held not only by the Nazi elites, but also by the military and 
18
 Wette, „Die propagandistische Begleitmusik,“ 53. 
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German populace as a whole. From the first day of “Operation Barbarossa,” the Eastern 
Front became the decisive and most-watched front of the entire war within Germany.
19
The extent to which the German nation believed in this invasion thus determined the 
extent of disappointment, disillusionment and despair once “final victory” seemed out of 
reach, especially after the disaster of Stalingrad in the winter of 1942/43. During the 
initial weeks, several Nazi leaders claimed internally as well as publicly that the defeat of 
the Soviet Union would happen in a matter of weeks, or months at most. To make sure 
that this optimism was conveyed properly to the public, Goebbels also told reporters 
during the secret June 22 meeting, that the war on the Eastern Front would be over within 
eight weeks.
20
 Already a week after the attack, on June 29, 1941, Goebbels launched a 
“day of special announcements” on national radio. Twelve messages were read 
throughout that Sunday, reporting rapid progress and implying that victory was around 
the corner. Each special announcement was introduced by the “Russian Fanfare” based 
on Franz Liszt’s “Hungarian Rhapsody.”
21
 Hitler himself told Goebbels during a meeting 
at Fuhrer Headquarters (FHQ) on July 8, 1941 that “the war in the East was in the main 
already won.”
22
 Less than a week earlier, Army Chief of Staff Franz Halder, noted in his 
diary with the same certainty: “It is ... probably no overstatement to say that the Russian 
campaign has been won in the space of two weeks.” Only “the sheer geographical 
19
Reading through the Meldungen aus dem Reich of the SS’ Sicherheitsdienst from June 1941 on, it can be 
discerned that what most Germans cared about in those war years were their loved ones fighting or missing 
on the Eastern Front, the allied bombings of German cities and towns, the resulting daily deprivations, and 
many were reported to have expressed a numbed longing for peace. See Heinz Boberach, ed., Meldungen 
aus dem Reich. Auswahl aus den geheimen Lageberichten des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS, 1939-1944
(Neuwied, Berlin: Luchterhand, 1965), 155-525.
20






vastness of the country and the stubbornness of the resistance ... will claim our efforts for 
many more weeks to come.”
23
When reviewing what the National Socialist movement had promised and 
proclaimed since the mid-1920s, it becomes clear that German public was not 
unreasonable to believe that the victory over the Soviet forces would be an easy 
undertaking. The Nazi program was one of openly propagated aggression and candid 
threats against its neighbors to the East in particular. The so-called “theory of living 
space” was based on the invasion and exploitation of these territories, which in Nazi 
jargon were to be “returned into the Reich” (Heim ins Reich!). Moreover, those 
supposedly threatening Germany’s very existence, the “Jewish-Bolshevist plutocrats” and 
“conspirators,” had to be annihilated if the German people was to survive and flourish 
again. The criminal intent of any action against Poland and the Soviet Union was thus 
obvious for everyone to see and hear during the years of the Nazis’ rise to power and 
after.
24
 Resulting from these years of effective Nazi propaganda was a widespread “basic 
feeling of a sinister menace” threatening Germany.
25
 This sense of being threatened, in the 
beginning, prevented most Germans from protesting Hitler’s politics of open aggression, 




See for example the classic Martin Broszat, Hitler and the Collapse of Weimar Germany (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1987). And Eberhard Jäckel, Hitler’s worldview. Most recently Wehler, Deutsche 
Gesellschaftsgeschichte, vol. 4. And Rafael Seligmann, Die Deutschen und ihr Führer (München: Ullstein, 
2004). One of the first to argue for the interrelatedness of Hitler’s military and racial goals was Lucy 
Dawidowicz, The War against the Jews. Two excellent case studies illustrate the dissemination of Nazi 
ideas in the Reich: Geoffrey Pridham, Hitler’s Rise to Power: The Nazi Movement in Bavaria, 1923-1933 
(London: Mac Gibbon, 1973). William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a 
Single German Town, 1930-1935 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965). 
25
 Pätzold, “Antibolschewismus und Antikommunismus,” 135. (In Pätzold’s words a “Grundgefühl einer 
unheimlichen Bedrohung”).
53
defeat and destruction of the German Reich.
26
 In the summer of 1941, to many 
“Volksgenossen” the time had come to “do away with Russia in one stroke,” as the SD 
reported on June 23, 1941: people were “proud that Hitler has discovered the real 
intentions of Russia and England.” “If Germany lets the weapons speak now, then this 
was a necessary conclusion in order to destroy the plans and machinations of the real 
enemies. Now the great war-machine ... stands ready, later it might have turned out more 
difficult to annihilate a stronger-growing enemy for good.”
27
 Even if the SD reports to 
some extent also carried the official party line, the essence of these reports spoke to a 
prevailing popular sense of a righteous war in the East.
The first “winter-crisis” of 1941/42 which found the Wehrmacht stuck in the harsh 
Russian winter before Moscow, soon dampened this optimism of the Nazi leadership and 
confirmed the nonetheless skeptical, war-weary mood on the home front; it offered a 
glimpse of what was to come. With the push towards the Caucasian oilfields and the city 
with the emblematic name Stalingrad, the Wehrmacht’s renewed offensive in the summer 
of 1942 prepared the stage for an unprecedented propaganda campaign first exhilarating, 
and then bemoaning the heroic fight and sacrifice of hundreds of thousand German 
soldiers at Stalingrad.
26
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THE SAGA OF STALINGRAD
Unlike prior to “Operation Barbarossa” in 1941, the Nazi regime prepared Germany 
propagandistically for the summer-offensive “Operation Blue” launched on June 28, 
1942. One of the most important consequences of the preceding “winter crisis” was that 
Hitler fired his commander-in-chief, General Field Marshall Walther von Brauchitsch, 
and took over army command on December 19, 1941. Now, after the alleged failure of 
the army command, Hitler himself claimed to lead Germany towards final victory in the 
East. On March 15, 1942, Hitler had returned to Berlin from Fuhrer Headquarters (FHQ) 
to attend the Heroes’ Memorial Day ceremony. During his speech in which he once again 
blamed the “Jewish-capitalist world conspirators” for the war, the Fuhrer declared the 
approaching end of Bolshevist Russia: “The Bolshevik hordes, which were unable to 
defeat the German soldiers and their allies this winter, will be beaten by us into 
annihilation this coming summer.”
28
 Again, this proclamation flatly denied that the 
German troops were the aggressors; rather, Hitler implied that the Wehrmacht had been 
attacked by “Bolshevik hordes,” remaining nonetheless invincible. The legend of the 
Wehrmacht defending itself on Soviet territory was put in place much earlier than its epic 
climax at Stalingrad occurred. The seeds for the saga of Stalingrad were sown well before 
the drive towards the Caucasus began. Simultaneously, with that speech and in other 
public announcements expectations were raised so high, that ordinary Germans once 
again became convinced that, this time, the offensive would bring an end to the campaign 
on the Eastern Front and with that final victory was in reach. Not surprisingly, once the 
28
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offensive was under way people hoped for larger military triumphs: “The events on the 
Eastern Front are followed with much interest and at many places in hopeful expectation 
of reports about imminent greater successes.”
29
The regime, however, was wise enough to not only prepare its people for immanent 
victories thereby raising the public mood in the Reich, but to also challenge the 
Volksgemeinschaft’s perseverance and resolve in the war effort. Now, there was no talk 
of a fast-won offensive; rather, Nazi leaders appealed to Germany’s strength, resolution 
and hidden potentials in case another winter would have to be fought through. During a 
speech to the Reichstag on April 26, 1942 (a Sunday) – the last time it was called into 
session in the Third Reich – Hitler recalled the “triumph of the will” shown during the 
first war winter on the Eastern Front, indicating that people and army must be prepared to 
fight through another winter in the East.
30
 Hitler again made clear that, ultimately, “we 
Germans only have to win everything in this struggle for being or not being [Ringen um
Sein oder Nichtsein], because losing this war would be our end anyway.”
31
By mid-1942, over one million soldiers were either dead, missing or injured on the 
Eastern Front – almost one third of the troops that had entered the Soviet Union just a 
year earlier; only about 50 percent could be replaced with substitute troops. When 
“Operation Blue” started in late June 1942, the Wehrmacht was already weakened 
29
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significantly, and reports of high casualties started to reach and affect the home front. In 
addition, the air-war over German cities caused death and devastation; on May 30, 1942, 
Cologne had been bombed to ruins by Allied air-planes. It is before this background that 
the Caucasian offensive must be viewed. Stalingrad itself, an industrial city of one 
million inhabitants over 1,300 miles east of Berlin, did not make it into national news and 
radio broadcasts until August 1942. But once it became clear that Soviet and German 
forces would concentrate around that city, the symbolism of its name already bestowed 
this coming battle with a spell of destiny being decided there. Yet, having learned the 
lessons of the previous winter, Hitler and Goebbels gave explicit instructions to the 
propaganda apparatus and newspaper organizations to exercise restraint in the reporting 
about the battle for Stalingrad. This time, “no propaganda of illusion” was the order of 
the day.
32
 Rather, reports “were to emphasize the bitterness of the fighting and the bravery 
of the German soldier. Stalingrad was to be referred to as a fortress which had to be 
stormed.”
33
 Eventually, this “fortress” was heroically “defended” by German troops 
against the fiercely-fighting Russians who “are a type of swamp human and not 
European,” as Hitler raged during his Sports Palace speech on September 30, 1942 trying 
to explain why the Wehrmacht’s offensive has halted. Consequently, it was “more 
difficult for us,” he continued, “to advance in this muck than it is for those people born in 
the morass.”
34
 Ultimately, the German war propaganda blamed the Soviet forces of being 
inhuman, even mad, in their fierce resistance. It claimed that the “Bolsheviks refused to 
32
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realize when a struggle was useless, and continued to fight to the last man.”
35
 The Nazis 
turned their own ruthless, fanatical fighting spirit on the Red Army, thereby transferring 
and aggrandizing the sense of a real “barbarization of warfare”
36
 which characterized the 
war on the Eastern Front like no other battle of the war. In this logic, “Stalingrad 
represented the quintessence of the Soviet contempt for the human race.”
37
 Newspaper 
accounts in Germany indeed depicted the ferocious battle in the city as the most brutal 
test of the German soldier’s courage. On October 1, 1942, the popular Berliner 
Illustrierte Zeitung ran a large front-page photograph showing two Wehrmacht soldiers 
caught in street-to-street fight amidst the ruins of Stalingrad. The caption rhapsodized as 
follows:
In a struggle of unprecedented harshness, German infantry fights its way deeper and deeper into the 
heart of the city of Stalingrad. They move from crater to crater, take street by street. The enemy 
defends himself doggedly, numerous buildings are converted into bunkers, and shots churn from the 
ruins, from the factory roofs and water towers; smoke and fume darken the skies. A gigantic 
struggle.
38
The Völkische Beobachter continuously portrayed the fights in and around Stalingrad as 
“heroic battle of our soldiers” against an enemy who is “fighting until his self-
annihilation.”
39
 In November, a sequel report informed readers of the Völkische 
Beobachter about the daily hardship of the “pioneers before Stalingrad.” The opening 
article addressed the readers directly in order to create a virtual community of suffering 
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Do you at home know what sleep is? Do you know the sleep which counts by minutes? Can you 
imagine that for weeks, for months now, we are sleeping with open eyes, because we don’t have 
time to close our eyes?
40
The instructions to emphasize and dramatize the fierceness of the fights, to portray 
German soldiers as the “defenders of Stalingrad” while Goebbels simoultaneously gave 
orders to avoid purveying the impression of an impending victory, were well-calculated. 
The astute observer Victor Klemperer (1881-1960), a Jewish-born scholar of comparative 
literature who lived in the Judenhaus in Dresden since 1942, commented on this 
propaganda strategy in his diary with the following words: “Regarding the reports from 
the OKW, I ‘coined’ the word: In Stalingrad we took another two-bedroom-apartment 
with bathroom in tough hand-to-hand combat.”
41
 Moreover, just as the Wehrmacht was 
struggling to take Stalingrad, the home front was to remain steadfast in light of 
intensified Allied air-raids over German cities: the fact that the war came closer to the 
German home front made Hitler believe that the bombings would help “wake up the 
population to the realities of war.” Such was his cynical private reaction to the nightly 
raids destroying parts of Munich, Bremen, Düsseldorf and Duisburg in the late summer 
of 1942.
42
Publicly, however, the propaganda campaign changed dramatically by the beginning 
of December which in turn contributed greatly to the growing sense of uncertainty and 
anxiety in the Reich. From the tremolo of the heroic fight for Stalingrad news reports 
abruptly shifted focus to the African theatre, where the Allies had landed on November 9, 
40
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1942. After taking up the front pages for months, leaving the reader in anticipation of an 
immanent showdown between the two armies, the news from the Eastern Front were 
relegated to a few lines on the last pages by early December.
43
 This sudden official silence 
over an obviously dramatic and costly battle, whose end and outcome was still uncertain, 
was a crucial ingredient of the Stalingrad saga. The regime left the public with a clear 
sense that a catastrophe was about to happen – there was word of a “second Verdun” –
and more and more people demanded information about the fate of the 300,000 men 
fighting in the Sixth Army.
44
On Christmas Eve 1942 people were glued to the radio. In a faked link-up with the 
“front on the Volga” Germans were called on to join the soldiers in singing “Silent 
Night,” unaware that on that day alone 1,280 German soldiers had died. With the 
preceding shift well before Christmas Eve to silence and negligence about the events on 
the Eastern Front, another aspect entered the NS propaganda campaign: concealment of 
the facts, and outward lies about the state of the fights at Stalingrad. No one knew how 
many soldiers were actually fighting in the city. The fact that the Sixth Army was 
completely encircled by the Soviet troops since November 22, 1942 was hidden from the 
public for weeks. Only in January 1943, when rumors spread of growing casualties, 
starving and freezing men running out of supplies, another major shift was undertaken 
heralding the ultimate master narrative, or better: saga, which the National Socialists 
created around the Stalingrad disaster. On the tenth anniversary of Hitler’s assumption of 
43
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power, January 30, 1943, newspapers were full of dramatic accounts of the heroic battle 
German soldiers were fighting to the last man. In the Berliner 12 Uhr Blatt the front page 
headline in red, bold letters read: ”Fighting, working, triumphing, and never 
capitulating!” Under a drawing depicting German soldiers storming up a mound towards 
a Soviet tank, the message to the German people was clear: this fight was to be won, or 
the Sixth Army would face complete destruction.
Virulent resistance rises from the ruins of Stalingrad. Our will: victory at any price!
War with a global reach and intention will never be won with half or even lukewarm measures. He 
who marshals against a superior enemy that has proclaimed to annihilate the people, is well-advised 
to armor his heart with a steely belt of faith and courage wherever he may be on duty. With a 
matchless, heroic willingness to sacrifice, the soldier at the front fights the onrush of the enemy. Far 
distant from the Reich’s borders, he fulfils his duty as he has sworn to the Fuhrer. When the colossal 
tanks storm against the trenches and grenades slash the soil to shreds, when the masses of the 
attacking infantry wallow over the ground and the bombs mash the fields, then the private leaps 
forward to challenge to powers of annihilation. Wherever a German soldier bears his weapon against 
the enemy, there Germany stands by his side. The home front works tirelessly to produce canons 
and grenades. An endless stream of weapons rolls relentlessly to the front. Front and homeland 
march hooked together. Struggle and work of the entire people are aimed at the same goal, which we 
will achieve because we have to achieve it: victory at any cost!
45
Two days later, the Sixth Army capitulated to the Red Army, the remaining 110,000 
soldiers went into Soviet captivity.
46
 The above quoted newspaper report encapsulates the 
main themes of the saga of Stalingrad. The heroic fight, again, was none of aggression 
but defense in the eyes of an enemy who set out to “annihilate” the German people. Why 
and how the Wehrmacht got to Stalingrad, and why this city had to be defended against 
Soviet troops, was never a point of discussion. It is important to note that this view of a 
45
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military tragedy happening for no obvious reason, somewhat “out there in the blue,” was 
one to stick in the collective memory of the Eastern Front in postwar Germany. 
Particularly in West German memory, the battle of Stalingrad for decades would embody 
the senseless and bloody suffering of the brave German soldier during World War II. 
A second theme, depicted in the above report, is that of the Schicksalsgemeinschaft –
a community of fate – between homeland and front. Indeed, the German home-front was 
preoccupied with events in the East. Stalingrad became the “psychological turning-point” 
of the war.
47
 After the second “winter crisis” 1942/43, confidence in the Fuhrer was 
severely eroded, the bond between the people and its Fuhrer began to dissolve, the Hitler-
myth, while still intact, was severely battered. “The German people’s love affair with 
Hitler was at an end. Only the bitter process of divorce remained.”
48
After weeks of “ominous silence”
49
 about the real situation in Stalingrad following 
the counter-offensive of the Soviet side on November 19, 1942, the Nazi propaganda 
machine had to react swiftly once the total defeat of the Sixth Army could no longer be 
kept secret. Rumors about the catastrophic conditions of the encircled soldiers reached 
47
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Germany via front letters and word-of-mouth from soldiers on furlough.
50
  On January 16, 
1943, the Wehrmacht report for the first time used a wording from which one could infer 
that defeat was immanent. The men were fighting “a heroically courageous defensive 
struggle against the enemy attacking from all sides.”
51
 After General Friedrich Paulus
(1890-1957), commander of the Sixth Army, had rejected a Soviet offer to surrender, the 
Red Army started a new offensive on January 10, 1943. Unable to check the Soviet 
onslaught, Paulus wired to Hitler that the situation was hopeless. Hitler replied surrender 
was no option, fighting must continue to the last man. On January 31, Paulus surrendered 
part of his troops, the last battles continued until February 2, 1943, when the Sixth Army 
was fully defeated. During the last week of January the Wehrmacht reports finally 
admitted the encirclement, and utter defeat was instantaneously turned into victory: the 
German armies, the report concluded, had won eternal honor for their heroic and 
sacrificial struggle.
52
The mythical embellishment of this costly military disaster – the extent of cynicism 
and disregard for human live reflected in the sources remains inconceivable – was not 
only the product of Goebbels’ propaganda apparatus but originated also in the high 
echelons of the Wehrmacht, as the above-mentioned January reports show. The master 
narrative of the battle of Stalingrad was to serve two functions. First, self-sacrifice for the 
Fuhrer and fatherland promised eternal victory even if one was to die in a lost military 
50
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conflict. The notion that soldiers had “died so that Germany may live” – such was the 
title of Völkischer Beobachter on February 4, 1943 – constituted the Nazified version of 
the old Christian narrative of ultimate redemption.
53
 During his speech on January 30, 
1943 (dubbed “Leichenrede” among the embattled Stalingrad soldiers), Commander-in-
Chief of the Airforce Hermann Göring (1893-1946) had introduced the “metaphysical 
aspects” of the drama. Borrowing heavily from religious vocabulary, he referred to Hitler
as a “man sent by God,” and proclaimed his “holy” and “indestructible belief in 
Germany’s victory,” in the “justice of the Almighty [Allmacht].”
54
 The Nazis’ ambiguous 
approach towards Christianity, rejecting traditional religion while embracing an Aryan 
religiosity, manifested in the quasi-religious aesthetization of the sacrifices at Stalingrad: 
they symbolized the “mission here and now, for utopian ends on earth.” The Stalingrad 
saga became one of the “substitutes for the futility of earthly existence and the majesty of 
God” the Nazis created in order to replace traditional Christianity.
55
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Fig. 1. Defeat at Stalingrad: “They Died So That Germany May Live” 
(Völkischer Beobachter, February 4, 1943, 1).
Since military sacrifices had thus a higher meaning in Nazi Germany, the meaning of 
war had transformed as well. The meaning of going to war was not the defeat of the 
enemy, but the fighting itself. The designers of the saga of Stalingrad put the momentary 
defeat into the perspective of an ultimately victorious German destiny. Alfred Rosenberg
(1893-1946), the chief ideologue of the Nazi party, proclaimed this historical legacy in an 
obituary for the “heroes of the Sixth Army” published on the front page of the Völkische 
Beobachter on February 4, 1943:
The German Reich emerged from the struggles, defeats and victories of the Germanic peoples. Not as a 
result of a treaty, not as a result of a so-called ‘development,’ but as a result of powerful conflicts with 
the preceding ruling forces of history. The German Kaiser, generals and statesmen had to endure many 
a difficult hour before they were able to realize part of what they envisioned. Many of them stepped in 
their graves without fulfillment and could only pass on the flag. We all stand in the greatest fight of the 
German people for its legacy in this war. We know many symbols of greatest soldierly devotion 
[Soldatentum], brave, quiet devotion – of thousands we cannot know yet. 
65
But the battle that was fought far, far to the East on the river Volga will enter history as the greatest 
symbol of all times. That is heroism of the entirety [Gesamtheit], of a whole army, which already today 
we can recall only in reverence, which future centuries will retell in a way an allegorical national 
struggle has never been spoken of before.
56
This was the – utterly irrational – Nazi version of Stalingrad as a “Hegelian moment”. 
The forces of history culminated in this historic sacrifice, overshining not only 
humanity’s past struggles, but foreshadowing the dawn of the Germanic empire. 
The second function of the Nazi master narrative of Stalingrad was to prepare and 
inspire the German military and homeland for the upcoming fights in the war. Moreover, 
it served to underscore the urge for every German to become even more dedicated and 
determined in the fight for final victory. As Rosenberg’s history lesson indicated, 
Stalingrad was just one, albeit a very important, milestone on the path towards erecting 
the German Millennial Reich. Accordingly, propaganda minister Goebbels kicked off  the 
campaign for “total war” right after the “heroic” doom of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad. In 
order to fully instrumentalize the magnitude of the defeat, and to exploit the shock and 
awe of the moment, the Nazi master narrative used the battle of Stalingrad as the 
initiating spark of the campaign towards total mobilization and ultimate radicalization of 
the war effort. 
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“TOTAL WAR” OR THE “IDEOLOGY OF SELF-DESTRUCTION”
Stalingrad can be defined as an indirect “collective trauma”
57
 in more than a 
metaphorical sense. According to the sociological definition, “collective trauma” 
constitutes a “blow to the basic tissues of social life that damages the bonds attaching 
people together and impairs the prevailing sense of community.”
58
 The battle of 
Stalingrad was an indirect trauma because most Germans were either distant witnesses to 
the event, or more closely involved emotionally because of relatives fighting on the 
Eastern Front, or even in Stalingrad itself. The term “collective trauma” is useful because 
it encapsulates a shared life-altering experience entailng long-term psychological and 
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social consequences which hardly anyone could escape. Its impact was amplified by the 
way the Nazi regime exploited the disaster in the weeks and months to follow. But to 
dwell on the above-cited definition a little further, both fundamental consequences of the 
collective experience of disaster can be observed in the German “post-Stalingrad 
society.” First, the basic tissues of social life, namely the feeling of a bond between the 
members of the Volksgemeinschaft, dissolved after the “winter crisis” 1942/43, provided 
one grants the National Socialist project of a socio-racial community a certain success.
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Seclusion, apathy and resignation were common attributes for the mood among the 
population during the last two and a half war years.
60
 Wehler even dates the beginning of 
the “denazification” of ordinary Germans to the Stalingrad crisis. At that point, the “inner 
retreat” from the Third Reich began, and by the end of the war most people were 
disillusioned, many de-ideologized, preoccupied with the individual and familial 
survival.
61
 Secondly, the battle of Stalingrad can be viewed as a passive “collective 
trauma” because its catastrophic outcome – paradocxically – not only “impaired” the 
59
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German Volksgemeinschaft’s “sense of community” but it also endowed German society 
with a new sense of belonging together. Only now, Germans were bonded together by a 
common destiny into a community of fate, a Schicksalsgemeinschaft. Thus, the 
Volksgemeinschaft lived on, was even reinforced by the collective experience of distaster. 
In the postwar period, this sense of a shared suffering was indeed closely tied to the name 
Stalingrad. 
Concerned about the magnitude of the impact the news about the loss of an entire 
army would have on the general public, Goebbels designed a response that was to help 
Germans to cope with the trauma. On February 3, 1943, the propaganda minister gave 
full written instructions to the press outlining the regime’s script for the national coping 
process.
The heroic battle of Stalingrad will become the greatest of all the heroic epics in German history. 
The German press has one of its greatest tasks before it. In the spirit of the special OKW 
communiqué to be issued later today, the press must report this stirring event, outshining every 
feat of heroism known to history, in such a manner that this sublime example of heroism, this 
ultimate, self-sacrificing dedication to Germany’s final victory, will blaze forth like a sacred 
flame. The German nation, inspired by the deathless heroism of the men of Stalingrad, will draw 
even more powerfully than before on those spiritual and material forces which assure the nation of 
the victory it is now more fanatically than ever resolved to win.
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In a similar tone, the OKW’s communiqué of the same day praised the sacrifice as 
existential to the entire campaign on the Eastern Front. The men of Stalingrad had “died 
so that Germany might live.”
63
 Because the soldiers had died for Germany, the German 
nation was now bound to this sacrifice for the eternal future.
62




This was the atmosphere in which Goebbels launched the “Total War” campaign.
64
We know that the idea of “total war”-mobilization was born during the final months of 
the First World War, and that it had long been breeding in Goebbels’ head, but the defeat 
at Stalingrad was its actual “birth hour.”
65
 The fact, that historiography retrospectively 
has proven this campaign an institutional and organizational failure,
66
 is not of direct 
relevance to my argument. Rather, the “total war”-campaign, kicked of immediately after 
the Stalingrad disaster and inaugurating the fiercely anti-Jewish wartime propaganda 
claiming ever more boldly that a world-wide Jewish conspiracy was responsible for the 
war, is examined here for its impact on the emerging political memory.
67
 It is crucial to 
notice that while the Goebbels speech of February 18, 1943 in the Sports Palace sought to 
instill the homeland with a strengthened, fanatical dedication to the war, the theme of 
“Stalingrad” disappeared completely from the public sphere on personal order from the 
Fuhrer. In the course of his long speech, Goebbels referred only once to the “stroke of 
fate” at Stalingrad:
I express me deep conviction that the German people was deep inside thoroughly refined by the 
stroke of fate at Stalingrad. It has looked into the war’s hard and merciless face, it now knows the 
brutal truth and is determined to go with the Fuhrer through thick and thin. [Bravo calls, strong 
applause].
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According to Hitler’s chief military historian, colonel Walter Scherff, the Fuhrer 
decided in early February 1943 that “there was no reason to refer publicly to the winter 
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campaign 1942-43 ... especially regarding Stalingrad.”
69
 This time, Hitler had been 
commander-in-chief and he feared that his prestige as a military leader would be severely 
damaged. 
The “Total War” campaign was a substitute for the drama that had unfolded on 
the Eastern Front between September 1942 and February 1943. By that time, Bernd 
Wegner has recently argued, Hitler’s “ideology of self-destruction” was about to fully 
materialize and Stalingrad played a central part in the choreography of total defeat. 
Challenging convential historiography, Wegner argues that Hitler had as early as 
November 1941 “realized that final victory was out of reach” and had turned to a self-
destructive strategy, namely a “defense without strategy.”
70
 He was determined to 
radicalize “his” war to the point of “almost complete destruction” for three reasons. First, 
war was the indispensable cover under which the extermination of the European Jews 
could be carried out. Second, by the end of 1941 the destruction caused by the war was 
already so immense that a diplomatic solution seemed impossible; thus, ending the war 
was a matter of life and death. Finally, Germans knew – in Göring’s words – “what 
threatened us all were we to weaken in this war ... On the Jewish question we are so 
committed that there is no escape for us at all.”
71
 Knowledge or even just suspicion of 
mass crimes made the Volksgemeinschaft guilty by affiliation. Further, Wegner reminds 
us how crucial the ending of the First World War was in Hitler’s thinking, and that for 
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him, if military victory was impossible, “moral victory” had to be achieved at all cost. 
The idée fixe that 1918 could happen again inspired Hitler’s determination to fight to the 
last breath. In this sense, “Stalingrad became a practice run for greater things to come.” 
Transforming the dead of Stalingrad into heroes, sorrow into pride, defeat into victory, 
the Stalingrad disaster became “the model for the later collective destruction of 
Germany.”
72
 The Nazi leadership was well aware of the fact that the scorched-earth-
tactics inflicted on Soviet territories would, in case of a military defeat, be turned back on 
Germany – unless the German Volk would destroy their country themselves as the 
infamous “Nero Orders” of March 1945 demanded.
73
 As demonstrated in the analysis of 
the Nazi master narrative about Stalingrad, the war on the Eastern Front was fought 
according to a “choreography of collective self-annihilation,” if the annihilation of the 
enemy could not be achieved. In Hitler’s thinking, if life and victory was impossible, 
death and destruction were the “second-best solution.”
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Yet, once it became clear how deeply frustrated the German population was after 
the lost battle of Stalingrad, its central role was relativized. The “epic” was banned from 
the public sphere because in its immediate aftermath the spell of failure was too 
damaging to the Fuhrer’s image. Only on a very limited level, memorialization of 
Stalingrad was nonetheless desired in the Third Reich. In the shadow of official silence, a 
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the Zeughaus in Berlin during an exhibition dedicated to the “Fight in Central Russia” 
(opened by Hitler on “Heroes Memorial Day” in March 1943). The sculpture depicts a 
soldier holding the Reichsflagge in his left arm while struggling to remain standing. The 
stone on which he stands bears the word “STALINGRAD.” The same year also saw the 
coinage of a memorial medal “The heroic saga of Stalingrad” depicting two fighting 
soldiers and an injured and/or sleeping soldier to their feet.
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One year later, however, on the first anniversary of the battle, the propaganda 
ministry gave strict orders to avoid any discussion of the debacle. Throughout the 
remainder of the war authorities were instructed to intercept and destroy front letters and 
POW correspondence referring to Stalingrad.
76
 The entire correspondence of German 
prisoners in Soviet POW camps was not transported to and from their relatives in 
Germany. The letters were first read, analyzed and then destroyed. Nonetheless, 
bureaucratic sloppiness allowed a few letters to reach their destination. These had a 
tremendous effect on the community of people who had missing or captured men on the 
Eastern Front. In 1943 and 1944, a letter by a POW named Heitz to his wife in Vienna 
stirred rumors and raised the hopes of thousands to receive notice from missing loved 
ones. The Heitz letter was copied and circulated as chain letter for months in the entire 
Reich, undermining the Nazis’ propaganda strategy. More importantly, this example 
implies the potential extent to which peoples’ hearts and minds were still glued to the 
events of the Stalingrad winter and the fate of the recently celebrated “fallen heroes.”
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The sudden shift from mythical aesthetization of the catastrophe – endowing the 
sacrifice at Stalingrad with the potential to inspire the mobilization for total war – to 
official silence was utterly absurd and might have added more than anything else to the 
longevity and emotional power of the memory of Stalingrad. Worse than stylizing a 
collective trauma into a national saga may only be the complete disregard of its existence. 
II. The “Other” Narratives of War
It may be difficult to assess the potential reach of alternative narratives of the war on 
the Eastern Front inside the Third Reich. Nevertheless, they existed. Some of their 
proponents, like the members of “White Rose,” paid with their lives; others, like the 
exiled communists around Paul Merker (1984-1969) in Mexico or the writer Thomas 
Mann (1875-1955) in the United States, used the freedom of speech guaranteed in their 
“new” homes to voice dissenting interpretations of the war against the Soviet Union and 
to denounce the crimes committed on the Eastern Front. Again others, such as the 
Moscow émigrés Walter Ulbricht and Wilhelm Pieck, sided with the Soviet Union’s anti-
Hitler fight to the extent of complete submission, propagating the overthrow of the Nazi 
regime in order to pave the way for the planting of Stalinist socialism in Germany. 
Lastly, statesmen such as British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill and U.S. President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt supported by American and British radio broadcasts and front 
leaflets offered a different story of Hitler’s war in the East – especially since their public 
denouncement of the killings of the European Jews in late 1942 – to illegal listeners of 
enemy radio stations in Germany and Wehrmacht soldiers on the front. 
In the following paragraphs I will recapture these “other” narratives of war in order 
to demonstrate that alternative interpretations were available to Germans even before the 
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end of the war, albeit in a very limited form. This will allow us to trace the diverging 
post-war memories of the war on the Eastern Front to their roots and to ask why certain 
aspects of this invasion were remembered (the suffering of the German soldiers) while 
others were suppressed (the massive killing of civilians, especially Jews). If the memory 
of the war on the Eastern Front which so dramatically contains the main themes and 
contradictions of modern German memory – guilt and suffering, being perpetrator and 
becoming victim – can be traced and connected to its multiple roots it will also be 
possible to substantiate recent attempts to reassess the nature of German 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung: For indeed, German memory was never characterized only 
by “silence”, “amnesia”, “denial”, “shame” or “trauma.”
78
 Rather, as Confino and 
Fritzsche have recently argued, “polyphony seems to be the sound that characterizes 
German memory.” Collective memory, and in a narrower sense political memory too, can 
be best understood as conglomeration of “noises of the past,” a phrase that “takes the full 
measure of the evasions, silences, and tendentious emphases of memory work.”
79
 The 
purpose of the following paragraphs is to point out that such evasions, silences and 
tendentious emphases were not merely the result of post-war political and ideological 
conflicts but that they were rooted in wartime propaganda and counterpropaganda 
interpretations of the events on the Eastern Front. It is this background before which the 
question how Germans “mastered their past,” in this case how they came to learn about 
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and realize the nature and dimension of the war against the Soviet Union, can be best 
examined. After all, mastering this past is not a “process that leads to reconciliation with 
Nazi crimes” but it is the “process of learning how to live with the realization that Nazi 
crimes are part of [one’s] history and identity.”
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INSIDE GERMANY: ANTI-NAZI PROPAGANDA AND THE WAR ON THE EASTERN FRONT
In a dictatorship, resistance is a matter of life and death. Consequently, dissenting 
voices are rarely to be heard. In the case of Nazi Germany, resistance to the regime was 
limited to all but a few hundred individuals originating in various sections of society: 
democrats, communists, clerics, military persons or ordinary people.
81
 The overwhelming 
majority of Germans either actively collaborated or passively complied with the regime 
and indifferently watched the Nazis’ criminal blueprint unfold; resistance was offered by 
only a tiny minority. As Ian Kershaw has aptly phrased it, “the road to Auschwitz was 
built by hate, but paved with indifference.”
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The war on the Eastern Front was a war against “Jewish Bolshevism” aimed at the 
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 Military operations to conquer Soviet 
territory went hand in hand with police measures to exterminate “Jewish Bolshevism.” 
Both, military operations and police measures formed a strategic unity and constituted 
Hitler’s “double core principle” for the war against the Soviet Union.
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 For most 
Germans, however, the Eastern Front represented the most horrible facets of the war, and 
especially after Stalingrad it came to encapsulate the brutal and costly character of the 
Nazis’ projects “living space” and “new order.” The fact, that the Wehrmacht and SS-
Einsatzgruppen committed unprecedented crimes on and behind the Eastern Front lines 
was mostly discussed in anti-Nazi campaigns outside Germany. As early as July 1941, 
Wehrmacht military leaders themselves were informed of the extent to which war crimes 
were committed by their own troops and the SS.
85
 Inside the country, however, such 
“hard” information could only be obtained by, for example, listening to enemy radio 
stations or via propaganda leaflets dropped over German towns by Allied air planes. If 
resistance was offered with regards to the Eastern Front it was linked to the senseless 
mass-killing of German soldiers during the battle of Stalingrad, i.e. to German sufferings 
and not to German crimes. 
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The group of young students around the siblings Hans (1918-1943) and Sophie 
Scholl (1921-1943), and Christoph Probst (1919-1943) at Munich University was 
inspired by personal experience to link the call for resistance against the Hitler regime 
with the war on the Eastern Front. Their leaflets written between June 1942 and February 
1943 are powerful documents of dissent and it can be inferred from the way the regime 
reacted to the activities that the message was thought to have spread well beyond the 
walls of the Munich university building. After their capture, the “People’s Court” refused 
to pardon the “White Rose” activists from the death penalty by pointing to the threat their 
campaigns had posed to the Reich: “This matter at hand might well be the severest case 
of high-treasonous leaflet propaganda which has occurred during the war in the old 
Reich.”
86
 Written mostly by Hans Scholl and the medical student Alexander Schmorell
(1917-1943), a part of the leaflets were mailed to members of the old bourgeois elites in 
Munich, Stuttgart, Frankfurt/Main, Augsburg, Linz and Salzburg – to teachers, 
professors, doctors, lawyers, writers and booksellers, as well as to owners of beer bars 
and restaurants in Munich, who, it was hoped, would debate and spread the message 
among their guests.
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 The rest was thrown out of incoming trains near Munich station 
during nightly tours or even stuck on car windows in Munich’s city center.
88
 The group 
produced between 2000 and 9000 copies of each leaflet, and every message ended with 
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the call to multiply the leaflet for further distribution. The potential reach of the “White 
Rose” campaign was fairly large and therefore indeed threatening to the regime. Yet, 
Gestapo records show that quite a few recipients of the mailed leaflets were still willing 
to cooperate with the authorities: out of 100 leaflets mailed in the summer of 1942, 35 
addressees delivered the letters to the Gestapo!
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Overall, the group produced and delivered six leaflets, three of which dealt 
explicitly with the events on the Eastern Front, the General Government and Stalingrad. 
The general message of the leaflets was a religiously inspired and powerfully worded 
appeal to the moral [sittliche] consciousness of Germany’s citizens: “We will not be 
silent. We are your bad conscience. The White Rose will not leave you in peace!”
90
 The 
texts confronted Germans with the fact that by knowing about the crimes of the NS 
regime – and the Munich students were in no doubt that people knew by the summer of 
1942 – not only compassion (Mitgefühl) for the victims was in order but every day 
without (at least passive) resistance was a day that aggrandized their Mitschuld – a 
collective share of responsibility for those crimes. The leaflets refered to the murder of 
the Jews in occupied Poland and to the sacrifices of German soldiers in the East for the 
“criminals” who had erected a “dictatorship of evil” over Germany:
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We do not want to discuss here the question of the Jews, nor do we want in this leaflet to compose a 
defense or apology. No, only by way of example do we want to cite the fact that since the conquest 
of Poland three hundred thousand Jews have been murdered in this country in the most bestial way. 
Here we see the most frightful crime against human dignity, a crime that is unparalleled in the whole 
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Why do the German people behave so apathetically in the face of all these abominable crimes, 
crimes so unworthy of the human race? Hardly anyone thinks about that. It is accepted as a fact and 
put out of mind. The German people slumber on in their dull, stupid sleep and encourage these 
fascist criminals; they give them the opportunity to carry on their depredations; and of course they 
do so.
92
Denouncing Hitler’s war on Europe, the leaflets dealt explicitly with the hate campaign 
against Bolshevism. It is documented that the group had passionate internal discussions 
about passages that unmasked the Nazi lie of a preventive war against the Soviet Union. 
The positions of the activists were mainly shaped by their own world views and personal 
experience. Professor of philosophy Kurt Huber (1893-1943), a nationalist liberal, had 
strong resentments against Soviet Bolshevism and supported the Wehrmacht’s war 
against the Soviet Union despite its devastating consequences. He was the author of the 
draft for the sixth leaflet and encountered resistance from his student conspirators for a 
passage that was later erased from the final draft: “There can be no other goal for us all 
but the annihilation of Russian Bolshevism in every form. Continue to stand united in 
ranks of our glorious Wehrmacht,” read a sentence in the erased paragraph. Particularly, 
Russian-born Alexander Schmorell, Hans Scholl and Willi Graf (1918-1943) opposed the 
adoration and exoneration of the German armies: the three of them had spent a “combat 
internship” on the Eastern Front in the summer and fall of 1942 where they had witnessed 
the devastation with their own eyes.
93
 Hans Scholl elaborately explained the lessons he 
drew from this experience during the interrogation by the Gestapo after his capture on 
February 18, 1942: 
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Graf had fought on the Eastern Front since October 1941 and had witnessed the crimes of the Security 
Police and SD behind the front lines. As students him, Hans Scholl and Schmorell were obliged to attend a 
“combat internship” on the Eastern Front during school break. 
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After I had come to believe that after the defeat on the Eastern Front [Stalingrad] and as a result of 
the astounding growth of England’s and America’s military power a victorious end to this war on 
our part had become impossible, I reached through many painful considerations the conclusion that 
there was only one option left to save the European idea, namely the shortening of the war. On the 
other hand, our treatment of the occupied territories and peoples was a horror to me. I could not 
imagine that after these ruling methods a peaceful reconstruction in Europe was possible.
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From his “Russian diary” and letters from the front we know about Hans Scholl’s deep 
distress about the crimes on the Eastern Front and the sincere affection he held for the 
Russian people at the same time.
95
 The central role of the battle of Stalingrad in this 
thinking is reflected in the text of the last leaflet, distributed on February 18, 1943 in the 
main building of Munich university. That same evening Goebbels would give his “Total 
War” speech in the Sports Palace of Berlin, the announcement of the Sixth Army’s defeat 
was just two weeks old. In their last leaflet, the “White Rose” activists addressed fellow-
students and the text reads like a mockery of the Nazi jargon celebrating the men of 
Stalingrad as fallen heroes. At the same time, the leaflet sought to wake up the population 
from the belief that Germany would find its salvation in Hitler. Instead, people, especially 
the youth, were urged to finally open their eyes to the “mass-murderer’s” ruthless 
sacrifice of German blood (this time, Soviet casualties remained unmentioned):
Fellow Fighters in the Resistance! 
Shaken and broken, our people behold the loss of the men of Stalingrad. Three hundred and thirty 
thousand German men have been senselessly and irresponsibly driven to death and destruction by 
the inspired strategy of World War I Private First Class. Führer, we thank you!
...
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Hitler and his coadjutors … have sufficiently demonstrated in the ten years [since 1933] by the 
destruction of all material and intellectual freedom, of all moral substance among the German 
people, what they understand by freedom and honor. The frightful bloodbath has opened the eyes of 
even the stupidest German – it is a slaughter which they arranged in the name of “freedom and 
honor of the German nation” throughout Europe, and which they daily start anew. The name of 
Germany is dishonored for all time if the German youth does not finally rise, take revenge, and 
atone, smash its tormentors, and set up a new Europe of the spirit. Students! The German people 
look to us. As in 1813, when the nation expected us to shake off the Napoleonic yoke, so in 1943 
they look to us to break the National Socialist terror through the power of the spirit. Beresina and 
Stalingrad are burning in the East. The dead of Stalingrad implore us to take action!
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In this context as well, Stalingrad emerged as a tragedy of mythical size. Yet, unlike in 
Nazi propaganda, it signified the beginning of the end. This interpretation must have 
resonated with the wide-spread popular mood which perceived the battle as a turning-
point in the war. Moreover, the sheer unimaginable – in fact, largely unknown – toll 
numbers seemed to have inspired the idealization of this drama on many fronts. The dead 
were thought to haunt Germany eternally. As we will see, a similar tone was struck in 
leaflets printed and distributed by the National Committee “Free Germany” over the 
troops on the Eastern Front. 
Among the few discordant voices inside Germany were also those of Arvid Harnack
(1901-1942), Harro (1909-1942) and Libertas Schulze-Boysen (1913-1942) and the 
roughly 150 members of the resistance group that came to be known under the name 
invented by the Gestapo: “Red Orchestra.”
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 Focusing less on the suffering of German 
soldiers on the Eastern Front and at Stalingrad, the “Red Orchestra” organized poster 
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campaigns in Berlin publicizing and denouncing war crimes committed in the occupied 
Eastern territories, and especially in the Soviet Union. The politically very heterogeneous 
group around Oberregierungsrat of the Reich Ministry of Economics, Harnack, and the 
Air Force Lieutenant Schulze-Boysen was one of the most important resistance groups in 
the Third Reich. Its members adhered to a variety of political and religious world views. 
Their motivations sprang from Christian ethics, communist or social-democratic 
convictions, the alternative youth culture of the Weimar Republic, the liberalism of the 
educated bourgeoisie or even the nationalistic, anti-bolshevist sentiments.
98
 The group 
mainly organized the production and distribution of illegal texts and leaflets as well as the 
duplication and distribution of sermons critical of the regime. At the height of its activity 
(1940-1942), the “Red Orchestra” organized a campaign to denounce the crimes 
committed by Wehrmacht and SS units on the Eastern Front, the most famous evidence 
of which are the periodical pamphlets “Open Letters to the Eastern Front.” Since 
February 1942, following a mailed leaflet campaign whose main document bore the title 
“The Concern for Germany’s Future Troubles the Nation,” the Gestapo observed and 
recorded the group’s activities.
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 In May 1942, Harro and his wife Libertas Schulze-
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exhibition “The Soviet Paradise” in Berlin, again distributing texts on gummed labels that 
detailed the atrocities committed by German army and SS forces on the Eastern Front.
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The texts document detailed knowledge of the situation on the Eastern Front. Libertas 
Schulze-Boysen, for example, began to record stories and witness accounts she gathered 
from conversations with soldiers on leave from the Eastern Front. Harnack’s wife 
Mildred (1902-1942), an American-born professor of Anglo-American literature at Berlin 
University until 1933, had close connections to the US embassy. She received and 
duplicated Roosevelt’s speeches and provided the group with all kinds of information 
from the Allies. The well-informed and well-written texts of the “Red Orchestra” are 
unique documents of political resistance against the barbarity of the regime because the 
transported facts – knowledge about crimes. In this context, two leaflets are of special 
interest. The first one was written in January 1942 and distributed under the title “The 
Concern for Germany’s Future Troubles the Nation.” The six-page-long text discussed 
the consequences of Hitler’s rule for Europe and the German people, and, similar to the 
leaflets of the “White Rose,” called for the realization of this self-inflicted catastrophe 
and passive resistance against its main culprits – the Nazi leadership, but also party “fat 
cats” (Bonzen), industrialists and “war-profiteers.” In view of the unspeakable crimes 
committed under Nazi rule, the group appealed to “true patriotism” as source and 
motivation for immediate action:
The conscience of all true patriots rebels against the character of the current German rule over 
Europe. All those who have preserved a sense for true values shiver how the German name is 
discredited more and more under the sign of the swastika. In all countries today, hundreds, often 
thousands of people per day are being executed under martial law and shot arbitrarily, or strangled ... 
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In the name of the Reich the most atrocious tortures and cruelties are being committed against 
civilians and prisoners. Never before in history was a man hated as much as Adolf Hitler. The hatred 
of tormented humankind is burdened upon the German people.
101
A most powerful appeal to the morality and individual responsibility of those fighting “in 
the name of the Reich” on the Eastern Front is a second document, one of the above-
mentioned “Open Letters to the Eastern Front.” Letter No. 8, produced in the spring of 
1942, addressed “one police captain” and confronted him with the details of mass 
executions and torture of civilians in the occupied Eastern territories. In this case, the 
authors of the text had received their information from soldiers on leave and visits to 
military hospital where they interviewed soldiers recuperating from “nervous 
breakdowns.” The five-page “letter” sought to engage the addressee in a conversation 
about guilt, responsibility and choice of action. It read as follows:
To one police captain:
You have become captain in the East, as I heard. Have you indeed excelled with your police 
battalion who is fighting the partisans?  I can’t believe it! You really don’t belong to those brutal-
robust police beadles for whom, without any consideration and humanity, all questions of politics 
and morality dissolve simply into rumbling and torture. ... Or would I else write to you, if I would 
not assume that you haven’t lost the ability and the courage to follow the power of the conscience 
where it comes into conflict with a too obviously bestial duty such as the treacherous killing 
[Meuchelmord] of the Soviet population? ...
I have recently visited some comrades from the police in a state hospital where they were brought to 
from the East after nervous breakdowns, all of them. ... Whispering, eyes wide open, hoping to get a 
word of redemptive justification from me, they talked about mass executions of civilians in Russia, 
about distinct cruelties, about blood and tears without measure, about the ultimate character of the 
brutish SS-orders, the unfathomable stoicism of the helpless victims ... [One of them told me] he had 
shot 50 people morning by morning over months and as a daily quote, so to speak. ... The horrible 
thing is … that Hitler has managed to make uncounted numbers of normally upright people into 
blood-besmeared accomplices of his crimes.
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The group’s campaign to publicize the crimes on the Eastern Front was one of their last. 
In the summer of 1942, the Gestapo arrested over 100 persons connected to the 
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Harnack/Schulze-Boysen group, the following investigation was led by a special 
commission “Red Orchestra” in the Reichssicherheitshauptamt. In a number of trials over 
50 members of the Berliner “Red Orchestra” members were sentenced and executed in 
Berlin-Plötzensee.
103
As the two examples “White Rose” and “Red Orchestra” demonstrate, the Eastern 
Front was thus not only the place where most German soldiers fought and perished but 
also a motivation and theme of internal resistance against the Nazi regime. Naturally, 
battling the Nazi propaganda colossus might have been not much more than a “drop in 
the ocean.” Yet, people accidentally or as a result of open eyes and ears could know 
alternative narratives of the war on the Eastern Front – narratives that implied an 
inevitable share of responsibility for the Nazi war in Europe and the crimes committed in 
its course. Although it is impossible to determine how effective resistance initiatives were 
with spreading their views, it can be inferred from the evidence that there was some 
probability of overhearing rumors, reading gummed leaflets on the tram or encountering 
the words “FREEDOM” and “HITLER MASS MURDERER” written in bold, black 
paint by the “White Rose” students on the outside walls of the main Munich university 
building.
104
 And for those who were able and daring enough to listen to enemy radio 
stations, Thomas Mann honored the legacy of the White Rose and multiplied their 
message via the German program of the BBC:
In this summer, the world was deeply moved by the events at Munich University ... We know of 
Hans Scholl, the survivor of Stalingrad, and his sister, and of Christoph Probst, of Professor Huber
and all the others, ... of their martyrdom, of the leaflets, which they distributed und in which there 
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are words that make up for quite a lot of what was done in German universities during those certain 
unblessed years to the spirit of German freedom. Yes, it was sorrowful, this susceptibility of 
German youth ... for the national socialist revolution of lies. Now their eyes are open, and they lay 
their young head on the block for their knowledge [Erkenntnis] and for Germany’s honor – lay it 
there after having told the president of the Nazi-court right in his face: ‘Soon it will be you standing 
here where I stand now;’ after they proclaimed in view of death: ‘a new conviction in freedom and 
honor is dawning.’ Brave, splendid young fellows! You shall not have died in vain.
105
It is noteworthy how powerful and just different such words must have sounded to 
German ears in the fourth war summer in 1943 if they indeed reached their audience. 
Later that year, thousands of copies of the “White Rose’s” sixth leaflet were dropped 
over Germany by the Royal Air Force.
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 Last but not least, even the Nazi press reported 
occasionally about resistance activities, respective investigations, trials and executions.
107
Thus, that the German population had, to say the least, a collective hunch, a vague 
notion of what German troops, SS and SD forces were up to in the occupied territories is 
not least proven by the collective fear, or vague anticipation of what was to come once 
Germany’s enemies succeeded.
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 In January 1943, SD report no. 354 noted that the 
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“overwhelming majority” of people were convinced that “loosing the war would equal 
doom [Untergang].”
109
 A year later, a report concluded that since Stalingrad the image of 
Soviet Russia had changed in the population, it was now viewed as a “somehow sinister 
and fateful” menace, as a country and nation with an “irrational and instinctual element, 
threatening to throw itself over Europe with primordial ferocity and vitality.”
110
 In short, 
this was a “nerve-wracking waiting for revenge.”
111
 The regime’s propaganda clearly had 
had an effect on the population. The “conclusion” people drew from this – even as late as 
in the spring of 1944 – was that Russia “must be totally destroyed.”
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COMMUNISTS FOR THE TRUTH: THE MOVEMENT FOR A “FREE GERMANY”
 IN MEXICO CITY AND MOSCOW
Those who risked their lives since 1933 in underground activities against the Nazis 
had left Germany mostly by 1939 if they could. Many of the most active opponents of the 
Nazis sought refuge in countries of the Western hemisphere such as France, Great 
Britain, the United States or Latin America. The two centers of communist anti-Nazi 
propaganda, Mexico City and Moscow, will be the focus of this section because these 
men and women eventually took over power in the Soviet occupation zone once the war 
was over. By the end of the war, and unlike the Mexico exiles around the KPD veteran 
Paul Merker, the writer Anna Seghers (1900-1983), the publicist and writer Bruno Frei
(1897-1988) and KPD activist Alexander Abusch (1902-1982), the Soviet-based 
movement for a “Free Germany” had achieved domination among German communist 
émigrés – both in terms of the monopoly of interpretation of history and in terms of 
actual political power. The organization “National Committee Free Germany” (NKFD) 
founded in July 1943 in a Soviet POW camp by German communists around later GDR 
president Wilhelm Pieck (1876-1969)
113
, the later SED ZK’s general secretary Walter 
Ulbricht (1893-1973)
114
and the writer Erich Weinert (1890-1953) was to some extent a 
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puppet resistance group inspired and led by Moscow. Yet, many a member of the 
NKFD’s military-oriented arm, the Association of German Officers (BDO) founded in 
September 1943, acted as a result of an genuine feeling of responsibility, even remorse.
115
Recent scholarship describes both organizations as “serious attempts to participate out of 
imprisonment in the fight and resistance against Hitler and his regime.”
116
 From the 
perspective of post-war East German history it is important to note that the nucleus of the 
political elite of the GDR originated in these alliances between civilian antifascists 
around Pieck and Ulbricht and transformed military leaders such as Wilhelm Adam or 
Vincenz Müller who in the socialist state founded by the SED in 1949 attained leading 
positions in the NDPD and other organisations. Moreover, NKFD and BDO were not 
only run by the founding fathers of the later German Democratic Republic, but also 
embodied the beginning of a collective, antifascist renunciation movement in which 
every willing socialist citizen could later join in. Accordingly, the narratives of the war 
against the Soviet Union developed by these two antifascist organizations also became 
the ideological foundation and source of legitimacy for the future leaders of the GDR, a 
member, 1926-1929 KPD deputy in the Saxonian parliament, since 1928 member of the CPSU and 
frequent visitor in Moscow, 1933 exile in Paris, 1938 Moscow, 1943-1945 NKFD, head of its operative 
division. April 1945 return to Germany as leader of the KPD’s “initiative group” for Berlin, since 1946 
deputy head of the SED and 1953-1971 first resp. general secretary of the SED’s ZK.
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political system installed and maintained in East Germany after the war largely against 
the will of the population.
Despite the fact, that the Mexico-based communists eventually would loose all 
influence in the later GDR as a consequence of the SED’s stalinization and the resultant 
“anti-cosmopolitan” purges during the early 1950s, their wartime analyses of the war on 
the Eastern Front prefigured the future rifts and disagreements among the KPD/SED elite 
during the first years after the war. The most important difference concerned the “Jewish 
question” and the Holocaust. While the Mexico group, among them KPD member Paul 
Merker, put great emphasis on the Jewish catastrophe and pleaded for solidarity with the 
main victims of Hitler’s racial policy,
117
 the NKFD announcements reported 
indiscriminately about “crimes against Soviet citizens,” largely neglecting the genocidal 
dimension of the war on the Eastern Front. Relative agreement existed over the role of 
the “fascist Wehrmacht” in this war, although the complicit involvement of the “worker-
soldier” in Nazi war crimes remained ambivalent during and after the war: he was both, 
victim of Hitler’s blinding ideology, sacrificed in a crusade launched by the “Hitler 
clique” and the lobbyists of “monopoly capital,” and perpetrator of unspeakable crimes in 
the name of Hitler’s Germany. 
The German communists, artists, and writers who gathered in Mexico City in 
1942 all saw themselves as representatives of the “other Germany.” Their primary 
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publication, the monthly magazine Free Germany (“Alemania Libre”), first appeared in 
November 1941 and continued until the summer of 1946. About 3,300 copies were 
printed of each issue and distributed all over the world via illegal mail and hand-to-hand 
propaganda in the underground.
118
 A number of (later) famous exiled writers and 
intellectuals contributed – without pay – articles to the paper from all parts of the world 
(for example, philosopher Ernst Bloch (1885-1977), the Austrian writer Leo Katz (1892-
1954), Thomas (1875-1955) and Heinrich Mann (1871-1950), the writer Bertolt Brecht
(1898-1956), the economic historian and later president of the Association for German-
Soviet Friendship (DSF) Jürgen Kuczynski (1904-1997), and the writer Willi 
Bredel(1901-1964)). In Mexico City, the editorial and writing staff also included well-
known literary persons such as Egon Erwin Kisch (1885-1948), Anna Seghers, André 
Simone (1895-1952), as well as German communists such as Paul Merker and Alexander 
Abusch. 
The first issue appeared while Wehrmacht troops were stuck before Moscow in 
November 1941 and the first “winter crisis” of “Operation Barbarossa” was about to 
befall the German armies in the East. Echoing pope Pius XI.’s encyclical of March 1937, 
the first editorial of Free Germany expressed the great worries of the German exile 
community. The “burning concern” for the “city of Moscow which must defend itself in 
the blood of its sons against the onrush of the German tank troops” was at the center of 
this first issue, reflecting the paper’s enormous sympathy, even bias, towards the Soviet 
118
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Union and the Red Army. While supporting the cause of all nations fighting in the anti-
Hitler-coalition, Free Germany’s main theme was the struggle of the Soviet peoples 
against fascism – a struggle, it was often, and rightly, pointed out, they had to face alone 
for long three years until the Western allies opened a second front in 1944.
119
 Accordingly, 
the struggle for Moscow, and the war on the Eastern Front in general, was viewed as an 
all-decisive battle for the survival of the civilized, the “progressive” world of socialism:
Today it is being decided, whether something will survive of the values that emerged from bloody 
wars and revolutions and from the peaceful intellectual and artistic acts of creation in the last two-
hundred years ... or whether everything will sink in the bloody, fetid swamps of fascist barbarism.
120
The article appealed to exiled Germans all over the world to renew the “popular front” 
movement and to unite in the fight against Nazi Germany. In bold letters, one of Thomas 
Mann’s “Speeches to the German Listeners” was printed next to the opening editorial.
Written in late June 1941, Mann had called the invasion of the Soviet Union an “obscene 
farce” that finally obscured the “despiteful pact of Munich.” The 1939 German-Soviet 
Non-Aggression-Pact had led to “Russia’s estrangement from the West” and the 
“political rapprochement” between the two nations had caused the first popular front to 
dissolve in “confusion and without any sense of direction.” Now, that Hitler had attacked 
the Soviet Union under breach of contract a “clearing of the external fronts was finally 
reached” and therefore there is “hope that this new constellation which was created by 
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Several articles discussed the motives, nature and scale of German war crimes. 
Above all, the murder of the Jewish people was put upfront, historical analyses by 
scholars such as the later renowned Leo Katz discussed the role of anti-Semitism in 
German history, pointing to the new quality of violent anti-Semitism in the Third Reich: 
waging war and killing the Jews were symbiotic events, the one unthinkable without the 
other. As Katz put it, “like never before in history, anti-Semitism has become the banner 
of an army designed to conquer.” The National Socialist demagogues used anti-Semitism 
for a new purpose, namely as the “political banner for German imperialism.”
122
 Likewise, 
Free Germany discussed the crimes committed in the Nazi war of aggression against 
Europe at great length and detail, and what is more important, linked them to the German 
people and their sense of responsibility. In March 1942, a special issue of Free Germany
appeared under the headline: “TO ABIDE MEANS: TO BE COMPLICIT!” (Dulden 
heisst: Mitschuldig sein!) In a “Call to the German People,” the editorial decried the 
crimes committed in the occupied territories, listing Poland, Yugoslavia, France, 
Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Holland, Norway and Greece. Yet, “all these atrocities which 
cover Germany’s name with disgrace and which precipitate the approaching day of 
terrible revenge fade to insignificance in light of the systematic cruelties committed by 
the fascist hangmen in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union.”
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 And while 
unparalleled crimes were being committed against the “Russian workers and farmers,” 
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the German nation remained “silent.” Urging Germany’s population to wake up and 
revolt in view of these known facts, the “Call to the German People” continued:
Still, German men and women, you do not realize the excessive crimes committed on the Eastern 
Front, and you do not recognize how much guilt befalls your men, your brothers, and sons for their 
participation. ...
To close the eyes before this, to slur over these facts in silence, means to justify these crimes. We 
too are convinced that many German soldiers did not sink so deep to participate in such bestialities. 
But millions of Germans at the front and in the homeland, who do not have the courage to rise 
against this shame and to make an end to it, therefore will become accomplices in those crimes.
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The leading communist and former deputy of the Prussian parliament, Paul Merker, 
wrote another centerpiece of the paper’s wake-up-campaign to enlighten the German 
people about their share of responsibility. Merker was member of the KPD’s central 
committee. After the war he initially attained an influential position in the social 
administration of the Soviet occupation zone. Yet, he was purged from the SED in 
1950.
125
 Back in 1942, he and other German émigrés in Latin America gathered for a 
“Congress Against the Terror of Nazi-Fascism.” One result of the congress was the 
publication of the “Black-Book of Nazi-Terror in Europe,” published in 1943.
126
 Among 
the speakers at the congress was Merker who expressed “deadly hate” for the Nazis and 
“deepest shame about the uncounted crimes and cruelties committed by the Hitler-
Soldateska in the occupied countries, and in the Soviet Union.”
127
 He, too, focused on the 
suffering of the Soviet people, claiming that the country “had never been Germany’s 
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Hitler sent his tank-divisions against Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad, devastated the land, 
murdered millions of peaceful inhabitants, forced men, women and children, Russians, 
Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Jews, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Karelians, and Don Cossacks 
through his Gestapo hordes to compulsory labor against their own bleeding fatherland, starved and 
slimmed to skeletons.
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Remarkable is Merker’s indictment of the German workers, who instead of unmasking 
Hitler’s propaganda and preventing his rise to power, had left the fight against Nazism to 
a “heroic minority.” Instead of realizing the all-too obvious war plans of the regime, they 
had lent their hands to the military machinery unleashed on Europe in 1939, and on the 
Soviet Union in 1941. Merker’s bitter conclusion was that the efforts of German émigrés 
to mobilize the German people against their own regime were eventually futile, and that 
with the failure to topple the dictator themselves, Germans would be excluded from the 
international community for years to come. Pointing to the necessity for compensation of 
all victims of fascism, including and above all the Jews, Merker reminded his distant 
audience that with “every day of the war, the future of the German people will be further 
darkened, and its unity further endangered.”
129
 He closed with yet another call:
German workers, soldiers, women! Realize: In order to disassociate yourselves from the 
responsibility for the outrageous crimes of Hitler-fascism and in order to be free yourselves, great 
sacrifices are necessary. Yet, these sacrifices are miniscule compared to those inflicted by Hitler’s 







Ibid. Merker later published a two-volume work entitled Germany – To Be or Not To Be (Mexico: 
Editorial “El Libro Libre”, 1944/45). The book was an impressively comprehensive account of the end of 
the Weimar Republic and the Nazi dictatorship in Germany. The war against the Soviet Union is 
interpreted as “holy war against Bolshevism.” (257ff.) The work was praised by Thomas Mann, among 
other. Mann wrote to Merker in a letter of 20 July 1944: 
“I was engrossed in the work for days. It is a shattering document, the first deeply argued and historically 
exact representation of the most frightful and shameful episode in German history. […] There is no doubt 
that the book will find many curious readers. I only hope that it reaches Germany soon and will teach the 
people there who’ve been hit on the head, how it happened to them.” (Quoted in Herf, “East German 
communists and the Jewish Question,” 654, fn. 39.) The fact that the book became far less prominent than, 
let’s say, Franz Neumann’s Behemoth, might well have to do with the fact that Merker’s story reflected a 
strong bias for the Soviet Union and uncritically listed “Marshall Stalin’s” grand strategic talents without 
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The NKFD activists who joined together in 1943 in the Soviet Union to launch a well-
organized anti-Nazi propaganda campaign among the German troops on the Eastern 
Front were much closer to the actual theater of war.
131
 Their leaflet propaganda was 
directed by and coordinated with the political head office of the Red Army operating in 
the background. Externally, the campaign was to reflect German concerns. The Kremlin 
assured, that themes and announcements of the National Committee appeared separate 
from those of the Red Army. The NKFD’s campaign appealed to “national German 
interests” and aimed at the overthrow of Hitler in order to “prevent the catastrophe” of 
total breakdown and “to save what still can be saved.”
132
 Accordingly, the texts were 
designed to address primarily soldiers in battle, not German exiled intellectuals or the 
home front. Thanks to the material support of the CPSU’s central committee in Moscow, 
over 100 million leaflets were printed and distributed between 1943 and 1945.
133
The central document of the NKFD, the “Manifest to the Wehrmacht and the 
German People” of July 1943, announced the founding of the committee and urged 
soldiers and citizens to change sides in order fight and defeat Hitler, and to free Germany. 
The call for high treason was justified with the higher calling of the nation which stood 
above Hitler’s orders:
showing any regard for the dictatorial nature of the Soviet system and its inhuman consequence. See for 
example Merker, Deutschland, 413f.
131
 See Nikolaj N. Bernikov, „Die propagandistische Tätigkeit des NKFD und des BDO sowie deren 
Zusammenarbeit mit den Politorganen der Roten Armee während des Krieges 1943-1945,“ in Ueberschär, 
Das Nationalkomitee’Freies Deutschland,’ 112-120.
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Such was the Red Army’s directive for the foundation of the NKFD, printed in Bernikov, “Die 
propagandistische Tätigkeit des NKFD,” 113.
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 Heinz Starkulla jr., „Zur Überlieferung der Flugblätter des NKFD,“ in Ueberschär, Das 
Nationalkomitee’Freies Deutschland,’ 219-224.
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The fight for a free Germany requires courage, energy and resolve. Above all, courage. Time is 
running out. ... Whoever sticks with Hitler out of fear, faint-heartedness, or blind obedience acts 
cowardly and helps to drive Germany into the abyss. Whoever puts the need of the nation above the 
orders of the ‘Führer’ and pleads his life and honor for his people, acts courageous and helps to save 
the fatherland from its deepest disgrace.
For nation and fatherland! Against Hitler and his war!
For immediate peace!
For the salvation of the German people!
For a free, independent Germany!
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This call for the self-liberation of Germany was connected with the for German troops 
gloomy news from the Eastern Front lines. One of the first out of about 100 leaflets was 
designed as a message from the dead to the living: above the heads of a group of 
exhausted soldiers, the shadow of a dead German soldier wanders in the dark skies, 
beseeching his comrades:
Comrades! 
Where ever you are by day and night – we will leave you no peace, we stand before you, 
we, the shadows of Stalingrad!
We were over 240,000, 240,000 German soldiers like you. Now, our bones molder restless in 
foreign soil. Senseless was our death. Give it a last meaning. Hear our warning and learn from it!
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Fig. 2. “The Shadows of Stalingrad.” NKFD leaflet, May/June 1943
The battle of Stalingrad which had kicked off the efforts to found a German military 
resistance group against Hitler, played a most prominent role in many NKFD leaflets. As 
opposed to how it was interpreted by “Free Germany” in Mexico, NKFD believed 
Stalingrad was not just another piece of evidence proving the Red Army’s inevitable final 
victory. The NKFD focused on the suffering of the German soldiers. They hardly 
mentioned the casualties of the Soviet side.
136
 Stalingrad was stylized as the haunting 
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 Alexander Abusch, editor-in-chief of “Free Germany” in Mexico, identified the “men of Stalingrad” as 
Red Army soldiers, who heroically defended their country to the last stone against the invaders. See for 
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example of the horror inflicted on Germany and its troops by an adventurous criminal 
leader. Many leaflets recounted the story of Stalingrad and pointed to Hitler’s 
irresponsible and unnecessary stubbornness in view of a forlorn military quagmire.
137
Stalingrad was invoked as a warning of what was to come and a reminder of Hitler’s 
unconditional commitment to the all-or-nothing strategy: “In the way Hitler has 
abandoned the Sixth Army at Stalingrad, he will now sacrifice the whole German army, 
only to remain in power for a few more months.”
138
 Only if the troops – in whose hands 
lay the “fate of Germany” – turned collectively against its military leadership, the 
German nation might be saved.
While the leaflets of the NKFD addressed mostly the question of deserting the 
National Socialist cause, the weekly “central organ” of the NKFD, also labeled Free 
Germany and distributed among German POWs, provided more space for detailed 
descriptions of the Nazi menace. Full issues were devoted to the crimes committed by the 
Gestapo and SS against Germans at home, but also to crimes against people in the 
occupied territories committed by SS and SD forces behind the front lines. In October 
1944, for example, a lengthy eye-witness report detailed the “industrial mass killing in 
the name of the German people,” of millions of Jews and other civilians from all over 
example Alexander Abusch, “Die Männer von Stalingrad,” Freies Deutschland, vol. 1, no. 12 (October 
1942), 12-14. According to Abusch, “Stalingrad was not Verdun;” just like the new industrial city was built 
by determined workers and committed Soviet citizens, its defense showed the strength of the communist 
bastion on the Volga. “The unparalleled resistance of Stalingrad demonstrated how to fight Hitler according 
to Stalin’s way [auf Stalin’sche Art].” Ibid., 12, 14.
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Europe in the extermination camp Maidanek Lublin.
139
 Another article gave an inventory 
of the various crimes committed by the Nazis in and outside Germany. Under the 
headline “Hitler’s Rule – Hangman’s Rule,” a report listed the crimes in various 
concentration and extermination camps, for example in Dachau, Mauthausen, 
Flossenburg and Tarnopol in the Ukraine.
140
 The report also detailed torture, shootings, 
forced labor, strangulation, medical experiments and euthanasia and attributed these 
crimes to SS henchmen. It depicted the brutal treatment of Soviet prisoners of war, too, 
yet made no mention of the Wehrmacht’s involvement in these crimes. To the contrary, 
the running text below the headline identified Wehrmacht soldiers as mere witnesses of 
these crimes in “Hitler’s mass slaughter houses,” and of the “orgies of extermination 
committed by Himmler’s servants (Himmlerknechte) in the occupied territories.” Still, 
these cruelties were not the result of spontaneous “bloody excesses of a few camp 
commanders, as some might hope; no, they are committed according to a plan 
everywhere just as systematically as the extermination of millions of Poles, Ukrainians, 
Russians, Jews … This plan belongs to Hitler’s government program.”
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Despite the intensive and efficient spread of word against the Hitler regime among 
the troops of the Eastern Front, the NKFD was unsuccessful. The repeated calls for a 
collective surrender of the Wehrmacht and the appeals to turn the weapons against the 
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Nazi leadership yielded little echo and remained without practical results.
142
 There were 
no massive acts of desertion or surrender to the Red Army, no voluntary retreat to the old 
Reich borders, no military revolts against the Wehrmacht’s command structure and no 
national uprising to topple Hitler on the home front. The reasons for the continuing 
fighting will among German soldiers on the Eastern Front were manifold: fear of Soviet 
imprisonment and revenge, efficient Nazi indoctrination, a persisting detestation of the 
“Bolshevik hordes” and a lasting ambition to “change the face of the world.”
143
 The 
failure of the German troops at the fronts and the German people at home to liberate 
themselves from the “fascist yoke” would have a lasting impact on how communist exiles 
in Moscow viewed the post-war reconstruction of Germany. During the first few years, 
the KPD/SED leaders would use this collective failure to justify the erection of a 
“proletarian dictatorship.” Yet, soon after the war’s end they  generously extended the 
narrative of antifascist resistance on the entire population of East Germany once they saw 
the need to legitimate and substantiate the second dictatorship on German soil.
VOICES FROM ABROAD: THE ALLIED PERSPECTIVE: CHURCHILL AND ROOSEVELT
The Soviet-sponsored activities of the NKFD were watched closely in the Western 
capitals, not only because of the suspected potential to stir actually viable resistance 
among enemy forces, but also because the collaboration between Moscow and German 
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communists, officers and soldiers signaled the possible direction of Soviet post-war 
foreign policy towards a defeated Germany. Charles E. Bohlen (1904-1974), expert on 
Soviet affairs in the U.S. state department, reckoned in August 1943 that the foundation 
of the NKFD in Moscow “could be one of the most far reaching steps that the Soviet 
government has taken so far with consequences for the future relations with the United 
Nations.”
144
 Despite efforts in London and Washington to create a similar committee in 
the Western hemisphere, plans for such an organization never materialized.
145
Nonetheless, the Western allies raised their voices loud and often in order to inform and 
rally the anti-Hitler forces inside and outside Germany. Above all, British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill (1874-1965) became famous for his powerful war-time speeches 
against Hitler;
146
 his and other important speeches were broadcast by the BBC. The British 
radio station ran a German speaking channel aimed at undermining the efficient Goebbels
propaganda apparatus inside Germany. Less prominent but equally relevant were the 
speeches of Thomas Mann broadcast by the BBC to “German Listeners” (“Deutsche 
Hörer!”) in which the exiled writer fervently formulated his vision of the “other 
Germany.”
147
Hence, if people inside Germany had access to the “Allied perspective” at all, so 
mostly by way of underground papers or illegal radio. Since the beginning of the war, 
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listening to enemy radio could potentially be punished with the death penalty.
148
 With the 
war dragging on, people increasingly turned to other available sources of information in 
order to get a realistic as possible picture of events at the front. Since the end of 1942, the 
BBC and the Soviet information service broadcast accurate reports, partly in German, on 
the extent and methods of the mass murders in the occupied territories.
149
 The Goebbels
ministry made no efforts to counteract these information because that would have 
required mentioning them to the German public. Rather, they simply ignored them or 
denounced unspecific Allied “lies.” 
Still, Goebbels remained alert as to the potential impact of allied propaganda. His 
ministry relied heavily on denunciation by neighbors in order to prevent people from 
listening to foreign radio broadcasts. Following the “Exceptional Radio Measures” of 
September 1, 1939, it issued several appeals to the population asking that “anyone who 
became aware that someone else had listened in should report the matter immediately” to 
the local Gestapo office.
150
 The minister took these measures very seriously. Even 
government officials applied for permission to listen in – “strictly in the line of duty” –
and frequently were turned down.
151
This certainly happened with good reason. According to the British Foreign Office, 
the goal of British clandestine broadcast efforts was nothing less but to “divide German 
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popular opinion from Hitler.”
152
 The Foreign Office in London also received encouraging 
reports from Berlin on the impact of the broadcasts in Germany. One German journalist 
reported already in March 1939, that “for some time now the British wireless has been 
causing a stir.”
153
 Nevertheless, the success was very limited, clandestine broadcasting did 
not lead to a division between popular opinion and Hitler in Germany. Yet, what is 
important for our purposes is that such radio broadcasts had quite a reach, thus people 
had access to the alternative narratives of the war in general, and events on the Eastern 
Front in particular. Even Victor Klemperer living in a Dresdener Judenhaus, had indirect 
access to such radio broadcasts: as he noted in his now famous diary on October 9, 1942, 
“Thomas Mann is said to have pleaded vigorously for the German Jews on American 
radio.”
154
This chapter, thus, shall close with a brief look at the references to the Eastern Front 
in the speeches of the leaders of the anti-Hitler-coalition, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin. 
Aside from the severe differences regarding politics and ideology, the anti-Hitler 
coalition stood firmly together, militarily, and rhetorically, during the years following the 
Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Nuance was brought in occasionally with 
regards to the dictatorial nature of the Hitler tyranny, and at least Western democrats felt 
prompted to compare it with Stalin’s rule.
155
 Nonetheless, it was agreed that the attack 
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 A good example of such “choosing the lesser evil”-considerations is acting secretary of state Sumner 
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against the Soviet Union was a monstrous crime signaling not only Hitler’s boundless 
hubris but also his inevitable doom.   
On the very Sunday on which the Wehrmacht entered Soviet territory, June 22, 
1941, Churchill qualified this attack as historic event of unparalleled magnitude: “The 
past with its crimes, its follies, and its tragedies flashes away” in view of what was to 
befall the Russian lands.
156
 In a radio broadcast the same day, Churchill put the Soviet-
German-war into a wider perspective and warned that this was only the “prelude to an 
attempted invasion of the British Isles,”
157
 just as Hitler and Goebbels had threatened 
multiple times.
158
 Churchill portrayed Hitler as a 
monster of wickedness, insatiable in his lust for blood and plunder. ... And even the carnage and ruin 
which his victory, should he gain it – though he’s not gained it yet – will bring upon the Russian 
people, will itself be only a stepping stone to the attempt to plunge four or five hundred millions 
who live in China and the 350,000,000 who live in India into that bottomless pit of human 
degradation over which the diabolic emblem of the swastika flaunts itself. It is not too much to say 
here this pleasant summer evening that the lives and happiness of a thousand million additional 
human beings are now menaced with brutal Nazi violence. That is enough to make us hold our 
breath.
was the “right of all peoples.” This right has been denied to their peoples by both the Nazi and the Soviet 
Governments. To the people of the United States this and other principles and doctrines of communistic 
dictatorship are as intolerable and as alien to their own beliefs as are the principles and doctrines of Nazi 
dictatorship. Neither kind of imposed overlordship can have, or will have, any support or any sway in the 
mode of life, or in the system of government, of the American people.” In the current situation, however, 
Nazism is worse than communism and must thus be fought with all means and in collaboration with 
otherwise opposed Soviet Russia: For “the immediate issue that presents itself to the people of the United 
States is whether the plan for universal conquest, for the cruel and brutal enslavement of all peoples and for 
the ultimate destruction of the remaining free democracies which Hitler is now desperately trying to carry 
out, is to be successfully halted and defeated.” A “realistic America” chose to support “any defense against 
Hitlerism,” including the Red Army’s fight. [Emphasis added].
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At this point, also Churchill paused to say a word about the nature of the two modern 
tyrannies: communism and Nazism:
The Nazi regime is indistinguishable from the worst features of Communism. It is devoid of all 
theme and principle except appetite and racial domination. It excels in all forms of human 
wickedness, in the efficiency of its cruelty and ferocious aggression. No one has been a more 
consistent opponent of Communism than I have for the last twenty-five years. I will unsay no words 
that I've spoken about it. But all this fades away before the spectacle which is now unfolding.
The Prime Minister expressed compassion and sympathy for the struggle of ordinary 
Russians, “poor as are the Russian peasants, workmen and soldiers,” and determined to 
fight until Hitler’s total defeat: “We have but one aim and one single irrevocable purpose: 
We are resolved to destroy Hitler and every vestige of the Nazi regime. ... We shall fight 
him by land, we shall fight him by sea, we shall fight him in the air, until, with God’s 
help, we have rid the earth of his shadow and liberated its people from his yoke.” 
Churchill’s main message that day was that “the Russian danger” was “our danger,” just 
as the “cause of any Russian fighting for his heart and home” was the cause of all free 
men in every corner of the world. He left no doubt that the invasion of the Soviet Union 
constituted a crime of historic dimensions and that the Russian people were about to 
become the victims of unparalleled crimes in the wake of this attack.
Nine weeks later, Churchill again spoke on radio about a “symbolic meeting” with 
U.S. president Roosevelt on the battleship Princes of Wales in the Atlantic Ocean 
demonstrating the unity of the English-speaking world. In the course of this speech he 
said that his worst fears had been confirmed, and he denounced the mass crimes 
committed on the Eastern Front. The Prime Minister also noted that “the aggressor is 
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retaliates by the most frightful cruelties. As his armies advance, whole districts are being 
exterminated. Scores of thousands, literally scores of thousands of executions in cold blood are 
being perpetrated by the German police troops upon the Russian patriots who defend their native 
soil. Since the Mongol invasions in the sixteenth century there has never been methodical, merciless 
butchery on such a scale or approaching such a scale.
160
In a “Joint Message of Assistance,” Roosevelt and Churchill declared their support to 
Stalin on August 15, 1941, and suggested to meet in person in order to discuss the most 
effective way to resist the “Nazi attack.”
161
 With the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 
8, 1941, initially much of the attention was taken away from the Eastern Front and public 
announcements made fewer references to the events on Soviet territory. Yet, on 
December 17, 1942, eleven allied governments and exile regimes published a “Joint 
Allied Declaration” stating that the Hitler regime was now carrying out the often-declared 
physical destruction of the European Jews in Eastern Europe, and that the German 
government would be held accountable for these crimes.
162
 This was the first official 
Allied declaration denouncing Nazi crimes against the Jews. It was now known to the 
world, that the Eastern Front was the site at which the most monstrous crimes in human 
history were under way.
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As German troops entered the second winter of fighting on Soviet soil in 1942, the 
first Big-Three Meeting in Casablanca (January 1943) was prepared to discuss the most 
urging issues with regards to the war effort. Following the public denouncement of Nazi 
crimes against the Jews in December of 1942, the meeting in Casablanca now concluded 
with the call for Germany’s “unconditional surrender.” Stalin, however, could not attend 
the conference, as the battle of Stalingrad was still not over. In a statement to the press on 
January 24, 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill assured the Soviet leader of their 
determination to defeat Hitler with allied forces.
163
 In the Soviet Union, Stalingrad became 
one of the most famous battles of World War II symbolizing both the heroic victory of 
the Red Army troops and the defeat of fascism by communism.
164
 The fighting at 
Stalingrad itself was watched but little commented on by Roosevelt and Churchill. They 
both praised “Mr. Stalin’s very wonderful detailed plan” leading up to the successful 
counter-offensive launched in December of 1942.
165
 Back in October, in one of his 
presidential address delivered by radio from the White House (the so-called Fireside 
Chats), Roosevelt had discussed the waning success of the German effort and the Nazis’ 
resulting propagandistic dilemma: 
My dear fellow Americans: 
... [Hitler’s] ‘war of nerves’ against the United Nations is now turning into a boomerang. For the 
first time, the Nazi propaganda machine is on the defensive. They begin to apologize to their own 
people for the repulse of their vast forces at Stalingrad, and for the enormous casualties they are 
suffering. They are compelled to beg their overworked people to rally their weakened production. 
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They even publicly admit, for the first time, that Germany can be fed only at the cost of stealing 
food from the rest of Europe.
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Roosevelt informed his own population; it was not the purpose of his message to reach 
Germany. Still, if these words reached German ears then the message was certainly clear 
enough.
Thomas Mann, also speaking from American soil, confronted “German listeners” 
with the catastrophe unfolding before their very eyes. Mann’s relentless wake-up-calls to 
his fellow-citizens were characterized by three main themes: the famous writer forced 
upon his listeners a European, a global perspective, urging them to look beyond the edge 
of the plate. Secondly, he predicted Hitler’s ultimate doom, and warned the German 
people that only their self-liberation would assure the nation’s return into the world 
community. Thirdly, Mann encouraged every man and woman to defend themselves, to 
revolt against the “monster” and “organizer of the second world war.” When the Nazi 
press finally admitted the disaster at Stalingrad in February 1942, Mann seized the 
opportunity to once again demonstrate how the regime violated their own people, 
sacrificed “ten thousands of its sons” and how they “mocked any real mourning” over the 
dead soldiers of Stalingrad.
167
 At the same time, Mann unmasked the purpose of the Nazi-
propagated “saga of Stalingrad,” namely to appeal to the last bit of “patriotism” in order 
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The wholehearted frankness with which they informed the German people of the Stalingrad disaster 
which indeed belongs to the most devastating failures in military history, was monumental and 
overwhelming. Nothing was embellished of the horrible end of the siege at Stalingrad – aside from 
the fact that it was not mentioned that Hitler alone and in person is responsible for this catastrophe. 
... The disgusting aftertaste of this truthfulness results from its purpose. Its purpose was, first, to 
abuse the elementary patriotism of the people for the salvage of the regime and to achieve the 
mobilization of the last energies – while the organizers did not so much care for the dubious results 
of this last reserve as for the distracting emotions connected to it. Secondly, however, and above all, 
the victories of the Russians and the Nazi defeat were admitted so openly and honestly, and maybe 
even aggrandized in order to arouse fears in the Anglo-Saxon world of the ‘Red Threat,’ of the 
flooding of the European continent by Bolshevism.
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This was a piercing description of Goebbels’ “Total War-” strategy. Mobilization and 
fear were the two central elements of this campaign, both ultimately leading towards total 
defeat and self-destruction. But, of course, Mann was unable to effectively erode anti-
Bolshevist sentiments and irrational fears of the “Asian hordes” in Germany with this 
kind of reasoning.
169
 With surprising naivity, the writer portrayed Stalin as one of the true 
liberators of the world defending “the right of every nation to independence and 
inviolability of its territory … and also its right to choose a social order and to elect its 
form of government which it deems wise and necessary.” To underline this point, Mann 
repeated Stalin’s famous dictum, “one Hitler comes and goes, but the German people and 
the German state persevere.”
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Yet, such was indeed the basic line in official Soviet statements following the 
June 1941 attack. The first high-ranking official to raise his voice in the Soviet Union 
was foreign minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov in a radio broadcast on June 22, 1941. 
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people and its “German Fascist rulers,” on the latter of which fell “fully and completely” 
the “entire responsibility for this predatory attack upon the Soviet Union.”
171
 Already in
the first statement of the Soviet communist leadership a precautionary exculpation of the 
German working class was granted. It was along those exact lines, that German 
communists around Pieck and Ulbricht could later build their master narrative of the war 
against the Soviet Union, its causes and perpetrators:
This war has been forced upon us, not by the German people, not by German workers, peasants and 
intellectuals, whose sufferings we well understand, but by the clique of bloodthirsty Fascist rulers of 
Germany who have enslaved Frenchmen, Czechs, Poles, Serbians, Norway, Belgium, Denmark, 
Holland, Greece and other nations.
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With an astounding two-week delay, Stalin himself made an announcement on radio. 
On July 3, 1941, he spoke about the “perfidious attack on our Fatherland, begun on 22 
June by Hitler Germany” and the “grave dangers” hanging over the country.
173
 After 
explaining at length why this attack had come as a complete surprise to an unprepared 
Red Army, Stalin presented his country as a “peace-loving” nation that respects the 
“territorial integrity” of other nations, of course without mentioned the conquest of 
Eastern Poland in 1939, the annexation of the Baltic States or the war with Finland in 
1940. Now this was a life-or-death struggle the result of which would decide whether the 
world would be free or enslaved. This was a “patriotic war” against “the fascist 
enslavers,” not against the people of Germany:
This war with fascist Germany cannot be considered an ordinary war. It is not only a war between 
two armies. It is also a great war of the entire Soviet people against the German fascist forces.
174
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This 1941 narrative falls in line with the NKFD’s anti-Hitler propaganda aimed two years 
later at separating the German people from its Fuhrer. In view of the catastrophic 
quagmire the Wehrmacht found itself in on the Eastern Front, overthrowing the regime 
seemed a reasonable thing to do. Yet, reality proved the futility of this argument: it was, 
after all, not just a “clique” who invaded Russia, but a million men army among which 
more than just a few were “workers”, and more than just a few clung to Nazi ideas. 
The difficulty of settling the question of collective and individual responsibility was 
thus intricately embedded in the multiple memories and narratives of Stalingrad and the 
war on the Eastern Front ever since the actual fighting had ceased. The emotional, 
political and ideological battles following this unparalleled blood bath can only be 
understood thoroughly by including the origins of such memories and narratives. The full 
complexity of this memory emerges from the multitude of perspectives, the polyphony of 
the “noises of the past” and from the intricate relationship between personal experience, 
collective perceptions and political memory. The following concluding remarks 
summarize the pieces gathered in this chapter in a first step towards a full-textured 
comprehension of the roots of the memory of Stalingrad and the Eastern Front.
III. “Barbarossa” – The Unpopular War?
In order to fully understand the genesis, complexity and changeability of the memory 
of the war against the Soviet Union and the battle of Stalingrad we have to return to the 
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beginning of this “most destructive and barbaric war in history.”
175
 While many historians 
have claimed that “Barbarossa” was a war forced upon the German people by the Nazi 
regime, the evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that this was anything but an 
unpopular war. Passing such a verdict always requires weighing the evidence carefully; 
in this case this is even more consequential, for the interpretation of the postwar dealing 
with this legacy depends on this very fundamental assessment. 
Kershaw has shown that the general population reacted with anxiety and dismay to 
the news of “Operation Barbarossa,” this was “Hitler’s war,” not the Germans’ war. Yet, 
he also admits that after an initial shock, most people supported this invasion as a 
necessary “crusade” against Bolshevism and they believed the Nazi propaganda of a 
preventive war in order to save Western civilization.
176
 Mommsen and others have noted 
the lack of enthusiasm for a new war in June 1941;
177
 Frei even identified the German 
people as a whole to having been the “target of the racial-biological, socio-biological 
program” of the Nazis and put the war into this context.
178
 Yet, these claims must be 
qualified by evidence reflecting a continuing support for the basic direction of German 
foreign policy, namely for its aggressive reality in the guise of a hollow peace rhetoric 
since 1933 (after all, Hitler’s “Mein Kampf” had been a bestseller in the 1920s and 
175
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 Latent, increasingly violent, anti-Semitism and anti-Bolshevism along with a 
“traditionally approving view of war”
180
 in wide parts of German society were the main 
reasons why there was no significant popular rebellion against Hitler’s declaration of war 
in 1939. And, as long as the war was victorious people rallied behind Hitler.
The war against the Soviet Union put an end to the series of victorious invasions 
between September 1939 and spring 1941. Without grasping the gravity of this risky 
undertaking – the Red Army was hopelessly underestimated – people still cheered on the 
evening of June 22, 1941, for example in Dresden. According to the recollection of 
Victor Klemperer there was
[g]eneral popular delight [Allgemeine Volksvergnügtheit]. Mood: ‘We want to beat France 
victoriously, Russia and the whole world.’ [In a bar, a traveler:] ‘Now we have clear fronts, now we 
will be done faster – this time we are prepared, it is not like in the Kaiser Reich anymore.’ [In a dance 
bar, later that evening:] People danced, joyful faces everywhere. A new jamboree [Gaudi], a new 
prospect for a new sensation, the Russian war is a new pride for people, their clamoring of yesterday 
is forgotten just as their talk of a ‘peaceful walkover.’
181
Götz Aly has recently pointed to the degree of appeal and popular support for the Nazi 
war for “living space” in the East among millions of Germans – and the extent of their 
potential and actual personal gains. This “concrete utopia for everyone” promised “space, 
resources, and opportunities for personal advancement.”
182
 Aly lists the manifold material 
gains for ordinary Germans who engaged in a kind of robbery tourism all over Europe –
179
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the regime’s policies of “public greed” and “National Socialist enrichment” bought the 
nation’s consent, or at least kept it silent.
183
As the war dragged on and the news from the Eastern Front became ever gloomier, 
popular mood was increasingly marked by apathy, despair and self-pity. Allied bombers 
air-raided German cities almost nightly by the summer of 1942. The Nazis’ “national 
community” transformed into a “community of the exhausted, the desperate.”
184
 Fear of 
total defeat, of revenge and a commitment to “sticking it out” prevented any popular 
rebellion against a regime that relied increasingly on terror and intimidation as the faith in 
the Fuhrer crumbled. Yet, with every summer, people regained hope for a “new 
offensive.” They asked “when is the next offensive?,”
185
 this time, the last one which will 
bring “final victory;”
186
 or people wondered why no more actions were undertaken in the 
East in order to defeat the enemy once and for all. Gradually, a concrete fear of Soviet 
revenge, even understanding for “the Russian soul” seeking ultimate revenge, was being 
reported by the SD whilst the first rumors spread about the violent expulsion of Germans 
from the Eastern Reich.
187
Even if the evidence presented here points to the marginal role the antifascist 
counter-narratives played in the perceptions of ordinary Germans, these multiple 
dissenting voices did not dissolve in nothingness. The criminal nature and conduct of the 
183
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war on the Eastern Front was by no means a secret to the German population, and it is 
this awareness – however faint – that burdened the memory of this war from the very 
beginning. No other event in the history of the Second World War encapsulates the 
greatest dilemma of German post-war Vergangenheitsbewältigung: coming to terms with 
the suffering inflicted on “others” and mourning the “own” victims. The official 
discourses to be traced in the following circulated around this conflicting legacy, a legacy 
Michael Geyer has called the “stigma of violence.”
188
 Stalingrad was only the most brutal 
amassing of aggression and failure. It was perceived and aestheticized as a national 
tragedy not only by the National Socialists themselves but also by Hitler’s opponents –
by the Allies, exiled communists and in the domestic resistance against the regime. Both, 
the actual occurrence of the Stalingrad catastrophe and its immediate aesthetization 
contributed to the emergence of what I have called an (indirect) collective trauma. This 
battle unlike any other in German war-time and post-war memory became an emblem 
and a metaphor for senseless war and as such it allowed for the disguise of the most 
essential issues at hand: what happened and why it happened. 
Thus, Stalingrad had the potential of being loaded with all kinds of emotional, 
political and ideological meanings, and these potentials were fully explored in the 
postwar years. Yet, it was one purpose of this chapter to illustrate that these multiple 
memories and narratives did not emerge in May 1945 and after, but that they have their 
roots in the very events they describe. The total defeat of Nazi Germany was not a sudden 
defeat; there was no zero hour at which things suddenly turned upside down, from war to 
188




 It was a long process that can be said to have started with the halting of the 
incursion into the Soviet Union in late 1941, a military undertaking launched for 
ideological and material reasons and executed for the purpose of ridding the world off 
“Jewish Bolshevism,” i.e. mass murder. That Germany transformed from the aggressor 
and oppressor to the defeated and occupied is the central aspect shaping the first postwar 
years of political and moral reconstruction. The occupation of Germany by Allied troops 
determined its future destiny, and in terms of dealing with the legacy of the war on the 
Eastern Front, this occupation also entailed a fundamental and lasting division of its 
memory. 
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Memory under Occupation: Historical Truth and the Competing 
Memories of the Eastern Front, 1945-1949
“Each generation writes its history anew. Though the pasts remain what they are. 
They lay like deceased in the what-has-been, 
but the dead can come back and become the haunting present.”
Theodor Heuss (1946)
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I. Shifting Alliances, Changing Enemies
This chapter traces the origins of the postwar memories of the Eastern Front war in 
East and West Germany during the years of allied occupation. Despite the military 
occupation initially imposed on a defeated Germany, Germans themselves, and more 
specifically the emerging political elites, shaped these narratives. The successful 
integration of a multitude of wartime experiences, namely the sufferings and losses, and 
not so much German crimes and the “other” victims, was a crucial, necessary and 
problematic step in the political-spiritual reconstruction process. It promised and 
preconditioned the emergence of new coherent collective identities and a sense of loyalty 
to a new political system. 
The antifascist founding narrative established by the East German leaders in the 
Soviet zone in order to legitimize the erection of a “proletarian dictatorship,” rested 
primarily on the predominance of the Eastern Front war in the communists’ World War II 
memory. This calculated presence of the war against the Soviet Union as the “greatest 
crime of German imperialism” in the political memory of the SED reduced the war to the 
antifascist struggle in the East. It marginalized the Holocaust along with the Western 
Front, and the war-time alliance between the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great 
Britain. In the Western zones, however, the Eastern Front war was largely absent from 
the emerging political memory of the leading parties. There was a wide-spread refusal to 
face historical reality in light of postwar Soviet expansionism in Eastern Europe. The 
much-debated crimes of the Red Army in occupied Gernany gave little reason for 
empathy and memory of German crimes committed on the Eastern Front. 
120
Yet, these diverging political memories in the Eastern and Western zones were not 
only heavily influenced by the emerging Cold War divide, but they were also shaped by 
the individual experiences of their protagonists. The political socialization during the 
Weimar years, the Nazi period, and the war, had a major impact on the way the first 
generation of political leaders in postwar Germany interpreted the Eastern Front war. 
PAST AND PRESENT IN POSTWAR GERMANY
“Since midnight the weapons are silent on all fronts. On the command of the Grand 
Admiral [Dönitz], the Wehrmacht has stopped the fight which had become hopeless. 
Therefore the almost six-year-long, honorable struggle is over.”
1
 With these words the 
last entry in the Kriegstagebuch of the Wehrmacht High Command (OKW) reported the 
final capitulation of the German army on all fronts. The fierce fighting on the Eastern 
Front had continued until the very last hours of World War II in Europe. Berlin (May 2) 
and Breslau (May 9) were the two last cities to fall. Even in their final statement, the 
Wehrmacht leadership insisted on the honor of the German soldier and the righteousness 
of the Nazi war unleashed against Europe and the world. The “unforgotten achievements 
of the German soldiers” were hailed as unique acts of honorable bravery which would 
find ultimate appreciation only in the “later verdict of history.” The OKW report closed 
with the prophecy that even the enemy would not get around acknowledging respectfully 
the “achievements and sacrifices” of the German soldiers. Therefore, “every soldier can 
lay down the weapons in an upright and proud manner and begin to work bravely and 
1
 Last entry in the OKW’s War Diary, May 9, 1945. Quoted in Rolf-Dieter Müller, Gerd R. Ueberschär, 
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optimistically for the eternal existence of our people in this darkest hour of our history.”
2
This curious mixture of admitting defeat and professing confidence in the present and 
future on the last day of the war anticipated two central sentiments of the postwar years in 
occupied Germany: defeat, humiliation, and suffering on the one hand, and 
reconstruction, restoration, and national revival on the other. This process entailed 
addressing the question of crimes and their punishment, and the way it played out 
between 1945 and 1949 illustrates the roots of the emerging “divided memory” of the war 
on the Eastern Front and the Holocaust in the two German states. The trauma of defeat 
and destruction which had started with the saga of Stalingrad was to dominate the 
postwar narratives of the Eastern Front more than any other theme, and in fact, regardless 
of the political system to be installed. 
This chapter will examine the multiple memories emerging from the historical legacy 
of the war against the Soviet Union and its symbolic culmination point, the battle of 
Stalingrad. To gain intellectual power over the past promised actual power over the 
present and future of the nation. The “public use of history” (Habermas) is always 
political and it is the correlation between power and memory which underlies the 
following considerations. While the focus here is on the developments in Soviet occupied 
Germany, I will also discuss the political and intellectual discourses over the past in the 
Western zones. Occupied Germany was divided militarily, yet people still perceived of 





In East Germany where the communists under Walter Ulbricht and Wilhelm Pieck
sought to realize their vision of the “other Germany”, antifascism became the overriding 
theme under which a socialist reconstruction was to take place. The memory, 
interpretation and instrumentalization of the war against the Soviet Union played a 
central role in the “founding myth” of antifascism in the GDR.
3
 The fact, that the war 
between Germany and the Soviet Union was essential for the formation of the GDR’s 
self-image has long been neglected in historiography on East Germany. The other central 
and concurrent pillar of the KPD/SED’s drive towards a socialist Germany was the 
German-Soviet alliance and friendship. In the limited research done on the Society for the 
Study of Soviet Culture and its successor, the Association for German-Soviet Friendship, 
their crucial function as ideological and political mass organizations linking the fascist 




While the German communists sought to integrate the memory of the Eastern Front 
into their vision of practiced antifascism in East Germany, the war against the Soviet 
Union soon vanished from the political and historical discourses in the Western zones. 
The reluctance to face the historical reality certainly resulted in part from the misery the 
Soviet Army had brought over many Germans, and it was also a consequence of rising 
3
 Münkler, “Antifaschismus und antifaschistischer Widerstand. See also Jürgen Danyel, „Die Opfer- und 
Verfolgtenperspektive als Gründungskonsens?“ Meuschel, Legitimation und Parteiherrschaft, 29-122. 
Grunenberg, Antifaschismus.
4
 David Pike, The Politics of Culture in Soviet-Occupied Germany, 1945-1949 (Stanford: Standford 
University Press, 1992), 315-319, 460-472. Norman Naimark, Russians in Germany. A History of the 
Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949 (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 408-419.
5
 Jan C. Behrends, “Sowjetische ‘Freunde’ und fremde ‘Russen’. Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft 
zwischen Ideologie und Alltag (1949-1990)“ in Jan C. Behrends, Thomas Lindenberger, Patrice G. 
Poutrous, eds., Fremde und Fremdsein in der DDR. Zu historischen Ursachen der Fremdenfeindlichkeit in 
Ostdeutschland. (Berlin: Metropol, 2003), 74-98.
123
Cold War tensions. The legacy of the invasion was subtly codified in the legend of the 
“tragedy of Stalingrad” and in the myth of a “clean Wehrmacht” heralding an army 
which, if at all, was guilty of following the scrupulous adventurer Hitler into a world war 
but not of committing crimes in its wake. Nonetheless, the war on the Eastern Front 
remained as important in German collective conscience as it was during the war even 
though its immediate reception and interpretation after the war differed fundamentally. 
While in both emerging Germanys the integration of this memory into a new (semi-)
national identity was a central concern of the political elites, the results of these attempts 
could not have been more dissimilar. In East Germany it was the calculated public 
presence of the war against the Soviet Union, in West Germany its selective public 
absence, which endowed the legacy of “Barbarossa” with such potential for later 
contestation. In turn, the Western Front, namely the fight of the Soviet Union’s anti-
Hitler coalition partners United States and Great Britain, were widely absent from the 
official memory of GDR until the 1980s, and rather prominently remembered in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. The divided memory of the Eastern Front in East and 
West Germany was the result of a politically and ideologically driven myth-making on 
both sides – indeed part of a European trend
6
– referring to the same historical event 
while arriving at completely different constructions of respectively “usable pasts.” 
The initiative and creative energy that went into these efforts at reconstructing the 
past came primarily from Germans themselves, and not, as often assumed, from their 
occupiers. Thus, the intentionally ambiguous chapter title “memory under occupation” 
6
 Judt, „The Past is Another Country.”
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refers rather to the socio-political context and external circumstances than to the degree 
of interpretative influence that the Allied occupation forces actually had on matters of 
history and memory.
THE MULTIPLE MEANINGS OF “1945” – MEMORY VS. MYTH, DEFEAT VS. LIBERATION
Before getting into the detailed discussion, two observations of general importance 
for the study of German postwar memory need to be discussed. The first pertains to the 
place of German postwar memory in the wider European perspective. The second takes 
issue with the perception of 1945 as “zero hour.” It points to the role of memory for the 
political and intellectual reconstruction of German postwar society in particular, and for 
political culture in democratic and dictatorial societies in postwar Europe in general. 
After the end of the Cold War, it has been argued that the memory of World War II was 
molded largely during the years of 1945 and 1948 and that these memories had more in 
common with myth than with history.
7
 Historians have further pointed out that World 
War II was both a global war and a series of civil wars erupting all over the European 
continent.
8
 Consequently, the tendency to exploit history for its potential to forge new 
national identities after the war was a European phenomenon which lasted throughout the 
Cold War until 1989. The emergence of the memory of World War II in East and West 
Germany must therefore be viewed in the context of a larger international trend towards 
historical myth-making – aimed at forging suitable historical narratives – in the aftermath 
of the war. The basis for the material and intellectual reconstruction was less an open and 
7
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honest inventory of past events than a mixture of their repression, selective memory and 
instrumentalization as ingredients for suitable founding myths stabilizing the emerging 
postwar societies. Even if we understand such political myths in this context as narratives 
which endow a community with an emotional sense of belonging and identity,
9
 it seems 
useful to consider the memories of the war on the Eastern Front more in terms of their 
historical than their mythical elements. 
The two central “mythical” elements pertaining to the Eastern Front have already 
been studied extensively, namely the “myth of the clean Wehrmacht” in West Germany, 
and the “antifascist founding myth” in the East Germany. In the earlier case, the term 
“myth” is used in his historical meaning as “lie” or “untruth;” the latter case refers to the 
analytical concept of a “political myth” which has been studied and debated extensively 
among historians and political scientiests. I prefer to speak of antifascism and the 
German-Soviet friendship project based on the war’s “lessons” as complementary 
“founding narratives.” It is a primary task of this dissertation to dissect these narratives in 
context of the memory of the war against the Soviet Union and to assess their impact on 
postwar German political culture. Thus, the political memory of the Eastern Front is 
9
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treated here not as a conglomeration of historical myths – which it was neither in the East 
nor in the West – but as amalgamation of publicly communicated stories about the past. 
The focus is not on political “myth-making” but on the intersection of historical memory 
and current-day politics in view of the (un-) willingness and (in-) ability of political elites 
to face historical reality in response to shifting political and ideological necessities. 
A truthful reckoning with the past was in the immediate postwar years not on the 
political agendas in Western and Eastern Europe for various reasons: the Western 
democracies saw themselves threatened by internal social upheaval, which a candid 
unraveling of the tangled web left by resistance and complicity during the Nazi 
occupation would inevitably entail, and by external domination of Soviet communism on 
the march in East-Central Europe. In the Eastern European countries, the bitter reality of 
Soviet occupation scotched every effort at finding nationally individual paths towards a 
sincere Vergangenheitsbewältigung from the very beginning. The Soviet narrative of the 
historical victory of communism over fascism was imposed on Eastern Europe in 
variations but with one central aspiration: to manifest the alleged superiority of Soviet 
communism. The antifascist war of liberation led by the Red Army and jointly fought by 
local communists became the founding legend of the new Eastern European “people’s 
democracies;” and in East Germany this legend was established in its “purest form.”
10
While it is true that “collective identities are always a complex composition of myth, 
memory and political convenience,”
11
 the politics of the past in dictatorial societies have 
neglected one fundamental feature of modern civil societies: the necessity to confront and 
10




debate the past in open discourse so that individual experiences and collective memory 
can be truly reconciled over time. The long-term suppression of individual and collective 
conversations about the past has had a lasting impact on these societies. In the East 
German case under consideration here, this fact becomes even more crucial considering 
that German reunification in 1990 has renewed the search for a national identity that 
appropriately integrates the Third Reich and its legacy. In the long run, the divided 
memory of the Eastern Front war became a historic burden which still remains to be 
overcome these days. 
Returning to the very beginnings of this division, the initial commonality of external 
circumstances has to be noted. Germany was occupied by forces of the anti-Hitler-
coalition, but soon the wartime alliance turned into mutual opposition and open hostility. 
The impact of these shifting alliances in the wake of the Cold War on the Eastern Front 
memory cannot be overstated. The former arch-enemy of Nazi Germany, the Soviet 
Union (or “Jewish Bolshevism”) attained new roles depending on the perspective. For the 
Western democracies, and the Western zones of occupation, the USSR became the chief 
adversary, the “other” totalitarian threat. This meant for parts of Germany a practical 
continuation of the Nazi view of the Soviet Union as a threat to Western (now 
democratic) civilization. For the Eastern part of Germany, however, the former arch-
enemy became the prime international protégé and ally. This radical transformation of a 
former enemy into the “greatest friend of the German people” created one of the major 
ideological problems for KPD/SED and Soviet authorities during the years of occupation. 
The sudden turn-around in allegiance engendered a lasting dilemma for the ruling 
communists throughout the existence of their state. 
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The emerging, diametrically opposed postwar attitudes towards the Soviet Union 
were accompanied by respectively opportunistic political memories of the Nazi war 
against the Soviet Union. In both cases, the war was used to exert fear – fear of another 
totalitarian, anti-democratic threat in the West, and fear of another imperialist, neo-fascist 
crusade against the Soviet Union in the East. The “Never Again” rhetoric employed on 
both sides of the Iron Curtain in this context referred primarily to the war on the Eastern 
Front – namely, depending on the perspective, to the suffering of German soldiers and 
over time also to the systematic extermination of the European Jews in the West, and to 
the imperialist war of exploitation and extermination against the USSR in the East. The 
peculiar interpretation and memory of “Operation Barbarossa” contributed crucially to 
the atmosphere of fear in the first two decades after the end of World War II. The rising 
Cold War tensions, it must not be forgotten, hung like a shadow over these memories, 
and it is this juxtaposition of past and present, of historical memory and political reality, 
which makes the Eastern Front a superb starting point for the study of the interrelatedness 
of war, memory and politics in postwar Germany.
The way political and cultural elites interpreted the war on the Eastern Front was first 
and foremost shaped by the way they viewed the caesura of May 8, 1945. From today’s 
perspective, the day on which the German armed forces surrendered marked the 
transition from war to peace. Yet, to contemporary Germans it was but one date in a 
series of existentially important events in the long process of the Third Reich’s 
dissolution. Depending on the personal circumstances, May 1945 had multiple meanings. 
For some it was a day of liberation from incarceration, for many it was a day signaling 
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military and personal defeat, for others again it was a time of suffering from expulsion 
and persecution.
12
Very early on, the contours of the official views of the end of the war became visible. 
A look at the first announcements of political parties in 1945 shows that while 
communists perceived VE Day as a day of liberation, thus as a generally positive event, 
all other political parties and the churches focused on the experience of defeat and 
national destruction, therefore endowing the war’s end with a generally negative
connotation. The KPD’s “Call to the German People for the Reconstruction of an 
Antifascist-Democratic Germany,” issued on June 11, 1945, described the end of the war 
as the apocalyptic conclusion of the nation’s erroneous path (Irrweg). The 
“conscienceless adventurer and criminals” around Hitler had thrown the blinded and all-
to-willing masses into their own doom; his “total war was the most unjust, wildest and 
most criminal war of conquest [Raubkrieg] of all times.”
13
 Ultimately however, the “cause 
of justice, of freedom and of progress” had prevailed thanks to Soviet, British and 
12
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American forces who had led the united nations’ fight against Nazi Germany. The Red 
Army’s and Allied sacrifices had saved “humanity from Hitlerbarbarism.” Not least the 
German people themselves had been unshackled, the Allies had brought them “peace and 
liberation from the chains of Hitler-slavery.”
14
 May 8, 1945 was thus a victorious date – a 
day of liberation, freedom and reprieve. Though the anti-Hitler-coalition was still 
expressively mentioned here, the statement also clarified who had been the prime victim 
of Nazism: “Hitler’s greatest and most fateful war crime was the perfidious and 
treacherous attack against the Soviet Union.”
15
Still in those early postwar months, the KPD could point to such prominent 
intellectuals as Thomas Mann to support this position. The second issue of the SED’s 
theoretical organ Einheit carried “some considerations” written by Mann before the war’s 
end under the title „Anti-Bolshevism – the Main Folly of Our Epoch.”
16
 The editors of 
Einheit reasoned that “even though we don’t agree with every single statement, we print 
them because every German should know how the greatest German bourgeois poet 
judges the anticommunist campaign launched by the enemy of the people.”
17
 They 
pointed in particular to the way Mann connected “fascism with monopoly capitalism.” 
The poet was thus quoted with the following critical lines:
Certainly, I wouldn’t pass the Marxist exam, but although I know that fascism has its intellectual side, 
and that one must view it as a reactionary movement against the rationalist humanism of the nineteenth 
century, I cannot but view it also as a political-economic-reactionary movement, … as the attempt of 
all those orientated socially and economically backwards to keep down the peoples and their claims to 











eyes of Western conservative capitalism, fascism was the bulwark per se against Bolshevism and 
against everything one wanted to target with that name.
18
Mann’s remarks must be viewed in context of the wartime alliance which united 
“differing world views” in Russia and the West against “fascisms.” In Mann’s view, “this 
war was in part also about overcoming this difference, about balancing socialism and 
democracy, on which all hope in the world rests. They are united in the fight against 
human degradation which the fascist conquest of the world would entail.” For the SED, 
these statements originating in the context of the wartime alliance – an alliance the SED 
would increasingly marginalize – offered nonetheless welcome support to their postwar 
critique of the West for allegedly carrying on Hitler’s anticommunism. Even more 
welcome was Mann’s quintessential declaration that “the scare of the bourgeois world of 
the word Communism,” the scare from which fascism has profited so long, had 
“something superstitious, something childish.” To Mann, who believed himself immune 
against the “suspicion to be a fore-fighter for communism,” this scare was the “main folly 
of our epoch.”
19
 Stripping these remarks off their context, the Marxist-Leninist SED even 
enlisted Germany’s “greatest bourgeois poet” in the propaganda battle over the right 
lessons of World War II and fascism’s “greatest crime,” the war against the Soviet Union.
Quite dissimilar was the tone in announcements of the other political parties. The 
two largest parties to emerge in the Western zone, the Social Democratic Party of 




 Ibid., 107. Mann is further quoted praising the communist idea (“a vision much older than Marxism”) 
because to him a future without “communist features” was unthinkable: “without the basic idea of common 
property rights to the goods of the earth, without a progressing reduction of the class differences, without 
the right to work and the duty to work for all,” the “world coming after us was unconceivable.” 
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situation in which the German people were at the end of the war. The SPD, while still 
supportive of the KPD’s call for a unified denazification and demilitarization campaign 
towards an antifascist Germany, nonetheless resonated a sense of victimization and 
despair among the German population. VE Day appeared as ultimate rock bottom of 
Germany’s existence. It had left “people in deepest spiritual torment, in unimaginable 
misery ... As a result of Hitler’s guilt, our pitiable and tortured nation has to endure 
unspeakable suffering and pass through a deep valley of sorrow.”
20
 The message for the 
future was that despite all this misery, the German nation had to learn from this “brazen 
lesson of history” and had to “work relentlessly for the respect of all peaceful, freedom-
loving countries.”
21
The Christian-conservative CDU expressed similar views in its first two political 
statements – the so-called “Theses of Cologne” and its founding declaration.
22
 Here as 
well, the German people first and foremost emerged as Hitler’s prime victim: “National 
Socialism has lured Germany into disaster, which is without example in its long history,” 
noting however that this could not have happened if “wide circles of the nation would not 
have let themselves be guided by a greedy materialism.”
23
 In the end was war, and with it 
20
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“ruin for us all.”
24
 Only a reorientation on the moral and spiritual powers of the Christian 
heritage could overcome the “chaos of guilt and shame” in which the “deification 
(Vergottung) of one criminal adventurer has plunged us.”
25
 The day of the end of the Nazi 
regime marks the beginning of a “path of atonement, a path towards rebirth.” This 
reconciliatory tone was accompanied by a compassionate reference to the “other victims” 
of Nazism, namely the “countless Jewish fellow-citizens”
26
 who had fallen victim to the 
terror regime – the only reference to the Jewish catastrophe in all initial party statements 
examined here. Nonetheless, to the newly found CDU, VE Day marked the hour of the 
“gravest catastrophe which ever came over any country.”
27
 Thus, Germany’s ultimate 
destruction and defeat was the greatest calamity brought on by Hitler. Quite atypically for 
his party at that time, its leader in Cologne, later chancellor Konrad Adenauer, noted 
already in October 1945 that the conduct of “Russia” in Eastern Europe and East 
Germany made the “division of Eastern Europe, the Russian territory, and Western 
Europe a fact,” and he anticipated the necessity to ally the West German territories to the 
democratic West.
28
A similar religiously inspired discourse about guilt and atonement can be found in 
the German protestant church’s “Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt“ (Stuttgarter 
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the Churches in October of 1945. The Evangelical Church of Germany declared in this 
document that it saw itself united with the German people not only by shared suffering 
but also by a “solidarity of guilt.”
29
 It viewed the end of the war first and foremost as a 
time for admission and the realization of guilt. “With great pain we say: because of us, 
endless misery has been brought over many peoples and countries.” The religious leaders 
who signed the declaration, among them Bishop Otto Dibelius (1880-1976) (its spiritus 
rector) and Pastor Martin Niemöller (1892-1984) who had both been active antifascists 
during the Nazi years, confessed the churches’ share of responsibility for the crimes 
committed in and by Nazi Germany. May 8, 1945 to them represented the ultimate failure 
of the “spirit of violence and revenge”
30
 which had inflicted such deep despair on 
Germany and other nations. Here again, VE Day was perceived with a negative 
connotation, namely as the present end point of human history.
It was between these two poles – VE Day as positively connoted date symbolizing 
liberation, and as negatively connoted date symbolizing defeat – that the memory of the 
war on the Eastern Front oscillated. In the East it was designed to embody the limitless 
suffering of German and Soviet soldiers in an ultimately worthy and victorious battle 
against fascism. In the West, the reality of “Barbarossa” was reduced to the seemingly 
senseless suffering of the German soldier and the German prisoner of war as the 
relentless Soviet counter-invasion of Eastern Europe caused new hardship and injustice.
29
 The text is printed in Armin Boyens, „Das Stuttgarter Schuldbekenntnis vom 19. Oktober 1945 –




In this sense, the reading of contemporary sources in order to trace the genesis of the 
Eastern Front memory is the attempt to put ourselves into the hearts and minds of 
contemporary Germans in the immediate postwar period. Thomas Nipperdey has 
reminded us that the “past is more than prehistory” and that writing history means 
unearthing and examining contingencies, not just outcomes.
31
 He emphasized the 
importance of the category of continuity for the study of times of radical historical 
change: “continuity is a category of historical conscience under which we select and 
organize the handed down historical material.”
32
 For this reason, I have examined 
alternative voices discussing events on the Eastern Front during the Nazi period; and for 
the same reason the multiple interpretations of the war on the Eastern Front in postwar 
Germany will be examined here – even if many of these interpretations did not make it 
into the mainstream or official narratives of this war.
Postwar views of the past were not imposed on Germans by Allied occupation 
authorities. As Jeffrey Herf has demonstrated, political parties resumed political and 
intellectual traditions of the pre-1933 era in order to explain issues of the past and 
present. Their representatives therefore initiated “multiple restorations of the non- and 
anti-Nazi political traditions of pre-1933 Germany – communism, social democracy, 
liberalism, and moderate conservatism – that came to dominate the post-1945 political 
culture of both Germanys.”
33
 Interpretations of the past were formulated within these 
31
 Thomas Nipperdey, „1933 und die Kontinuitäten der deutschen Geschichte,“ Historische Zeitschrift, 227 




Jeffrey Herf, “Multiple Restorations: German Political Traditions and the Interpretation of Nazism, 1945-
1946,” Central European History, 26, 1 (1993), 21-55.
136
resumed political worldviews and were shaped by both, experiences of the Nazi-past and 
the Weimar years, as well as by the socio-political situation in postwar Germany. History 
was thus not written by the Allies in occupied Germany, but it was the interpretative 
framework of the pre-Nazi period which primarily shaped German perceptions of the 
past. Even in the Soviet zone of occupation where former exile communists around 
Walter Ulbricht increasingly functioned as Stalin’s prolonged arm, the communists drew 
their own lessons from the failure of the divided “working class” to prevent Nazism’s 
rise. They further willingly adopted the Soviet interpretation of the war against Nazi-
Germany as communism’s victorious battle against fascist imperialism with the Soviet 
Union as Nazism’s prime victim and liberator thereof. In this scenario the historical 
examination of character and reality of the war on the Eastern Front attained particular 
and peculiar attention within the SED and its mass organizations such as the Society for 
the Study of Soviet Culture (since 1949 Association for German-Soviet Friendship, 
DSF). The genesis of the memory of the Eastern Front war in East and West Germany 
can best be understood in light of the political traditions within which it was formulated 
and publicly communicated following the end of World War II. 
II. Old Enemies, New Friends – New Enemies, Old Friends
POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE “RUSSIANS” AFTER THE WAR
In November 1945, Victor Klemperer who was now a free man again and still kept a 
lengthy diary, observed the changing political climate and the persisting popular mood in 
the Soviet zone. The ubiquitious official festivities commemorating the anniversary of the 
October Revolution prompted him to note the following comment on the state of 
German-Soviet relations just a few months after the end of the war:
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The revolutionary celebrations of the Russians, October 7, 1917, filled the Berlin radio station. The 
Germans crawl up deep into the Russians a. [ass], at times (speech of the Christian Democrats!) in a 
funny meandering way. Much, maybe most of the good which is being said about the Russians may 
well be true: the humanism, the law, the success of the Bolshevik basic principles. But here the misery, 
the bureaucratic chaos, daily insults, arbitrary acts of individual commanders, officially-sanctioned 
plunderings demonstrate us constantly that things are factually much different than on the radio. From 
this results great bitterness and danger for the future. … Gruesome, this identity between LTI and LQI, 
of the Soviet and the Nazi, the new-democratic and the Hitlerite song! This obtrudes on and pervades 
everything from morning until midnight! In every word, every sentence, every thought…unconcealed 
imperialism of the Russians.
34
Klemperer not only observed the intensity of the Soviet propagandistic and physical 
presence in East Germany, he also alluded to and forsaw the troubling similarities 
between the language of the Nazis (he was writing on a book about the Lingua Tertii 
Imperii) and the Soviet regime in Germany (Lingua Quartii Imperii). The “great 
bitterness” he noticed among the German population caused him to question the 
prospects of the Soviet presence from the very beginning. And as the following 
paragraphs demonstrate, his observations reflected the mainstream popular mood during 
the early postwar years. 
Among the records of the American occupation forces in Germany one finds a 
collection of letters to RIAS (Radio in the American Sector) written by Berliners and 
Germans from the Soviet zone of occupation during the summer of 1948.
35
 This unique 
source reflecting contemporary views on the internal conditions in East Germany 
documents a remarkable continuation of National Socialist sentiments, particularly of 
34
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anti-Russian feelings, and a strong sense of the Russians as unwelcome “strangers.”
36
Read before the background of the SED’s attempts at reconciling Germans and Russians, 
these letters allude to the magnitude of the undertaking the SED was up to in East 
Germany. Naturally, most correspondents were supportive of the Western Allies and 
squarely rejected the Soviet occupation of Germany. Thus, the letters constitute an 
important primary source for the anti-Soviet mood in the Eastern zone after three years of 
Soviet occupation. Even though the RIAS staff pre-selected the letters before forwarding 
them to the Office of the Military Government of the United States in Germany 
(OMGUS), they nonetheless represent distinct evidence for the severity of resistance and 
opposition in the hearts and minds of many East Germans. 
One striking though not unexpected feature of these texts was the omnipresence of 
the past, in general. The war, and along with it the former hostility with the “Russians,” 
was a recurrent theme in the letters, overshadowing many observations regarding the 
present and future situation in Germany. Yet, as historical reality the war against the 
Soviet Union was completely absent. Not a single letter reflected on the crimes 
committed by Germans on Soviet territory before 1945. Rather, the “crimes” of 
Bolshevist terror committed in Germany after 1945 were at the forefront. Though not a 
complete surprise, one could have expected some sense of historical burden and an effort 
to balance, considering the fact that the public prosecution of Nazi war crimes on the 
36
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Eastern Front was just a few months away in 1948. Especially in East German 
newspapers and radio, the Nuremberg Military Tribunal and the successor trials had been 
covered extensively; the cases at hand had been described vividly en detail and 
commented accordingly.
37
Yet, the present ruled the past. In June 1948 the currency reform and the Soviet 
blockade of Western Berlin deepened the rift between the former allies and inaugurated 
the first hot phase of the Cold War. A general sense of inevitable division not only 
between the Soviet Union and the Western allies took hold of people, along with a 
concrete fear of Germany’s permanent division, even of new war. This was clearly 
reflected in the letters to RIAS. The American-run radio station was seen by many as a 
last bulwark of truth, freedom and democracy amidst Soviet domination and terrorist rule. 
One anonymous writer in Oranienburg, a town north of Berlin, pleaded with the 
Americans not to leave Berlin and Germany: “We in the Eastern zone implore you: don’t 
forsake us!” He also reported that people were being taken to “concentration camps” for 
suspected opposition, and called for help: “Deliver us from the Russians and their 
communist friends! Plead for all of us, dear RIAS!”
38
 A worker from the Eastern zone 
expressed admiration for the air-lift established by the Western powers, “hoping that we 
too will once get help from them. Deliver us from the ‘liberators’ of the East!”
39
 The 
ironic use of the word “liberator” for the Soviets exemplifies the distrustful, often hateful 
37
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tone of all letters. Most writers had no illusions about the illegitimate and authoritarian 
aspirations of the Soviet and East German communists in the Eastern zone. 
The correspondents portrayed the East German population as helpless victims at 
mercy of an enemy both, cruel and inferior. Their letters expressed a mix of continuing 
anti-Russian sentiments and fear of danger in the present. A woman complained that “we 
women of East Berlin are like David fighting against Goliath.” Hinting at the problem of 
rape by Red Army soldiers and the sordid food situation which burdened particularly 
women and children, the writer asserted defiance not without a peculiar sense of 
superiority: “Rather death than still greater disgrace by being at the mercy of a vulgar 
power.”
40
 Another letter asked provocatively, “must an oppressed nation become extinct 
by these unworthy people?”
41
 Still others refered to the Soviets as “hodgepodge of Asiatic 
peoples”, “Slavs,” or “Bolshevist terrorists” clearly resonating a deeply-rooted aversion 
against Russians. This racist odium was accompanied by a sense of powerlessness and 
disgrace resulting from the defeat and destruction of Germany. For some, the fighting 
could continue unremittingly if only the means were available. A man from south-east 
Berlin expressed this desire with exceptional fervor:
To RIAS for profitable use!
We Germans are indignant at the mean actions of the hodgepodge of Asiatic hordes such as Tartars, 
Mongols ect. without our being able to offer resistance. And with shame we see that the three ‘Great 
Powers’ fear the Russian dictator and don’t check him. ...
There is yet time to stop the Russians’ proceedings, to send them back to their blessed country for here 
they can’t expect anything but hatred. Therefore the three Great Powers should come to an agreement 
40
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to expel the Russians out of Germany. ... If we Germans would possess or receive weapons we should 
know how to help ourselves; no Russian would be in Germany or would disturb the world.
42
In spite of the recent experience of war, the open call for – nuclear – war was not 
singular. A female Berliner expressed a similar determination to stand up against the 
Russians:
We Berliners are resolved to persevere – whatever may happen. In order to get Germany’s and 
Europe’s freedom back we are ready to die by atomic bombs – rather atomic bombs than Russian 
oppression! [later GDR President Wilhelm] Pieck, [later GDR Prime Minister Otto] Grotewohl and 
followers have to be exterminated [sic] for they are the worst murderers of the people.
43
In this context, also Stalingrad came up as reference point. The same woman used it 
to compare the potential fate of Berlin to that of the city on the Volga River. She wrote: 
“We could be just as well off without these extortionists who want to make a Stalingrad 
out of Berlin as they did it with Königsberg.”
44
 The writer acknowledged the Germans’ 
destructive plans for Stalingrad in 1942/43, while at the same time denouncing that the 
Soviets reprisal rendered similar destruction in Königsberg and Berlin. Without many 
qualms, she compared the total military destruction of Stalingrad by the invading German 
troops with the Soviet siege of Königsberg in April 1945 and the occupation of Berlin 
after 1945.
This falls in line with the general tone of these letters: Germany was seen primarily 
as victim of defeat and occupation; an atmosphere of self-pity and non-realization or 
42
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refusal to accept the historical legacy of the Nazi war against Europe had taken hold of 
many Germans three years after the war. Probably, this was the case in East Germany 
more than anywhere else in the country. Looking back on the past three years one Heinz 
Flieger writing from the Eastern zone realized the heavy burden put on the Eastern part of 
Germany and expressed a sense of being left alone:
Nobody intercedes for us. We are being left in the lurch. Have we alone lost the war? We are more 
suffering from hunger; we have been more looted by the troops than the other Germans. ... Therefore 
one inhabitant of the Eastern zone asks you today on behalf of many others:
Remember the people in the Eastern zone having lived for three years like slaves without being able 
to defend themselves. Encourage them in your broadcasts that they loose the feeling of abandonment 
and keep up hope for the future, for we too want to live in freedom.
45
The overshadowing power of present conditions in the Eastern zone was noted 
already by Norman Naimark who pointed in particular to the rape of German women by 
Soviet soldiers during the years of occupation. Naimark estimated that up to two million 
women were raped by Russian soldiers between 1945 and 1949 in the Eastern zone, and 
he stressed that the experience of this massive crime was unique to the Eastern zone. It 
laid a heavy, inexorable burden on all attempts to imbue East Germans with friendship 
for the Soviet Union after the war. It was a “severe handicap” for the SED, because the 
“social psychology of women and men in the Soviet zone of occupation was marked by 
the crime of rape” from the first days of the Russian occupation until the very end of the 
GDR.
46
 It had a “lasting impact” on this relationship in the sense that people largely 
turned their backs on the Soviets as long as they were present in the Eastern zone. And as 
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long as this was the case, the SED was in search of legitimacy – without ever fully 
achieving it until 1989.
47
The impact of these experiences on the genesis of the memory of the war on the 
Eastern Front cannot be overestimated. Social conditions – above all – shape perceptions 
of the past and the interpretation thereof in light of present events. This is particularly 
urgent when the political system disassociates official from individual memory as 
thoroughly as dictatorships do. It is thus only prudent to investigate the first official 
narratives of the war against the Soviet Union in East Germany in view of the social 
reality in which they were formulated. Not accidentally, Naimark refers explicitly to 
“Barbarossa” in his discussion of the causes and consequences of the Soviet soldiers’ 
behavior in their zone of occupation. Rape became the outlet for feelings of “retaliation 
and revenge” among Soviet soldiers, having chased the fiercely fighting Wehrmacht 
troops all the way from the war-torn Soviet territories to Eastern Germany. Thus, mass 
rape became the logic end to the barbarization of warfare on the Eastern Front, a “social 
act,” reflecting the way Germans and Russians experienced World War II in relation to 
each other.
48
 It can even be seen as the “final repayment” for “Barbarossa.”
49
 Whenever 
Soviet and SED authorities were confronted with this issue, they refused, first, to call 
rape by its name, and they hastely sought to put these unnamed crimes into historical 
perspective. Exemplary for this approach was the following comment by General Nikolai 








justifyed the material destruction and violent outbursts the Red Army brought over 
Germany in 1944/1945: “During my whole life, I have seen nothing like the bestial way 
German officers and soldiers pursued the peaceful population [of Russia]. All of the 
destruction you have here in Germany is nothing in comparison.”
50
 Yet, with the indeed 
unprecented destructive consequences of the Nazi invasion in mind, Berzarin might just 
as well have reacted with this statement to a popular mood which harbored little empathy 
for and little interest in the Soviet fate in the early postwar years. Returning from her 
Mexican exile to the Soviet zone in 1947, the writer Anna Seghers observed this attitude 
as well, feeling she had returned to live amongst a “people of cold hearts.”
51
SOWING GERMAN-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP: THE SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF SOVIET CULTURE
“Mobilize all means, the past included!” was the motto of the SED’s attempts to instil 
lasting friendship and respect for the Soviet Union in East Germany’s population – a truly 
grandiose undertaking in view of the popular mood described above. Anton Ackermann, 
KPD-member since 1926, NKFD founding member and after the war one of the SED’s 
leading foreign policy experts, coined this succinct instruction already in 1944 in context 
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instructions read like an outline for the postwar organisation of German-Soviet friendship 
and they already contained the major aspect of the SED’s pro-Soviet campaigns: the 
opportune invocation of the past for the sake of a new antifascist and socialist Germany. 
Ackermann’s notes for a lecture at the KPD party school contained the hallmarks of the 
SED’s postwar policy principles with regards to the Soviet Union:
“Germany and the Soviet Union
The great importance of an honest and consequential policy of peace and friendship of a new Germany 
towards the Soviet Union.
The most to make up.
He who has the Soviet Union as a friend, has a strong, sincere friend.
He who attacks the Soviet Union with force, will be smashed.
The political advantages for Germany.
The economic advantages for Germany. ...
Not only on narrow, class-restricted grounds but a broad, national motivation. ...
Denunciation as the repetition of the methods of fascist foreign policy which plunged Germany itself 
into disaster.
[Hitler’s Anti-Comintern-policy] was a mask before the grimace of war-hungry German imperialism.
Behind this mask attack, war prepared against all. ... 
Behind every such attempt, a new Hitler lures.
Thus clear: such a policy towards Soviet Union a greatest danger to all peoples – catastrophic for the 
German people itself
‘Anti-Soviet policy is high treason against Germany.’ ...
Friendship with the Soviet Union = special importance.
Mobilize all means, the past included. ...
History teaches that friendship with Russia has always been for the good of Germany, war, however, 
always [meant] disaster and defeat.”
53
The SED wholeheartedly adopted these views soon after the war, even if the role of the 
Soviet model for postwar reconstruction was initially played down by party officials.
54
Accordingly, the Soviet Union was to become the prime ally and friend of a future 
socialist Germany, it was recognized as the prime victim of German fascism, thus most 
Culture, he again came in trouble after supporting the anti-Ulbricht faction around Rudolf Herrnstadt and 
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deserving of restitutions, and anti-Soviet critique was nothing but camouflaged neo-
fascism. 
In order to effectively propagate this foreign policy paradigm, the past was deemed 
indispensable. Indeed the SED believed it to be the most valuable tool for the justification 
of its present policies and visions for the future. To integrate the lessons of the past with 
the necessities of present-day politics was one of the primary functions of the Society for 
the Study of Soviet Culture (SSC). The founding of the SSC was part of a shift in the 
cultural politics in the Soviet zone in 1947. Increasingly, Soviet and SED officials saw a 
need to address the still virulent anti-Soviet feelings in the Eastern zone and thus 
gradually disbanded what could be called the strategy of building socialism without 
Sovietization. Beginning in 1947, cultural affairs in the Soviet zone were geared towards 
Sovietization.
55
 In practice this meant that any opposition and dissent against SED policy 
was now subsumed under the blanket accusation of “anti-bolshevism.” The ideological 
justification for this shift came from leading cultural figures such as Johannes R. Becher
and Jürgen Kuczynski, and it was accompanied by a campaign to win over the East 
German intelligentsia for the socialist project. The campaign was initiated by the Soviet 
cultural authorities who grew increasingly concerned with what they saw as “fascist” and 
“anti-Bolshevist” agitation in Germany. Major General Sergej Tiul’panov (, chief of the 
Soviet Military Administration’s (SVAG) information office, and Major Alexander 
Dymshits, head of the SVAG’s cultural division, argued in the Soviet sponsored Tägliche 
Rundschau in late 1946 that German intellectuals had an obligation to acquaint 
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themselves with Soviet culture. The paper’s editor, Shemyakin, added in January 1947 
that it was time to seize the initiative in view of “reactionaries” who, though no longer 
daring to oppose openly “political democracy” in Soviet-occupied Germany, increasingly 
“resisted cultural democracy and could play on certain prejudices that still festered in the 
minds of Germans because of twelve years of fascism.”
56
The Soviet initiative was accompanied by the SED’s increasing tendency to use the 
terms “fascist” and “anti-Bolshevist” synonymously against any intellectual who seemed 
disinterested in or indifferent to Soviet culture, or critical of its imposition on German 
cultural life.
57
 The way history was employed in order to ideologically substantiate this 
campaign can be illustrated with one of Johannes R. Becher’s most important postwar 
essays, “Education for Freedom” (Erziehung zur Freiheit). The writer Becher (1891-
1958) had spent the years 1935-1945 in Soviet exile, was a founding member of the 
NKFD and belonged to the group of influential intellectuals in the KPD/SED.
58
 After the 
war he became a founding member and head of the Kulturbund (Cultural Union for the 
Democratic Renewal of Germany, KB), member of the SED’s central committee and 
served as the GDR’s first Minister of Culture between 1954 and 1958. His essay 
“Education for Freedom” (1946) justified the SED’s leading role in postwar Germany 
and established the “historical truth” by “combining collective guilt with the plea for a 
56
Quoted in ibid., 285.
57
On the communists’ tradition of conflating fascism with anti-communism, see Furet, The Passing of an 
Illusion. The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2000).
58
 During the time of the Stalinist purges he was attacked by the KPD leadership for “Trotzkyist wavering” 
and tried unsuccessfully to leave the USSR in 1936; he undertook several suicide attempts thereafter.
148
radical revision of German culture.”
59
 Since German culture had given rise to fascism and 
imperialism, only a radical renewal could lead to Germany’s redemption. One central 
pillar of this “national act of liberation and reconstruction in the ideological-moral 
sphere” was the fight against a resurgence of anti-Soviet and anti-Bolshevist views, and 
their replacement by “a new realistic perception [of the Soviet system] based on reason 
and truth.”
60
 This was ultimately an act of “genuine German nationalism,” Becher argued, 
and referred in this context to the war against the Soviet Union as “Germany’s war 
against Germany.” The causes for the crusade against Russia were primarily to be found 
in the cultural sphere, namely in an “unparalleled intellectual process of degeneration.” 
The Nazi propaganda campaign against the Soviet Union had “thrust the German people 
in their entirety into a psychotic condition” without which such an unprecedented brutal 
undertaking could not have been executed.
61
 In this reading, the victory of the Red Army 
over Nazi Germany spoke to the “unbroken power” of the Soviet Union and it was both a 
historical fact and a political necessity to place the national reconstruction of Germany 
within the wider context of a German-Soviet alliance. Consequently, a refusal to join in 
this “national act of liberation and reconstruction” was synonymous with anti-Bolshevism 
and (neo-) fascism and thus had to be prosecuted and punished mercilessly. 
In sum, Becher’s argumentation encapsulated the two main functions of the memory 
of the war against the Soviet Union in SED policy. On the one hand, it served openly to 
legitimate the communist seizure of power in East Germany for this was the logical 
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outcome of history. The SED was to fulfill the historical legacy of the Red Army’s 
victory by working towards the national reconstruction of Germany according to (Soviet) 
socialist principles. On the other hand, a refusal to “learn” from the mistakes of the past, 
namely the fatal attack against the Soviet Union – Hitler’s “greatest crime” –, entailed 
being branded as an enemy of this reconstruction effort. The declared necessity to 
eliminate “anti-Soviet prejudices” in order to fulfill the promise of “Never Again!” 
legitimized the labeling and bullying of any opposition against the SED-regime.
The realization of this program was the main motivation for the foundation of the 
SSC, which in 1949 was renamed the Association for German-Soviet Friendship (DSF).
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Both, Soviet authorities and SED leaders initiated the drive for a cultural “opening” 
towards the Soviet Union in 1947, and this campaign went hand in hand with the 
Stalinization of the SED, or as it was called in party-jargon, the creation of the “party of a 
new type.” A handbook written by an East German “collective of authors” in 1975 about 
the history of German-Soviet relations emphasized this connection:
The process of the development of a party of a new type, which found its conclusion at the 
beginning of the 1950s, was therefore a process of maturation for the SED in its relationship with 
the Soviet Union, which radiated into the population of the Soviet occupation zone and transformed 
the friendship towards the Soviet Union into a mass movement. This movement was given its 
organisational frame with the foundation of the Association for German-Soviet friendship.
63
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The roots of the DSF go back to the SSC, a loose organization of semi-official 
initiatives to erect “Houses of Soviet Culture” in every larger town in the Eastern zone. It 
was established on June 30, 1947 in Berlin with Jürgen Kuczynski, a historian, KPD 
veteran and remigrant from wartime exile in England and the United States, as its first 
president, and Anna Seghers serving as vice president.
64
 In November 1947, the Allied 
Control Council (ACC) granted the Society permission to operate in Greater Berlin.
65
 The 
first “House of Soviet Culture” was opened in East Berlin in March 1947. The occasion 
was used by Soviet authorities to launch a campaign for the “familiarization” of Germans 
with Soviet history and culture in the Eastern zone. The SVAG’s organ Tägliche 
Rundschau announced that it was “intended to help overcome the fear of all things Soviet 
used by the Nazis to establish the ideological preconditions for the war against the 
USSR.”
66
 Major General Tiul’panov gave a speech that was published in the same paper 
on March 4, 1947, entitled “Overture to Cultural Understanding. Thoughts of a Russian 
Officer.” The General linked the crimes of the German troops on the Eastern Front with 
the need to study Soviet society and culture: because Germans had been cut off 
completely from developments in the Soviet Union during the Nazi period, they had been 
64
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susceptible to hostile feelings in the first place.
67
 He stressed the responsibility of 
Germans for atrocities on Soviet territory and deduced from this a responsibility to study 
Soviet history, culture, politics, science and economics. With this statement, Soviet 
occupation authorities practically called an end to the “no sovietization” policy in the 
Eastern zone. The war on the Eastern Front served as vehicle to mobilize for this 
fundamental policy shift.
In accordance with this new policy, the SSC was to “provide the German people of 
today with knowledge and the serious study of Soviet culture.” As a result of the 
“yearlong isolation from the external world,” Germans had only “inadequate perceptions 
about the cultural roots of Soviet democracy” and the SSC was to fill this gap without 
any party-political affiliations.
68
 The claim that the SSC was a non-political organization 
was a deception as it “proselytized … aggressively and quickly acquired all earmarks of 
another ‘mass organization.’”
69
 It was the SVAG who initiated the founding meeting in 
the Berliner “House of Soviet Culture,” but German intellectuals who had been active in 
Soviet-German relations during the Weimar years joined the Society willingly. Yet, the 
SVAG’s involvement with this new organization was ambivalent, one could say it was 
limited to effective lip-service and financial aid. During the first few years, Kuczynski
sent multiple requests to SVAG authorities and the Moscow-based “All-Union Society 
for Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries” (VOKS) to provide books, posters, exhibitions, 
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phonograph records et cetera for the dissemination of Soviet culture in Germany –
without much success. Even with Tiul’panov supporting the requests, VOKS did not 
fulfill the material wishes of the new German friends. The only areas in which exchange 
was lively and fruitful were opera and ballet.
70
 Kuczynski at one point was “angry and 
frustrated by Moscow’s apparent indifference to his enterprise.” Indeed, he felt that his 
situation “resembled that of the unrequited lover.”
71
Rhetorically and politically however, the Soviets were deeply involved. At the SSC’s 
founding meeting on June 30, 1947 Major General Tiul’panov once again appeared to 
explain the purpose of studying Soviet culture. It was the task of “progressive Germans” 
who criticized the lack of knowledge among their fellow citizens to work for the goals of 
the SSC and it was thus necessary to expand the activities to “the broad mass of the 
people.”
72
 Anna Seghers was elected Kuczynski’s deputy, and several professors and 
artists joined the chairing committee. From the very beginning it was stressed that only 
those can become SSC members who stand in “resolute, clear distance” towards “any 
agitation and diffidence against the Soviet Union.” It was thus not enough to not “agitate” 
against the USSR; even a reserved stand ultimately made someone an enemy of the 
Soviet Union. By proselytizing Soviet culture in East Germany, it was concluded at the 
founding meeting, the Society for the Study of Soviet Culture “contributes to the moral 
70
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renewal of Germany, ... to the overcoming of fascism and to the elevation of Germany’s 
cultural level.”
73
In practice this meant that the Eastern zone was soon flooded with activities 
supposed to enhance knowledge of and affection for anything Soviet. According to 
DSF’s own historians this was a success: 
through interesting cultural, political and scientific events, lectures, discussions, exhibits, movie 
screenings, laymen workshops, language courses, and rich libraries the Houses [of Soviet Culture] 
developed quickly into cultural centers, into true adult education centers [Volkshochschulen] of 
Soviet culture.
74
The membership numbers increased steadily as a result of these activities. In June of 
1947, the SSC had counted just 2,200 members, by late 1948 the numbers had risen to 
about 35,000, and by December of 1949, the DSF counted 655,000 members.
75
Although 
the SSC/DSF was not part of the “National Front of Democratic-Antifascit Bloc,” 
acquiring membership therein soon was a necessary precondition for political and 
professional advancement, and over the years joining became a matter of course. No 
doubt, many thousand East Germans used theater, movie or lecture events to enrich their 
leisure-time program but the political purpose of these events, exhibits and so on was one 
of aggressive mass propaganda and agitation. It was not only a campaign for the 
popularization of the Soviet Union, but even more importantly, for the popularization of 
the SED. The campaign-like character of these activities prompted Victor Klemperer in 
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refused to make for another four decades: “I think these USSR-celebrations are fairly 
inopportune. They are worsening the mood. Or at least they are deadening.”
76
Already at the first two annual meetings of the SSC held in May 1948 and July 1949 
in the Opera of Berlin, this propagandistic role became explicit, and the deadening effect 
Klemperer was writing about becomes feasible. The list of guests to the second congress 
reads like a who is who of the political and cultural elite in the Eastern zone: politicians 
such as later GDR president Wilhelm Pieck, later Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl (1894-
1964)
77
, CDU leader Otto Nuschke (1883-1957), the two later foreign ministers Vincenz 
Müller (1894-1961, NDPD) and Georg Dertinger (1902-1968, CDU), leading SED 
members such as Anton Ackermann, Paul Wandel (1905-1995), and ZK member 
Heinrich Rau (1899-1961), the mayor of East Berlin, Friedrich Ebert (1894-1979, SED); 
artists such as Willi Bredel, Johannes R. Becher, and Anna Sehers, Ernst Thälmann’s 
widow Rosa, as well as Soviet representatives Ambassador Vladimir S. Semenov and 
Major General Tjulpanpov were present. The key note speaker at the first annual 
meeting, Tiul’panov again, asserted the importance of pro-Soviet agitation for Germany’s 
present and future. The fact that Tiul’panov was the one to give a first assessment of the 
SSC’s work also shows how committed Soviet occupation authorities in the zone – unlike 
their comrades in Moscow – were to German “reeducation” and “renewal.” The political 
implications of loosing – or rather not winning over – the hearts and minds of East 
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Germany’s population were all too obvious. Indeed as it turned out in 1953 and 1961, a 
“lasting friendship” could eventually only be secured by force, not conviction. 
In 1948, however, Soviet and SED officials were still enthusiastic about the realistic 
prospects of imbuing former arch-enemies with mutual friendship and respect. 
Tiul’panov’s key-note address reflected on the ideological and political motives behind 
the SSC’s activities. He pointed to the threat of present-day “reactionary” tendencies in 
“Anglo-American, imperialist circles,” and again elaborated on the direct link between 
atrocities in the war on the Eastern Front and neo-fascist agitations of the day:
In our view, the Society for the Study of Soviet Culture has developed into an influential 
organisation in a relatively short period of time and has generated comprehensive activity with 
regards to the popularization of Soviet culture. It has contributed to the further spreading of a 
truthful and honest reporting about the Soviet Union. This is a great and important, not only cultural 
task – in the narrowest sense of the word – but also a moral task, and I wish to say not only task but 
also duty; because not a single nation in the world has inflicted so much damage on the culture of 
the USSR – the Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian – like the Nazism 
which originated in Germany. It is also a moral task because the study of culture builds a dam 
against the anti-Soviet defamations which are being instilled into the German people every day by
foreign Anglo-American imperialist circles and the German reaction. The reaction relies on 
prejudices of the Nazi era and continues to work with Goebbels-arguments, and despite the severe 
lessons of the past it still finds believers in Germany.
78
Reminding his listeners of the crimes against the Soviet Union – albeit in very 
general terms – Tiul’panov continued to employ Germany’s most recent history in order 
to justify the German-Soviet alliance practiced mostly against popular will in East 
Germany. 
The founding meeting also passed a resolution to organize lectures, meetings and 
exhibitions dealing with the thirty-years-period since the October Revolution. In a broad 
sense, SED and DSF cadres understood these activities to be one form of reparations 
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payment for the Soviet Union as they too pointed to Nazi Germany’s responsibility for 
the temporary halt of the otherwise successful Soviet project:
First, Germans would learn about the ways in which the peoples of the Soviet Union overcame 
‘unbelievable difficulties,’ making Germany’s problems of postwar reconstruction seem less daunting 
and overwhelming. Second, lecturers were instructed to demonstrate that the Soviets had overcome all 
of their inherent problems of development, indeed had reached the pinnacle of modern civilization by 
the first half of 1941, when the Germans attacked. In other words, any problems with Soviet soldiers in 
the zone or deficiencies in the organization of the military government were to be attributed not to 
some weaknesses in the Soviet system itself but to the devastation caused by the German-incited war.
79
In addition, this view of the past fit well into the emerging Cold War against “reactionary 
tendencies” in the Western democracies. Yet, while the ideological motives are clear, 
Tiul’panov’s above-quoted remarks contained some painful truths. As I will demonstrate 
in the sections of this chapter dealing with the Western zones, a certain continuity 
between sentiments raised against the Soviet Union by the Nazi regime, and the 
anticommunism of the postwar era cannot be denied, regardless of whether the 
“prejudices of the Nazi era” were reemployed intentionally or not. What Tiul’panov and 
most other communists in turn denied, however, was that the anti-totalitarian, liberal 
critique of Soviet expansionist communism voiced by the democratic parties in the 
Western zones, had in fact nothing to do with Nazism or “fascist reactionary” tendencies.
Whether the officially promoted connection between responsibility for atrocities on 
the Eastern Front and a need for cultural understanding and friendship with the Soviet 
Union actually resonated with the population in East Germany remains difficult to assess. 
Nonetheless, there are sources which shed some light into the popular mood at that time, 
revealing both a limited willingness to address German war crimes and a sense of 
79
 Naimark, The Russians in Germany, 410. Naimark paraphrases a draft letter to all regional branches of 
the SCC informing about the decisions and plans discussed by the congress.
157
skepticism towards anything Soviet in light of the occupation experience. Other than the 
letters to RIAS examined earlier, records of a discussion series between Soviet and SSC 
officials and ordinary citizens in 1948/49 under the title “About the Russians and About 
Us” provide us with a more differentiated, unique sample of popular opinions and 
attitudes. The minutes of these public meetings, published in a censored version by the 
SED after their conclusion, have already been discussed elsewhere, yet never with a 
special focus on the way the pre-1945 past was addressed by citizens and officials.
80
 The 
meetings were dominated by discussions about the experience of violent occupation, i.e. 
rape, robberies, and intimidation by Red Army soldiers, even though it is fascinating to 
realize that these issues were debated without ever really calling them by their names.
81
The text that kicked off the series of public meetings was an essay entitled “About 
‘the Russians’ and About Us” by Rudolf Herrnstadt (1903-1966), editor of the SED organ 
Neues Deutschland. Herrnstadt was a trained lawyer and publicist, a long-time member 
of the KPD, during the war a NKFD founding member, and a former agent for the Red 
Army. Thus; he was an expert on “Russian” affairs in many respects. Herrnstadt had 
prepared the text for a SED party conference in 1948 and his paper carried it on 
November 18, 1948. The Tägliche Rundschau published it a day later “because it deals 
with the decisive questions of the fate of the German people.”
82
 Herrnstadt argued that the 
German working class was confronted with two main issues: there was “no orientation in 
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the class struggle ... without a correct assessment of the Soviet Union’s role,” and even in 
SED circles “attitudes towards the Soviet Union were deficient – gutless, divided and not 
free of enemy influence” as a result of which “the complex of the Soviet Union does not 
appear as it is.”
83
 At the heart of these issues was a “wrong basic opinion” about Soviet 
history since 1941. For only by realizing that the Great Patriotic War led to the 
destruction of the strongest alliance ever to have been formed against the USSR, the 
leading role of Soviet socialism can be recognized. Noting that the Eastern block could in 
case of war mobilize 200 million Soviet citizens, 100 million Eastern Europeans and 450 
Chinese in East Asia, Herrnstadt claims that “after 1941 the balance of power is such that 
peace can be preserved.”
84
 He openly contemplated the idea of a new world war while at 
the same time assuring the “working class” that such a war would be winnable. Yet, the 
primary goal of the Soviet Union and its allies was, Herrnstadt further claimed, the 
securing of world peace, which was only possible if the working people recognized the 
importance of enemy propaganda and the fight against it. This is the crucial point in the 
essay at which the author sets out to explain why “everything – in principle – everything” 
is good about the Soviet Union. In dialogical form Herrnstadt addressed the central 
aspects of his argument. A “provocateur” might ask:
Are you saying therefore that there are only good, beautiful and noble things in the Soviet Union?
The answer must be: Little provocateur! How can there be only good things in the Soviet Union if the 
nature, the greatness of the Soviet Union lays in the fact that the good seeks to overcome the evil? Of 
course there is still evil in the Soviet Union; 300 years of crippling men by capitalism don’t just vanish 
without a trace in 30 years. … Yet, what is the main difference? While in the imperialist states the 
crooks dominate and shape public life, where murderers prepare war as state representatives  and 
educate the masses to unworthy instincts, the remaining bureaucrats and careerists, felons and 
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murderers in the Soviet Union are about to be liquidated by the whole dominating people unbound to 
progress.
85
Therefore, “only he endorses the Soviet Union, who endorses her entirely.” The 
answer to the question whether one supported everything about the Soviet Union could 
thus only be: “everything, everything, everything.”
86
 It was this rather sophisticated 
exegesis of a Manichean dogmatism with which the SED set out to address “anti-Soviet” 
feelings in the population, and both past and present were to be judged under this 
paradigm. Herrnstadt himself demonstrated what such a debate with an ordinary citizen 
may look like. If your “brother in law” having stood on the sidewalk when the Russians 
marched into Berlin complained that one of them stole his bike, the following reasoning 
was suggested: knowing that total defeat was inevitable by early 1945, Germans even 
then refused to take up arms and join in the fight with the Red Army; instead they had 
passively witnessed the terribly costly final battles of the world war unleashed by the 
Hitler regime. “What went on in his head?” And Herrnstadt took the reader on a journey 
through the mind of this “brother in law:” 
He believed he was a progressive man although he was not. And the army that approached? It was a 
creepy army because instinct told him they could not possibly befriend him, because he had not 
fought. Did he see where they came from? ‘From Frankfurt (Oder),’ he’d probably say. No, they 
came from where he didn’t come from, namely from a class war in its most bitter, wildest form, 
from the war of liberation of an attacked people, against whom a four-year-long struggle for life or 
death had been launched. They didn’t come in the worn-out but clean boots he wore himself. … 
They came in clumsy shoes on which the dirt of history stuck, resolute, injured, alert, experienced 
and brutalized, yes in part also brutalized, because war brutalizes men. Who has a right to judge 
that?
87
With this vivid reference to the battle experience of Soviet soldiers on the Eastern 
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victims, first of all, but also as liberators of themselves and of the German people. This 
interpretation did not allow for Germans to judge their occupiers as perpetrators, thus any 
complaints about the violent behavior of Soviet soldiers – be it steeling a bike or raping a 
woman (for which the former might well have been a codification). And he added that it 
was worth asking what the justified revenge against the Germans could have looked like 
in light of the Nazis’ “total war” strategy, if the Soviet armies were not infused with “the 
spirit of progress and human dignity.” How, Herrnstadt asked, “would such an end have 
looked like?”
88
This is the application of the collective guilt theory on East German society, albeit 
eventually turned upside down. East Germans, instead of complaining about the behavior 
of their occupiers, should remember the war crimes committed against and in the Soviet 
Union. Consequently, the relative mildness with which the Red Army allegedly treated 
her occupied territories could only prompt gratitude and support for the Soviet presence 
on German soil. Thus, friendship with the Soviets should not only grow out of regret for 
past crimes, but also out of positive experiences in the present. It was precisely the 
intermingling of these two aspects which made the attempted double justification of the 
German-Soviet alliance ever more complicated and unrealistic. The public reactions to 
Herrnstadt’s theses were accordingly. 
The two multi-hour-long meetings between SED and Soviet officials and ordinary 






The debates were documented and published by the SSC under the title “About the ‘Russians’ and About 
US. Discussion About a Burning Topic.” Cf. Gesellschaft für Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft, ed., Über 
161
are most remarkable events in East Germany’s postwar history because. In retrospective, 
these meetings were the liveliest and most open public debates in East Germany until the 
end of the SED regime in 1989.
90
 Aside from that, the debates testify to the fact that the 
theory of collective guilt was, other than in West Germany, widely discussed and 
practically applied in East Germany. There might be no stronger evidence for this than 
the minutes of these two meetings for they speak not only the language of the official 
politics of the past but also include popular responses. Overall, the SED rather 
successfully employed the collective guilt theory in order to substantiate a second 
founding narrative of the GDR: German-Soviet friendship.
91
 Yet, collective guilt was 
discussed here not as an issue that just required admission and regret but as a potential 
starting point for collective redemption.
92
 Consequently, individual experiences in and 
after the war remained marginal; at most, the fate of Russians in the war was retold, 
descriptions of German women’s experiences with rape, for example, on the other hand, 
remained vague to non-existent. 
The meeting room in the Berliner “House of Soviet Culture,” located on Unter den 
Linden just a few blocks from the Brandenburg Gate, was packed on the evening of 
December 10, 1948. According to several speakers, Herrnstadt’s essay “About the 
Russians” was the talk of the town at that time. People discussed his theses in the tram 
“die Russen” und über uns. Diskussion um ein brennendes Thema (Berlin: Verlag Kultur und Fortschritt, 
1949). A summery of the discussions was also printed in Tägliche Rundschau, December 12, 1948, and 
January 9, 1949.
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and on the sidewalks, presumably with a “negative attitude” for one speaker remarked 
that enemy propaganda still seemed to work effectively.
93
Peter Alfons Steiniger (1904-
1980) from the SSC, a Humboldt University professor of international law and member 
of the Constitutional Commission of the Deutsche Volksrat, functioned as discussion 
leader. He summarized Herrnstadt’s essay and set the tone for the debate to follow – not 
without encouraging people to raise any questions they wanted.
94
 In addition to about 700 
interested people,
95
 other prominent SED members such as the philosopher and later 
dissident Wolfgang Harich (1923-1995) and Alexander Abusch were present. Vice 
president Anna Seghers was invited but could not attend. Questions centered mostly 
around past and present relations between Germans and Russians. The SSC documented 
all questions raised by the audience in an internal report, a sample reads as follows:
Can all [German] prisoners of war [in the Soviet Union] write? 
Why have not all POWs been repatriated until the end of 1948 as promised?
Do Russians acknowledge us as friends?
Why did the Russians not behave differently during the invasion?
How can one explain hate and disdain of the German people against the Soviet Union?
Can we learn culture from a people who was obviously underdeveloped until recently?
Was the Soviet Union prepared for the German attack [in 1941]?
Why are there only soldiers in Soviet films?
Do the Russians have culture?
96
This selection exemplifies the range of topics people thought about at the time, they 
included many questions about the history of the war against the Soviet Union, including 
the delicate question of the German-Soviet non-aggression treaty of 1939,
97
 Stalin’s 
unpreparedness for the German invasion, and the military capacities of the Red Army as 
93
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it compared to the Anglo-American forces in 1948/49.
98
 In this context, crimes on the 
Eastern Front were mentioned explicitly, and, what is important, they were always 
connected to postwar events in East Germany. In short, what had happened to the Soviet 
Union during the German invasion was cause and reason for the postwar calamities, 
including the “occasional rude behavior” of Red Army soldiers in the Soviet zone of 
occupation. SED officials were eager to explain that until 1941, the Soviet Union was a 
constantly progressing nation where socialism was about to materialize in its purest form. 
But the Nazi attack stopped this process, even reversed it here and there, and brought 
back wildness and barbarity into the country.
99
Accordingly, Wolfgang Harich who had deserted the Wehrmacht in 1943 to join the 
KPD’s underground work in Berlin, suggested that one could overcome the “trauma of 
the invasion” (in 1945) by reading the Soviet humanists and studying the achievements 
until Hitler invaded in 1941. “On the scale of world history,” he concluded, events in 
1945 did not weigh much; it was time to move on.
100
 Responding to a question from the 
audience whether friendship was possible at all between occupiers and occupied, 
Harich’s comrade Alexander Abusch reminded his listeners that the victors invaded 
Germany after having witnessed the destruction of their homes. Back then, the Soviet 
Union had been fighting an “antidemocratic Germany.” But it would become the true 
friend of a “democratic Germany” today.
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for the Soviets’ behavior: it was “up to the Germans themselves, how the Russians 
treated them.”
102
A Russian captain Tregubow, introduced by Steiniger as a “representative of a great 
nation,” retold his experience during the war on the Eastern Front stressing the Germans’ 
collective responsibility for the crimes and demanding to appreciate the Soviets’ 
commitment to a “peaceful Germany:”
Judging from this discussion, the problem emerged for you only in May 1945. But for us the 
problem Germans and us emerged much earlier, namely on June 22, 1941 [lively applause], when 
Hitler treacherously attacked the peoples of the Soviet Union. … Dear Sirs and Madams! I am a Red 
Army soldier since June 22, 1941, and I know very well, which thoughts Russian soldiers and 
officers had on the day of the attack. We knew that Hitler had destroyed all democratic forces in 
Germany. But every one of us believed that the workers and farmers of Germany would not fight 
against the might of the workers and farmers of the Soviet Union. [Very good]
I, an ordinary soldier of the Red Army of 1941, was very disappointed at the German workers and 
farmers. Don’t be offended! They forced me to bear a weapon four years long without interruption. 
The brutal war that was launched by Hitlerism lasted four long years. Four long years and still today 
millions of Russian women weep and bemoan their men, brothers and children. No country which 
was attacked by Hitler’s hordes has suffered as much loss as my home and my people. [Very true!] 
... But can one even measure the value of the lives of the fallen, the wounds, and the blood of the 
mutilated and the tears and the misery of the women and children and the bereaved?
103
The captain concluded his remarks by reminding the audience that they too had been 
liberated and his argumentation was a brilliant example of what SED leaders such as 
Anton Ackermann had in mind when he demanded that “all means must be mobilized” to 
achieve lasting German-Soviet friendship – “including the past.” Not only that Germans 
as a nation were squarely blamed for the crimes against the Soviet Union, what happened 
to them afterwards was a direct result thereof: the loss of the Eastern territories was 








 Rape was relativized by asking how someone can complain about “occasional 
incidents” while forgetting at the same time the “mass rape of entire countries.”
105
Besides, rape was a direct result of the barbarization of warfare caused by the German 
invasion, as Professor Steiniger pointed out: “war is the enemy of men, and also of the 
survivors, and the question can only be how can I deal with this barbarization. ... By 
fighting against war, by preventing it!”
106
 Harich even claimed that before the war, rape 
was “not a normal thing” in the Soviet Union; rather men and women had lived 
respectfully with each other.
107
This approach was summarized aptly by one speaker who recalled talking to a “few 
girls” about this problem and reminding them of the proper context: 
You expect that the Russians and especially the Poles forget what shameful crimes were committed 
in the name of the German people in their countries. But you want to blame the Russian people for 
the unpleasant deeds of a few. These you don’t want to forget while you expect from the others that 
they shall have forgotten much greater crimes and monstrosities in such a short period of time. 
[Applause].
108
Here we encounter exemplarily why it was problematic to try to teach people lessons 
of the past by invoking a guilt that is both abstract and concrete depending on whom you 
are talking to, and whose real-life experience in the present overshadowed everything 
which had happened in the past. Naimark has analyzed the intricate connection between 
the Eastern Front war and the postwar behavior of Red Army soldiers in Germany. Yet 
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no amount of positive propaganda about the Soviet Union seemed to suffice to dent the 
hatred of Russians resulting from National Socialist hate-campaigns against the Soviets 
in the past as well as from the every-day experience under Soviet occupation in the 
present.
109
 After all, every person has individual memories which often contradict or 
undermine the officially proclaimed memory. Which of the existing memories are 
favored in public discourse is mainly a matter of political power, yet the multitude of 
individual experiences and memories makes the forging of official narratives extremely 
difficult. It was exactly for these reasons that the SED’s politics of memory remained of 
questionable success, ultimately doomed to become a central factor causing the SED’s 
demise into ideological illegitimacy and moral incredibility.
The established “frozen past,”
110
 the official narrative that declared “Operation 
Barbarossa” the ultimate crime of Hitler Germany and molded East Germany’s future 
into the alleged lessons to be drawn from this past, collided sooner or later with 
individual experiences and perceptions during and after the war. Thus, the role the 
postwar present for both individual and official attempts to come to terms with the past 
cannot be emphasized enough. The more interesting it is therefore to investigate what 
was told and what was suppressed about the war on the Eastern Front, and how it was 
interpreted. No doubt, the extent to which the Eastern Front was discussed in the Eastern 
zone had no parallel in the West. This explains why the “myth of a clean Wehrmacht” 
could not emerge in the East the way it did in the West. Very early, the crimes on the 
Eastern Front were connected to the Wehrmacht, as a last example from the “About the 
109
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Russians” debates illustrates. Asking herself whether Russians could ever truly befriend 
Germans after what both had done to each other, a German woman with front experience 
remembered the brutal routine of German war crimes in the Soviet Union:
I was also stationed at the front and when we entered one village we discovered that Germans had 
left the village two days earlier. Before they left they had locked up the remaining inhabitants: 
elderly, children and cripples in the houses and burned them. A small child which had jumped out 
of one of the burning windows kneeled before a commander and pleaded for his life and this child 
was kicked back into the houses with the feet. I later asked witnesses, Soviet citizens who had seen 
this happening, who these troops were, whether they were SS troops, but they had to tell me that 
these were ordinary rank-and-file soldiers acting on orders.
111
Despite the occasional allusion to the Wehrmacht’s role on the Eastern Front, the 
SED state was far from becoming the advocate of historical truth. If it was opportune to 
deal with such crimes en detail, i.e. if it served the purpose of mobilizing for socialism 
and against Western “reaction,” the SED encouraged it. Over the years, however, the 
“German working class” was exculpated from any responsibility and the “fascist hordes” 
who committed crimes had nothing in common with the worker soldiers who were forced 
by Hitler into the abyss of a senseless war. 
One group in particular, the German POWs in Soviet captivity, served this purpose 
suitably: those returning until 1949 were canvassed by the SED for their potential moral 
credibility as first-hand witnesses of “progress” and “humanism” in the Soviet Union and 
as contributors to reparations resulting from the forced labor they had performed in 
Soviet captivity. Most of the returnees to the Eastern zone retreated into apolitical private 
life because they were unwilling to serve such propagandistic purpose; quite a few, 
however, joined the German-Soviet friendship movement. They in fact became the 
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“backbones” of the DSF.
112
 In contrast, the Soviet government refused to repatriate 23,000 
German soldiers in 1949 most of which it had convicted for “war crimes.” By accepting 
and embracing Moscow’s claim that these remaining POWs were convicted war 
criminals, the SED found a way to blame Nazi war crimes in the Soviet Union on a 
concrete, yet distant group of people. At the same time, by supporting the continuous 
imprisonment of this group, the SED put itself into a position from which it was no 
longer necessary to publicly debate a share of responsibility among its own people – the 
“German working class.”
113
 I will come back to the POW issue but for the moment it is 
important to note that returnees started to play a crucial role in the campaign for German-
Soviet friendship in 1948/49. Their individual, potentially criminal, conduct on the 
Eastern Front was erased by an asserted personal cathartic experience in Soviet 
imprisonment which could be manifested upon return by joining the collective movement 
to build socialism in the Eastern zone.
“LEARNING FROM HISTORY:” BUILDING DEMOCRACY, FIGHTING DICTATORSHIP
Although the so-called anti-totalitarian consensus did not emerge until the 1950s in 
West Germany, its roots can be found in the early postwar years.
114
 The most outspoken 
critic of Soviet communism and its prophets in East Germany was Kurt Schumacher
(1895-1952) who emerged as the leader of West German social democracy. Schumacher, 
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a former Reichstag deputy and World War I veteran, had suffered ten years of 
imprisonment in the Nazi concentration camp Dachau and was the “man of the hour” for 
the SPD in 1945.
115
 Schumacher’s speeches and programmatic contributions were 
immersed in history. He defined the role of history for his political commitment with the 
following words: “History is what has happened, and particularly today it fulfills only 
one purpose for the politician, namely to learn from it.”
116
 Schumacher was most 
outspoken about the failure of the German communists to anticipate the fascist 
catastrophe, and he also harshly criticized Allied policies in occupied Germany more than 
any other leading politician between 1945 and 1949. He was a rare voice in advocating to 
grant surviving Jews restitution in material form and to acknowledge their singular fate 
under Nazism in moral and political terms.
117
 Nonetheless, the crimes of the past remained 
vague; he seldom referred to them in explicit terms. Honoring the war dead, Schumacher 
commemorated all victims of Nazism indiscriminately, and he stressed that the main war 
criminals in politics and industry must be prosecuted. He saw the German working class, 
much as the KPD asserted, as the abused victim and blinded tool of fascism. During his 
opening speech at the first SPD Party Congress in Hannover in 1946, Schumacher 
recalled first and foremost the suffering and martyrdom of “our own dead:”
Friends and Comrades!
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Our first thought goes to our dead. The victims of fascism in our own people. The dead of the fight for 
liberation in other countries. The women and children who where carried off to death by air-war, 
hunger, and disease. The Jews who fell victim to the bestial race delusion [Rassenwahn] of the Hitler
dictatorship. All, without difference in nation and race, who lost their life in the fight against 
dictatorship, oppression and expansionism.
118
Schumacher’s explicit reference to the Jewish catastrophe is noteworthy and was not 
a common topos in political rhetoric of that time. Yet, he was never quite clear on who 
was to blame for these crimes – aside from the acknowledgment, that the “cliques” 
around Hitler were responsible for the war and that “many Germans” bore a share of 
responsibility for the rise of National Socialism.
119
 He called for the “punishment of the 
Nazi criminals” and the prosecution of “those responsible for these policies going as far 
as extermination (bis zur Vernichtung).”
120
 Yet, he did not identify the “German working 
class” as participants in Hitler’s war of aggression against Europe, but as sacrificing 
“fighters against Nazism.” Thus, German workers “must not shy away from comparison 
with other working classes in the world:”
If one points at the armed uprisings in the territories occupied by the Nazi armies, then we respond 
that these parallels don’t make sense. Almost the entire nation stood behind the insurgents there. 
They had to fulfil a national mission. The penetration of Germany with Nazism, the closely-knit net 
of the Gestapo, which the Germans felt on the streets, at work and in the family, does not allow a 
comparison between German and other conditions. We cannot imagine that a working class without 
which socialism in its current form would be unthinkable shall simply disappear into the abyss 
together with the guilty.
121
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Schumacher extended the resistance of a few social democrats to the entire German 
working class, and thus did something very similar to what KPD/SED leaders propagated 
in the Eastern zone: the legendary story of proletarian antifascism was extended to the 
mass of ordinary Germans thereby disassociating them, and practically exculpating them, 
from Nazi war crimes. Yet, whereas the KPD/SED at least sought to preserve an 
awareness that millions of German workers had served in the “fascist Wehrmacht” – not 
because they were committed to the historical truth but because this was the necessary 
pretext for establishing a “proletarian dictatorship” eternally securing German-Soviet 
friendship – Schumacher refrained from even making this connection in his major 
speeches of the postwar years. 
The reasons for this partial silence lay in politics. Squarely denouncing the Soviet 
Union as totalitarian state, Schumacher did not see the past for what it was, but – in 
accordance with his credo – learned from it for the present. The fact, that the USSR had 
occupied Eastern Europe and was imposing Soviet-style “democracy” was the overriding 
theme and motivation of Schumacher’s stand towards “Russia,” as he called it. Not once 
did he refer to “Barbarossa” as a historical burden or a possible and plausible source of 
certain security concerns in Moscow. Although the cost and legacy of the Nazi war 
against the Soviet Union were undoubtedly on his mind, he did not make them part of his 
public speech and political thought. Here he differed greatly from his popular heir, Willy 
Brandt, who, as we will later see, introduced a new openness and honesty with regards to 
past and present German-Soviet relations causing a paradigm change in the way not only 
social democrats viewed the historical, political and moral implications of the war on the 
Eastern Front. Schumacher knew that a peaceful Europe needed Russia, albeit not at all 
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cost: “Europe is possible with Russia, Europe is best possible with Russia; but Europe 
and Germany are not possible the Russian way.”
122
 He accused the East German 
communists of selling the zone to the Soviets by “paying as much reparations as Russia 
demands, by giving up and sacrificing the [remaining] prisoners of war, by slaughtering 
the idea of freedom in Germany and at the will of Germany.” All this, he concluded, was 
in fact “pan-Slavic politics” guised in “pan-Germanic agitation.”
123
 Schumacher also 
noted the importance of fear: “they speculate on the masses’ fear of violence,” fear of a 
new war instigated with the “tactics of power, the monopoly over agenda-setting, 
constant agitation, denunciations and defamations.” Yet, Schumacher claimed, even if 
Germans were “weakened in spirit and ethos” by twelve years of dictatorship, “they have 
not become so weak and poor not to realize that now the same thing is going on here that 
had been going on for the last twelve years.”
124
 For the SPD-leader, the reality of Soviet 
totalitarianism was just as bad as the Nazi regime. 
Indeed by 1947, Soviet communism, had risked and lost the grandiose historical 
credit and popular support it had generated around the world during the fight against Nazi 
Germany. In the course of this process the Soviet Union had lost even the potential 
compassion of the fascist enemy’s former most virulent resisters – German antifascist 
dissidents such as Schumacher. As a result, World War II came to be viewed not as the 
past war between Germany and the Allies, but as a prelude to later confrontations 
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culminating in the Cold War. The shadow of the present inescapably hung over the past. 
And just as the memory of World War II was overshadowed by rising Cold War tensions 
and the long-term division of Europe, the war on the Eastern Front was hardly taken for 
itself in East and West Germany until the 1990s. In the West, it was the most politicized 
and ideologically charged aspect of the history of the entire war for two very different 
reasons. First, the Holocaust was carried out under the guise of the crusades against 
Poland and the Soviet Union, and any historical research was bound to unearth the 
connection between the Wehrmacht’s Eastern campaign and the mass murder of the 
Jews. Second, the main victim of “Barbarossa,” the Soviet Union and its citizens, 
transformed into the chief enemy, indeed became the main “perpetrator” in the global 
East-West conflict after 1945. Only in part resulting from its own actions in Eastern 
Europe, for decades to come the Soviet peoples were denied, a truthful and sincere 
acknowledgement of the nature and extent of Nazi war crimes committed on the Eastern 
Front. These conclusions remain just as valid if we look beyond the political borders in 
the Western zone and even beyond the caesura of dual state-hood in 1949. 
The two other emerging influential and charismatic leaders in the West, Konrad 
Adenauer of the Christian-Democratic Union (CDU) and Theodor Heuss of the Free 
German Party (FDP) subscribed in general to the same world view as their social 
democratic counterpart. Yet, in Adenauer’s speeches the large group of former soldiers, 
POWs and their families figured more prominently, and Heuss engaged in more than 
routine lip service when discussing the role of the Wehrmacht, its criminal legacy and 
defeat. Konrad Adenaur, 69 years old in 1945, had been mayor of Cologne during the 
Weimar years and spent the Nazi era in inner exile and political abstinence. Often 
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described as “democratic patriarch” or “democratic autocrat” (Sebastian Haffner), he is 
said to have been the strong charismatic fatherlike figure Germans needed in the 
transition towards democracy.
125
 Adenauer defined democracy and Christianity as the two 
fundaments of his political thought. His answer in 1945 to the question of how Nazism 
could have happened was more spiritual than political: a wrong understanding of the 
state, a deification of the state and its institutions, and the godlessness of the age had 
paved the way for amoral “materialism.” Dissecting “National Socialism” into right 
nationalism and left socialism Adenauer traced its roots back to the grand transformations 
of the nineteenth century: industrialization, urbanization, nationalization, secularization, 
materialism and consumerism. The total negligence of the individual’s dignity and 
freedom deriving from its divine creation had been lost along the way – the main 
calamity of modernity in Adenauer’s eyes. Consequently, what he required of Germans 
was not an admission of “collective guilt” for what had gone wrong with Germany, but 
an individual “search of conscience.” He expressed both shame and pride in light of the 
catastrophe; shame for the crimes committed in the German name, and pride for the 
“heroic” way in which Germans “bore their fate.”
126
It was always part of Adenauer’s political rhetoric and conviction to side with the 
small Nazi and to save the “decent German soldier’s” memory from maculation and 
condemnation. Already in 1946 he demanded to “finally” leave the former nominal 
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members of the Nazi Party (“Mitläufer”) alone, notwithstanding that the “National 
Socialist and militarist spirit must be expunged” from German society. During a March 
1946 speech about CDU principles at Cologne University, he also addressed the question 
of denazification and cautiously differentiated between personal and collective guilt. He 
clarified that those “active Nazis and active militarists, those responsible for the war and 
its prolongation – including certain economic leaders – must be removed from their 
positions.” The “misery they have brought over Germany and the world cries to heaven” 
and they should be indicted and judged before German courts. Yet, he specified:
We only want to hit him who is really guilty. The followers [Mitläufer], those who did not oppress 
others, who did not profit, did not commit any crimes, one must finally leave alone. They themselves 
should behave with restraint for they bear part of the guilt, even if only a miniscule part, for this 
terrible development. They can join our party even if they cannot yet fulfil a task.
127
The same goes for former soldiers, Adenauer concluded: a soldier who has fought 
“in a decent way and who did nothing else than that” was not an “active militarist per se, 
regardless of his rank, whether he was officer or not.” Consequently, former soldiers 
“must not be relegated.” For if “one affronts harmless followers and soldiers just because 
they believed to fulfil their duty, one practically breeds a vulgar and extreme 
nationalism.”
128
 As first chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Adenauer stuck 
to this tactical argumentation, pragmatically manoeuvring between accusation and 
integration, yet ultimately advocating the white washing of the Wehrmacht. Regardless of 
the gruesome and incriminating facts unearthed during the Nuremberg trial in 1945/46, 
and the successor trials, particularly the so-called OKW-trial of 1948 (“Case 12”), 






Wehrmacht.” He was convinced that the number of “truly guilty higher officers” was so 
“extraordinary small” that “the honor of the Wehrmacht is not derogated by that.”
129
The political consequences of this view are evident: Adenauer incessantly denounced 
the continuing incarceration of German POWs in the Soviet Union without ever referring 
to the reasons why they were taken prisoners, leave alone explaining why they were on 
Soviet territory in the first place.
130
 Similarly to Schumacher, the perception of present 
Soviet injustice justified the negligence of past German injustice. The political 
argumentation became one-dimensional in the sense that preceding historical events were 
simply removed from the reference frame of political speech and action. 
Russia as global power and as potential threat, however, remained at the center of 
political and security considerations. In a semi-public speech to students in Bonn in July 
1948, Adenauer elaborated on the possibility of a new war with Russia. He stated that the 
scenarios of “paganism” flooding Europe and the “Russians on the Rhine one day” was 
no mere fiction. He also reminded his young listeners that “Russia has been and will be a 
land of hunger” but that the country’s economic, military and human capacities have been 
reduced by the last war so that one cannot consider it a “world power” any longer.
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Mixing a persisting sense of superiority – in spite of the total defeat of Germany! – with 
the verdict of inferiority about the ever-backward Russian lands, Adenauer appropriated 
the past accordingly: reference to the destruction caused by the Wehrmacht in the Soviet 
Union was, if made at all, tainted by the cynical conclusion that this thorough and bloody 
curbing of Russia’s capacities had permanently ended its aspirations as global player. 
After all, the “twelve years of National Socialism were an episode in history” which 
cannot count as justification for the “Russian occupation in half Germany.” This kind of a 
“historization of National Socialism”
132
– i.e. the attempt to place the Nazi period within 
the larger context of world history – in fact aimed at de-contextualizing the war against 
the Soviet Union. It disconnected present policy concerns and decisions from the past. 
Given the critical international situation in 1948 this is well understandable. The West 
had good reason to fear expansionist communism in its Soviet design. For, as John Lewis 
Gaddis has phrased it, the Western empire arose “by invitation,” but the Soviet “by 
imposition,” by the use of force.
133
 Yet, it also meant a durable settlement, or rather non-
settlement, concerning one of the most horrible wars ever waged in human history with 
severe and long-term implications for German national identity, collective memory and 
political culture. 
context. Adenauer claimed the world was divided into two powers, good and evil, literally: the latter was 
“Soviet Russia, which can be equaled with Asia […] This power is a direct enemy of Christianity, an 
enemy of God […] The danger for us Germans and Europeans to be swallowed by communist pagandom is 
by no means banned.”
132
 Martin Broszat coined this phrase decades later during the so-called historians’ controversy in Germany, 
pleading for the integration of Nazi history into the larger context of German history and repudiating 
attempts to dissociate the Third Reich as “abnormal episode” from the otherwise “normal” course of 
German history. See Martin Broszat, “Plädoyer für eine Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus,” Merkur
no. 435 (1985), 373-385
133
 John Lewis Gaddis, We now know. Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998), 1-53, quote on 52.
178
The leading politician of postwar German liberalism, Theodor Heuss (1884-1963), 
declared that he wanted to serve his country as “intermediary” upon swearing his oath as 
the first president of the Federal Republic in Germany in 1949. He had grown into this 
role during the preceding four years, particularly as leader of the FDP since 1948 and as 
member of the constitutional convent in 1948/49 assembled to draft a “Basic Law” 
(Grundgesetz) for the West German state. As journalist, writer and intellectual, Heuss 
had a much more ambiguous past than Schumacher and Adenauer. Despite having been 
well aware of what “Hitler’s Path” meant for Germany (he had written a book with this 
title about the rising Nazis in 1932
134
), he voted for Hitler’s “Enabling Law” in 1933 as 
Reichstag member for the Deutsche Staatspartei, certainly the darkest hour in his life as 
homo politicus.
135
 He spent the Nazi years in inner exile, writing biographical studies, and 
returned to politics in 1945 joining the Liberals in Wurttemberg-Baden. As Minister for 
Culture in Wurttemberg-Baden, Heuss began his career as public speaker and was soon 
recognized as apt intermediary between the past and present. With “cold frankness” he 
repeatedly insisted that the war had been caused by Germany, that its leaders “had wished 
for it.” Echoing Karl Jaspers’ dictum to let the “good-will of communication reign,”
136
Heuss warned that “without such clear speaking-out we will loose the ground beneath our 
feet” in a March 1946 speech before the Kulturbund in East Berlin.
137
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trials, taking place simoultaneously, were not even needed for this, he claimed, people 
had known what would follow once Hitler attained power and they knew of the crimes 
his regime committed all over Europe. His Salomonian verdict: “we were conscientiously 
forced into this war”
138
 and now the well-known “bitter truths”
139
 were presented. 
With this in mind, Heuss approached the difficult question of judging the Wehrmacht 
soldiers’ role during the war with much sensitivity for the individual tragedy but also 
with much willingness to overlook historical facts, precisely those facts discussed by the 
International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg at the time. He underlined that it was 
“difficult to speak of the situation of the German soldier in this last war:”
It is a tragic conversation. One must not forget the people who believed to be fighting for Germany and 
who died for Hitler. One example for many others: A young man foresaw his death and wrote to his 
mother: ‘I will perish. Don’t write in the paper that I died for the Fuhrer, because I hate him and 
despise him.’ The obituary was already in print with the ‘Fuhrer’ and everything, and the family felt 
that it had betrayed its son’s legacy. Thousands, millions, who stood in the line of duty as soldiers, 
cannot be released of this legacy. It is not permitted to disregard this fighting and dying of millions and 
even to speak of it disdainfully. They stood in a tragic bond.
140
It is not clear who disregarded and disdained these dead soldiers but obviously Heuss
was hinting at revelations about the Wehrmacht’s involvement in war crimes on the 
Eastern Front – the killing of the Jews, civilians, and maltreatment of Soviet prisoners of 
war as it was unearthed during the IMT’s proceedings. Instead, he contended, it was 
necessary to speak of the “historical greatness of the German soldierly tradition 
(Soldatentum), … yet, we see it clearly, this part of German history is over.” And Heuss 
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victors and vanquished but only those “exterminated” and those who survived: “We are 
the exterminated and we are the survivors. For a nation there is no comfortable exit such 
as a little suicide was for Hitler or Goebbels or [SS-leader Heinrich] Himmler who 
simply sneaked out of history through a postern.” Yet by granting the surviving Germans 
that they were merely the “witnesses of their own fate,” Heuss turned history itself upside 
down and – to say the least – equalled the suffering of Germans with those who actually 
were exterminated by them. That “thousands and millions” had died, mainly on the 
Eastern Front, he did not link directly to the aggressive war waged in Eastern Europe and 
to the million-fold deaths among the local populations occuring in the wake of it. The 
memory of and empathy for the “other” victims was there but vague, present but aloof, 
and authentic but relativizing. 
This section should be concluded with one of Theodor Heuss’ memorable remarks 
that actually reflects these very ambiguities and limitations. In an essay prepared for a 
meeting of liberal leaders in January 1946, he dealt extensively with the question of 
narrating and writing history. The following lines document both his historical insight 
and his humanity:
Each generation writes its history anew. Though the pasts remain what they are. They lay like deceased 
in the what-has-been, but the dead can come back and become the haunting present.
141
Heuss recalled that during the Nazi period, historians have come to disregard 
Ranke’s understanding of writing history, namely to “show how it really was.” 
Historiography had mutated into a science of picking and choosing from history, had 
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become “a selection procedure serving current political purposes.”
142
 Unfortunately, this 
way of reading history continued to dominate historical discourses in postwar Germany. 
Heuss’ warning that “a politically motivated interpretation of history is not worth much” 
and his call for a “return to uncommitted (zweckentbundenen) truthfulness” trailed away 
for at least two decades without much resonance. Ultimately, his own speeches helped 
erect some of the obstacles for such an undertaking in truthfulness. 
The calculated presence of the Eastern Front war in East German political memory 
did not generate a genuine interest in historical reality, in the question of individual guilt 
and responsibility. Rather, the SED’s project of German-Soviet friendship aimed at the 
collective redemption of East Germany’s citizen. It offered absolution in exchange for 
political loyalty. The general absence of “Operation Barbarossa” from West German 
memory led to a different kind of disinterest.
143
 While the political leaders commemorated 
and acknowledged the Wehrmacht’s sacrifices in a “clean” Eastern war, they remained 
silent about the complicit role of the Wehrmacht in the war of extermination and about 
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during those same years, that the Nuremberg Trial in 1945/46, the OKW-Trial in 1947/48 
and the Manstein-Trial in 1949 constituted moments of historical truth during which most 
of the realties of “Operation Barbarossa” were publicly discussed – only to disappear 




Nothing but the Truth: “Operation Barbarossa” and the Prosecution of 
War Crimes
“Attracted by the militaristic and aggressive Nazi policies, the German generals found themselves drawn 
into adventures of a scope they had not foreseen. [They] planned and carried through manifold acts of 
aggression which turned Europe into a charnel-house, and caused the Armed Forces to be used for foul 
practices foully executed of terror, pillage, murder and wholesale slaughter. Let no one be heard to say that 
the military uniform shall be their cloak, or that they may find sanctuary by pleading membership in the 
profession to which they are an eternal disgrace.”
From the Nurmberg Indictment (1945)
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I. Nuremberg and the Question of Guilt 1945/46
The Nuremberg Tribunal, the trial of the Wehrmacht High Command (OKW) as well 
as the Manstein Trial represent three examples for the early and sincere reckoning with 
German war crimes after World War II in Germany. They were initiated by the Allies 
which explains to a great extent the sincerity and thoroughness with which the criminal 
legacy of the Nazi regime was treated. These trials signify moments of historical truth in 
Germany’s early postwar history. This chapter reconstructs what these trials had to say 
specifically about Nazi war crimes on the Eastern Front, and it examines the reactions to 
them in all four zones of occupation. By paying attention to the details of these judicial 
proceedings, the chapter offers also the opportunity to clarify what is meant by the 
“legacies” of Stalingrad and the Eastern Front war. The wealth of historic evidence 
introduced before the trials not only informed the public about the crimes and their 
victims; it also speaks to the degree of ignorance this evidence received after the trials 
were over. 
Political memory is not only about commemorating the past. It is political because it 
usually transports a certain historical knowledge into the public sphere. The history of the 
Eastern Front memory in postwar Germany illustrates the pitfalls of a “public use of 
history”
1
 if this “use” is reduced to the communication and selection of historical 
knowledge for political purposes. In both Germanys, the historical knowledge emerging 
from the meticulously working Allied tribunals was largely neglected by the political 
elite – albeit to varying degrees and for differing reasons. This chapter thus investigates 
1
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what was known, debated and judged before the courts and in the public between the 
years of 1945 and 1949 about “Operation Barbarossa.” And as these facts were largely 
neglected until the heated controversy surrounding the Wehrmacht exhibit fifty years 
later, it also demonstrates just how complete this negligence of historical truth regarding 
the “war of extermination” on the Eastern Front was in West German society, and just 
how selectively and calculated the SED’s Eastern Front war memory was in the GDR. In 
so far, Dolf Sternberger’s contemporary diagnosis that by 1949 West German society had 
grown a “thick skin” immersing in a “vital forgetfulness” with regards to the Nazi past, 
can also be applied on the selective forgetting of the Eastern Front war in West and East 
Germany.
2
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was established by the four Allies 
in order to prosecute Nazi war crimes and crimes against humanity. The main task and 
most valuable achievement of eventually thirteen trials between 1946 and 1949
3
 was the 
“discovery, collection, examination, translation, and marshalling of documentary 
evidence demonstrating the criminality of the former leaders of the Third Reich.”
4
 It was 
the first time in history that “legal proceedings have been instituted against leaders of an 
enemy nation.” They accordingly received much attention, and promted approving as 
2
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well as critical commentary among contemporaries.
5
 The twenty-two defendants on trial 
in Nuremberg were leading political, economic and military functionaries of the former 
Nazi regime and their individual indictment testified to the Allies’ willingness to avoid 
any claims of German collective guilt. The defendants were accused of three central 
charges formulated in Article 6 of the IMT Charter:
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which 
there shall be individual responsibility: 
(a) CRIMES AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of 
aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in 
a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing; 
(b) WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, 
but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of 
civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on 
the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns 
or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity; 
(c) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and 
other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; or 
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country 
where perpetrated. 
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a 
common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts 
performed by any persons in execution of such plan.
6
Apart from providing evidence that proved the defendants responsibility for any or 
all of these crimes, the Tribunal also discussed the question of individual guilt by 
association or membership in a group or organization. It was in this context that the 
criminal conduct of the Wehrmacht and the relationship between the Wehrmacht 
leadership and the Nazi rulers was debated. Article 9 of the IMT Charter provided the 
Tribunal with the possibility to declare a group or organization as “criminal:”
At the trial of any individual member of any group or organization the Tribunal may declare (in 
connection with any act of which the individual may be convicted) that the group or organization of 
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The indictment proposed to declare the leadership of the Wehrmacht – a group of 
about 130 high-ranking officers who formed the general staff  of the three armed services 
(army, navy, air force) and the High Command (OKW) – a criminal organization. This 
declaration was rejected in the final judgment; what stuck with the public thereafter was 
the conclusion that “the Wehrmacht was no criminal organization.” The Tribunal’s 
reasoning for this decision was largely disregarded: it held that “the number of persons 
charged … is still so small that individual trials of these officers would accomplish the 
purpose here sought better than a declaration such as is requested.” Furthermore it 
reasoned that General Staff and High Command were “neither an ‘organization’ nor a 
‘group’ within the meaning of those terms as used in Article 9 of the Charter,”
8
 because 
its member had not joined a declared “organization” in a voluntary act but as a matter of 
course determined largely by their professional careers.
9
 They should thus be tried 
individually. By advocating the individual prosecution of the wider Wehrmacht 
7
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leadership, which in itself was another prove against the widely lamented “collective 
guilt” theory – the Tribunal inadvertently paved the way for the emergence of the “myth 
of the clean Wehrmacht.” Yet, as the following paragraphs will demonstrate, the facts 
were out in the public, the true nature of the war on the Eastern Front was extensively 
documented by the Tribunal, and communicated via print media and radio in all four 
occupation zones. 
With regards to the war against the Soviet Union, the prosecution clarified the main 
objectives already in the indictment: first, to disprove the Nazis’ claim that “Barbarossa” 
was a preemptive war forced upon Germany to avoid an impeding Soviet aggression; 
secondly, to demonstrate that the Eastern campaign was an aggressive war violating 
international law and bilateral agreements, and that it was a premeditated attack; and 
thirdly, that the war was waged for the economic exploitation of the USSR and for the 
acquisition of Lebensraum with the ultimate aim to eliminate the USSR as political 
power in Europe.
10
 In conclusion, the prosecution sought to demonstrate that “in the 
history of relations between sovereign nations, a blacker chapter has never been written 
than the one which tells of the Nazi conspirators’ unprovoked invasion of the territory of 
the Soviet Union.”
11
The facts, documents, photographs and film materials presented before the court in 
the appendix to the indictment laid the foundation for the historiographical, judicial and 
political reckoning with the Nazi past. The material was published in English in 1946/47 






The evidence was also partially reproduced and commented by all main newspapers 
across Germany.
12
 The press reports about the Tribunal’s proceedings demonstrated to the 
German public not only the deep entanglement of the military elite with National 
Socialism. It also informed them about the scope of crimes committed, particularly in the 
Eastern occupied territories, and even highlighted the presence and participation of rank-
and-file soldiers in these crimes.
13
What happened to this knowledge after 1946? It obviously did not enter political and 
collective memory and conscience in the immediate postwar years. In the Western zones, 
where no ideological imperative demanded the continuous public presence of the crimes 
on Soviet territory, these facts soon disappeared in libraries and court archives. This is a 
sad example of a collective amnesia, of the public forgetting of common knowledge 
about the past. It is important to keep in mind, though, that this does not mean that the 
war on the Eastern Front was obliterated from collective memory altogether; in fact, it 
was widely discussed and remembered, yet only in selections, in bits and pieces, often 
lacking the historical context (e.g. in literature, media) and focused on the tragedy of 
individual soldierly suffering – with the Stalingrad disaster as its historical incarnation.
14
Already in 1946, attentive and interested contemporaries could learn about the war 
on the Eastern Front what the organizers of the Wehrmacht exhibit “War of 
12
 See Jörg Echternkamp, „Wut auf die Wehrmacht? Vom Bild der deutschen Soldaten in der unmittelbaren 




 See the evidence provided in Christina Morina, „Der Angriffskrieg als Lesestoff: Der Krieg an der 
Ostfront in der deutsch-deutschen Nachkriegsliteratur, 1945-1960,” Zeitgeschichte Online/Contemporary 
History Online, Special Issue on the Sixtieth Anniversary of the End of World War II, May 2005. Online 
available at: http://www.zeitgeschichte-online.de [June 2005]. See further section 3 of this Chapter, as well 
as Chapter 8 “War and Literature.”
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Extermination. Crimes of the Wehrmacht, 1941-1945” unearthed again and anew fifty 
years later. Only in 1995, this historical knowledge entered the public conscience and 
thus undermined the durable “Wehrmacht myth.” A brief recollection of the Tribunals 
findings and judgements does not only illustrate the thoroughness of the just mentioned 
process of forgetting but also details those very historical facts which inspire this study. I 
therefore distil from the IMT’s evidence what is relevant to the picture of the Eastern 
Front as it could have emerged in German political culture and popular perception.
According to the before-mentioned three main objectives of the prosecutors, the 
indictment contained the documentary evidence for “Plan Barbarossa” concluding “that 
this directive was no mere staff planning exercise [in 1940]. It was an order to prepare for 
an act of aggression which was intended to occur and which actually did occur.”
15
 Further 
documents such as operational plans and military orders demonstrated “beyond any doubt 
that the invasion of the Soviet Union was undeniably a premeditated attack.”
16
 In sum, the 
documents
are sufficient to establish the premeditation and calculation which marked the military preparations for 
the invasion of the U.S.S.R. Starting almost a full year before the launching of the attack, the Nazi 
conspirators planned and prepared every military detail of their aggression against the Soviet Union 
with all that thoroughness and meticulousness which has come to be associated with the German 
character. The leading roles were performed in this preparation by the military figures – Goering, 
Keitel, Jodl and Raeder [all among the present defendants].
17
The prosecution further maintained that the Nazis had ensured that the attack would be 
“economically profitable.” It detailed the “political and economic motives” for the attack 
but it lacked a discussion of the racist background of the Lebensraum project. “Greed for 
15
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the raw material, food, and other supplies” was what the Nazis drove to the East, 
materials “which they conceived of themselves as needing for the maintenance of their 
war machine.”
18
 The “political aim” was “the elimination of the U.S.S.R. as a powerful 
political factor in Europe, and the acquisition of Lebensraum,”
19
 for which the writings 
and activities of Alfred Rosenberg – Hitler’s commissioner or Reichsleiter for the Eastern 
occupied territories – were presented as evidence. The Soviet prosecutors introduced 
evidence showing “how all this planning and preparation for the elimination of the 
U.S.S.R. as a political factor was actually carried out:” the planned execution of the 
intelligentsia, for example, was presented as one part of the “program to destroy the 
Soviet Union politically and to make impossible its early resurrection as a European 
Power.”
20
The way the attack was planned and carried out, the indictment concluded, showed 
that the reasons for it could not have been “self-defense or treaty breaches.”
21
 Instead, all 
of the mentioned reasons 
appear to blend into one grand motif of Nazi policy. The pattern into which these varied reasons fall is 
the traditional Nazi ambition for expansion to the East at the expense of the U.S.S.R. This Nazi version 
of an earlier imperial imperative, “Drang nach Osten,” had been a cardinal principle of the Party 
almost since its birth, and rested on the twin bases of political strategy and economic aggrandizement. 
Politically, such action meant elimination of the powerful force to the East, which might constitute a 
threat to German ambition, and acquisition of Lebensraum. Economically , it offered opportunities for 
the plunder of vast quantities of food, raw materials, and other supplies. ...
If any doubt existed that at least one of the main purposes of the invasion was to steal the food and raw 
material needed for the Nazi war machine, regardless of the consequences to the Russian people which 
such robbery would entail, that doubt is dispelled by [a series of cited documents] showing clear and 












 Ibid., 831-833. See also chapter XIII of the Indictment, 1040-1052.
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Neither could there be doubt in the public mind about the fact that the military 
campaign “Barbarossa” was expected to and actually did entail devastating consequences 
for the Soviet population. It was “a program of premeditated murder on a scale so vast as 
to stagger human imagination.”
23
 Up to this point, the systematic hunt-down and killing of 
“partisans,” “Bolshevik commissars” and “Jews” in that territory had not even been 
mentioned. In 1946 and after, the anti-Jewish policies of the Nazi regime were commonly 
viewed as merely “one part” of the Nazi program, not as one of its central pillars as later 
historians would conclude.
24
 The indictment therefore simply noted that “anti-Jewish 
policy was part of the plan for unification” of Germans according to the motto “one race, 
one state, one Fuehrer.” The Nazis were convinced that the “Jews would not contribute to 
Germany’s military program, but on the contrary would hamper it. The Jews therefore 
must be eliminated.”
25
 Yet, the Tribunal also stressed that “the treatment of the Jews 




 One of the famous contemporary works arguing that anti-Semitism was peripheral to Nazi policy, i.e. 
that it served mainly economic and propagandistic purposes, was Franz Neumann’s Behemoth. The 
Structure and Practice of National Socialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944). Also other 
representatives of the Frankfurt school reasoned that anti-Semitism was a mere tool of Nazi policy, see for 
example, Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Dialektik der Auklärung. Philosophische Fragmente 
(Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 1971): “Antisemitismus ist kaum mehr eine selbständige Regung, sondern eine 
Planke der Plattform: wer irgend dem Faschismus die Chance gibt, subskribiert mit der Zerschlagung der 
Gewerkschaften und dem Kreuzzug gegen den Bolschewismus automatisch auch die Erledigung der 
Juden.“ (180) And: „Daß, der Tendenz nach, Antisemitismus nur noch als Posten im auswechselbaren 
Ticket [dieser oder jener ideologischen Bewegung] vorkommt, begründet unwiderleglich die Hoffnung auf 
sein Ende. Die Juden werden zu einer Zeit ermordet, da die Führer die antisemitische Planke so leicht 
ersetzen könnten, wie die Gefolgschaften von einer Stätte der durchrationalisierten  Produktion in eine 
andere überzuführen sind“ (185). Both statements, though, have been met with great skepticism or were 
even rejected by later historians. For a summery of the discussion and an assessment see Jäckel, Hitler’s 
World View, 13-26, 47-66.
25
 Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, ed., Nazi Conspiracy and 
Aggression, vol. I, 978.
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of armaments and the conscription of manpower.”
26
 The court thus made clear that 
waging aggressive war against Europe in any case entailed exporting anti-Jewish policies 
to all conquered and occupied territories. Then followed a detailed description of these 
policy stages, ranging from discrimination to segregation, to slave labor to physical 
extermination. The two main means of destruction employed under the guise of war in 
the East were the extermination camps in the “General Government” established in 
Poland and the execution of Jews, other civilians, partisans and other declared “hostile 
elements” behind the front lines. While the indictment discussed the first in detail, it 
mentioned the second only in passing. Still, the facts were clear: 
It was not always necessary, or perhaps desirable, to place the Jews within Ghettos to effect 
elimination. In the Baltic States [i.e. on Soviet territory after June 1941] a more direct course of action 
was followed. According to a report by SS Brigade Fuehrer Stahlecker to Himmler, dated 15 October 
1941, entitled “Action Group A” ..., 135,567 persons, nearly all Jews, were murdered in accordance to 
basic orders directing the complete annihilation of the Jews.
27
The SS report was cited at length and is particularly interesting because of its description 
of various pogroms first instigated by advancing German troops and then carried out by 
local “auxiliary forces.”
The nature and degree of the involvement of Wehrmacht leaders and troops in such 
crimes was debated in connection with the question whether the OKW was a “criminal 
group or organization.” The prosecution’s argumentation, as already mentioned, was not 
adopted by the Tribunal (excluding the Soviet prosecutor) in the final judgement. 








 With regards to the categorization of the Wehrmacht as criminal 
organization, the Tribunal explicitly acknowledged the veracity and justification of the 
prosecution’s arguments in its final verdict. Noting that the Reichswehr/Wehrmacht 
antedated the Nazi regime, the indictment weighed soldierly tradition and recent practice 
in the German armed forces carefully against each another. And it also clarified that the 
“group” referred to in the indictment was the Wehrmacht leadership and that an army is 
not potentially criminal per se:
Needless to say, it is not the prosecution’s position that it is a crime to be a soldier or sailor, or to serve 
one’s country as a soldier or sailor in times of war. The profession of arms is an honourable one, and 
can be honorably practiced. But it is too clear for argument that a man who commits crimes cannot 
plead as a defense that he committed them in uniform.
29
This was the bottom line for the Tribunal’s handling of war crimes charges against 
the Wehrmacht leadership. It constituted a balanced acknowledgment of the difficult 
situation a soldier could find himself in while serving in the Wehrmacht under Hitler. 
Yet, it also set a standard of accountability for crimes possibly committed in uniform. As 
the last section of this chapter will demonstrate, this bottom line was not accepted by 
postwar German public opinion and political leadership – neither in East nor West 
Germany. Only, the first half of this reasoning, the claim that being a soldier was not a 
crime per se, was integrated into the respectively formulated soldierly narratives about 
World War II.
The indictment argued further, focussing on the leadership group, that the group 
agreed with the basic objectives of National Socialism and thus supported it. “Hitler
28
 Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, ed., Nazi Conspiracy and 
Aggression. Opinion and Judgment (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1947), 107.
29
 Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, ed., Nazi Conspiracy and 
Aggression, vol. II, 317.
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attracted the generals to him with the glitter of conquest and then succeeded in 
submerging them politically.” That they became a “tool” did not mean, however, that 
“they were unwitting, or that they did not participate fully in many of the actions which 
are charged as criminal.”
30
 In connection with the discussions and preparations of 
“Barbarossa,” the prosecution granted that some generals might have opposed the plan, 
yet as a group they failed to take action against it. The “events of 1941 and 1942 do not 
suggest that the High Command embarked on the Soviet war tentatively or with 
reservations, but rather with ruthless determination backed by careful planning.”
31
 Once 
again, the indictment took up the issue of a soldier’s role in a criminal war, clarifying that 
the generals were not accused on the grounds that they were soldiers: they were not 
accused because they had done “the usual things a soldier is expected to do, such as make 
military plans and command troops.” With the help of a very simple analogy, the 
indictment explained its main point:
“It is an innocent and respectable business to be a locksmith but it is none the less a crime if the 
locksmith turns his talents to picking the locks of neighbors and looting their homes. And that is the 
nature of the charges against all the defendants. ...
The Charter (Article 6 (a)) declares that wars of aggression and wars in violation of international 
treaties, agreements, and assurances are crimes against peace. It is no defense to plead that they 
practice a particular profession, whether it is arms or the law. It is perfectly legal for military men to 
prepare military plans to meet national contingencies, to carry out such plans and engage in wars if in 
so doing they do not knowingly plan and wage illegal wars.”
32
Moreover, by drafting and executing illegal war plans, the group also disregarded the 
rules of traditional warfare and became “wedded in a policy of terror.” The High 








or the actual crimes were committed by others such as SD and SS, in which case the 
prosecution believed that the group was “well aware that they were assisting in the 
commission of war crimes.” In fact, the prosecution was convinced that 
many crimes committed by the SS or SD were committed with the knowledge and necessary support of 
the General Staff and High Command, and that frequently members of the German Armed Formers 
[i.e. ordinary soldiers] acted in conjunction with the SS and SD in carrying out tasks then know by 
such respectable terms as “pacification,” “cleansing,” and “elimination of insecure elements.
33
In one of the most important sections on war crimes, the Tribunal made a distinction 
between the limited warfare in the Western occupied territories after 1940, and the brutal 
fighting amidst a hostile population on the Eastern Front. This is also the section where 
the nature of the war on the Eastern Front became most clear and explicit. The means of 
conventional warfare were deemed all but suitable to “respond” to the military resistance 
of the Red Army and partisan fighters. Crucially, the Tribunal unmasked the “partisan 
war” as the pretext for the murder of millions of civilian, thus in fact, for race war:
The activities of the German Armed Forces against partisans and other elements of the population 
became a vehicle for carrying out Nazi political and racial policies, and a cloak for the ruthless and 
barbaric massacre of Jews and of numerous segments of the Slavic population which were regarded by 
the Nazis as undesirable.. ... The German Armed Forces supported, assisted, and acted in cooperation 
with the SS Groups which were especially charged with antipartisan activities. Members of the General 
Staff and High Command Group ordered, directed, encouraged, and were fully aware of these criminal 
policies and activities. ...
The German High Command developed and applied a policy of terror against commandos and 
paratroopers, in violation of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, on the Western Front. On the Eastern 
Front it descended to savagery. In advance of the attack against the Soviet Union, the High Command 
ordered the troops to take ‘ruthless action,’ left it to the discretion of any officer to decided whether 
suspected civilians should be immediately shot, and empowered any officer with the powers of a 
Battalion commander to take ‘collective despotic measures’ against localities. Offenses committed 
against civilians by German soldiers, however, were not required to be prosecuted, and prosecution 
was suggested only where desirable in order to maintain discipline and security from a military 
standpoint. ...
The High Command and the chief lieutenants of Himmler jointly planned the establishment of the 
Einsatzgruppen ... These groups when in operational areas were under the command of the German 
Army, and German soldiers joined in their savagery. The Einsatzgruppen were completely dependent 
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Already during the proceedings before the Nuremberg Tribunal in 1946 it became 
abundantly clear that army and SS worked “hand in glove”
35
 in the commission of war 
crimes on the Eastern Front. Yet, especially in the West, almost none of these 
conclusions entered the official (and popular) memory of the war on the Eastern Front. 
When in 1995, a group of historians at the Hamburg Institute for Social Research reached 
similar conclusions and provided visual evidence for the involvement of ordinary 
German soldiers in the “war of extermination,” a public outcry shook post-unification 
Germany with a lasting impact on its historical self-image and political culture.
36
After the verdict was handed down in October 1946, only a small part of the 
Tribunal’s arguments stuck in the public mind: neither the General Staff nor High 
Command (and thus nor the Wehrmacht on the whole) were declared “criminal 
organisations” in the sense of Article 9 of the IMT Charter for reasons already mentioned 
above. The Soviet prosecutor issued a dissenting opinion in this regard, basically 
repeating the arguments of the indictment.
37




 Heer/Naumann, eds., Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944. On the public debates 
following the exhibition see Greven/von Wrochem, eds., Der Krieg in der Nachkriegszeit. And Hannes 
Heer, „The Difficulty of Ending a War: Reactions to the Exhibition ‚War of Extermination: Crimes of the 
Wehrmacht 1941-1944,’” History Workshop Journal, 46 (1998), 187-203. And idem, Vom Verschwinden 
der Täter. Der Vernichtungskrieg fand statt, aber keiner war dabei (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 2004). This 
was not the first time, of course, that these facts were documented but perhaps the first time that they were 
communicated to the public in an effective way (photo exhibition and extensive media coverage). 
37
 The Soviet prosecutor claimed that “the verdict incorrectly rejects the accusation of criminal activity 
directed against the General Staff and the OKW,” a statement which was actually not quite correct. The 
verdict left no doubt as to the criminal character of the General Staff’s and High Command’ activities, it 
refused however to declare it a criminal organization. The Soviets’ dissenting opinion is printed in Office 
of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, ed., Nazi Conspiracy and 
Aggression. Opinion and Judgment, 166-190, quote on 183.
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important conclusive statement clarifying what the Tribunal had found the German 
military leadership guilty of:
Although the Tribunal is of the opinion that the term ‘group’ in Article 9 must mean something more 
than this collection of military officers, it has heard much evidence as to the participation of these 
officers in planning and waging aggressive war, and in committing war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. This evidence is, as to many of them, clear and convincing.
They have been responsible in large measure for the miseries and suffering that have fallen on millions 
of men, women, and children. They have been a disgrace to the honorable profession of arms. Without 
their military guidance the aggressive ambitions of Hitler and his fellow Nazis would have been 
academic and sterile. Although they were not a group falling within the words of the Charter, they 
were certainly a ruthless military caste. ...
Many of these men have made a mockery of the soldier’s oath of obedience to military orders. When it 
suits their defense they say they had to obey; when confronted with Hitler’s brutal crimes, which are 
shown to have been within their general knowledge, they say they disobeyed. The truth is they actively 
participated in all these crimes, or sat silent and acquiescent, witnessing the commission of crimes on a 
scale larger and more shocking than the world has ever had the misfortune to know. This must be said.
Where the facts warrant it, these men should be brought to trial so that those among them who are 
guilty of these crimes should not escape punishment.
38
The individual prosecution of members of this group was picked up only 
halfheartedly by German courts after ACC Law No. 4 expanded the judicial authority of 
German courts to war crimes in 1950. Only few former members of the Wehrmacht were 
actually punished for war crimes. There could be no indictment without complaint, and in 
most cases where a trial was held, the defendants were acquitted because the courts found 
it impossible to prove that a murder was “cruel,” of “base motives” or “perfidious.”
39
The impressive documentary and judicial work completed by the IMT did not find a 
proper continuation in the German judicial system after the end of the Allied trials. The 
devastating conclusions of the Tribunal with regards to the Wehrmacht leadership 




 Ruth Bettina Birn, “Wehrmacht und Wehrmachtsangehörige in den deutschen Nachkriegsprozessen,” in 
Heer, Volkmann, Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944, 1081-1105. See further 
Chapter 10.I. for details.
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“most degrading of all the groups and organizations charged in the indictment” – thus 
declaring them worse than the NSDAP, the Reich Cabinet, the Gestapo and even the SS: 
The bearers of a tradition not devoid of valour and honour, they emerge from this war stained both by
criminality and ineptitude. Attracted by the militaristic and aggressive Nazi policies, the German 
generals found themselves drawn into adventures of a scope they had not foreseen. [They] planned and 
carried through manifold acts of aggression which turned Europe into a charnel-house, and caused the 
Armed Forces to be used for foul practices foully executed of terror, pillage, murder and wholesale 
slaughter. Let no one be heard to say that the military uniform shall be their cloak, or that they may 
find sanctuary by pleading membership in the profession to which they are an eternal disgrace.
40
II. Towards the Wehrmacht Myth, Despite of it All: The “OKW-Case” and 
Manstein-Trial, 1947-1949
The responsibility of individual Wehrmacht leaders was addressed twice more before 
Allied courts in the so-called Case 12 (“OKW-Trial”) held in 1947/48,
41
 the last of the 
Nuremberg successor trials, as well as in the “Manstein-Trial” held before a British 
military tribunal in 1949.
42
 The “OKW-Trial” against fourteen former high-ranking 
40
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Aggression, vol. II, 399f.
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officers (actually thirteen for one defendant, General Johannes Blaskowitz (1883-1948), 
former commander-in-chief of the German army in Poland, committed suicide during the 
trial) picked up directly were the IMT verdict had left off: with the individual prosecution 
of war crimes committed by the German Wehrmacht. The American prosecutor in the 
case, Walter H. Rapp, hoped that this trial would help to prevent the creation of legends 
about the Wehrmacht.
43
 However, after the decision to classify the OKW not as a 
“criminal group” during the Nuremberg Tribunal, this had already become a mission 
impossible. 
Among the defendants were many who had held leading positions in the Wehrmacht 
during the Eastern campaign, such as Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb (1876-1956, in 1941/42 
Commander-in-Chief of Army Group North), Georg von Kuechler (1881-1968, between 
1942 and 1944 Commander-in-Chief of Army Group North), Hans Reinhardt (1887-
1963, Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Centre),
44
 as well as two other OKW 
Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion, ed. Wigbert Benz, 4 (2004), http://www.historisches-
centrum.de/forum/schroeders04-2.html [08-06-2005]. Christian Schneider, „Denkmal Manstein. 
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1941-1944, 402-417. J.H. Hoffman, „German Field Marshals as War Criminals? A British Embarassment,” 
Journal of Contemporary History, 23, 1 (1988), 17-35. On Manstein’s biography see Marcel Stein, 
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(Mainz: v. Hase & Koehler, 2000) which details Manstein’s knowledge of the killing of Jews in the USSR.
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members, Hermann Reinecke (1888-1973), and Walter Warlimont.(1894-1976)
45
 They 
were charged on four counts: I) Crimes against Peace; II) War Crimes and Crimes against 
Humanity: Crimes against Enemy Belligerents and Prisoners of War, III) War Crimes 
and Crimes against Humanity: Crimes against Civilians; and IV) Common Plan or 
Conspiracy. Particularly counts II) and III) involved testimony and documentary 
evidence regarding the nature of warfare on the Eastern Front. Count II) detailed crimes 
against POWs: 
The defendants ... participated in the commission of atrocities and offences against prisoners of war 
and members of armed forces of nations then at war with the Third Reich or under the belligerent 
control of or military occupation by Germany, including but not limited to murder, ill-treatment, denial 
of status and rights, refusal of quarter, employment under inhumane conditions and at prohibited 
labour of prisoners of war and members of military forces, and other inhumane acts and violations of 
the laws and customs of war.
46
Count III) listed the various atrocities committed by and with the support of members of 
the Wehrmacht against civilians:
The defendants ... participated in atrocities and offences, including murder, extermination, ill-
treatment, torture, conscription to forced labour, deportation to slave labour or for other purposes, 
imprisonment without cause, killing of hostages, persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds, 
plunder of public and private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns and villages, devastation not 
justified by military necessity, and other inhumane and criminal acts against German nationals and 
members of the civilian populations of countries and territories under the belligerent occupation of, or 
otherwise controlled by Germany.
47
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 Chief of Department National Defense in the Armed Forces Operation Staff (WFST) of the OKW 
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Eleven of the defendants were found guilty by the court on at least one of the four 
charges. As the Nuremberg Tribunal, the court grew convinced that the defendants had 
willingly and knowingly participated in an illegal aggressive war, and that they had 
committed war crimes and crimes against humanity: they “were principals in, accessories 
to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, were connected with plans and enterprises 
involved, and were members of organizations and groups which were connected with the 
commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.”
48
 The verdicts ranged from two 
acquittals to nine prison sentences, two of which meant life in prison (Reinecke and 
Warlimont).
49
 None of the convicted, however, fully served his sentence.
50
Equally harshly sentenced but soon amnestied was General Erich von Manstein 
(1887-1973), supreme commander of the southern Eleventh Army and later Army Group 
“Don” on the Eastern Front during his trial in October 1949. He was one of the big names 
connected with the battle of Stalingrad during which he failed to assist General Paulus’ 
Sixth Army.
51
 The most telling document illustrating his view of the war in the East was 
Manstein’s notorious army order of November 20, 1941 in which he detailed why this 
war could not be fought according to the “conventional rules of European warfare.” As 
one of Hitler’s most trusted generals, Manstein supported, disseminated and activated 
Nazi racial policies among his troops. The rear areas of the front were central in his 






 Warlimont and Reinecke were amnestied in 1951. 
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population already liberated from Bolshevism.”
52
 And, it was the “Jewry who functioned 
as the middleman between the enemy in the rear and the fighting remains of the Red 
Army and Red leadership.” As a consequence, the “Jewish-Bolshevist system” was to be 
“annihilated once and for all.” Accordingly, Manstein saw the German soldier in a new 
role:
The German soldier thus has not only the task to destroy the military means of this system. He also 
acts as the bearer of a Volkish idea and as avenger of all cruelties which have been done to him and the 
German people. ... The soldier must understand the necessity of tough atonement of the Jewry, the 
intellectual [geistige] bearer of Bolshevist terror. This is also necessary in order to scotch any uprisings 
incited mostly by Jews.
53
During his trial, Manstein was accordingly charged and found guilty of having given 
criminal orders and having acquiesced to criminal orders already issued. The two counts 
on which he was convicted as charged involved also the abuse of Soviet POWs for the 
building of military fortifications and the clearing of minefields, as well as deporting 
civilians from his area of command to Germany.
54
 Manstein was convicted of crimes such 
as the mistreatment and shooting of Soviet POWs, “commissars,” the killing of Jews, 
Sinti and Roma, and of encouraging disproportionably harsh reprisals against partisans. 
The defense, however, was able to convince the court that most of the crimes took place 
in his rear areas by forces withdrawn from his direct command. Thus, “it may be argued 
that Manstein was convicted of the failure to control the rear areas.”
55
 He was sentenced 
to 18 years in prison; a military review board later reduced this sentence to twelve years. 
Manstein was amnestied and released in 1953, after having served only five years. 
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Two years later he published his memoirs “Lost Victories,” which became one of the 
“classics” of the West German rehabilitation literature. The “strategic memories” of 
former generals and officers overall pursued a “systematic distortion of the past” and a 
“new stab-in-the-back legend,” only this time the Fuhrer was blamed for not listening to 
his supposedly brilliant generals.
56
 War crimes were either denied or attributed to a few 
individual soldiers’ misbehavior. Manstein’s memoirs, which appeared in at least six 
editions, made no mention of the above-quoted order of November 20, 1941. Rather, the 
general recalled at length the conflicts between Hitler and the military leadership to the 
effect that the war against the Soviet Union could have been won without the Fuhrer’s 
amateurish interference.
57
 He presented the defeat in the war against the Soviet Union as 
an avoidable “lost victory.” In no way did on of its major military advocates reflect on 
the illegal and criminal nature of the campaign. By the mid-1950s, with the help of men 
like Manstein, the “myth of the clean Wehrmacht” had become an integral part of West 
German memory, just a few years after the court files had been closed which contained 
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 Notably, neither the full records of the OKW-case nor of the Manstein-trial have been published in 
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III. Published vs. Public Opinion or:                                                    
The Immunity of Collective Memory Against Facts
Recent studies of the press coverage of the Nuremberg Tribunal have demonstrated 
that there was a fundamental difference between the published opinion about war crimes 
trials and the public opinion thereof.  In fact, the first dominated the latter.
59
 This can 
partly be explained with the then still Allied-controlled press seeking to educate Germans 
about Nazi war crimes. Yet, many Germans felt subjected to the concept of collective 
guilt during the trial despite the Tribunal’s individual approach. Indeed, the notion of a 
collective responsibility for the crimes committed during the Third Reich was a constant 
theme in the press. The majority of Germans also showed strikingly little interest in the 
trial proceedings (except during its opening and ending) even though the German 
licensed press reported extensively and continuously about them. The seven main daily 
and weekly papers in all four zones published 2,442 articles on the Nuremberg trials 
between October 1945 and October 1946.
60
 Similarly, while the licensed press defended 
and supported the integrity of the war crimes tribunal, many Germans thought a “short 
trial” (“kurzer Prozeß”) would have sufficed since the defendants’ guilt was obvious. 
59
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Consequently, public support, initially quite strong, plummeted in the course of the 
Tribunal’s duration.
61
While these findings aptly summarize the situation in the three Western zones, the 
specific character of the Soviet-/Communist-dominated press in the Eastern zone limited 
the scope and diversity of point of views from the very beginning.
62
 Throughout the 
duration of the trial, the SED’s organ Neues Deutschland had carried a number of reports 
on the proceedings in Nuremberg. Special attention was averted to the persecution of 
communists and workers in the Third Reich, to Hitler’s “big business” connections and 
the profiteers of the regime, and to the crimes committed on the Eastern Front in the war 
against the Soviet Union. On June 22, 1946, five years after the invasion, Neues 
Deutschland devoted the title page and two inside pages to “June 22, 1941 and its 
Consequences.” Photographs of destroyed Soviet cities and body piles were accompanied 
by articles detailing the preparation and execution of “Barbarossa.” An article about the 
invasion’s assessment before the Nuremberg Tribunal discussed the evidence that proved 
the conspiratorial and treacherous character of the war and demonstrated to the “German 
people the extent and monstrosity of the betrayal to which it fell victim in 1941.” The 
article concluded that “the Nuremberg trial destroys the web of lies and meanness into 
61
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which the German people has become entangled.”
63
 Being well aware of the persisting 
hostile attitudes towards the Soviets in the German population, it was one of the SED’s 
greatest concerns to counter the legend of a preventive war.
According to the press in the SBZ, their coverage of the Nuremberg Trials 
“contributed to a clear picture of the recent past among many people, also in view of a 
new, better future free from fascism and war.”
64
 As the previous chapter has already 
demonstrated and as the following will further elaborate, this “clear picture of the recent 
past” was in fact a mere clipping of World War II history focusing almost exclusively on 
the Red Army and the antifascist struggle in the East. Yet, even this focus entailed very 
few specific, selected and calculated references to the criminal nature of warfare on the 
Eastern Front as exposed during the Nuremberg Trial.
In the West, in contrast, former Wehrmacht generals and mainstream politicians 
started creating the “myth of the clean Wehrmacht” even before the trial was over. In his 
study of the licensed press in the American occupation zone, Jörg Echternkamp has 
demonstrated how the public knowledge about crimes was translated into popular notions 
of a “clean Wehrmacht” – despite of all the facts presented at Nuremberg. The Tribunal 
and the respective press reports left no doubt about the intricate (and effective) 
relationship between Wehrmacht leadership and the Nazi regime, about the extent and 
monstrosity of crimes on and behind the front lines, or about the ideological nexus 
between Wehrmacht and National Socialism in general. Yet, the picture of Wehrmacht 
soldiers emerging from all this in the public mind – and the political memory – was one 
63
 „…Und das Spiegelbild von Nürnberg,“ Neues Deutschland, June 22, 1946, 3.
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of ordinary men who had served their country faithfully and dutifully. Hence, the 
“potential perpetrator became an actual victim,” the Wehrmacht turned into an “abused 
army.”
65
 Echternkamp’s conclusion summarizes the birth of a mode of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung which would dominate West German political culture for at 
least two decades to come:
The rage about the Wehrmacht [caused by the results of the Nuremberg trial] did not go without 
resistance. Already at an early point in time strategies of exculpation became visible which aimed at 
disconnecting military warfare from the political context, particularly by invoking the myth of 
soldierly tradition [Soldatentum] and by redressing the secondary virtues of war which then made room 
for the acknowledgment of soldierly achievements. They also facilitated the cover up of Wehrmacht 
activities under the garb of ordinariness and helped to dissolve a concrete, personal responsibility in 
the haze of the past. The discourse over the Wehrmacht is thus symptomatic for the handling of the 
question of guilt in the early postwar years.
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As stated above, matters were different in the Soviet occupation zone. Here, the
official discourse over the past went hand in hand with political indoctrination. The 
Nuremberg trial served not only to denounce capitalism, imperialism and fascism in one 
stroke, but also – in the long run – to exonerate the mass of Germans who had held out 
the Nazi years on the home or military fronts with more or less ideological zeal. Even 
though the East German public was said to have attained a “clear picture of the recent 
past” during the trial, the SED and Soviet press in the SBZ heavily attacked the IMT once 
the sentences were announced. Reportedly, the Soviet prosecution had demanded to see 
the location reserved for the execution of the Nuremberg defendants on the first day of 
preparations for the trial in late 1945, before the trial had even started. For the Soviet side 
it was clear that the death sentence would await all twenty-two Nazi leaders. Yet, when 
65





the verdict was handed down on September 30, and October 1, 1946, only twelve 
defendants were hanged.
67
 The Soviets issued dissenting opinions. The SED in line with 
the Soviet prosecution, protested the “mild” judgment of the other defendants, 
particularly the acquittal of von Papen, Fritzsche and Schacht. They called for a “German 
court” to judge these “representatives of the Nazi regime” for crimes committed “against 
the German people” as defined in the German criminal code: “high treason, incitement of 
murder, extortion, intimidation, deprivation of liberty.”
68
 But on the other hand, the SED 
praised the hanging of the twelve defendants as “an act of justice in the history of 
mankind.” The “extraordinary importance” of this verdict derived from the fact, the SED 
further declared, that “for the first time the initiators of an imperialist war have suffered 
the deserved and dishonorable death for crimes against the international community.” 
Without mentioning the USSR specifically, the statement referred to the “suppression of 
the working people in Germany” by Hitler, and to the “series of criminal attacks against 
neighbors” with the mere purpose to “enrich the German bourgeoisie” in the course of 
67
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which “singular crimes were committed against individuals and whole nations.” Overall, 
the IMT’s conclusion was interpreted as a dual signal to all Germans: as satisfaction and 
relief, on the one hand, and as a reinforcement of the “sincere will” to fight for a “Never 
Again!”
69
In order to get a more comprehensive picture of “German reactions” to the trial, it 
seems wise to look for sources outside Germany. One such excellent group of sources are 
the reports of New York Times correspondents dispatched to Germany in 1945 and 1946.
70
With the inside view of the outsider, the authors provided readers in the United States 
with a glimpse into the “German mind” of the postwar years. Based on a series of 
conversations with ordinary citizens as well as with politicians and public intellectuals, a 
series of articles printed during the trial adds some important evidence to the observation 
that public opinion differed greatly from published opinion during those months. These 
articles also further highlight the immunity of German collective memory to facts. 
69
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With a series of interviews the New York Times opened its investigation of popular 
attitudes towards the trial in November of 1945. Reporters spoke to thirty “prominent 
Germans” (politicians, government officials, professors, union leaders, journalists, 
lawyers and business men), and reported that “there was widespread agreement among 
those interviewed that the German people sympathized, and still do, with Adolf Hitler’s 
pre-war demands based on the ‘injustices’ of the Versailles ‘Diktat.’” Furthermore, the 
interviews prompted the following general conclusions illustrating the public mood 
which accompanied the trial:
That the anti-Nazis and the most of the disillusioned non-Nazis were looking forward to the trial and 
punishment of the Nazi leaders. ...
That many feared that the trial would arouse a new wave of world hatred against the Germans and lead 
to new drastic measures against the German population. In this connection some of the Nazis urged 
that full details of the trials be withheld from publication to prevent this. ...
One encounters in all interviews two main currents of German thought, a strong and sensitive German 
nationalism and a desire to have the leaders of the National Socialist party punished.
One view is that Hitler did not want war but nevertheless was responsible for it because of his clumsy 
diplomacy. The people who hold this view condemn Hitler, not because his aims were wrong but 
because he failed to realize them and brought Germany to disaster.
71
“’So what?’ Say Germans of Nuremberg” was the title of an article appearing four 
weeks later in December of 1945. And the subtitle read: “Despite the evidence, their 
attitude toward the war crimes trial is one of indifference.” Reporter Raymond Daniell
lamented that despite the eight months of intense U.S. propaganda since the end of the 
war aimed at demonstrating the German people their share of collective responsibility, 
“Germans are not interested.” When most of the licensed press carried the text of the 
indictment in full length, “it was interesting to watch the Germans skip that part of their 
papers.” To Daniell, the cause for this indifference laid in an emotional void in German 
71
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hearts and minds: “the great mass of Germans have an ethical lacuna which makes it 
possible for them to accept the proof of certain acts attributed to them without 
recognizing the concept of evil … which is implicit in the deed.” Connecting the present 
to the past, Daniell presented a sober analysis of the moral-political consequences of the 
Third Reich, while at the same time criticizing the American approach to reeducation:
Perhaps our approach itself was wrong. It can be argued that we started in the middle instead of at the 
beginning of the argument. We assumed an ethical moral standard among the Germans after twelve 
years of Nazi domination which just did not exist. And so, instead of starting with the fundamental 
premise that it is wrong to hate and persecute people of another race or nation for that reason alone, we 
set out merely to prove that the Nazis with support of a goose-stepping, [hailing] nation had done these 
things.  And now that proof acceptable to the majority of the German people is being adduced, there is 
a general attitude of ‘so what,’ because for all they know to the contrary they have merely acted as the 
master race they were taught to believe – and still believe – themselves to be.
72
So, it was not that Germans did not realize the crimes debated at Nuremberg, they 
just did not see their basic wrongness because Nazi indoctrination still continued to 
influence most Germans’ world view.
73
 This could indeed be one plausible explanation 
for the apparent collective refusal to absorb these very facts. Not the fact that the German 
army fought on Polish or French or Soviet territory was the problem in many peoples’ 
minds but – if at all – it was the monstrosity of human suffering this war had cost on all
sides. Daniell concluded accordingly, “the only sense of guilt that the German has is one 
of self-criticism for not working harder and making greater sacrifices so that the war 
might have been won instead of lost.”
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After visiting Germany for the first time after the war, the German-Jewish 
philosopher Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) who had fled Nazi Germany in 1933, made very 
similar observations: people seemed to flee from reality and responsibility alike, they 
commonly “treated facts as though they were mere opinions.” And in general, nowhere, 
she sensed, the “nightmare of destruction and horror was less felt and less talked about 
than in Germany itself:”
A lack of response is evident everywhere, and it is difficult to say whether this signifies a half-
conscious refusal to yield to grief or a genuine inability to feel. Amid the ruins, Germans mail each 
other picture postcards still showing the cathedrals and market places, the public buildings and bridges 
that no longer exist. And the indifference with which they walk through the rubble has its exact 
counterpart in the absence of mourning for the dead, or in the apathy with which they react, or rather 
fail to react, to the fate of the refugees in their midst. This general lack of emotion, at any rate this 
apparent heartlessness, sometimes covered over with cheap sentimentality, is only the most 
conspicuous outward symptom of a deep-rooted, stubbarn, and at times vicious refusal to face and 
come to terms with what really happened.
75
Just as Anna Seghers pondered about the “cold hearts” she encountered among many 
East Germans upon her return, Arendt detected a similar disinterested “heartlessness” 
among many West Germans during the immediate postwar years. 
Discussing a recent survey conducted by the U.S. War Department’s Information 
Control Division (ICD) in January 1946, another New York Times report speaks to the 
validity of these harsh judgments and concluded that the “war crimes trials were dull to 
Germans.” While the “vast majority” of those interviewed believed, as they did before 
the trial, “that the defendants will have a fair trial, that the German newspaper coverage 
of the proceedings is adequate and the guilty should be punished,” there was beyond that 
75
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“little interest in the historic revelations of the trial.”
76
 Nonetheless, in the course of the 
trial, particularly after the defense took up its task in the spring of 1946, popular interest 
increased. In fact, “the fullness and freedom of the defense has shocked the Germans into 
the idea that perhaps it was a real trial and a fair one, after all.”
77
 This and the fact that 
most people reporters talked to after the verdict was handed down said it was justified 
and by no means too harsh,
78
 led one staff member of the American prosecution, German-
born Robert M. W. Kempner (1899-1993) to the hopeful conclusion that the Tribunal will 
have a “lasting effect on the German mind.” Kempner recalled that the information 
coming out of the Palace of Justice in Nuremberg were disseminated in the most effective 
and widest possible way and through all possible media channels – papers, radio and 
newsreels. Referring to “a constant flow of letters from all four zones,” Kempner saw a 
mostly “favorable” reaction to the trial among the population which he took as “evidence 
of some success.”
79
 He noticed a feeling of shock and awe among Germans about the 
brutality of the crimes, about details such as the quantities of gold teeth taking from 
murdered Jews and deposited in the vaults of the German Treasury. It should not be 
forgotten, Kempner concluded mildly, that Germans “who had been loath to admit it, 
have been forced to acknowledge that atrocities were committed by the leaders of their 
country.” And he expressed hope that “the principle of moral standards apply to public as 
well as to private life has been revived”, yet the “full effect of the Nuremberg trial, 
however, moral and otherwise, cannot be fully evaluated for many years. They will be 
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cumulative as qualified representatives of German political and intellectual life study the 
documents and testimony, and the lessons of the trial permeate the thought of the German 
people.”
80
FROM “BARBAROSSA” TO LIBERATION
This, as we know, happened neither in the East nor West of Germany as the Cold 
War unfolded and the present came to overcast the past in every respect. History, 
historical facts, became subordinated to current political and ideological considerations in 
the course of which not only the historical truth suffered severely, but also individual and 
official memory drifted apart. On both sides of the Iron Curtain, political leaders had, 
mostly independent from their occupiers, engaged in a lively debate about the past war 
and established differing narratives of the war on the Eastern Front. The multiple 
political-cultural “restorations” after 1945 included addressing the question of guilt, and 
particularly the concurrent, in fact competing, issues of German crimes and German 
suffering. One fundamental aspect of these debates was the way VE Day was interpreted: 
already here, and very early on, the basic differences between East and West emerged in 
so far as the East German KPD functionaries sought to charge “1945” with a positive, 
victorious connotation, namely that of a “liberation.” In the Western zones where plural 
discourses soon revived the political-cultural sphere, “1945” came to signal not only the 





This crosswords interpretation of the end of World War II anticipated the way the 
Eastern Front – its costliest theater – was remembered and interpreted in divided 
Germany. The fact that the Eastern Front was perceived as the bloodiest battle field of the 
entire war and as the epiphany of the Wehrmacht’s total defeat, made it impossible for 
future leaders to ignore its multiple legacies. In the Eastern zone, the reality of Soviet 
occupation spoiled official attempts to imbue East Germans with a lasting sense of 
responsibility for the suffering inflicted on the Soviet peoples by Wehrmacht and SS. The 
mere repetition and ideological aesthetization of the Soviet sacrifices (and those of 
German communists fighting alongside) could not make up for the fact that the reality of 
Soviet occupation in Germany caused new injustice and hardship, and therefore 
contributed to the persistence of anti-Russian feelings. Neither the founding of an 
“Association of German-Soviet Friendship” in 1947, nor the unusually candid debate 
about the “Russians” in Germany in the winter of 1948/49 could ameliorate this dilemma. 
If nothing else came out of it, the SED-sanctioned public discourse “About ‘the Russians’ 
and about Us” provides a unique source for the deep contempt and popular resentment 
which would continue to pose a main challenge to SED. An honest reckoning with the 
legacies of Stalingrad and the Eastern Front war was impossible in such an atmosphere of 
Soviet military intimidation and SED political domination. Although the crimes and costs 
of the Eastern Front war were discussed in much greater detail than the Holocaust, the 
official narrative of Stalingrad and the war against the Soviet Union was crafted during 
the first postwar decade in East Germany and would remain unchanged over the course of 
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forty years. In the SED’s “administered past,”
81
 facts were routinely subordinated to 
ideological necessities.
A sincere reckoning seemed similarly impossible in the Western zones where the 
Soviet Union was increasingly perceived as the external threat number one. Old anti-
Bolshevist sentiments merged with a new democratic anti-totalitarianism into a position 
of intellectual and political neglect of all things “Russian,” including all historical 
burdens resting on Germany as a consequence of the Wehrmacht’s invasion in 1941.
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Hence, in the immediate postwar years the Nazi race war against the Soviet Union was 
even less discussed than the Holocaust. An official and public acknowledgment of the 
crimes committed against Soviet civilians and POWs occured much later than the 
memory of the Holocaust – in part also because the number of persons potentially 
incriminated by a truthful reckoning with the legacies of “Barbarossa” was much larger 
(millions!) than of those hundred thousand or so involved in the Holocaust. Apart from 
these individual, even private motives to be discussed in a later chapter, the political 
order of the day called for a resolute stand against an expansionistic Soviet communism 
with little room for and interest in recalling crimes committed against “Jewish 
Bolshevism.” This close interconnectedness of the memory of Stalingrad and the Eastern 
Front with the Cold War paradigm on both sides of the Iron Curtain is a running theme in 
this study. The next chapter deals explicitly with these multiple intersections during the 
81
 Sabrow, Verwaltete Vergangenheit.
82
 See Peter Jahn, “Rußlandbild und Antikommunismus in der bundesdeutschen Gesellschaft der 
Nachkriegszeit,” in Babette Quinkert, ed., „Wir sind die Herren dieses Landes.“ Ursachen, Verlauf und 
Folgen des deutschen Überfalls auf die Sowjetunion (Hamburg: VSA-Verlag, 2002), 223-235. Idem, 
’Russenfurcht’ und Antibolschewismus: Zur Entstehung und Wirkung von Feindbildern,“ in Peter Jahn, 
Reinhard Rürup, eds., Erobern und Vernichten. Der Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1941-1945. Essays 
(Berlin: Aragon, 1991), 47-64.
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Cold War: The Political Memory of the Eastern Front in Divided 
Germany, 1949-1961
“Do they know that the birch crosses on the graves of new ‘Barbarossa’-adventurers will not stand in 
Stalingrad but in Cologne?”
From Neues Deutschland, June 1961
“I think that if we enter a new era in our relations – and that is our sincere will – that then we should not 
look into the past too deeply, because then we will only build up obstacles before us. 
The beginning of a new era also requires a psychological cleansing.”
Adenauer in Moscow, September 1955
220
I. “Barbarossa” as Historical Analogy in Communist Propaganda during the 1950s
This chapter reconstructs the official master narrative of this war in East Berlin, 
Moscow and Bonn. Yet in doing so, I seek to go beyond the mere description of official 
memory by turning to specific events which illustrate the intersection of memory and 
politics, of meaning and power. In the East German case, these examples – the campaign 
for the “building of socialism” in 1952, the June uprising in 1953, and the building of the 
wall in 1961 – underline the SED’s continuing effort to place the past into the service of 
present-day political purposes. The SED applied history on politics primarily to gain and 
retain political legitimacy. It was a calculated effort to politicize history and its memory. 
But the East German communists also believed in the righteousness of their interpretation 
of the past, they had often witnessed it first-hand, and they believed to be drawing the 
“right” lessons. This is also one of the reasons why the Eastern Front war became the 
main historical reference point in the SED’s political-historical propaganda. 
In West Germany, the continuous absence of the Eastern Front war from the political 
memory of World War II turned Adenauer’s historic trip to Moscow in 1955 into an 
event of significant meaning. In his conversations with Soviet leaders he was forced to 
address the recent German-Soviet past in some form or another. He managed to balance a 
hint at the tremendous wartime suffering in the Soviet Union with the critique of Soviet 
postwar aggressive expansionism. Yet, overall Adenauer’s political memory of the 
Eastern Front war continued to evade facing historical reality unless historical references 
assured the continuation of the West-German-Soviet dialogue that was about to begin.
221
THE SED MASTER NARRATIVE
Official versions of a historical event do not necessarily, and in fact rarely, absorb 
scholarly knowledge about the past, but rather constitute a conglomerate of a certain 
world view, popular memories and personal experiences which politicians communicate 
in public speeches and commemoration ceremonies. To varying degrees, these official 
narratives can be called propaganda, as they create images of the past designed to fit in 
with a certain ideological and political agenda.
1
 The fact, that Ulbricht and the SED had 
Soviet blueprints and the entire apparatus of a one-party state at their disposal – along 
with an efficient security service – to articulate and transport their version of the Eastern 
Front war, explains why history could be imposed on the East German population albeit 
without ever actually convincing a majority of the righteousness of Soviet domination 
and the necessity of German-Soviet friendship. The fundamentally different structural 
preconditions for the genesis of the Eastern Front memory in the dictatorial GDR and the 
pluralist West German society thus determined not only its content but also its political 
functions and instrumentalizations. This section will therefore not just recall the official 
narratives of the Eastern Front but rather seeks to place these narratives into the political 
realm; what I am most interested in are those pieces of evidence which suggest and 
illuminate the practical intersection of memory and politics.  
1
 Used in this context, I thus follow the recent very useful definition of propaganda proposed by Thymian 
Bussemer: Propaganda is the „in der Regel medienvermittelte Formierung handlungsrelevanter Meinungen 
und Einstellungen politischer oder sozialer Gruppen durch symbolische Kommunikation und als 
Herstellung von Öffentlichkeit zugunsten bestimmter Interessen. Propaganda zeichnet sich durch die 
Komplementarität von überhöhtem Selbst- und denunzierendem Feindbild aus und ordnet Wahrheit dem 
instrumentellen Kriterium der Effizienz unter. Ihre Botschaften und Handlungsaufforderungen versucht sie 
zu naturalisieren, so dass diese als selbstverständliche und nahe liegende Schlussfolgerungen erscheinen.“ 
Bussemer, Propaganda, 29f.
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In order to recapture the SED master narrative I have chosen to examine the speeches 
and writings of three leading communists, each representing a certain approach to 
political memory in the GDR: Alexander Abusch, a leading communist intellectual, 
Walter Ulbricht the leading political functionary, and Albert Norden, the party’s chief 
agitator. While Abusch’s writings focused on interpreting recent German history, 
Ulbricht’s and Norden’s writings and speeches concentrated on the political capital to be 
gained from relating the past to the present and vice versa. 
The basic line of the Soviet and East German interpretation of “Operation 
Barbarossa” can be found in a small book entitled Stalin and the Vital Questions of the 
German Nation written in 1949 by the Jewish remigrant to East Germany, Alexander 
Abusch. Since the publication of his influential Der Irrweg einer Nation in 1946,
2
 Abusch 
had risen to the position of one of the SED’s chief historical analysts. As long-time KPD-
member, he could draw from his experience as former editor of Free Germany, the voice 
of the antifascist resistance in Mexico City. Abusch’s 1949 tractate about Stalin’s attitude 
towards the German nation sought to put the events shaping the four postwar years into 
the “historical context of an entire epoch.”
3
 The years of “utter challenge” between 1941 
and 1945 were for Abusch years of trial and triumph. His depiction of the events on the 
2
Alexander Abusch, Der Irrweg einer Nation: ein Beitrag zum Verständnis deutscher Geschichte (Berlin, 
1946).
3
The third edition was published in 1952 after Abusch had been purged in 1950, rehabilitated shortly 
thereafter and, as he declares in the foreword, with improvements after “a self-critical revision” of the first 
edition. Ibid., 5. Abusch was arrested in connection with the Noel-H.-Field-case in July 1950 and accused 
of a „pro-Zionist attitude” during his time as editor of Free Germany. Between 1951 and 1956 he 
cooperated with the MfS as informer, returned to public office (1951) and served in several functions, most 
notably as Minister of Culture between 1958 and 1961. In March 1955 he was a prominent witness for the 
prosecution in the trail against Paul Merker, his once-important wartime collaborator in the anti-Nazi 
movement in Mexico-City. See further Karin Hartewig, Zurückgekehrt. Die Geschichte der jüdischen 
Kommunisten in der DDR (Köln, Weimar: Böhlau, 2000), 164-172.
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Eastern Front contain the main elements of the official Soviet and East German memory 
thereof. Particularly noteworthy is his claim, that while the Soviet Union fought an 
existential battle of mythical dimensions – with unprecedented resolve and under 
unimaginable sacrifices – the victory over German fascism was not a myth, not a miracle, 
but the real-life manifestation of socialism’s historical superiority: The war destroyed not 
only cities, monuments and human lives, but it also destroyed the many “legends 
fabricated  during the previous twenty-five years about the Soviet Union and its leading 
statesman Stalin.” The year 1941 saw the “miracles of Moscow and Leningrad,” followed 
by the “miracle of Stalingrad which shattered the hearts of all freedom-loving people in 
the world.” They all occurred “under the supreme command of the man who once had 
said: ‘We Bolshevists do not believe in miracles.’” And Abusch conceded, that “these 
were no miracles, indeed, and no new myth was created.” Instead, “worldly and real, the 
new superior political system of socialism and the higher morality of its people had 
passed the historical test in a battle for life and death: against an enemy that embodied the 
darkest powers of the capitalist reaction.”
4
 Like many other official statements about the 
war at that time, Abusch omitted the Nazi-Soviet-Non-Aggression pact of 1939, and 
reduced the history of World War II to the years 1941 until 1945. Often in these 
narratives, the attack against Poland, and thus the beginning of the war on September 1, 






 This was already observed by contemporary West German historians, see for example, Andreas 
Hillgruber, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen,“Der Zweite Weltkrieg im Spiegel der sowjetkommunistischen 
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Playing with the idea that the Red Army’s victory appeared as a miracle-like 
triumph, Abusch dismissed any “previously held doubts” about socialism as political 
project and endowed the victory of 1945 with the spell of an idea turned reality. And 
indeed, despite the sobering reality of Soviet postwar occupation in Eastern Europe, the 
end of the war inaugurated a decade during which the Soviet ideology “exercised its 
greatest fascination over the twentieth-century political imagination.”
6
 The communist 
idea had become the “greatest beneficiary of the Nazi apocalypse:”
7
 the militant anti-
fascism of the communists – temporarily aligning themselves with the democratic West 
in the struggle for liberty – lent the Soviet Union’s fight against Hitler a universal 
fascination. Its victory in 1945 “combined the two gods that make or break historical 
times: power and ideas.”
8
It was precisely the fascinating power of antifascism’s victory from which the East 
German communists hoped to gain ideological legitimization and political capital. While 
in the Soviet Union the war inspired a series of myths – the personality cult of Stalin and 
a popular memorial culture celebrating legendary stories of trial and triumph in the fight 
against Hitler’s armies – the SED primarily sought to endow the recent past with 
anticipatory meaning for the future of socialism in the GDR, declared the “other 
Geschichtsschreibung,” in Boris S. Telpuchowksi, Die sowjetische Geschichte des Großen Vaterländischen 
Krieges, ed. Andreas Hillgruber and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (Frankfurt/Main: Bernard & Graefe, 1961), 66. 
Hillgruber and Jacobsen concluded that according to Soviet historiography only with the Soviet Union’s 
entry in 1941, the pure “imperialist war of conquest” turned into a truly “just war of liberation.” The 
periodization was thus: September 1939-July 1940 “imperialist war;” July 1940-June 1941 “transitional 
phase;” June 22, 1941-1945 “truly just struggle for liberation.” Notably, the Western allies’ war effort thus 
also transformed into a “just war” in 1941.
6






Germany.” In the Soviet Union, the Eastern Front was remembered as the “Great 
Patriotic War” and this memory, indeed “cult,” was overload with stories of heroism and 
sacrifice.
9
 The war experience became a “dominant myth” within Soviet society 
endowing the permanent Bolshevik revolution with a renewed sense of legitimacy and 
reinforcing the institutions of Soviet power, the one-party state and its socioeconomic 
order.
10
 Moreover, since the war cult was both a “cult of heroes” and a “cult of strength,” 
which rested heavily on the use of veterans for socialist propaganda, the “Soviet Union 
was unable to mourn.”
11
 However, while socialism in whatever current outlook and 
degree of “perfection” was already in place – and invigorated – in Soviet Russia in 1945, 
the idea had yet to materialize in the GDR. 
Abusch’s text points to this political relevance of the war’s memory and reveals the 
peculiar East German interpretation: it was to provide real, actual proof of the superiority 
of a political system-to-be about to be established in East Germany against popular will. 
In that sense, Leningrad and Stalingrad were indeed no “miracles;” these battles were no 
“myths” but sheer reality and proof of a historical logic: Soviet socialism’s rise to power. 
This led East German communists to believe that not only the Eastern Front war on the 
9
 See Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead. Although this is not a scholarly work, but rather a personal 
account of the author’s trips to the USSR and her visits to local commemoration events of the war, it is an 
informed and well-written depiction of the cultic dimension of the Soviet memory of the Second World 
War. Tumarkin, a Russian-born Jewish exile to the United States, is most concerned with how Russians 
mourned millions of dead while, at the same time, the war played an extraordinary role in sustaining a 
certain self-image as Soviet citizens with great pride and self-confidence inspired by the experience of 
suffering and victory in World War II.
10
 Weiner, Making Sense of War, 7f. 
11
 Sabine Rosemarie Arnold, „’Das Beispiel der Heldenstadt wird ewig die Herzen der Völker erfüllen.’ 
Gedanken zum sowjetischen Totenkult am Beispiel des Gedenkkomplexes in Wolgograd,“ in Reinhart 
Koselleck, Michael Jeismann, eds., Der politische Totenkult: Kriegerdenkmäler in der Moderne (München: 
Fink, 1994), 351-374, quote on 372. See also her Stalingrad im sowjetischen Gedächtnis. Kriegserinnerung 
und Geschichtsbild im totalitären Staat (Bochum: Projekt, 1998). 
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whole but also its ending, the liberation of Germany from Nazism by the Soviets, 
embodied one of the century’s “Hegelian moments.” The reduction of World War II to 
the years 1941 to 1945, forming a “Hegelian moment,” was a key point in the East 
German communists’ Eastern Front memory. The Weltgeist had found its successful end 
in the rise of Soviet power at the end of World War II, just as Hegel used to claim that 
with Prussia’s rise the Weltgeist had reached its ultimate destination in the nineteenth 
century.
12
 The “Hegelian moment” deduced from the experience of the war between Nazi 
Germany and the Soviet Union was a two-fold construct: it included both the attack and 
devastation of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany as well as the Soviet Union’s ultimate 
triumph over Nazi Germany. This is an important aspect because it alludes to the central 
elements of the postwar antifascist founding narrative. Struggle, sacrifice, and suffering 
had not only been inevitable, but they had inevitably led to ultimate victory. 
To communists in Moscow and East Berlin, the battle of Stalingrad was the 
cataclysmic event signaling the dawn of this “Hegelian moment.” The memory of the 
Eastern Front found its ultimate climax in this battle – it was its quintessence. The instant 
death of 60,000 German and 500,000 Soviet soldiers during the battle of Stalingrad 
inspired a memory of loss and heroism. The (East) German side remembered the 
allegedly “senseless” sacrifice of innocent rank-and-file soldiers (usually without 
commemorating specifically the Soviet victims), and the Soviet side the costly defense of 
the homeland.
13
 While “German fascism” was clearly identified as the aggressor in Soviet 
12
 Herf, „’Hegelianische Momente,’“, 201.
13
 On the losses see Chapter 2, fn. 46. In addition to those 60,000 German soldiers who died in Stalingrad, 
over 100,000 died during prisoner transports or in captivity.
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memorial culture, Stalin and his comrades had been eager from the beginning (1941) to 
point out that the Red Army sought to destruct “not the German people” but the “fascist 
armies” on the Eastern Front. In his Order No. 55 of February 1942 “On Germany and 
Germans,” Stalin made this explicit distinction which the SED later cited on numerous 
occasions:
Occasionally it is babbled that the Red Army’s goal was to extinguish the German people and to 
destroy the German state. That is naturally a silly lie and a foolish denunciation of the Red Army.  ... It 
would be ridiculous to equalize the Hitler-clique with the German people. The experience of history 
demonstrates that the Hitlers come and go, but the German people, the German state persists.
14
Only Hitler and his “clique of Nazi war criminals” had to fear the victory of the Red 
Army. This alludes to a second key point in the East German memory of the Eastern 
Front: The question of concrete agency, of who was responsible for war crimes in the 
Soviet Union, was instantly absent from the official narratives in Moscow and East 
Berlin. Even though the thesis of a German collective guilt was part of the KPD’s initial 
propaganda in postwar Germany in 1945/46, they never boiled it down to identifying 
concrete groups or persons outside the “Hitler-clique,” the “monopoly capital,” Gestapo, 
and the SS. Stalin’s 1942 declaration “On Germany and Germans” was an important and 
politically far-sighted rhetorical concession to the East German communists because it 
14
 Here quoted from a NKFD leaflet, printed and distributed on April 14, 1945. Two days later the Soviet 
offensive towards Berlin started on the Oder River. Under the headline “Marshall Stalin on Germany and 
the Germans” the leaflet was to assure Germans that despite their utter defeat the Red Army and the Soviet 
people did not harbor racial hate against Germans but instead respect the sovereignty of nations and seek to 
live in peace and friendship. “Only Hitler and his clique of Nazi war criminals have to fear the inevitable … 
victory of the Red Army.” Printed in Flugblätter des Nationalkomitees Freies Deutschland, 413. A first 
German translation of Order No. 55 was printed in 1949 in Joseph Stalin, Über die Rote Armee (Berlin: 
Dietz, 1949), 16-23. See also the handy collection of Stalin’s relevant “positive” statements on Germans 
and their country prepared for distribution in the Soviet occupation zone in 1946: Stalin über Deutschland
(Berlin: Huth, 1946). Stalin had made a similar already in July of 1941, cf. Stalin’s Broadcast Message to 
the People of the Soviet Union, July 3, 1941, printed in Ueberschär, Wette, eds., ‘Unternehmen 
Barbarossa,’ 326-329, and cf. also Chapter 2.II.
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made it easier for them to include ordinary Germans, i.e. also former Wehrmacht 
soldiers, in the project of building socialism in postwar Germany without losing face. 
The communist memory of Stalingrad exemplifies the selectiveness of political 
memory and the opportunistic nature of remembrance in Moscow and East Berlin. In the 
Soviet Union, the contrast between individual experience and official memory was 
particularly striking. While the million-fold deaths in World War II needed mourning 
first of all, the official politics of memory aimed at the glorification of the war 
experience. Memorial sites and rites of commemoration left little room for individual 
memory, mourning and reflections.
15
 In contrast to the individual memories of loss and 
suffering, the Communist Party’s version of the war served primarily the mobilization of 
the masses and was designed by its “managers” to engender “a unifying, cohesive 
force.”
16
 It was full of omissions and untruths. In particular, the Holocaust was absent in 
the official narrative. 
Under the banner of its prime slogan, ‘no one is forgotten, nothing is forgotten,’ the war cult claimed to 
recall every incident, every person, every moment of those 1,418 days and nights of war. Indeed the 
official memorialization of the war was obsessively determined to tell the story of the war in the 
greatest possible detail. The cult’s managers manifested a compulsion to display the names of the war 
dead on slabs and stone obelisks and walls, such as the mosaic walls of the grand memorial at 
Volgograd wherein are embedded thousands of names of Soviet soldiers who died in the Stalingrad 
battle. And yet that very compulsion was part of a massive effort to obliterate the real collective 
memory of the most horrific war in the history of humankind.
17
The central ingredient of this “war cult” in the Soviet Union was the cult of the heroes 
which found its perfection at the memorial site in Stalingrad itself. Here, the party-
15
 Catherine Merridale, “War, death and remembrance in Soviet Russia,” in: Jay Winter and Emmanuel 
Sivan, eds., War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 61-83. And Catherine Merridale, Night of Stone: Death and Memory in Twentieth Century 
Russia (London: Pinguin, 2002). See also Arnold, Stalingrad im sowjetischen Gedächtnis.
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official memory “managers” assured that both the individual hero soldier and the 
collectively heroic Red Army were celebrated. Not the suffering and cruelty of the war 
were central in the official memory of the battle, but the triumph over the enemy.
18
The East German communists swiftly adopted the perspective of the victor in their 
own “history propaganda” seeking to profit from the triumphant interpretation of the 
war’s end. For that reason, their interpretation of the war against the Soviet Union
contained similar ingredients and operated with similar techniques. It is for the same 
reason that the Kremlin leaders did not have to convince or force their comrades in East 
Berlin into copying the Soviet view of World War II – they really felt as victors, 
extended this feeling on the population as a whole and turned it into a state doctrine.
19
 The 
SED’s Eastern Front memory was a truly homegrown project. Walter Ulbricht himself 
spent the wartime years on the Eastern Front organizing the antifascist resistance among 
German POWs in the Soviet Union. He spent almost two months in the embattled city of 
Stalingrad in the winter of 1942/1943 – celebrating Christmas Eve with Nikita 
Khrushchev – and emerged from the war as Moscow’s most reliable partner and faithful 
disciple among the German communists.
20
 His personal experience at the front lines of the 
18
 Wolfram von Scheliha, „’Stalingrad’ in der sowjetischen Erinnerung,“ in Jahn, ed., Stalingrad erinnern, 
30f.
19
 On the great influence of the veteran communists in East Germany see in general Epstein, Last 
Revolutionaries.
20
 Mario Frank, Walter Ulbricht. Eine deutsche Biographie (Berlin: Siedler, 2001), 165-168. There he 
worked for the anti-Nazi propaganda patrolling the German front lines in a loudspeaker truck. He spent 
Christmas 1942 in a POW camp together with Nikita Khrushchev, then political commissar in the Red 
Army. Ulbricht wrote a report about his Stalingrad visit: „Lehren von Stalingrad für das deutsche Volk,“ in: 
Walter Ulbricht, Zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung. Aus Reden und Aufsätzen, vol. II 1933-
1946 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1966), 299-301. He herein described how German soldiers perished senselessly 
as a result of Hitler’s orders and praised German POWs for surrendering to the Red Army. Under the 
impression of the battle, Ulbricht felt that now – after Stalingrad had signaled the ultimate turning point of 
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Eastern Front war strongly influenced the political memory he communicated after the 
war as head of state in the GDR. The official Eastern Front memory thus was not only the 
product of ideology, Cold War politics and propaganda, but also the result of Ulbricht’s 
distinct biography. Strikingly, he largely refrained from placing his veteran status at the 
center of this memory. In his speeches during the 1950s and 1960s, the Realpolitiker 
Ulbricht set the tone for the official narrative about the war against the Soviet Union by 
rather focusing on its “lessons,” by placing this narrative within the contemporary 
political context. Ulbricht’s along with Albert Norden’s public references to the war 
provide ample evidence for the sophisticated and very practical instrumentalization of the 
Eastern Front in SED propaganda and policy. 
THE PAST AS PROGRAM: “BUILDING SOCIALISM,” 1952
In Ulbricht’s world view, the globe was divided into two “camps,” the “peaceful” 
Soviet Union and its allies, and the “aggressive, imperialist” West. The communist two-
camp theory was introduced by Soviet chief-ideologue Andrei A. Zhdanov in 1947 in a 
speech to the first Comintern meeting in Poland. Zhdanov’s speech was partly a response 
to George F. Kennan’s remarks about Soviet aggressive intentions in Eastern Europe,
21
but it was also an attempt to rally support and respect among the national communist 
the war – the German people stood before an existential question: if they were good Germans, they would 
secede from Hitler once and for all. 
21
 Following his confidential “Long Telegram” to President Harry S. Truman in 1946, Kennan (1904-
2005), a US diplomat stationed at the Moscow Embassy between 1944 and 1946, had published an article 
entitled “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” under the antonym “X” in the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs, 
566-582. In the article he argued that the “Soviet power as we know it today is the product of ideology and 
circumstances.” The “Russian expansive tendencies” threatening the free West since the end of World War 
II, must be checked with a “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of these power 
aspirations,” an effort to be led by the United States. In Kennan’s view, the Soviet Union headed the 
aggressor camp; the United States and its allies were defending their liberty.
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parties for Stalin’s course. According to Zhdanov, the world was divided into the 
“imperialist, anti-democratic camp” on the one hand, and the “anti-imperialist, 
democratic camp” on the other.
22
 After the defeat of Nazism in 1945, he claimed, 
“American imperialism had shifted to an aggressive, openly expansionist course.” The 
declared “crusade against communism” was a plan to “enslave Europe.”
23
 With this claim, 
Zhdanov laid the foundation for the communist (re-)interpretation of World War II: it 
neglected the fact that the “imperialist camp” had fought alongside the Soviet Union in 
the anti-Hitler coalition, marginalizing the Western Front as much as the Allied 
contribution to the victory over Nazi Germany. According to the communist 
interpretation of the war, the United States and its allies had secretly hoped that Hitler 
would defeat the Soviet Union. Since the end of the war had brought about the opposite, 
they were now out to “strengthen imperialism” and to “prepare a new war against 
socialism and democracy.”
24
Walter Ulbricht, a year-long KPD veteran, antifascist agitator during World War II 
and experienced, bureaucratically talented party leader with close personal ties to 
Moscow, adopted this two-camp theory and applied it to the situation in the early 1950s. 
Zhdanov’s analysis seemed verified after the Cold War had manifested the ideological 
divide. In 1949, the GDR had become a formal part of the Soviet empire, and the 
Ulbricht regime secured Stalin’s foothold in Germany. In 1952, after years of painful and 
22
 Here quoted from the first edition of the speech in German: Andrei A. Zhdanov, Über die internationale 
Lage. Vortrag, gehalten auf der Informationsberatung von Vertretern einiger kommunistischer Parteien in 




 Ibid., 3f., 12.
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unpopular economic, political and social “reforms” in East Germany, the SED initiated a 
Stalinization campaign with the II. Party Conference declaring that the time had come to 
“build socialism according to a plan.” In his key note address at the conference Ulbricht 
elaborated on the historical lessons that informed this drive towards the Stalinization of 
party, state and society in an atmosphere of permanent class struggle.
25
 Like Zhdanov in 
1947, Ulbricht saw the world in 1952 divided into the “camp of democracy and 
socialism” and the “camp of imperialism.” While the first stood for peace in the world led 
by the Soviet Union, the second was led by the United States, “the center of the capitalist 
governments, of warmongering, of the reactionary and exploitative elements in the 
world.”
26
 World War II had demonstrated that the Soviet Union was the “most powerful 
country in the world” (373), while the United States emerged as the “greatest financial 
exploiter in the capitalist world” (377). The permanent struggle for markets and profits, 
Ulbricht continued, has plunged this capitalist world into crisis rendering internal 
“contradictions and antagonisms” amongst the Western states. Yet, in order to overcome 
this internal rift, the imperialists were preparing to launch a “new war which they intend 
to wage primarily against the socialist Soviet Union” and its Eastern European allies, a 
second “Barbarossa” in the footsteps of Hitler and Mussolini: “For this purpose they 
engage in an insane arms race, … they forge military coalitions which mask themselves 
25
 With the rejection of the Stalin-note in the spring of 1952, the SED – encouraged and instructed by Stalin 
– launched an offensive on several domestic fronts: a “people’s army” was to be created “without clamor,” 
the collectivization of the agrarian sector intensified, and the party was to be “renewed” by internal purges. 
See for a brief summary Ulrich Mählert, Kleine Geschichte der DDR (München: Beck, 2004), 60ff.
26
 Walter Ulbricht, „Die gegenwärtige Lage und die neuen Aufgaben der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei 
Deutschlands. Aus dem Referat auf der II. Parteikonferenz der SED, Berlin, 9. bis 12. Juli 1952,“ in idem, 
Zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung. Aus Reden und Aufsätzen, vol. IV: 1950-1954 (Berlin: 
Dietz, 1958), 372. Passim.
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hypocritically with the flag of ‘defending’ the West, and follow in every respect the path 
of the war criminals Hitler and Mussolini” (379). He added quickly that this war would 
be “the most dangerous war for imperialism” leading to ultimate defeat of men “like 
Adenauer who in Hitler’s manner speaks of the ‘new order’” in Eastern Europe, and men 
like Adenauer’s foreign policy advisor Walter Hallstein (1901-1982) who “gabbled of a 
‘crusade to the Urals” (380). 
This passage contained the recurring themes in Ulbricht’s political views about the 
nature of the West German state, its chancellor and Western allies, rooted in a certain 
interpretation of the Nazi war against the Soviet Union: he literally equaled Hitler’s 
aggressive expansionism with Adenauer’s anti-totalitarian policy of strength (“Politik der 
Stärke”) vis-à-vis the reality of Soviet power enforced in Eastern Europe (which, Ulbricht 
claimed, was mighty enough to defeat another army invading from the West).
27
 That 
Adenauer indeed used the term “Neuordnung” in connection with his determination to 
check Soviet power over Eastern Europe, and his commitment to the long-term liberation 
and independence of those countries under Soviet rule, could have been an unfortunate –
more likely a calculated – lapse. Ulbricht also misconstrued Hallstein’s remark on the 
“crusade to the Ural.’” Far from advocating the relaunch of “Operation Barbarossa,” 
Hallstein occasionally referred to Adenauer’s European vision according to which a 
27
 On the “policy of strength“ see Hans-Peter Schwarz, Adenauer. Vol. 2: Der Staatsmann 1952-1967
(Stuttgart: dtv, 1991), 14ff. According to Schwarz, Adenauer believed in 1950/51 in a Soviet invasion of 
the Eastern zone but had changed his opinion by 1952. In April 1951, still fearing open military actions 
from the Soviet side, he had declared that “in the long run, a new regulation [Neuregelung] of the relations 
with the Eastern bloc will only be possible if the Soviet Union too realizes that it is an unrealistic and 
peace-threatening policy … to permanently disrespect the striving of great peoples for self-determination or 
to break [this strive] with force.” By 1952, Adenauer favored unambiguously a solution to the German 
question by diplomatic means – albeit he saw the need to bolster these efforts with military might. For 
“totalitarian states, particularly Soviet Russia, know … only one decisive factor: that is power.” Ibid., 14f.
234
unified, free Europe would stretch from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural.
28
 Ulbricht and 
Stalin, however, interpreted these and similar statements as open military threats to their 
national security.
29
 Moreover, they used them not only rhetorically in the propaganda 
battle against the Western enemies but also in context of crucial policy decisions, most 
importantly to legitimize the remilitarization of East Germany and the military build-up 
in the Soviet sphere of influence. This instrumentalization is exemplified in a caricature 
printed in June of 1951 in Neues Deutschland in context of the commemoration of the 
tenth anniversary of the beginning of “Operation Barbarossa.” While the American 
president “Mr. Truman” was depicted as ruthless warmonger sitting on an army and 
cracking a whip (“I can exterminate 20,000 people in one stroke”), a friendly “Soviet 
man” promises to “lead hundreds of millions into a happy future.” The caricature 
identified the “West” led by the U.S. president as a threat to world peace while presenting 
the Soviet Union as the leader of the “peaceloving nations.”
28
 Karl-Ludwig Sommer, “Adenauers Konzeption, Heinemanns Alternative und die Nachwirkungen der 
gefällten Entscheidungen bis zum heutigen Verhältnis zwischen Ost- und Westdeutschen,“ in Dieter Dowe, 
ed., Verhandlungen über eine Wiedervereinigung statt Aufrüstung : Gustav Heinemann und die 
Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik in das westliche Militärbündnis (Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2000), 
29. 
29
 Reading Adenauer’s statements closely and in context, Ulbricht’s calculated misinterpretations are clear. 
For example, in his response to the Stalin note, Adenauer declared in the Bundestag: “Germany has three 
options: integration into the West, integration into the East, and neutralization. … western integration 
means – that is what I want to say towards the East – means in no way pressure on the East but it is nothing 
else but a preparation of a peaceful new order (Neuordnung) of the relationship with the Soviet Union, 
towards the reunification of Germany, and the Neuordnung of Eastern Europe. And these are our political 
aims.” And on the „policy of strength: „We want the West to be so strong that he can enter a serious talks 
with the Soviet government. […] The goal of serious talks between West and East will be: securing peace 
in Europe, stopping the irrational arms-race, reunification of Germany in freedom, and a new order in the 
East. Then finally the world will get what it urgently needs after all the past decades: a long and secure 
peace.” Quoted from Andreas Hillgruber, „Adenauer und die Stalin-Note vom 10. März 1952,“ in Dieter 
Blumenwitz et. al., eds., Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit. Politik und Persönlichkeit des ersten 
Bundeskanzlers, vol. 2: „Beiträge der Wissenschaft“ (Stuttgart: dva, 1976), 113 f. On Adenauer’s foreign 
policy see Arnulf Baring, Außenpolitik in Adenauers Kanzlerdemokratie. Bonns Beitrag zur Europäischen 
Verteidigungsgemeinschaft (München: Oldenbourg, 1969). And Josef Foschepoth, ed., Adenauer und die 
Deutsche Frage (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1988). 
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Fig. 3. “The Stronger One: Mr. Truman: I can exterminate 20,000 people in one stroke. The Soviet man: And I can lead 
hundreds of millions into a happy future.” (Neues Deutschland, June 22, 1951, 3).
In his speech to the II. Party conference, Ulbricht drew a direct line from this alleged 
threat to the need to establish Soviet-style socialism in East Germany, i.e. “to create 
facts” as Stalin had demanded in an April 1952 meeting with SED leaders.
30
 After duly 
denouncing West Germany for the rejection of Stalin’s “peace offer” (the infamous note 
of March 10, 1952)
31
 and praising the “peaceful” path chosen in East Germany, Ulbricht 
30
 According to Pieck’s notes of the meeting; quoted in Mählert, Kleine Geschichte, 61.
31
 The „Stalin-note” has been a controversial issue for decades. For a summary of historiography and 
debates see van Dijk, „The 1952 Stalin Note Debate.” Van Dijk concludes that “1952” was not a “wasted 
opportunity” for German unity,” that, in fact, the note was not an opportunity for unification and “can 
therefore not have been wasted.” Ibid., 3. Recently published documents further support the conclusion that 
the note was not a serious diplomatic offer but rather a tactical maneuver. The following remarks of Stalin 
vis-à-vis SED leaders in April 1952 strongly indicate this: “You should continue propaganda for German 
unity in the future. It has a great importance for the education of the people in Western Germany. Now it is 
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listed the concrete measures to be taken in order to react to the current threat and to 
prevent another “Barbarossa.” This list reads like the codified program for the drive 
towards socialism. It inaugurated a phase of intensified political terror, propaganda and 
mass agitation, militarization, repression of churches and youth organizations, 
collectivization of the agrarian and craft sectors, and party purges. In short, the dictatorial 
grip on East German society would soon be severely tightened. Ulbricht’s phrased it as 
follows at the II. Party Conference in 1952:
In consensus with the suggestions of the working class, of the working farmers and of other circles of 
working people the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party has decided to suggest to the II. 
party conference that in the GDR socialism will be build according to a plan. … The main instrument 
for creating the fundament of socialism is the state [Staatsmacht]. What are the tasks of the state in the 
GDR? 
Breaking the resistance of the toppled and expropriated big capitalists and big agrarians. Liquidation of 
all their attempts to restore the rule of the capital.
Organizing the building of socialism by gathering all working people around the working class.
Creation of armed forces … for the defense of the homeland against external enemies.
32
Thus, the threat of a “new war,” a “crusade to the Ural” served to justify the realization of 
a program which – under the guise and in the name of militant pacifism – contained both 
repressive and aggressive policy steps aimed at the destruction of all (perceived) internal 
resistance and the deterrence of all (perceived) external enemies.
The officially propagated history of World War II Ulbricht referred to constantly in 
his political speeches derives from his Manichean world view of the Cold War. Two 
camps, good and evil, socialists and imperialists, antifascists and fascists confronted each 
a weapon in your hands. We should also continue to make proposals regarding German unity in order to 
expose the Americans.” Quoted in Christian F. Ostermann, ed., Uprising in East Germany, 1953. The Cold 
War, the German Question, and the First Major Upheaval behind the Iron Curtain. (=National Security 
Archive Cold War Readers) (New York: Central European University Press, 2001), 40. [Emphasis added].
32
 Ulbricht, „Die gegenwärtige Lage und die neuen Aufgaben der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei 
Deutschlands,“ 407-409. Among other measures, the catalogue also included a complete reorganization of 
East Germany’s communal and regional administrative structure, the five Länder were dissolved and 
instead 14 Bezirke with 217 Kreisen (before: 132) were formed in order to “improve the work of the state 
apparatus.” Ibid., 415f. 
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other in the permanent class struggle. The Second World War, and in particular the war 
against the Soviet Union, was a milestone in this historical scheme.
33
 This was one of 
Ulbricht’s core convictions. Already in 1945, Ulbricht had published these convictions in 
a brief pamphlet under the title “Theses About the Nature of Hitler Fascism.” The 
“Theses” represent one of his earliest attempts at writing history himself; it introduced 
the basic line of argument for all future historical references to World War II in East 
Germany.
34
 Ulbricht insisted that Hitler’s invasions of neighboring countries between 
1938 and 1940 had served just one purpose – to prepare the war against the Soviet Union. 
And the main driving force was not expansionism (Lebensraum) but anti-Bolshevism.
35
This assertion enabled Ulbricht to prepare the argumentative ground for his later claim 
that West Germany continued Hitler’s hate campaign against Bolshevism:
33
 Herf, „’Hegelianische Momente.’” Furet, The Passing of an Illusion, 366-371, describes aptly how 
World War II and the communist response to it, anti-fascism, were seen to have reenergized the communist 
idea. In practical terms this meant that with the end of the war, the USSR had “established on the front line 
of history by the twofold means of its military strength and the return of the revolutionary idea.” Ibid., 369. 
See also above my discussion of the claim that the Red Army’s victory proved the historic superiority of 
communism. 
34
 Walter Ulbricht, „Thesen über das Wesen des Hitlerfaschismus,“ in idem, Ausgewählte Reden und 
Schriften zur Geschichte der deutschen und der internationalen Arbeiterbewegung (Berlin: Dietz, 1979), 
91-100.
35
 In fact, Hitler combined the two in a peculiar merger of race ideology, anticommunism and the drive for 
Lebensraum in the East. Under the guise of anti-Bolshevism he planned the realization of a “twin 
obsession:” “removing the Jews” and “Lebensraum.” Reducing his motives to anti-Bolshevism ignores 
completely Hitler’s plan for the extermination of the Jews. See Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 336ff. For a 
detailed discussion see Gerd R. Überschär, “Hitlers Entschluß zum ‘Lebensraum-’ Krieg im Osten. 
Programmatisches Ziel oder militärstrategisches Kalkül?“ in Ueberschär, Wette, eds., Unternehmen 
Barbarossa, 83-110. Ueberschär concludes that the attack on the Soviet Union was a long-term 
programmatic goal of Hitler’s “race and living-space policy” towards the East. Wolfram Wette, „Die 
propagandistische Begleitmusik,” shows that the claim of Germany as a “bulwark” against Bolshevism has 
been used by the Nazi regime repeatedly and opportunistically as “propagandistische Mehrzweckwaffe,” 
(deployed between 1933 and 1939 to crush the communist resistance and rally the middle-class, and 
completely withdrawn during the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact 1939-1941). In Ibid, 111-129, quote on 
121.  Thus, while Hitler’s anti-Semitism was a genuine hate ideology and a driving force behind the plans 
to invade the Soviet Union, his anti-Bolshevism was an important but mere tactical instrument reflecting a 
political-military rivalry. 
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He had Austria occupied militarily as a strategic position for another offensive against the Balkans. 
The German troops invaded the Sudetenland, accompanied by the claim that Germany wants no 
Czechs. The invasion of Czechoslovakia followed immediately. Hitler ‘quit’ his pact of non-aggression 
with Poland in order to secure the rear for his invasion of France and to move forward the 
concentration area [Aufmarschgebiet] against the Soviet Union. When Hitler finally attacked the Soviet 
Union perfidiously he didn’t reason it, like in ‘Mein Kampf’, with the ‘conquest of land in the East” but 
with the alleged ‘danger of Bolshevism.’ Only after the occupation of the Ukraine, Hitler and Goebbels
spoke openly about the war aim of subjugation and exploitation of the Soviet Union and the other 
countries of Europe. ... 
By unleashing the war against the Soviet Union, Hitler had challenged the strongest power in the world 
and had allowed the formation of the great anti-Hitler coalition. With the crossing of the Soviet border 
began the German armies’ road to catastrophe. Hitler had to lose the war because he was fighting an 
unjust, an imperialistic war of conquest against the Soviet Union and the other freedom-loving 
nations.
36
In Ulbricht’s view, the history of World War II was the history of the invasion of the 
Soviet Union, and anti-Bolshevism was the danger linking the Nazi period with the Cold 
War. In East Germany, he believed, this danger was being rooted out by striving for 
“peaceful and friendly relations to other nations, most of all the great Soviet people.”
37
Though Hitler by no means had made a secret of his plans for the enslavement of the 
Eastern Europe – “if we talk about new soil and territory in Europe we must think 
primarily only of Russia and its vassal border states,” Hitler had declared already in 
1925
38
– it is true what Ulbricht claimed here: Germany’s relationship with Russia had 
been the most important foreign policy question for Hitler, and on June 22, 1941 he 
reasoned that the Wehrmacht was mobilized to save Europe.
39
 Yet, Ulbricht used these 
facts to singularize the history of World War II into the history of the German-Soviet 
war. Since the past was about the “perfidious attack” on the Soviet Union, the present and 
36
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future were about preventing its repetition by adhering to the “unbreakable friendship” 
with the Soviet Union.
In communist narratives such as Ulbricht’s, collective idioms such as “class,” 
“proletariat” or “Hitlerfascists” (Hitlerfaschisten) often served to describe the agents of 
history; the focus rested on the grand picture, on the right “message,” not on details. The 
officially propagated history of the war on the Eastern Front – not the historiography
40
– is 
probably the best example for illustrating what a monopoly over memory means for the 
tradition of historical facts. The official SED narrative was published as volume five of 
the eight-volume “History of the German Workers Movement” in 1960s. Although a 
number of historians had collaborated on the work, it was first and foremost a SED 
project developed for the Central Committee by the Institute for Marxism-Leninism in 
East Berlin. Ulbricht personally led this project.
41
 According to his official biographers, 
history was like a “third profession” to Walter Ulbricht, the learned carpenter. He 
fulfilled his task as chair of the “authors collective” with much dedication: 
[H]e reads all manuscripts, and these are, after all, several thousand pages. Again and again he warns 
the historians of their responsibility to smash the antinational concept of history of the enemy with the 
weapon of historical truth, to help the party and the people to better resolve the questions of the present 
by recognizing the historical lessons.
42
It is this understanding of history as a “weapon” that informed Ulbricht’s interpretation of 
the war against the Soviet Union already in the 1950s. Eager to place Hitler’s 
expansionism within a presumed historical continuity of (German) imperialism, the book 
40
 The GDR historiography on the Eastern Front is discussed en detail in Chapter 10. III. 
41
 On the meetings of this „collective of authors,“ Ulbricht’s role, and their discussions on how to write 
World War II history see the detailed analysis in Chapter 11.I.
42
 Lieselotte Thoms, Walter Ulbricht. Arbeiter, Revolutionär, Staatsmann (Berlin: Staatsverlag der DDR, 
1968), 295f.
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was intended to “enlighten” East Germans about the history of the German working class 
on the one hand, and to rebuke West Germany’s continuing flirt with imperialist 
militarism, on the other hand. “Hitlergermany’s” attack on the Soviet Union “was not 
only a severe crime against the Soviet people; it was most of all the severest crime that 
German imperialism has committed against the German nation since its existence.”
43
Further, June 22, 1941 changed the “entire course of the Second World War” for now the 
“character of the war against Hitler-Germany and his satellites as just, antifascist war of 
liberation emerged completely.”(293) The “Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union” was 
at once a national war of defense and a transnational war of liberation. Early in the text 
the authors pointed out that “Barbarossa” was not a preventive war – “the claim of some 
West German historians and memoir-writing generals [is a] political lie (Zwecklüge)” –
but that it was the result of “military, political and economic plans of fascist imperialism 
for the extermination of the Soviet state and the enslavement of the Soviet people.” 
(290f.) The murder of the Jews was a marginal aspect in this extermination plan,
44
 its 
executioners remained unnamed while its chief resisters, Red Army and German 
communists, received the most detailed attention. Overall, the narrative stressed –
supported indeed by the Nuremberg Tribunal’s conclusions – that the Hitlerfascists’ plan 
43
 Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim Zentralkomitee der SED, ed., Geschichte der deutschen 
Arbeiterbewegung, vol. 5: „Von  Januar 1933 bis April 1945“ (Berlin (Ost): Dietz, 1966), 292, passim.
44
The narrative included a reference to the planned murder of the Jews upfront albeit in passing. It pointed 
out that the SS Einsatzgruppen were to “fight any resistance movement in the occupied territories 
ruthlessly, exterminate entire parts of the population and to kill communist functionaries as well as Jewish 
and other citizens of the USSR.” (290) The authors cited the Wannsee Conference as deciding the “murder 
of eleven million Jewish citizens from 27 countries.” Herewith “the greatest massacre in world history was 
inaugurated to which six million people fell victim within three years in Auschwitz, Belzec, Chelmno, 
Majdanek, Sobibor, Treblinka and other fascist extermination centers. No further details were added. The 
appendix contains an excerpt from the „Wannsee Protocol” with the numbers of Jews “to be considered” 
for the “final solution” sorted by country. See ibid., 556f.
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to “Germanize and colonize” the European continent was ultimately aimed at the 
“destruction of the Soviet state, the physical extermination of a considerable part of the 
Russian people and the relocation of other parts of the Russian people in Siberia.” In 
conclusion, “with this outrageous program of extermination the inhumanity and 
barbarism of German imperialism and militarism reached unfathomable dimensions” 
(322).
The official version of World War II history entailed the distortion, 
marginalization or plain omission of facts, incidents, and persons who did not fit into the 
grand narrative of trial and triumph.
45
 East Germany’s communists saw the war on the 
Eastern Front as more than just a military battle; it was rather a fight motivated– almost 
primarily – by political and economic motives, and less so by ideological differences. 
The stress on the indisputable exploitative character of Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet 
Union allowed for the causal allusion to “capitalism” and “imperialism” as the true 
driving forces behind Hitler’s war aims. Accordingly, the main term used in reference to 
the perpetrators on all levels of the Nazi political and military apparatus was 
“Hitlerfascist.” It was “Hitlerfascists” who occupied the Soviet territories (296), it was 
the “fascist troops” and the “fascist occupants” who were defeated at Stalingrad, (334) 
and throughout the narrative soldiers were never just soldiers but members of the 
“Hitlerwehrmacht” or of the “fascist Wehrmacht.” 
45
 See the essays in Sabrow, ed., Geschichte als Herrschaftsdiskurs, especially Heimann, „Erinnerung als 
Wandlung,“ 39-85, Christoph Classen, „Vom Anfang im Ende: ‚Befreiung’ im Rundfunk,“ 87-118, and 
Simone Barck, “Widerstands-Geschichten und Helden-Berichte. Momentaufnahmen antifaschistischer 
Diskurse in den fünfziger Jahren,” 119-173. See further, for example, the aspects discussed in Alf Lüdtke, 
„Wer handelt? Die Akteure der Geschichte. Zur DDR-Geschichtsschreibung über Arbeiterklasse und 
Faschismus,“ in Georg G. Iggers, ed., Die DDR-Geschichtswissenschaft als Forschungsproblem (München: 
Oldenbourg, 1998), 369-410. Heider, „Das Nationalkomitee ‚Freies Deutschland.’
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Only with regards to the communist resistance, the text mentioned concrete names, 
namely the “usual suspects” of the communist pantheon of antifascists on the Eastern 
Front: Ulbricht, Pieck, Becher, Bredel, Weinert in Moscow and behind the front lines, 
and imprisoned Wehrmacht leaders Walter von Seydlitz-Kurzbach (1888-1976), Egbert 
von Frankenberg, Otto Korfes and Luitpold Steidle in the NKFD. German soldiers 
entered the stage only as prisoners of the Red Army, “some of which brought the 
discontent of the various classes of the nation with the Nazi regime and the Hitlerwar 
(Hitlerkrieg) and their longing for peace into captivity.” The German soldier was not the 
prime culprit in an aggressive war, but stood basically on the same level with the Red 
Army, the initial victim of this aggression. Ulbricht’s official history thus turned German 
soldiers from perpetrators into victims: “on the German-Soviet front they had 
experienced the senseless fascist war the harshest” (356). 
Only in light of the refusal of most Wehrmacht soldiers to follow the KPD’s and 
NKFD’s call for orderly retreat or collective surrender, the narrative noted briefly that the 
“influence of the fascist ideology on the German soldiers and officers was still strong” 
(367) in early 1943, when the Sixth Army’s defeat at Stalingrad had signaled the 
“fundamental turnaround in the Second World War.” (334) From here on, the 
Wehrmacht, along with the German home front, was fatally mistaken not to rise against 
Hitler as the KPD had demanded constantly since 1942 (346f.) Between the lines, this 
collective failure is implicit even if the repressive nature of Goebbels “total war” 
campaign is depicted en detail. Just as the text – as the official narrative – hardly 
identifies the soldiers on the Eastern Front as war criminals in concrete instances –
exception is for example a photograph showing “Soviet citizens” hanged by “members of 
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the German Wehrmacht” (384) – the mass of the German population remained spared 
from charges of complicity. While the nation continued to submit under Hitler’s regime, 
its avant-garde, the working class, was the first to realize the looming end. The KPD 
counted on the German “working class” for their plans for eradicating capitalism as the 
natural breeding ground for fascism and war, and for realizing socialism in its place. 
In the SED’s view, World War II had taken place principally on the Eastern Front; 
party leaders rarely made references to the other fighting members of the anti-Hitler
coalition, or the Western Front in general. In their speeches and pamphlets during the 
1950s, they instead portrayed the United States, Britain and West Germany as Hitler’s 
heirs. The triumph of socialism was the logic outcome of World War II and the battle of 
Stalingrad served as the ideal vantage point for this claim. Ulbricht’s view of the battle 
thus contains the essence of the war’s lessons: 
This victory [at Stalingrad] was no accidental success but was conditional on profound causes which
had an objective character. It attested to the fact that the military and economic balance of power had 
changed in favour of the anti-Hitler-coalition led by the USSR. It proved irrefutably the superiority of 
the socialist social system and state order. (334) 
The victory of the Red Army and the German communists on the Eastern Front liberated 
the German nation from the “Nazi joke.” It legitimized “the path to a new, democratic 
life” in Germany. In 1945, a “fundamental turn in the history of the German people 
began” (438) – a turn which eventually forced the Eastern part of Germany into a second 
dictatorship. This official view celebrated the arrival of the past in the present, and 
viewed recent German history – regardless of the factual division of the German nation 
and the Cold War – as a story with a happy end. 
The political capital to be gained from this interpretation of history was enourmous. 
Ulbricht, Abusch and other leading party “historians” sought to instill East Germans with 
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a feeling of remorseful sympathy for the fate of Soviet citizens during the Eastern Front 
war, and a sense of pride and confidence in the victorious socialist cause. Their narratives 
selectively recaptured historical events, their actors and victims. In particular, the SED 
rewrote the history of the German antifascist movement – a minority movement – to 
encompass all Germans who subscribed to the idea of socialism in East Germany. Thus, 
the “unifying, cohesive force” of the Eastern Front memory was not, like in the Soviet 
Union, the war itself, but the antifascist narrative of the “group Ulbricht” returning from 
the Eastern Front in the slipstream of the victorious Red Army. It mattered not only 
ideologically during the immediate postwar years, but constituted the basis for a political 
agenda inspired by history’s lessons. Just as Ulbricht in 1952 placed the program for the 
“building of socialism” within the context of the superior mission to realize the lessons of 
the war by preventing it from happening again, the popular unrests facing the SED 
regime in 1953 were crushed by pointing to the threat of another “Barbarossa.”
THE PAST AS WARNING: JUNE 17, 1953 AND THE “LESSONS OF JUNE ”
The way the SED handled the June uprising in East Germany in 1953 demonstrates 
the substantial grip which the calculated utilization of history can have on peoples’ lives. 
This uprising was the first and last expression of massive popular resistance against the 
SED until 1989. After workers in East Berlin took to the streets to protest the introduction 
of increased production quotas on June 16, 1953, the rebellion quickly spread throughout 
East Germany the following days. The over one million demonstrators soon called for a 
change of government, free elections, and unification. The SED regime, left uncertain 
about the future course of the Soviet Union after Stalin’s death on March 3, 1953, was 
incapable of solving the crisis on its own. Only after Soviet tanks intervened on June 17, 
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1953, killing at least 60 people and wounding hundreds, public order could be restored. 
The SED denounced the uprising as “fascist coup” and arrested thousands of citizens.
46
The East German uprising was a major event in the postwar history of communism, the 
“first real mass uprising within the Soviet sphere of influence.”
47
 It also exposed the 
volatility of the SED-regime. Ulbricht survived the crisis as SED leader in a “position of 
strength by being weak”
48
– his regime’s very existence now openly rested on Soviet 
tanks. 
On the ideological front, the SED relied heavily on history and its propagandistic 
potential. The hasty search for an explanation of the riots led the party press to intensify 
the anti-Western propaganda in an unprecedented way: the uprising was a “fascist 
adventure” incited by Western agitators and spies in order to make the GDR the “starting 
point” of a new war. On June 18, 1953, the editorial of Neues Deutschland asked „What 
happened in Berlin?,” and explained that „Western agencies had succeeded in confusing 
and instigating segments of the population for a few hours.” Even though the “great 
majority had rejected the provocation with hostility,” the same “dark forces” were at 
work which had “plunged Germany into catastrophe twice.” Yet, it was “shameful that 
German workers fell for the clever machinations of the provocateurs” so that the Soviets 
46
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had to “stand in for the vital interests of the German nation … with the necessary resolve 
by declaring a state of emergency.”
49
In SED propaganda, the “dark forces” of German history harbored by the Bonn 
government planned a third World War. If it were not for Soviet tanks, German workers 
would have been tricked – once again – into another war. The nucleus of this legend was 
crafted in the SED ZK’s “General Division,” the most important organisational link 
between the SED leadership, the Soviet authorities in Berlin-Karlshorst, Soviet diplomats 
in the GDR, and Moscow. Responsible directly to Ulbricht, the division filed a report in 
the summer of 1953 which provided an “Analysis of the Preparation, the Outbreak and 
the Suppression of the ‘Fascist Adventure’ from June 16 to June 22, 1953.” It claimed 
that “hostile forces” led by “American agencies” and supported by “the warmongers in 
Bonn,” had organized an “attempt for a fascist coup” in East Germany. It was their goal 
“to make Berlin and the German Democratic Republic the starting point of war in 
Europe.”
50
 Repressing the uprising was thus a matter of war and peace in Europe. It was 
directed primarily not against unpopular SED policies in East Germany but against the 
Soviet Union. By seeking to “revive the anti-Soviet feelings among the population,” the 
report reflected the SED’s (indeed justified) concern about persisting anti-Soviet 
49
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247
sentiments. Yet, at the same time, the true instigators were said to sit in Washington, 
Bonn and West Berlin. Their goal was nothing less than to start a new war against the 
Soviet Union. 
The most candid and most articulate formulation of this claim was crafted by the 
SED’s chief agitator, Albert Norden (1904-1982), then head of the press bureau in the 
GDR Information Office.
51
 On June 21, 1953 – the uprising was almost completely 
crushed by then, and it was one day before the twelveth anniversary of the Nazi attack on 
the Soviet Union – Norden published a lengthy essay on “The Lessons of June 22, 1941” 
in Neues Deutschland.
52
 His text bundled the SED’s orchestrated propaganda effort to 
submerge the memory of June 22, 1941 into the June events of 1953 for political profit. 
“They are preparing a new June 22” was the main message of the essay, and Norden 
identified a few West German politicians as the “flesh from the flesh of fascist 
imperialism,” among them chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Jakob Kaiser (1888-1961), 
the head of the CDU in West Berlin (550). He argued that for German militarism, June 
22, 1941 had been “Day X” – the long prepared starting point for gaining “world 
dominance.” Since 1945, Norden continued, these same German imperialists prepared for 
another “Day X” on which they would erect a “bloody regime on the territory of the 
51
 Norden was the son of a rabbi, a journalist in the Weimarer Republic (Rote Fahne), and since 1921 KPD 
member. In 1933 he flew first to Czechoslovakia, then to France (where he coauthored the famous 
Braunbuch über Reichstagsbrand und Hitlerterror in 1933/34). In 1941 he emigrated to the United States. 
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GDR” with “American help:”  this day was to be the “prelude for a new, gruesome 
military adventure against the countries of peace, against the Soviet Union” (542). On 
June 17, 1953, they had believed “their hour had come” to launch the “refascization” 
(Refaschisierung) of Germany. Yet, just as in the years 1941 to 1945, the “decisive will 
of the Soviet Union” assured that “another ‘Day X’ was doomed to fail as well” (542f.). 
Norden’s text referred to contemporary works published by former Wehrmacht generals 
in the West and cited documents from the Nuremberg trials which proved that 
“Barbarossa” had been all but a “preventive war:”
Indeed, in order to have an alibi before the German people and in order to awake enthusiasm among 
the people for a war against the Soviet Union, the lie of the Soviet threat had to be invented and to be 
painted in the blackest colors. ... You see that the main motif in the foreign policy of the Bonn regime, 
the ‘threat from the East,’ is merely a duplicate of the score played by Hitler and Goebbels. (546)
Norden recounted the millions of Soviet “men, women and children” killed in accordance 
with the Nazi “Germanization” plans. He also pointed to the personal continuities 
between the Nazi era and West Germany suggesting this was the reason why the “same 
generals, big industrialists and politicians who had approved of Hitler’s attack against the 
Soviet Union and participated in it, could [now] breed over new ‘Barbarossa-plans’” 
(551). Not only keeping quiet about the use of former Wehrmacht generals in the East 
German armed forces,
53
 Norden here did something that was typical in the SED’s 
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 See the useful overview by Niemetz, „Besiegt, gebraucht, gelobt, gemieden.” As a rule, former 
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of leading cadres and decided to gradually remove all former Wehrmacht officers from the NVA. In 1958, 
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rhetorical deployment of the Nazi past: he used known – and indeed scandalous – facts 
such as the involvement of former Wehrmacht generals in the creation of the 
Bundeswehr, exaggerated, inflated and distorted these facts and presented the 
implications to be drawn from them creating an enemy image of the “West German 
reaction” that can only be called a conspiracy theory. While Adenauer, Kaiser, 
Schumacher and others in the West German political elite fiercely and articulately 
opposed the Soviet regime over Eastern Europe and its presence in East Germany, to 
claim that they actively planned to wage aggressive war (yet again) was sheer invention. 
Notwithstanding, the SED inflated the scandalous dimensions of West German 
Vergangenheitspolitik to such a degree that they appeared to unmask a scandal of 
historical dimensions – the plan for another “Barbarossa.” This historical rhetoric for the 
sake of propagandistic profit and political legitimization, not of remembering war and 
preventing history from being repeated, ultimately disgraced every genuine concern over 
the persistence of Nazi sentiments and militarism in West German society and politics. It 
ridiculed the SED’s claim to carry on the antifascist legacy.
Norden’s last lines read like the rational conclusion of an irrational argument, they 
offer an escape from the conspiracy of “history’s dark forces” to wage World War III: 
only when “the soil of German society is being stubbed … as it has happened in the 
German Democratic Republic,” the nation and the world would be “immunized against 
the repetition of such crimes as June 22, 1941” (552). Ultimately, the world remained 
their number was reduced to 400, in 1964 only 67 of them were left. By 1972, the category “member of the 
former Wehrmacht” no longer appeared in the NVA cadre files.
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divided into good and evil, peace-loving and war-thirsty. Yet, Norden ended with the 
claim, that by 1953 the Soviet Union had found true friends among most Germans:
They, the German imperialists, are, like ever, ravenous for other people’s land, for cheap fame, for 
abundant war profits. The German people, however, are starving for peace. They will demonstrate to 
the troublemakers in Bonn that 1953 is not 1941, and that the friendship with the Soviet Union, which 
has always displayed friendship and helpful understanding for us Germans, has become today a matter 
that is near to their hearts, and a program of action of all nationally conscious people between [the 
rivers] Oder and Rhine. (552)
The officially claimed bond between (East) Germans and Soviet citizens became a 
notorious claim in SED propaganda throughout the existence of the GDR. To many it 
was no more than an “invented friendship” because it collided with the reality of the 
Soviet presence in Eastern Germany.
54
In West Germany, however, and in contrast to Norden’s presumptuous claims, the 
official and categorical anticommunism mingled with a popular distrust, indeed fear, of 
everything Russian since the end of the war. It was thus a diplomatic milestone when 
representatives of both hostile states met in Moscow in 1955 to discuss the prospect of 
establishing diplomatic relations in exchange for settling one pressing issue pertaining the 
legacy of the Eastern campaign: bringing home the remaining German POWs.
II. The Shadows of the Past: Adenauer in Moscow, 1955
When Konrad Adenauer met with the leadership of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU) in Moscow in September of 1955 it was the first direct official 
encounter between Soviet leaders and representatives of that part of Germany which 
claimed to be the only legitimate German state, the successor state to the Third Reich 
(Alleinvertretungsanspruch). The way the past was discussed and reflected in the course 
54
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of the summit highlights the essence of West Germany memory of the war against the 
Soviet Union (or “Russia,” as most West Germans still called the country). This section 
will briefly recapture Adenauer’s personal view of the Wehrmacht role on the Eastern 
Front, and then examines the talks between the CPSU ZK’s general secretary Nikita 
Khrushchev (1894-1971) and the German delegation where they touched on the issue of 
the legacy of the Eastern Front war. The episode serves as snapshot of West German 
memory of the Eastern Front in 1950s. 
In 1955, the German-Soviet relationship was still “abnormal and historically 
loaded,” and Adenauer knew that his countrymen connected  traumatic memories with 
the war in “Russia” and the Soviet intrusion into Germany in the year 1944/45.
55
 To most 
people, the occupation of East Germany constituted an ongoing outrageous crime. The 
criminal legacy of the Eastern Front war was neither part of the public perception of the 
Soviet Union nor of Adenauer’s public references to recent history. In August 1953, a 
poll conducted by the Allensbach Institute found that Adenauer was in sync with public 
opinion: 55 percent of West Germans did not think “that the German soldiers of the last 
war [could] be reproached for their conduct in the occupied countries.” Twenty-one
percent said, yes, “in some cases,” only six percent said “yes.”
56
 Yet, Adenauer also knew 
he had to find a way to communicate with the Soviets about the past in order to be able to 
communicate in and about the present and future. In fact, this difficult political situation 
engendered an ambiguous approach to a difficult past. Soviet power had reached 
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Germany, indeed it controlled one half of the country. A confession of historical guilt 
could easily be interpreted as a concession to Soviet dominance in the present. This left 
very little room for historical differentiation beyond the absolutely necessary. To 
Adenauer, the Soviet Union was and remained a “dreadful power,” threatening the 
occidental, European family of nations with its “expansionist drive towards the West.”
57
The talks with the Soviet leaders were the first candid conversation between 
Germans and Russians after the Eastern campaign had ended (leaving aside the meetings 
between Moscow and its followers in East Berlin). Accordingly, this conversation was 
the first opportunity to exchange respective memories and conceptions of the past. In the 
center of it seemed to stand the fate of the last German POWs. The long history of the 
repatriation of over two million German prisoners of war from the Soviet Union came to 
a preliminary end in the fall of 1955 after Adenauer’s meeting with the head of the 
CPSU, Nikita Khrushchev, resulted in the release of the last 9,626 POWs who had been 
kept on charges of war crimes. Adenauer received credit for the release, but the Soviets 
had already decided this before the meeting.
58
  The path-breaking negotiations opened 
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formal diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic, and 
Adenauer was celebrated in West Germany for his alleged triumph over the Soviets who 
had now agreed to release the last German POWs from captivity. For his countrymen he 
was “a grandpa [who] traveled to Moscow to bring home Germany’s sons.”
59
For Moscow, the summit was not so much about  dealing appropriately with German 
“war criminals” but about moving towards more normal relations with West Germany 
and about preserving the status quo.
60
 Adenauer was aware of how crucial a better 
relationship with Bonn was for Khrushchev. He thus approached the Soviet leaders from 
a position of strength and with a good measure of openly displayed self-confidence. Upon 
his arrival in Moscow, he declared that “for the first time a representative of the German 
people negotiates with the Soviet government.”
61
 Such rhetoric along with his well-known 
previous comments on the issue of war crimes committed by the Wehrmacht during 
World War II, created and sustained an atmosphere of open detestation. Since his early 
days in the CDU, Adenauer had shown much sympathy for former Wehrmacht soldiers 
and nominal members of the NSDAP. Weighing justice against integration he opted 
consequently for the latter. His program of Vergangenheitspolitik was primarily aimed at 
the amnesty and integration of these groups into West German society.
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addressed the issue of the Wehrmacht’s role in the Nazi era, Adenauer was eager to point 
out that the number of those “truly” guilty of war crimes was “extraordinary small” and 
that they would not “diminish the honor of the former German Wehrmacht.”
63
 In his view, 
members of the Wehrmacht had not belonged to the “activists and profiteers” of the Nazi 
regime. Thus the “chapter of the collective guilt of the militarists” must be closed once 
and for all.
64
 As demonstrated earlier, Adenauer expressed understanding for Mitläufer on 
many occasions. He duly sided with the “decent German soldier” whose memory and 
reputation needed to be defended against maculation and condemnation.
65
This was the core of the official memory of the Eastern Front as Adenauer articulated 
it during his Moscow visit. Already on the first day of negotiations, September 9, 1955, 
the conversation between Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai A. Bulganin(1895-1975) and 
Adenauer turned towards the subject of the last war. Bulganin recalled the extraordinary 
suffering of the Soviet peoples and, while admitting that Germans too had suffered 
greatly, reminded the chancellor that it was Germany who had started the war. In 
response, Adenauer expressed understanding for the need to “speak from one’s heart,” 
and drew a picture of German society under Nazism which was plainly incorrect:
If one seeks to establish a normalization of the relations after all that has happened, one must as a start 
speak with each other openly in order to vent one’s heart. You have, Mister Prime Minister, described 
the sufferings of the Soviet people during the last war at the beginning of your considerations. I 
honestly concede to you that the Soviet people have suffered extraordinarily as a result of this war. But 
if you say, the German people have been in a different situation [because Germany had started the war] 
then I may turn your attention to the fact that one must not equate Hitler and his followers with the 
German people. There is a very large percentage of the German people which out of innermost 
63
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conviction has condemned Hitler, who has condemned this entire war, and who has condemned all 
cruelties committed by Hitlerism.
66
Downplaying the extent of popular support for much of Hitler’s agenda, Adenauer
implied that even though a majority of Germans had not opposed Hitler, they had 
condemned “all cruelties.” It remains unclear who had committed these cruelties –
“Hitlerism” is hardly a historical agent. Yet, shortly thereafter he spoke of the “German 
troops” who had “invaded Russia:”
It is true: much bad has happened. Yet it is also true that the Russian armies then – in defense, I admit 
that offhand – intruded into Germany and that then in Germany as well many terrible things happened 
in the war. I think that if we enter a new era in our relations – and that is our sincere will – that then we 
should not look into the past too deeply, because then we will only build up obstacles before us. The 
beginning of a new era also requires a psychological cleansing.
67
The peculiar wording in the passage underlines Adenauer’s reluctance to acknowledge 
the difference in kind between Hitler’s war of annihilation waged against “Jewish 
Bolshevism” and the Red Army’s invasion of Eastern Europe and Germany in the wake 
thereof. That “bad” or “evil” things have happened in Russia, he admitted; yet, in 
comparison, one is tempted to conclude, much worse, namely “terrible” crimes were 
committed by the Red Army.
68
 It was reported that Khrushchev “exploded” after hearing 
the above-quoted comment about the “psychological cleansing” and “shook his fist on 
Adenauer.” The Chancellor is said to have responded by also jumping up and raising his 
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 What outraged Khrushchev so much is further illustrated by a comment by 
Adenauer pertaining the emotional legacy of the war. In a meeting with the CDU 
executive committee in late September back in Germany, he reported that, predictably, 
“in the first encounter after the war all the anger, rage and mourning broke out about all 
that has happened in this war between the two nations, about what one nation had done to 
the other.”
70
Adenauer indeed displayed a propensity to relegate the “war thing”
71
 to the realm of 
psychology, namely as something that can be dealt with as a matter of course and of will. 
Memories of war, such was the implication, would have to and could be overcome one 
day; the sooner, the better. In a press conference held upon his return to Germany on 
September 20, 1955, Adenauer summed up his trip with the following assessment of the 
state of memory affairs:
All in all, the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Soviet Russia and the Federal Republic 
is a step of a certain meaning because with it, this war thing is disposed of once and for all [diese 
Kriegssache mal aus der Welt geschafft]. The war memories played indeed a great role on the other 
side; they were still very strong and very alive.
72
In a similar way Adenauer had summed up his impressions during a meeting with 
President Theodor Heuss on 16 September 1955. He recalled that the “reception was 
outwardly cordial” yet “behind these testimonies of friendship shivers still the psychosis 
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Adenauer nonetheless drew a balanced conclusion for his foreign policy conduct 
from this trip, albeit not in public. In the same CDU meeting cited above, he cautioned 
that the past kept hanging over the present and, in a way, was a third party sitting at the 
negotiation table. Unfortunately, the following evenhanded and perceptive comments on 
the legacies of the Eastern Front war never reached the West German public: 
Looking back on the negotiations [Adenauer] also sought to avoid one-sidedness: ‘As atrocious as the 
Russians have raged here ... I believe the Germans have committed no less grandiose crimes in Russia. 
The number of Russian POWs one has left to starve, in the truest sense of the word, goes in the 
millions.’ And, the Hitler-Stalin-pact though it was ‘mean in its goals and bad in its motives’ – it was a 
contract after all. Indeed, ‘many years have passed since 1939’ but one should keep the facts and 
numbers before one’s eyes ‘if one sits down on a table with representatives of the Soviet Union to talk 
about issues which stem from those years….’
74
Adenauer might have been aware of history’s role in diplomacy, yet his political 
character, instinct and world view left just as little room for maneuvering within this 
space as did the demands of day-to-day politics at the height of the Cold War. His public, 
less differentiating anticommunist stand might thus well have contributed to the popular 
perception that those last POWs returning after his Moscow visit to West Germany were 
“Hitler’s sturdiest soldiers,” as the magazine Stern titled in October 1955. Their war had 
lasted another ten years behind barbed wire, the story went, and now they emerged as the 
final victors in the fight against “Soviet inhumanity and Bolshevist propaganda” – an 
enemy against which already Hitler had stood.
75
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III. Beyond the Rhetoric of Militant Pacifism:                                                                                
The “Anti-Imperialist Protection Wall” and the Prevention of another 
“Barbarossa” 
While an ambiguous Eastern Front memory burdened relations between West 
Germany and the Soviet Union throughout the 1950s and much of the 1960s, the GDR 
depended on the material and ideological support which flowed from the German-Soviet 
friendship pact with Moscow. In the East,the SED converted its declared lessons into 
political practice. It was not only Ulbricht, and the inner circle of SED leaders, but a 
number of other men who partook in this conversion of history into politics. Namely, 
former Wehrmacht officers sharing with Ulbricht the Eastern Front experience 
contributed to the canonization and political instrumentalization of the Eastern Front 
memory in East Germany. These veterans found a political home in the National 
Democratic Party of Germany (NDPD) after their personal transformation from Hitler’s 
officers to members of the anti-Hitler movement – the NKFD – on the Eastern Front. At 
the SED’s initiative they also formed the “Working Group of former Officers”
(Arbeitsgemeinschaft ehemaliger Offiziere or AeO) in 1958. That way Ulbricht assured 
that prominent members of the “front generation” joined in the struggle against “Western 
imperialism” – a struggle which the SED declared decided on August 13, 1961 with the 
building of the “anti-imperialist protection wall.” The SED enlisted these veterans in a 
concerted fear-and-threat-campaign leading up to the building of the wall.
Towards the end of the 1950s, several organizational reforms tuned the propaganda 
apparatus towards the more effective propagation of “Barbarossa’s” lessons not only 
inside the GDR, but also their dissemination among the West German public. A 
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concerted effort to bundle the “information” about the continuing “threat” and to 
disseminate them among the East German population was made in 1957 when the SED 
ZK’s Division of Agitation and Propaganda headed by Horst Sindermann (1915-1990) –
an experienced KPD veteran who had spent ten years in various Nazi prisons before 1945 
– launched an internal circular entitled “Information Service” (Informationsdienst). Its 
foremost purpose was to intensify the work against “the enemy” and it was distributed 
among the first secretaries of the SED Bezirks- und Kreisleitungen, to SED leaders in 
selected factories, to the editors-in-chief of the SED’s regional print-media and to all 
heads of division in the SED central committee. The first issue of spring 1957 was 
introduced with the following words:
Dear Comrades,
This Information Service shall arm you with facts and arguments as well as with internal information 
beyond what is possible through the press so that you can argue and stand against the enemy 
independently and offensively.
76
The material was confidential. It constitutes an excellent source for the reconstruction of 
the propaganda production in the GDR. As a rule, the “Information Service” included 
original statements by GDR officials and institutions, statements by West German 
politicians, excerpts from the West German press as well as counter-arguments and 
directions for group discussions with ordinary citizens. For example, a lengthy issue was 
circled in February 1957 in reaction to a major foreign policy debate in the Bundestag
during which “the speakers of German militarism” detailed their “program” – in reality, 
the debate addressed the prospects for German unification in view of the divided alliance 
system and unsolved security situation in Europe. The SED ZK’s thirtieth meeting dealt 
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with the Bonn debate and formulated a “clear assessment of West German militarism.” 
The “Information Service” provided its selected audience with a collection of suitable 
citations from both sides. West German Foreign Minister Clemens von Brentano (1886-
1965) was quoted saying that “any demand for West Germany’s withdrawal from NATO 
is absurd,” and clarifying that “the phrase ‘reunification in freedom’ is about absolute 
values which need no qualification … it is the goal of the federal government, to reunite 
the German nation in peace and unity, to provide the entire nation with the blessings of a 
state order based on the rule of law.”
77
 These statements were juxtaposed with SED ZK
proclamations deemed appropriate and effective to “unmask” the “aggressive plans” that 
“German imperialism” and “American finance capital” harboured: “German militarism is 
the greatest danger in Europe … German imperialism has plunged Germany twice into 
the abyss” and now sought to go down this path a third time in its incessant “drive 
towards the East.”
78
 West German hopes for a future democratization of Eastern Europe, 
and thus the demise of Soviet power as a result of the “politics of strength,” were 
denounced as “new edition of Hitler’s goals” and, moreover, interpreted as the “no longer 
concealed preparation of a war.”
79
 History was employed whenever it seemed useful to 
claim that it was about to be repeated. 
In addition to these improvements in the propaganda apparatus, the SED searched for 
alternative ways to optimize the campaign against a new “Barbarossa” which reached its 
climax in August 1961 with the party declaring that the erection of the Berlin wall was 
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the necessary “measure for the securing of peace in Europe.”
80
 A brief look into the 
timely beginnings of the “Working Group of former Officers” in 1958, a group of veteran 
Wehrmacht officers glued together by the shared Eastern Front experience and by the 
commitment to the “defense of socialism,” illustrates the centrality of the Eastern Front 
memory for the SED’s anti-Western fear-and-threat-campaign. 
PROFESSIONALIZING THE RHETORIC OF MILITANT PACIFISM: THE “WORKING GROUP OF 
FORMER OFFICERS” IN THE GDR
By the mid-1950s the SED reconsidered its 1948 decision to prohibit veteran 
organizations in East Germany
81
 and came to realize the potential value of a loyal 
association of former Wehrmacht officers in the GDR. In 1954, when the FRG’s formal 
integration into the Western alliance system had become only a matter of time, the SED 
made an orchestrated effort to hinder this process by gathering former Wehrmacht 
officers from East and West Germany for an “all-German conversation” about the future 
of Germany. General Field Marshall Friedrich Paulus,
82
 the former commander-in-chief 
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 Paulus led the Sixth Army through the invasions of Poland, Belgium and France; he was involved with 
the plans for the invasion of Great Britain in 1940/41 and paid Hitler respect for his “successful” Western 
campaigns. In September 1940 he was appointed Generalquartiermeister I im Generalstab des Heeres 
(Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel’s successor) and was thus Generaloberst Franz Halder’s deputy. In Zossen 
he participated in the preparations for “Operation Barbarossa” although his relationship to Keitel and Jodl
in the OKW was and remained strained. In January 1942 he became supreme commander of the Sixth 
Army who at this point stood near Charkov in the Ukraine. In May a second offensive of the Red Army
against Charkov hinders the Sixth Army’s further advance, yet Paulus’ successful fight against the Soviet 
offensive earned him respect in the Nazi press at home. In the course of the German summer offensive of 
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of the Sixth Army in Stalingrad who had (initially reluctantly) joined NKFD and BDO 
after his surrender in February 1943, had returned to the GDR from Soviet captivity in 
1953. The SED was eager to involve him in the campaign against the FRG’s 
remilitarization and Westbindung. Ulbricht, in particular, had great hopes for the general
as he was believed to exert some measure of influence on war veterans in both Germanys. 
He was the only former high-ranking general prominent enough to counter Erich von 
Manstein’s apologetic “Lost Victories” campaign in West Germany. Both former 
generals had served as military leaders in Hitler’s war on the Eastern Front and their 
opposing postwar careers – Manstein as unrepentant convicted war criminal, Paulus as 
transformed Hitler-opponent who had even testified for the Soviet prosecution against 
Hitler’s generals before the Nuremberg Tribunal in 1945
83
– exemplify the divided 
veteran memory of the Eastern Front in postwar Germany.  
On the initiative of the SED and the paramilitary so-called Quartered People’s Police 
(KVP), and with the logistic assistance of the NDPD, Paulus invited a few dozen former 
Wehrmacht officers to the “First All-German Congress of Officers” scheduled to take 
place in January 1955 in Berlin. This and the following two meetings fulfilled none of the 
1942, the Sixth Army advanced towards the Volga River, in August Paulus ordered the attack of Stalingrad. 
By November 29, 1942, the Sixth Army was encircled in the city. Hitler denied Paulus the permission to 
retreat, Göring promised relieve by air. On January 8, Paulus refused to accept an offer by the Red Army to 
capitulate and hope to contribute thus to the stabilization of the Wehrmacht faltering southern front. On 30 
January he was appointed GFM by Hitler, a day later Paulus capitulated with some 90,000 troops in the 
southern part of the divided cauldron. On February 2, the remaining troops in the northern part under 
general Strecker surrendered at last. While in Soviet captivity Paulus joined the NKFD and BDO after the 
failed assassination attempt of July 20, 1944 and supported and co-signed several calls for capitulation of 
the Wehrmacht. In 1946, still a POW, he acted as witness to the Soviet prosecution in the Nuremberg trials. 
He was released to the GDR in the summer of 1953 and resided in Dresden until his death in 1957.
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 On the details see Peter Steinkamp,Generalfeldmarschal Friedrich Paulus: ein unpolitischer Soldat? 
(Erfurt: Sutton, 2001), 94-98.
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hopes the SED had harbored. Although the first meeting of “87 former generals and 
officers of all branches of the military service” – among them high-ranking Waffen-SS 
officers – caught some attention in the Western media, it produced nothing more than a 
joint resolution on the “burning problems of our fatherland.” The German fatherland’s 
very existence was said to be on the line because the Paris Treaties (regulating West 
Germany’s NATO-integration and its limited sovereignty) were “a deadly threat to the 
unity and existence of our nation.”
84
 In view of the West German impending NATO-
membership, the resolution called on the “German Nation” to “refuse to fight under 
foreign flags,” insisted on the primate of a policy for a unified and neutral Germany, and 
warned that one could speak of German sovereignty only “once we are able to organize 
our state and political life free from any attempts at foreign infiltration 
(Überfremdung).”
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 In a report filed directly to Ulbricht after the meeting, Paulus 
admitted that the resolution reflected the maximum of a possible consensus between the 
East and West German officers, and hinted at prevailing Nazi sentiments among the 
latter.
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 A second “Congress” held in June 1955, demanded of the “millions of German 
soldiers of two world wars” to offer “national resistance” against the permanent division 
of Germany. This time, history was invoked, namely the “dead comrades” of Second 
World War. The meeting ended with an oath:
We solemnly swear not to rest and not to pause, to retreat from no danger, to work and to strive for the 
unity, freedom and independence of our German fatherland – anywhere and anytime!
This is what we owe our dead comrades!
This is what we owe our youth!
84
 Printed in Lapp, Ulbricht’s Helfer, 104.
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May Germany live – our common fatherland!
87
The Paris Treaties had just passed the Bundestag and became effective on May 5, 
1955. Thus, the first “all-German” veteran organization was little more than a well-
organized propaganda flop. When Paulus died on February 1, 1957, the idea of an East 
German elitist veteran association seemed to have lost its protagonist. During the same 
month, the SED Politburo decided to gradually remove all former Wehrmacht officers 
from the armed forces in reaction to continuing discussions within the party about the 
political “reliability” of Hitler’s former soldiers – irrespective of the fact that most of 
them had joined the antifascist resistance on the Eastern Front.
88
 According to the 
Politburo, the remaining 452 former Wehrmacht officers were to be removed until 1960. 
The decision to establish the “Working Group of former Officers” was partly prompted 
by the need to “absorb” the retirees before they could form a less controllable network of 
their own.
89
 A second impulse for the founding of AeO came from General Paulus’ 
funeral that February. Otto Korfes (1884-1964), a former division-commander of the 
Sixth Army, NKFD member and later the head of the AeO, recalled the reunion of 
several veteran Eastern Front fighters (all of them former NKFD members as well) on 
this occasion and reported later that the group realized the “urgent need to create a 
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 Regardless of the truthfulness of this claim, this was, in a sentence, 
indeed to become the mission of the organization.
The AeO was more than a „pension club”
91
 for retired Wehrmacht officers in the 
GDR. This elite veteran organization (membership by invitation), along with the 
simultaneously founded Institute for Military History in Potsdam, was to play a key role 
in the SED’s Westarbeit before and after the wall, and it embodied the translation of the 
lessons learned from the Eastern Front war into the socialist reality of the “other 
Germany,” the better German state.
92
 It existed as long as the SED could profit from the 
instrumentalization of this memory. As soon as a major shift in West Germany’s foreign 
policy under Willy Brandt brought about the over-due official acknowledgement of the 
Soviet Union’s losses on the Eastern Front, AeO was dissolved in 1971. 
Between October 1957 and January 1958 an initiative group gathered around retired 
Colonel Wolf Stern (1897-1961) outlined agenda and outlook of the new organization. 
Stern was as staff member of the Ministry of National Defense the central figure in this 
process. He was a Jewish-born veteran communist and Red Army volunteer with 
extended fighting experience from the Spanish Civil War and World War II.
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 Under his 
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 Just how timely the founding was is also demonstrated by the fact, that only a short time later about 1000 
former Stalingrad fighters met in Nuremberg for the first time to found the “Bund der ehemaligen 
Stalingradkämpfer” in October 1958. See Jahn, Stalingrad erinnern, 65f. The “Bund” began as early as 
1960 to include Soviet victims in commemoration ceremonies. For example, delegations visited memorial 
sites for perished Soviet POWs in Germany. This peculiar memorial culture resulted from the perception of 
the common suffering of ordinary German and Soviet soldiers in a war that had come over them almost like 
a natural disaster of as a matter of fate. This resonates with the major themes of literary fiction about the 
war widely read by veterans in the 1950s. See Schornstheimer, Die leuchtenden Augen der Frontsoldaten. 
See also Chapter 5.III.
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 He was awarded Soviet citizenship at the height of the Stalinist purges in 1937, and was closely involved 
with German POWs on the Eastern Front as staff member of the NKVD/Interior Ministry’s (MVD) POW 
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direction and under close supervision of the SED ZK’s Division for Security Questions 
headed by Erich Honecker, a group of Eastern Front veterans met three times in 1957/58 
to discuss and decide the work basis of AeO.
94
Among them were the “Stalingraders” Otto 
Korfes, a retired division-commander of the Sixth Army, Heinrich Homann (1911-1994), 
a retired major captured in Stalingrad, deputy president of the Volkskammer and later 
head of the NDPD, Luitpold Steidle(1898-1984)
95
, a retired regiment-commander also 
captured in Stalingrad, and between 1950 and 1958 Minister of Health as well as Martin 
Lattmann (1896-1978), another former Wehrmacht officer and Stalingrad veteran, and 
since 1952 employed as military advisor in the GDR’s People’s Police (VP). Stern knew 
all of these men personally; during the war, he had interrogated and “worked them” as 
POWs for the Soviet MVD. Initially, his authority allowed him to act as the “unofficial 
head” of the AeO.
96
The minutes of the two preparatory meetings in October 1957 document the 
ideological motives and strategic intentions behind the AeO’s founding. Realizing the 
degree to which Wehrmacht veterans in West Germany had organized themselves in 
networks in the course of the 1950s, Stern noted that these organizations had become 
division between 1943 and 1950 (for example, he was assigned to convince Paulus to join NKFD and 
BDO). Returning to the GDR in 1956, reserve officer Stern first worked as head of the political division in 
the Ministry of National Defense, then headed the initiative to found the AeO. He became the first director 
of the Institute for Military Historiography (1958-1961). 
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“instruments of the ideological preparation of the Bundeswehr and the population of West 
Germany towards revanchist aggression.” On the other hand, he absurdly claimed that the 
federal elections of 1957 – at the end of which Adenauer’s CDU/CSU had gained an 
absolute majority – indicated that “a great part of the working class and the intelligentsia 
as well stood against the Adenauer regime.” It was thus necessary and useful to unite 
former Wehrmacht officers in the GDR to “effectively counter this process of the 
ideological preparation of a new war by the militarists in the West through adequate 
writings and tracts in the press.”
97
 Beyond this propagandistic task, the AeO was to 
pursuit “personal and other connections with former officers in West Germany for the 
purpose of their involvement in the fight against nuclear war and aggression.”
98
 Steidle
suggested that the working group should bear the phrase “all-German” in its title to stress 
its function as “collecting basin for all progressive former officers ready to fight against 
… a nuclear war against the countries of the socialist camp” in both Germanys.
99
Although well-argued, Steidle’s suggestion was not realized.
The second meeting detailed the ideological objectives and also negotiated possible 
“theses” of the key-note speech to be delivered by Steidle at the founding meeting. Stern
summarized the motives of the AeO by demanding that:
- an intensified and organized fight of the former officers must be executed against the increasing 
ideological preparation of the West German population for a third world war by the West German 
soldiers associations;
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 Wolf Stern, “Aktennotiz … Beratung der Frage der Gründung einer Arbeitsgemeinschaft ehemaliger 






- through a transformation of hearts and minds of the former officers in West Germany and in the 
Bundeswehr the insight prevails, that, beyond everything that divides us, peace must be preserved most 
of all.
100
It was further decided that a monthly “information paper” would be published and that its 
“main feature” was to be “pugnacious, militant confrontation.”
101
 It was to put the central 
historical event of World War II, the “anticommunist” expansionist aggression against 
the Soviet Union, at the forefront of the contemporarily needed “threat” response. In light 
of their “own experience and new political insights,” the members saw themselves 
“obliged to speak out,” especially to “people in the West.” Their task was to contrast 
soldierdom in the “imperialist camp” with that in the “peace camp:” “There, spirit of 
attack [and] blind subjugation, here, holy readiness to protect the result of reconstruction, 
our state.” The AeO was also to demonstrate that anticommunism was the “great folly of
our century” (citing Thomas Mann again), and that socialism was the system of the 
future. Thus, the agenda was to “reckon with the past,” to “engage in a consistent, tough 
and clean, historically correct reckoning with the West,” to promote the “national idea 
everywhere,” and to organize the union of all former officers.
102
This set of goals aptly highlights the line of attack of the AeO’s main instrument, the 
monthly publication Mitteilungsblatt der Arbeitsgemeinschaft ehemaliger Offiziere. If 
World War II had taught lessons these were, firstly, not to repeat history and, secondly, 
that only as defenders of “socialism and peace” could soldiers in postwar Germany 
become “real soldiers.” Anticommunism, meaning in this view the rejection of 
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everything Soviet, was at the root of all evil in the twentieth century and the AeO was to 
contribute to its eradication by not only praising socialism’s worth (“we want socialism, 
we have the moral and technical superiority, as the Trabant shows”
103
) but also by 
reckoning the rights and wrongs of the recent German past and present. 
Indeed, the founding meeting was filled with the spirit of reckoning with the past and 
present. It took place on January 11, 1958 in the Central House of German-Soviet 
Friendship in Berlin Unter den Linden. The invited 31 participants, among them not only 
former Wehrmacht officers, but also deputies of the NDPD, SED and CDU, the president 
of the GDR supreme court, several university professors and media representatives,
104
elected an executive committee (headed by Korfes, Homann and Steidle) and agreed to 
publish a monthly newsletter. It was also decided that AeO members were to appear 
regularly on selected radio and television shows.
105
 The statute of the AeO contained a 
preamble which detailed the threat emerging from the West (NATO, Bundeswehr) and 
stressed the need to counter the “anti-Soviet hate campaign” of the “press organs of the 
numerous tradition clubs – the militaristic associations of former soldiers and officers in 
West Germany.” This Western hate campaign aimed at “whitewashing the generals and 
Hitler’s OKW of their responsibility for the Second World War” and the militarists 




 The complete list is contained in BA/SAPMO, DY 30 IV/2/12/7, 121-123.
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 See the report by Wolf Stern in BA/SAPMO, DY 30 IV/2/12/7, 139-141. Beginning in June 1958, the 
AeO had a regular appearance on the state radio: on every third Friday of the month, they could air their 
own ten-minute long show entitled “Militärwesen und Politik.” See BA/MA Freiburg, DVW 20, VA 0-
01/5945, 79.
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for “the planned aggressive war.” Among the AeO’s primary tasks was thus to publish 
“truthful historical research” on the causes and events of World War II.
106
As most speakers during the founding ceremony recalled the days of their 
collaboration as POWs in the NKFD, the experience of transformation from Hitler’s 
warrior to the Soviet Union’s soldier for peace was celebrated as the life-turning 
experience bonding the Eastern Front veterans in the GDR. Otto Korfes, soon-to-be-
elected first president of the AeO, reminded his comrades that it was their “special 
obligation” to fight against a “third world war” by providing a “scientifically exact 
description of the first and the second world war” and by “unmasking those interested in 
a third world war.” Korfes recalled the “historical role” of the NKFD during World War 
II, a committee founded in a “comparably dangerous  [sic] situation of the German 
nation.” He stressed that the AeO was no “tradition club” (Traditionsverein); it rather 
assembled “all those former officers who are able and ready to stand up against the war 
campaign of the West by word and writing.”
107
 All of the present “Stalingraders” and 
NKFD veterans had “learned and already contributed for a decade and a half in 
outstanding positions to the societal life in the GDR.”
108
 Steidle as well stressed the 
“positive fact, that after almost fifteen years such a considerable number of NKFD 
members … gathered again to fight for the preservation of peace.”
109
 The AeO was thus 
explicitly presented as the continuation of the war-time antifascist project on the Eastern 
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Front. Although the rhetoric focused on the consequences of nuclear war for Germany 
and on the resultant need to advocate a “neutral and unified” Germany, the arguments 
were infused with ritualistic references to the “lessons of the past” learned by German 
communists during their fight on the side of the Red Army against Hitler’s Wehrmacht.
The key instrument for the transportation of this message was the Mitteilungsblatt. It 
was edited by a group of former Wehrmacht officers some of which had until recently 
served in the NVA and were now subsequently released based on the SED Politburo’s 
decree of February 15, 1957.
110
This group of believed military-historical experts also 
constituted the core of the newly founded Institute for Military History in Potsdam. 
According to a memorandum filed to Erich Honecker’s Division for Security Questions 
in November 1958, the Institute soon attained a central role in the AeO’s activities as it 
“dealt with problems of World War II and especially with current military-political 
themes.”
111
 Most articles of the Mitteilungsblatt as well as manuscripts for radio and 
television appearances of AeO representatives were produced here. Already during the 
first few months, the members of the AeO gave several talks all over the GDR and 
appeared on television shows with “statements on current military-political events in 
West Germany,” for example on the supposed Bundestag decision to arm the 
Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons.
112
 The activities “resonated in the West.”
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 „Aktennotiz für den Genossen Honecker betr. Tätigkeit der Arbeitsgemeinschaft ehemaliger Offiziere“ 
by Werner Hübner [Hü./St.], 1 November 1958, BA/SAPMO, DY 30 IV/2/12/7, 146-149, quote on 147. 
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 See for example an AeO statement of 26 March 1958 in reaction to the Bundestag decision on 25 March 
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never came to the nuclear armament of the Bundeswehr after the Kennedy-Khrushchev accords of 1963. 
The statement compared this decision to the Enabling Laws of the Reichstag for Hitler in 1933 which “led 
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From the very beginning of its existence, AeO advocated the “true story” of 
Stalingrad and followed the SED’s master narrative of “Operation Barbarossa” as the 
worst crime of Hitlerfascism. Between March and June 1958 alone, AeO members 
delivered six speeches on “Stalingrad – a historical lesson for the German nation.” The 
audiences varied; among them were railway-workers and NVA officers, students and 
members of the faculty of the university in Jena and “the intelligentsia of the town” in 
Schwerin.
114
 The AeO also commemorated the seventeenth anniversary of June 22, 1941 
in 1958 with a special radio show aired on the Deutschlandsender (the GDR’s official 
station for propaganda in the West). The program dealt with the “Hitler-Wehrmacht’s 
attack on the Soviet Union and detailed its provocative preparation.” It also analyzed 
“certain political parallels to the present which derive from the Bonn politics of atomic 
war.”
115
 Aside from talks and radio shows, the AeO launched its monthly Mitteilungsblatt
in May 1958. Five thousand issues were printed, 3,500 for readers in the GDR, and 1,500 
for targeted postal delivery in the West.
116
 By 1966, these numbers had changed 
drastically: now most issues were distributed in the West (an average of 37,000 per 
month) and only circa 2,500 were sold monthly in the GDR.
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 Additionally, it was mailed 
to war.” The “enabling of the Bonn Bundestag for nuclear armament gives Adenauer and the generals who 
have learned nothing from history much more dangerous weapons in the hands, which will render even 
worse consequences.” BA/MA Freiburg, DVW 20, VA 0-01/5945, 64.
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 „Bericht über die Arbeitsgemeinschaft ehemaliger Offiziere im Jahre 1966,“ 15 December 1966. 
BA/MA Freiburg, DVW 20, VA 0-01/5951, 130.
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to several Western newspapers and to all embassies in the GDR.
118
 It appears that the 
Mitteilungsblatt received considerable attention in West Germany, particularly among 
veterans and military personnel. It was both respected and feared for the sophisticated 
style, professional appeal, and thematic diversity.
119
In stark contrast to West German veteran publications, the Mitteilungsblatt stressed 
the illegal, aggressive nature of the past war.
120
 Articles addressing historical events 
mainly focused on the Eastern Front and Stalingrad, and it was internally agreed that 
these texts “may not deal with mere memories, but such articles must grapple with the 
militaristic publications of West Germany.”
121
 Thus, the Mitteilungsblatt was probably the 
most Western oriented publication in the GDR. Constant references to events, 
developments and persons in the West were to underline the all-German dimension of the 
inner-German conflicts over the Wehrmacht legacy, remilitarization and bloc integration. 
Until 1961, the year of the twentieth anniversary of “Barbarossa,” the battle of Stalingrad 
dominated this discourse. It was celebrated as the event which had opened the “Path to 
the Truth”
122
 and stood as “Symbol for Life.”
123
 Echoing SED propaganda, Stalingrad was 
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not only the central metaphor for the life-transforming experience of “reflection and 
return” but also the cataclysmic manifestation of socialism’s historical superiority. On the 
occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the battle, retired major Homann, a leading AeO 
member, rhapsodized about the meaning of Stalingrad as a “symbol for life:”
On the battlefield of Stalingrad it was written in the book of history:
He who marches against socialism on the side of imperialism and militarism, marches into his own 
doom, he lost, looses and will always lose: his possessions, his honor, and his life.
Socialism is invincible, he who raises his hands against it, will perish. 
Stalingrad is the symbol of this truth. And likewise it shall remain a warning symbol of tragedy for all 
those who don’t want to see the truth.
For our German country and its inhabitants, Stalingrad is this truth and that is why it became the 
symbol of life, the symbol of the victory over errors and blunders of one’s own past, symbol of the 
path into the new, really free, thus better and stronger German fatherland without monopolists and 
militarists.
124
Homann recalled the “oath of Stalingrad” sworn by the founders of the NKFD in 1943: 
“Never again imperialist war.” In 1958, this oath meant the “fight of all good Germans 
against German militarism, against the Bonn preparations for nuclear war.” It symbolized  
the “fight of all good Germans for a peace treaty … so that finally a wall [sic] may be 
erected against a new war.”
125
 A “peace treaty” based on the Soviet proposal of a “neutral 
and united peaceful Germany,” would have formally ended the state of war between the 
allies and Germany. It dominated the SED’s anti-Western propaganda throughout the 
1950s until 1961.
126
 Yet, when in 1961 still no peace treaty was in sight as a “wall against 
new war,” the SED erected a concrete wall and found unlimited support for this measure 
124
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among the AeO. To former Wehrmacht officers claiming to have “reflected and returned” 
from the wrongful path in the abyss of Stalingrad, the road from Stalingrad in 1943 to 
Berlin in 1961 was a continuum in history. In 1961, the building of the wall was 
perceived the last measure to secure the “Eastern Front” against a renewed attack from 
the West. 
The AeO contributed significantly to the effectiveness of this argument by devoting 
much space and thought to the “right” interpretation of the battle of Stalingrad and the 
role of the German soldier in the war on the Eastern Front. This, again, took place in 
dialogue with Western (mis-)representations of the battle as the memoir and veteran 
literature there either blamed Hitler’s stubborn incompetence for the disaster or 
questioned Stalingrad’s strategic role as the decisive turning point of the war – all of 
which served ultimately only one purpose, namely to “make Stalingrad, the first and the 
second world war forgotten in order to launch a third.”
127
It was thus not enough to publish suitable articles and commemoration pieces in the 
Mitteilungsblatt; it was also insufficient to deal with Stalingrad merely in terms of its 
military history. Rather, only “the most general lessons let us Germans understand 
Stalingrad correctly.”
128
 For these reasons and certainly to the satisfaction of the SED, 
AeO chief Otto Korfes initiated a collectively authored book on the history of Stalingrad 
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 Heinrich Homann, „Stalingrad – Symbol des Lebens,“ in Mitteilungsblatt, 2/1959, 3. See also 
Anonymus, „Memento Stalingrad,“ in Mitteilungsblatt, 1/1961, 12f., which further details the „falsification 
of history by the German general staff.“ The analysis of this anonymous author (from West Germany – all 
West German contributors remained anonymous) concluded that Western historiography sought to 
minimize the events at Stalingrad as “non-fateful German partial defeat” and instead celebrated the 
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 In a lengthy memo, Korfes explained the necessity to write such a 
book and stressed the contemporary context in which such a work of history belonged:
On the History of Stalingrad: Reasons why it is necessary to write the history of Stalingrad
The battle of Stalingrad has the greatest importance among the battles of World War II. It is not a 
battle like so many others, it is not just a military defeat on the one side and a victory on the other, it 
has rather marked the sustaining, historical decision against German imperialism. For the German-
fascist Wehrmacht the battle meant a severe tactical failure as it ended with the loss of the city and the 
sixth army. It meant a consequential operative flop ... It was, most of all, a far-reaching strategic defeat 
because it threw overboard the military plans of the year 1942 and thereby the entire war plan of the 
general staff and the OKW; it wrested from the Germans once and for all the strategic initiative and 
inaugurated final defeat. As every major strategic decision bears a more or less noticeable political 
effect so the one at Stalingrad had particularly severe and decisive political consequences. Stalingrad 
numbed the willingness to fight among the fascist allies, shattered the belief in victory of the German 
people on the one hand, and incited the already long-lasting resistance fight within Germany and in the 
occupied territories to highest fervency. The battle proved to the world the superior powers of the 
Soviet army over the fascists ... and showed the world the politically so important fact that the 
Wehrmacht was vincible. The intrusion of the German-fascist troops to the Volga River and the 
Caucasus unmasked German imperialism with its rapacity and far-reaching plans for conquest. The 
battle of Stalingrad revealed the irrationality of the aims of German imperialism and militarism and 
became the symbol of the lawful [gesetzmäßig] victory of the fight for freedom over oppression, of 
progress over the political reaction. It taught the German nation the lesson that an aggressive policy of 
plunder leads inevitably to catastrophe.
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While the centrality of the battle of Stalingrad for the outcome of World War II was to 
become the central historiographical leitmotif of the book, the central propagandistic aim 
was to counter Western attempts to deprive the Soviet Union of its historic role as prime 
victim and victor of Hitler fascism.
131
 Even more so since the sole purpose of this betrayal 
was to “prepare a new war against the Soviet Union.” If Western historiography claimed 
that Stalingrad was a military turning point of little relevance then it inferred “that the 
political consequences, too, were insignificant, and superficial, and only temporary.” 
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 Wolf Stern, Memorandum, November 12, 1958, BA/SAPMO, DY 30 IV 2/12/7, 165-167. 
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These efforts thus “attacked the impression and image that Stalingrad has left in the 
memory of the world.”
132
 Korfes might have been right about the popular memory but he 
erred with regards to military history. The battle of Stalingrad was not the decisive battle 
on the Eastern Front – the military “turn” of the war in the East had occurred already a 
year earlier before Moscow.
133
 And still, in West Germany Stalingrad was remembered as 
the epiphany for the suffering of the German soldier in World War II, his fateful 
“Opfergang,” and as the “beginning of the end.”
134
 Korfes was correct to realize that this 
Stalingrad memory was far from acknowledging the “leading role” of the Soviet Union in 
the fight against fascism. While the universal suffering of German and Soviet soldiers 
was a popular theme in the 1950s veteran literature, Korfes’ Western comrades were far 
from concluding that the Wehrmacht’s defeat at Stalingrad had “revealed the irrationality 
of the aims of German imperialism,” or even symbolized the historical superiority of 
socialism over the “political reaction.” This refusal to accept the Soviet Union’s role as 
prime victim and victor was ample evidence for Western plans to attack it once again:
All these attempts derive from the plan to make the peoples of the West and particularly of West 
Germany psychologically ripe for an armed attack against the Soviet Union and communism. A 
description of the real events which led the German troops to the Volga River and let them perish 
there, supports the fight against the hateful lies of anti-communism and becomes a worthy weapon 
against militarism and in the fight for peace.
135
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Thus, the book was to become a “weapon against imperialism and militarism.”
136
 Despite 
detailed plans for structure and contents of the work as well as participating authors,
137
 the 
Stalingrad project did not materialize for unknown reasons.
138
 Instead, Heinz 
Bergschicker’s illustrated and widely read history of Stalingrad fulfilled the essence of 
Korfes’ demands and appeared in 1960.
139
Korfes’ considerations and priorities were all 
but irrelevant because they set the tone for several accordant reports, essays and 
commentaries on the history of Stalingrad published in the AeO’s Mitteilungsblatt.
140
As their counterparts in West Germany, the “Stalingraders” in the GDR remembered 
the suffering and sacrifices of soldiers, but remained largely silent about their 
responsibility. In very general terms, all articles inferred that Wehrmacht soldiers had 
ventured a wrong path by participating in “Operation Barbarossa.” Yet, far from 






 The project was long in the making. A memo by Wolf Stern in the files of the SED Devision for 
Security Questions reported that already in May of 1958, only a few months after the AeO’s founding, 
Stern met the East German emissary Ernst P. who in turn had met with former Wehrmacht lieutenant 
general Arthur Schmidt (the former chief of staff of the Sixth Army and the only surviving general who had 
led the operations in Stalingrad). Schmidt had kept a diary and was willing to cooperate on the book project 
anonymously in order to “denounce the untrue assertions in Manstein’s memoir ‘Lost Victories.’ Stern also 
reported to Honecker’s division that Schmidt turned down the offer to become head of the Bund der 
Stalingradkämpfer in the FRG because “he did not want participate in the abuse of Stalingrad fighters for a 
warmongering campaign.” Wolf Stern, Memorandum, 12 November 1958, BA/SAPMO, DY 30 IV 2/12/7, 
165-167. It seems that in 1960, when the book project was picked up by Korfes, Schmidt was no longer on 
the list of possible authors. See the list of “collaborators” in Otto Korfes, “Zur Geschichte von Stalingrad,” 
BA/MA Freiburg DVW 20 VA 0-01/5945, 136..
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texts held up the “red version”
141
 of the “Wehrmacht myth” in the GDR: crimes were 
committed, but it remained unclear who was responsible for them. In some cases, the 
Mitteilungsblatt carried photographs of crime scenes: “Fuhrer’s soldiers” humiliating 
Polish Jews, suffering Soviet partisans, murdering SS men, starving Soviet POWs, the 
murderers of Lidice, shootings in Lodz.
142
 Still, if texts dealt with the responsibility of 
ordinary Wehrmacht soldiers – the guilt of OKW and General Staff was undisputed and 
repeatedly addressed
143
– personal guilt was found to have been the result of passive 
partaking, not active deeds. 
It was in fact the “subjective innocence of many” and the “objective guilt of all” 
which represented the “tragedy of the Wehrmacht,” as Luitpold Steidle, Minister of 
Health and himself a Stalingrad veteran, had put it in his key note address at the AeO’s 
founding meeting. The text was reproduced prominently in the first issue of the 
Mitteilungsblatt. According to Steidle, the first lesson of World War II was therefore that 
soldiers must learn to “think politically:”
If the political development in Germany led from one military adventure to the next in this century 
then also because the German officer was never conscientious of the fact that with the decision to 
become a professional soldiers he had made a political decision of great consequences. ... This is what 
makes the path of the Wehrmacht so tragic: the subjective innocence of the many cannot outweigh the 
objective guilt of all. Thus the path of the former German Wehrmacht led inescapably to the dishonor 
and shame to having fought under Hitler’s flag in spite of all bravery and comradeship of many; it led 
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Wehrmacht soldiers] of the past, where are they today?” 6/1966, 6. Here the caption under a photo of a Jew 
and two Wehrmacht soldiers standing behind him: “A Jew had to dig his own grave and is now waiting for 
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into national catastrophe in 1945 whose causes – and one must finally see that – lay much deeper and 
farther back than the crime of the German attack.
144
This was a comfortable confession of – collective – responsibility for it made it possible 
to fully escape the question of a soldier’s personal conduct. Not that a soldier’s individual 
experience didn’t matter; it did to a great extent when it came to illustrating the 
transformation from Hitler’s soldier to antifascist fighter on the Eastern Front, as Steidle
further elaborated. Moreover, his romanticized image of this transformation extended this 
experience to “every German soldier.” Yet, even when specific events were said to have 
initiated an individual “reflection-and-return”- process, these recollections contained no 
concrete confrontations with concrete crimes. At most, “one” remembered the experience 
as bystander if not exclusively as victim: 
At one point in time, every German soldier certainly experienced a deeply unsettling moment: next to 
the dying comrade or during an air-raid while on furlough, facing starving and begging children in a 
conquered town, behind the barbed wire of a POW camp or at the first sight of the completely burned 
down and ruined homeland. In such moments it spoke with a clarity to us that was probably decisive 
for the rest of our live: ‘That is not how it should have come, I did not want this, such a war is madness 
and a crime.’ And from that moment the deeper insight might have derived and, resulting from it, the 
torturous question: ‘was my soldierly behaviour correct?’
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Assuming that many soldiers must have experienced such a life-altering moment, Steidle
warned that “one must not brush aside these memories today,” even if living life might 
become easier by forgetting. Rather, they must seek to understand the “political context.” 
The call for the political, i.e. biased, soldier was the fundament of the AeO’s commitment 
to the socialist homeland. When it came to “defending and protecting” this land, the 
“Stalingraders” remained faithful to the official party line, even and especially so when 
the SED decided to wall in the “state of the workers and farmers” in August 1961. Just as 
144




Neues Deutschland inaugurated an orchestrated campaign aimed at directly linking June 
22, 1941 to the necessity of building the “antifascist protection wall,” the AeO 
contributed with its military-historical expertise and political commitment to the 
ideological justification of the August 1961 measures.
OPERATION „CONCRETE ROSE:” THE BUILDING OF THE BERLIN WALL
It was certainly historical coincidence that the SED decided it was time to “protect” 
the GDR against the “enemies of socialism and peace” just in the summer of 1961, 
exactly twenty years after the beginning of “Operation Barbarossa.” Yet, its propaganda 
apparatus knew how to exquisitely instrumentalize this coincidence in order to justify its 
own people’s immurement. We know today that the factual reasons for the decision to 
build the wall – cynically code-named “Operation Rose” by SED and the Ministry for 
State Security (MfS) – lay in a series of severe economic problems, in the wide-spread 
resistance against the renewed collectivization drive kicked off in 1958 and, most of all, 
in the resultant massive flight of East Germans to the West.
146
In the early summer of 1961, in a plethora of articles, reports and memoir texts, the 
official print media dutifully transported the events of June 22, 1941 and the horrors it 
had entailed into the living rooms of every East German family and drew – always alert –
the appropriate parallels to the present. The fact that Moscow’s various “proposals for a 
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Since 1949, over three million East Germans had fled the GDR, the numbers oscillated between 170,000 
and 400,000 per year and peaked in 1953 (408,100), 1956 (396,300), 1961 (233,500 only until August). 
Numbers based on Helge Heidemeyer, Flucht und Zuwanderung aus der SBZ/DDR 1945/49-1961. Die 
Flüchtlingspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bis zum Bau der Mauer (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1994), 44. 
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peace-treaty with Germany” had been rejected by the West ever since 1952 (because their 
realization would not have resulted in the “neutralization of a unified Germany” but in 
the abolition of the West German democracy) was interpreted by the SED as the product 
of Bonn’s alleged aggressive policy towards the East, showing no interest to end the state 
of war with the Soviet Union. June 22, however, taught that enmity with the Soviet Union 
meant “national disaster,” and that only German-Soviet friendship meant “peace and 
fortune.”
147
 Consequently, the SED’s calculated invocation of the war on the Eastern Front 
reached its peak between June and August 1961. It did not take much in the heads of the 
SED propagandists to connect the call for German-Soviet friendship – the “pledge for 
Germany’s bright future” – with the claim that only the “conclusion of a peace-treaty 
makes a new June 22 impossible.”
148
The central message of this campaign was that in the GDR the lessons of history had 
been learned. In following these lessons, the SED acted in the “national interests” of 
Germany while Adenauer’s policy was anti-national. Here the use of history for the 
political legitimization of the wall was merged with the campaign to forge a national
identity for East Germans in reaction and response to the permanent division of 
Germany.
149
 A “historical documentation” in the June 20, 1961 edition of Neues 
Deutschland contrasted the events in West and East Germany between 1918 and 1961 
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and demonstrated what “history has taught us.” The Western enmity with the Soviet 
Union – in 1945 the Western allies supposedly negotiated with the Wehrmacht whether 
to “continue the war on the Eastern Front” to topple the Soviet regime in Moscow, in 
1949 Adenauer “sold out the West of Germany as imperialistic military build-up territory 
for a third crusade against the Soviet Union,” and so on – reached its highpoint in 1961. 
That year Bonn allegedly responded to repeated “offers for a peace-treaty” with the 
call for nuclear weapons, for their stationing on the GDR border, for further strengthening NATO, for 
revanch instead of peace, for insecurity instead of security. And the Bundeswehr is singing: 
Bright is our smile,
merry is our courage,
red is our blade,
from the Bolshevists’ blood.
Do the twenty-year-olds who are singing this know where songs like these have brought their fathers? 
Do they know that the birch crosses [on the graves] of new ‘Barbarossa’-adventurers will not stand in 
Stalingrad but in Cologne?
History teaches us: enmity with the Soviet Union was always a national catastrophe for Germany. It 
brought our nation to the brink of its physical existence. In Bonn, however, this suicidal policy of anti-
Sovietism is still being advocated. Because of their revanchist dreams Adenauer’s unteachable 
generals of defeat are ready to burn West Germany in a nuclear war. In the name of the nation: It must 
finally be done with this policy and with these ill-fated plans of the militaristic clique!
150
In contrast, the GDR was the “first true peaceful state of German history” and once again 
Stalin is quoted with an obscure remark on the equal suffering and fighting will of 
Germans and Russians in World War II.
151
 While in the West, the anti-Soviet campaign 
had reached its peak in the eyes of the SED in 1961, in the GDR the efforts to “secure 
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peace” were intensified. Ulbricht is quoted with a statement made on June 15, 1961 
before the “world press:”
’The proposal of the Soviet government gives the German people a great opportunity to come to a 
peaceful life and to the national rebirth of Germany as peace-loving and democratic state.’
History teaches us: friendship with the Soviet Union always brought the German people fortune and 
peace. Even in the darkest times the Soviet Union [in fighting Hitler] acted in the interest of our nation 
as well. In the GDR, the lessons of the past were drawn consequentially. The German-Soviet friendship 
became a matter of heart to all our people.  The roots of the predatory anti-national wars against the 
Soviet Union and other nations in Europe are extinguished once and for all. In the name of the nation: 
This policy must become the policy of all of Germany! That is why we need a peace-treaty.
152
Any anti-Soviet agitation and action was directed against German national interests too, 
the SED claimed in 1961, as it had claimed it ever since the end of the war. It was thus 
prudent and opportune to connect the campaign against another “Barbarossa” with the 
propaganda for the socialist SED-state as “example” for all of Germany. 
A series of articles published on and around June 22, 1961 dealt with the reasons for 
the defeat of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front. Apart from the various military-
strategic (Hitler the incompetent commander, failed Blitzkrieg-calculations), technical 
(underestimation of the Red Army’s capacities) and ideological arguments (unjust wars 
are always doomed, socialism’s historical superiority, victory historically predetermined), 
the principle intention of these texts was to prove and predict that another such “crusade” 
was doomed as well.
153
 A commemoration speech by Nikita Khrushchev appeared under 
the title “Every new aggressor would share Hitler’s fate” on June 22, 1961.
154
 The Soviet 
leader reiterated that those who hated communism must be aware that “1961 is not 1941” 
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in so far as “we have now all necessary means of defense.”
155
 It is indeed noticeable that 
the propaganda served not only the “defense” against a Western threat but reached 
threatening degrees itself. A caricature published on June 22, 1961 on the front page of 
the Neues Deutschland showed Hitler running away from a giant pair of pincers with the 
Soviet red star on it as it is crushing a much thinner pair of pincers marked with the 
swastika. The caption read: “the first acquaintance with the Soviet pincer.”
156






The Wehrmacht veterans organized in the AeO supported this campaign 
enthusiastically. The May 1961 issue of the Mitteilungsblatt carried a detailed gripping 
eye-witness account of the beginning of the invasion on June 22, 1941 in which the 
gruesome scenes of “the first day,” of murdered Soviet civilians and forlornly fighting 
Red Army soldiers, signaled the brutality of the “entire war.”
157
 The September and 
October issues carried pictures of Ulbricht visiting the soldiers “on the border of 
democratic Berlin,” and citizens giving flowers and gifts to the troops “protecting” the 
reinforced border. Commentaries reiterated the threat scenario and the necessity and 
legitimacy to respond with the “protection” measures in 1961.
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The mix of sustaining a feeling of threat and of boldly threatening the West with an 
“appropriate response” continued to dominate the national East German press until the 
historic days of August 1961.
159
 On the eve of August 13, 1961, the GDR’s puppet 
parliament Volkskammer announced that “the time has come for decisive measures for 
the securing of peace.” In this reading of contemporary events, West Germany refused to 
sign a peace-treaty with the Soviet Union because “for them World War II was still not 
157
Bernt von Kügelen, „Der erste Tag und der ganze Krieg. Eine Erinnerung 20 Jahre nach dem Überfall 
auf die Sowjetunion,“ in Mitteilungsblatt, 5/1961, 5-7.
158
 See for example Martin Lattmann, “Offizier und Weltfriedenstag 1961,” in Mitteilungsblatt, 8/1961, 5-
7. And Herbert Stösslein, „Zwei deutsche Staaten – zwei Wahlen,“ which addressed the question „What 
was August, 13?“ in context of the fall elections in both Germanys. In Mitteilungsblatt, 10/1961, 6-9. See 
also the editorial „Bilanz 1961“ by Volkskammer president Christoph Dieckmann, in Mitteilungsblatt, 
1/1962, 1-4.
159
 Another example in the SED’s theoretical organ: Hartmut Schilling, „Der Bonner Neokolonialismus. 
Feind der Völker,“ in Einheit, vol. 16, 1 (1961), 135-153.  Much to the dismay of the SED central offices, 
local newspapers seemed to follow this propaganda campaign only reluctantly, or at least not with 
sufficient fervor. In June 1961, the SED Propaganda Division criticized the local press for a lack of 
“political-ideological preparation.” It urged the editors to intensify the efforts to denounce the aggressive 
Western camp and to better connect the past to the present. See the Argumentationshinweise der 
Kommission für Agitiation, no. 38. BA/SAPMO, DY 30 IV/2/9.03/10, fiche 2. See also the earlier issue 
Argumentationshinweise der Kommission für Agitiation, no. 36, on the “Vorbereitung des 20. Jahrestages 




 For the SED regime, the lessons of June 22, 1941 which had been recalled and 
detailed in a prayer-wheel-like manner during the preceeding months, materialized on 
August 13, 1961 with the building of the wall.  The respective Decree of the Council of 
Ministers of August 12, 1961 elucidated this historic nexus in order to convince the East 
German people of the need to fence in their country:
The preservation of peace requires to put an end to the activities of the West German revanchists and 
militarists and to open the path for the securing of peace and the rebirth of Germany as peace-loving, 
anti-imperialist, neutral state by concluding a peace-treaty. The position of the Bonn government, the 
Second World War is not over yet, amounts to inciting a militarist provocation and civil war. This 
imperialist policy which is being carried out behind the mask of anti-communism is the continuation of 
the aggressive goals of the fascist German imperialism of the Third Reich. The Bonn government has 
concluded from the defeat of Hitler-Germany in the Second World War that the predatory policy of the 
German monopoly capital and his Hitler-Generals must be implemented once again.
By permanently closing the inner-German and Berlin borders to “secure peace in 
Europe,” the SED claimed to have thwarted these aggressive plans once and for all. 
The fact that much of this pathos about “peace in Europe” and another crusade 
against Soviet communism was mere agitation is confirmed by a (then) secret letter from 
Ulbricht to Khrushchev in which the SED leader summarized the actual practical and 
political results of August 13, 1961. Ulbricht indeed believed that he had protected the 
GDR against some kind of war, namely “a civil war and military provocations from West 
Berlin,” and, more importantly, admitted that he had stopped the political “undermining” 
of the GDR and the SED’s factual power.
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 This letter to Khrushchev, the representative 
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relevant security concerns of the European nations.
161
 Letter from Ulbricht to Khrushchev, September 15, 1961: 
“Now that the first part of the task of preparing the peace treaty has been carried out, I would like to inform 
the CPSU ZK Presidium about the situation. The implementation of the resolution on the closing of the 
border around West Berlin went according to plan. The tactic of gradually carrying out the measures made 
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of Hitler’s actual and Adenauer’s potential primary victim, contained no reference to the 
lessons of history or to the danger of history being repeated whatsover. The prevention of 
another “Barbarossa” was a fictional propaganda motif with the help of which the factual 
incarceration of the East German population was legitimized, justified and executed – a 
“measure” not for the “securing of peace in Europe” but to assure the continual existence 
of the SED regime against popular will for almost three more decades to come.
it more difficult for the adversary to orient himself with regard to the extent of our measures and made it 
easier for us to find the weak places in the border. I must say that the adversary undertook fewer counter-
measures than was expected. The dispatch of 1500 American bandits would bother the West Berliners more 
than we do. The drawing-up of the Soviet troops into a position of readiness as well as the employment of 
units of the National People's Army in Berlin had a very sobering effect on the adversary. It was of decisive 
significance that the Warsaw Pact states acted unanimously under Soviet leadership and that the Soviet 
press reported comprehensively after August 13 and took a position supporting the GDR measures. We 
achieved the following things by closing the border around West Berlin:
1.) The protection of the GDR against the organization of a civil war and military provocations from West 
Berlin.
2.) The cessation of the economic and cultural undermining of the capital of the GDR by the West Berlin 
swamp.
3.) A change in the political situation will occur. The Bonn government has understood that the policy of 
revanch and the plan to roll back the GDR by the organization of a civil war and a small war has been 
destroyed for all time. This will later have great effects on the tactics of the Western powers regarding 
Poland and Czechoslovakia. 
4.) The authority of the GDR state, which was weakened by its tolerance towards the subversive measures 
from West Berlin, was strengthened and a revolution in the thinking of the population of the capital and the 
GDR has occurred. 
The experiences of the last years have proven that it is not possible for a socialist country such as the GDR 
to carry out peaceful competition with an imperialist country such as West Germany with open borders. 
Such opportunities first appear when the socialist world system has surpassed the capitalist countries in per-
capita production.“ See the entire document in Harrison, “Ulbricht and the Concrete ‘Rose,’ 126.
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Chapter 6
Lessons of the Eastern Front: The Wehrmacht Legacy and the 
Remilitarization of Germany in the 1950s
“We don’t want war, and we will do everything to prevent it. But precisely in order to seize the 
imperialists’ lust for war adventures in the heart of Europe we have to create our own strong national armed 
forces. … If the imperialists instigated the Third World War, then this war must and will become the grave 
of not only several Western European capitalist countries but of world imperialism.”
Walter Ulbricht (1952)
290
I. New Soldiers, Old Histories: Rearmament in East and West
The controversial issue of Germany’s remilitarization(s) dominated the inner-
German debates of the 1950s like no other political topic. Hardly half a decade after the 
end of the war, the recreation of German armed forces was back on the agenda on either 
side of the Iron Curtain. The legacy of the Wehrmacht cast contrasting shadows on these 
debates as the following paragraphs demonstrate. Hitler’s army had suffered the greatest 
and most costly defeats in the war against the USSR, but simoultaneously it had 
facilitated and participated in the Nazi mass murder on the Eastern Front. Yet, the way 
the two Germanys faced this past in the course of the remilitarization debates could not 
have been more diverse: while in the GDR, the war against the Soviet Union became a 
constant theme, in fact an obsession in the political propaganda and military 
indoctrination, it was almost entirely absent from the official discourses over rearmament 
in the Federal Republic. 
In what follows I analyze the arguments used to legitimize – politically and 
historically – the reestablishment of German armed forces in the 1950s. After a brief 
overview of the events and debates leading up to the creation of the National People’s 
Army (NVA) in the GDR and the Federal Army (Bundeswehr) in the Federal Republic, 
an analysis of official announcements (speeches, parliamentary debates, national security 
documents) dealing with Germany’s bloc integration into EDC/NATO and Warsaw Pact 
as well as with the introduction of voluntary service and draft, will shed light on the 
multiple uses of and references to the Eastern Front memory in the quest for legitimate 
military rearmament. Exemplarily, the discussions about the soldier as “citizen in
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uniform” serve to illustrate how political and military elites in both countries sought to 
incorporate the difficult heritage of the Wehrmacht into a new military doctrine. 
One crucial factor shaped the political cultures in either country and infused the 
debates under consideration, namely fear of a new war. In the East, the SED nurtured and 
sustained fear of another “Barbarossa,” a third world war, with a relentless campaign 
aimed at proving that the West had treaded into Hitler’s footsteps. This campaign 
culminated in the building of the Berlin wall in August 1961, a “measure” which 
allegedly had saved Europe from the brink of war. On the other side, West German 
political culture was permeated with a consistent fear of “Bolshevism,” and Soviet 
expansionism was believed to aspire the spreading of the communist revolution around 
the world. Mutual Angst derived from both, rational security concerns in light of 
historical experience on either side – German aggression against the Soviet Union, Soviet 
repression of East Germany and East-Central Europe – and from irrationally hyped 
hostilities generated in the Cold War spiral of verbal and actual violence.
1
The question of the future military potential of the two German states entered the 
public debates soon after dual statehood materialized in 1949. The GDR had already 
begun to rearm in 1948: on the initiative of the Soviet occupation authority, the German 
People’s Police was expanded by 10,000 paramilitary so-called Kasernierte 
Bereitschaftspolizisten who served two to three years and were stationed, fully armed, in 
1
 On the Soviet fear and its implications for foreign policy see Michael MccGwire, “National Security and 
Soviet Foreign Policy,” in David S. Painter, Melvyn P. Leffler, eds., Origins of the Cold War. An 
International History (London, New York: Routledge, 1994), 53-76. On “Cold War Angst” and the 
remilitarization debates in West Germany, see Michael Geyer, “Cold War Angst” in Schissler, ed., Miracle 
Years, 376-408. 
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barracks as riot police for immediate response in cases of popular unrest. By 1951, their 
number had risen to 52,000, by 1952 to 80,000.
2
 This clandestine rearmament of East 
Germany was initiated, fostered and closely monitored by the Soviets.
3
 Despite the 
constant claims that the socialist camp was the “peace camp,” the SED officially 
announced in July 1952 that the time had come for the creation of a “National People’s 
Army” (NVA). This was a direct consequence of a conversation between Stalin and the 
SED leadership in the spring of 1952. According to Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl’s 
minutes of this meeting, the Soviet leader had come to believe that West Germany would 
soon be fully integrated into the Western military alliance.
4
 In a conversation with 
Ulbricht, Pieck and Grotewohl on 7 April 1952, Stalin declared that 
Adenauer is in the American’s pocket. All the former fascists and generals are there as well. In reality 
an independent state is being created in Germany. And you need to organize an independent state. The 
demarcation line between East and West Germany should be considered a border—and not just a 
border, but a dangerous one. We need to strengthen the defense of this border.
5
Since Stalin saw “all former fascists and generals” working for a new attack against the 
East, measures of defense had to be taken. While the rearmament was publicly 
legitimized with the alleged threat from the West, it was to be carried out rather 
discreetly. After a similar conversation with Stalin ealier that year (March 1952), GDR 
2
 Helmut Müller-Enbergs, „Garanten äußerer und innerer Sicherheit,“ in Matthias Judt, ed., DDR-
Geschichte in Dokumenten. Beschlüsse, Berichte, interne Materialien und Alltagszeugnisse (Bonn, 1998), 
434. During the June uprising these troops were employed but had order not to shoot; as a result, 
demonstrators attacked the KVP and even disarmed some of them. Thousands of paramilitary men were 
fired for their unreliability in the months to follow. Ibid.
3
 Thoß, ed., „Volksarmee schaffen – ohne Geschrei!“ Torsten Diedrich, Rüdiger Wenzke, Die getarnte 
Armee. Geschichte der Kasernierten Volkspolizei 1952-1956 (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2001).
4
 Curiously, Stalin’s considerations coincide with his “peace offensive” of the March 1952 note, 
presumably offering to exchange Germany’s reunification for neutrality. It is worth pointing out that Stalin 
aggressively approached East Berlin with the issue of rearmament at exactly the time when he suggested 
publicly Germany’s neutralization in which case its military power would have to be extremely reduced.
5
 Documented in Ostermann, ed., Uprising in East Germany, 1953, pp. 34f.  
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president Pieck had noted in his personal files: “create People’s Army without clamor.”
6
By 1954/1955, the KVP was fully indoctrinated with the official ideology, 80 percent of 
the officers were SED members and the then 100,000 troops received a full military and 
ideological training. In April 1955, after the Federal Republic had joined NATO, the 
KVP was renamed NVA. In May 1955, the GDR joined the Warsaw Pact.
7
 The law 
which officially regulated the creation of the NVA and the Ministry for National Defense 
was passed in January 1956.
8
 Until 1962, service was voluntary; the draft was introduced 
only then and the basic military service lasted 18 months. Although military matters were 
routinely overseen by a defense minister, the SED functioned as the actual leader of the 
armed forces represented by the head of the “National Defense Council” founded in 1960 
(Ulbricht until 1971, his successor Erich Honecker until 1989). According to the GDR 
constitution, it was the NVA’s primary task to “protect the socialist achievements of the 
people against all attacks from the outside.”
9
In contrast to the early, clandestine and efficient rearmament of East Germany the 
Bundeswehr was founded in November 1955 after a yearlong public conflict over 
Adenauer’s policy of remilitarization and NATO integration.
10
 Yet, from the beginning, 
West German rearmament was an ambiguous undertaking: Adenauer, clandestinely as 
6
 In German: „Volksarmee schaffen ohne Geschrei.” Quoted in Rüdiger Wenzke, „Auf dem Weg zur 
Kaderarmee,“ in: Thoß, ed., „Volksarmee schaffen - ohne Geschrei,“ 261.
7
 Helmut Müller-Enbergs, „Garanten äußerer und innerer Sicherheit,“ 434.
8
 Text printed in Judt, ed., DDR-Geschichte in Dokumenten, 450f.
9
Quoted in Walter Jablonsky, „Die NVA im Staat der SED,“ in Klaus Naumann, ed., Die NVA: Anspruch 
und Wirklichkeit (Berlin: Mittler, 1993), 15. 
10
 A good overview of this process with a focus on the personal continuities between Wehrmacht and 
Bundeswehr and on the question of tradition gives Jens Scholten, “Offiziere: Im Geiste unbesiegt,” in 
Norbert Frei, ed., Karrieren im Zwielicht. Hitlers Eliten nach 1945 (Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 2001), 131-
177.
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well and beginning in 1950, encouraged a number of former Wehrmacht generals to 
contribute their experience and expertise to the creation of armed forces in the Federal 
Republic. The famous albeit at the time secret “Himmeroder Memorandum”
11
– drafted 
by the “operative experts of the Wehrmacht’s Eastern campaign” – outlined the character 
of a new German army by utilizing the “lessons” learned in the war against the Soviet 
Union. The founding fathers of the Bundeswehr thus created and adhered in their thinking 
to a “symbiotic” nexus between the war on the Eastern Front and the Cold War: the new 
army was to become a “Wehrmacht optimized by the analysis of World War II, more 
modern, namely more mobile and equipped with higher military technology.”
12
11
 Published in Hans-Jürgen Rautenberg, Norbert Wiggershausen, Die „Himmeroder Denkschrift“ vom 
Oktober 1950. Politische und militärische Überlegungen für einen Beitrag der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
zur westeuropäischen Verteidigung (Karlsruhe: Braun, 1977). This was the first time, the document reached 
the public. The edition was critically commented by the Bundeswehr’s Historical Division, MGFA, with 
the rather mild words “recommendations burdened with the past” (vergangenheitsbelastete Empfehlungen). 
See Detlev Bald, “Kämpfe um die Dominanz des Militärischen,” in: Detlev Bald, Johannes Klotz, Wolfram 
Wette, eds., Mythos Wehrmacht. Nachkriegsdebatten und Traditionspflege (Berlin: Aufbau, 2001), 32.  
12
 Bald, “Kämpfe um die Dominanz des Militärischen,” 17-28, quote on 23. Parallel to the discussions in 
the Himmerod monastery (in the Eiffel), the US government assigned hundreds of former Wehrmacht 
officers with analyzing WWII in the German section of the US Army’s “Historical Division” in 
Königstein/Taunus und Karlsruhe. A main theme in the works produced in the Division was the tendency 
to idealize the fighting will, sense of duty and sacrifice generally connected to the war against the Soviet 
Union and to stress the efficiency of the troop. “Barbarossa” was related to the Cold War by dwelling on 
the traditional fight of the occident against the “eternal” threat from the East. Ibid., 21. See Bernd Wegner, 
“Erschriebene Siege. Franz Halder, die ‘Historical Divison’ and und die Rekonstruktion des Zweiten 
Weltkrieges im Geist des deutschen Generalstabs,” in Ernst W. Hansen et. al., eds., Politischer Wandel, 
organisierte Gewalt und nationale Sicherheit (München: Oldenbourg, 1995), 285ff.The Division was led 
by Franz Halder, formerly General Chief of Staff in Hitler’s army (1938-1942). After leading the military 
campaigns against Poland, France, the Balkans and the Soviet Union, Halder lost his post when Hitler took 
over the Wehrmacht command in 1942. For his contacts to the military resistance he was imprisoned after 
20 July 1944 in KZ Flossenbürg and Dachau until April 1945, and after a brief period of American 
captivity, he was released the same summer. He was co-author of the Nuremberg Denkschrift in 1945 (see 
Chapter 4. I.). His best-selling book Hitler als Feldheer (1949) contributed to the myth of the “clean 
Wehrmacht” in so far as it portrayed Hitler as incompetent obsessive fanatic who deprived the German 
military leadership of its influence only to lead Germany into catastrophe.
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The eventual founding compromise of the Bundeswehr contained nonetheless a few 
explicit remarks which clearly separated the new West German army from the 
Wehrmacht legacy. Thanks to the interventions of Wolf Graf von Baudissin (, a 
transformed former militarist who had spent the years between 1941 and 1946 in British 
captivity, the new army should bear no “reminiscence to the old Wehrmacht,” its 
members were obliged to “approve of the democratic system and life-style out of inner 
conviction,” and it should assured that it would not become another “state in the state.”
13
The planning process since 1950 was supervised by the so-called Blank Office (Amt 
Blank) founded in October 1950. It was headed by Theodor Blank (1905-1972), then 
“commissioner of the chancellor,” and in 1955 appointed first defense minister. The Paris 
Treaties of October 1954 ended the military occupation of West Germany, reinstated its 
full sovereignty and permitted the formation of 12 German divisions (with a maximum of 
500,000 troops). With the same treaty, the Federal Republic became member of NATO. 
One year later, the legislative process was finalized after several heated parliamentary 
debates, and in November 1955 the Bundeswehr was officially founded. The draft was 
introduced in 1957, five years earlier than in the GDR. Two central concepts were to 
assure that the Bundeswehr would indeed become a democratic institution: the concept of 
“inner leadership,” and the idea of the soldier as “citizen in uniform.”
14
The speeches and political debates addressing the nature of the armed forces in East 
and West Germany as well as the respective roles, rights and duties assigned to the “new 
13
 Bald, “Kämpfe um die Dominanz des Militärischen,” 29.
14
 On the debates and processes shaping the history of the Bundeswehr from its founding days to the late 
1980s see Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross, on Innere Führung and the concept of “citizen in uniform” 
in particular, 44-63.
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soldiers” circled around the above-mentioned objectives of defending socialism in the 
NVA, and defending democracy in the Bundeswehr. In the GDR, the creation of the 
NVA was accompanied by a bold propaganda offensive aimed at convincing the public 
of an immanent threat and the need to arm an otherwise pacifist, antifascist country. The 
memory of the Eastern Front war was the most important historical reference point in the 
SED’s rhetoric of militant pacifism. In the lively and captivating parliamentary debates 
on foreign policy and rearmament in the Bonn Bundestag, the war against Russia was 
rarely discussed explicitly, yet its implicit relevance and latent presence can be illustrated 
with many examples. The collective refusal of the political elites to problematize Soviet 
security concerns stemming from the all-too fresh memory of the Wehrmacht’s Eastern 
campaign was occasionally challenged by interventions of independent-minded or 
communist parliamentarians. Thus, while the SED propaganda on the NVA exemplifies 
the inflated instrumentalization of the Eastern Front memory in the Eastern part of 
Germany, the Bundestag debates provide ample evidence for the marginal role the same 
historical event played in West German political culture during the 1950s.  
II. “Barbarossa” as Historical Lesson:                                                                                          
The “Socialist” Soldier and Remilitarization in the GDR
“The best cannot live in peace if the evil neighbour doesn’t like it.”
15
 This is one of 
Ulbricht’s catchy statements which encapsulates the crux of his military philosophy: that 
the GDR, at heart a “good” nation, was forced to create armed forces in order to be 
15
 „Es kann der Beste nicht in Frieden leben, wenn es dem bösen Nachbarn nicht gefällt.“ Ulbricht quoted 
this, as he said, „old saying” during his already mentioned programmatic speech to the II. Party conference 
in July 1952. Ulbricht, Zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, vol. IV: 1950-1954, 423.
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prepared for an attack by its “evil” neighbors, namely West Germany and its allies. 
Moreover, there was no alternative to rearmament because “he, who is not prepared to 
protect peace from the aggressor with weapons, encourages the aggressor and threatens 
peace.”
16
 As demonstrated earlier, Ulbricht’s world was divided into two camps one of 
which planned to attack the Soviet Union sooner or later and thus sought to repeat, in fact 
to continue Hitler’s crusade against the East. In this scenario of immanent war, the 
Western powers were “preparing a new war, which they intend to wage primarily against 
the socialist Soviet Union” and Eastern Europe, and the “military coalitions” which they 
forged were masked “hypocritically with the flag of ‘defending’ the West” while in
reality they sought to “follow in every respect the path of the war criminals Hitler and 
Mussolini.”
17
Such a translation of the recent past into the present triggered two concrete political 
consequences: first, the SED systematically cultivated a climate of constant fear and 
immanent threat of war among the East German population. On numerous occasions 
political leaders would evoke the dangers looming from the “war-thirsty monopoly 
capital and the militarist Junkers”
18
 in the West. Secondly, and in reaction to this 
propagated threat, the NVA was created, indoctrinated and trained as the necessary 
military response to it. What could be called the politics of fear in this context was 






 Ulbricht in a discussion speech” following his speech to the II. party conference in 1952. Quoted in 
Militärgeschichtliches Institut der DDR, ed., Die Militär- und Sicherheitspolitik der SED 1945-1988. 
Dokumente und Materialien (Berlin: Militärverlag, 1989), 120.
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during World War II. And in order to refute potential resistance among East Germans to 
rearmament – something the SED leadership soon had to realize – carefully drafted 
announcements explained the difference between “just war” and “unjust war,”
19
 and 
between the “Western mercenary armies” and the “armed forces of the peace-camp.”
20
This seemed indeed necessary since the SED encountered little popular enthusiasm for its 
remilitarization campaign in 1952. The recruitment numbers for the new army were far 
lower than expected,
21
 and Ulbricht urged in November 1952 to launch “a systematic 
enlightenment campaign against the pacifist sentiments which still are existent in some 
parts of the population.”
22
At the core of this “enlightenment campaign” was the need to legitimize the 
militarization of a (declared) pacifist society. Under the motto “the defense of the 
achievements of our republic is the perceivably most just matter in the world,” the SED 
appealed to the collective socialist pride of its citizens in order to justify the need to bear 
arms again. It asked the nation of socialist citizens whether “there can be a more just 
cause than that the workers of our people-owned companies and factories defend the 
work of their hands against the greed of gain of the war-thirsty monopoly masters,” to 
19
 See for example Ulbricht’s argumentation in his speech to the II. Party conference. Ulbricht, Zur 
Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, vol. IV: 1950-1954, 423f. See further above Chapter 5. I.
20
 Quoted from a “Letter of the Central Committee of the SED to the members and candidates of the SED 
in the armed forces of the GDR,” January 1953. Printed in ibid., 129.
21
 SED plans called for the recruitment of 37,000 men during the summer months of 1952. In early 
September the SED Politburo came to the realization that fewer young men were willing to join the KVP 
(Kasernierte Volkspolizei/Quartered People’s Police) than expected. Subsequently, Ulbricht urged the 
regional SED branches to intensify the recruitment of “cadres.” In a meeting on September 3, 1952, 
Ulbricht stated, “we need cadres of qualified tank drivers, pilots, artillerymen, pioneers, intelligence, 
contact men, marines, military engineers as well as officers for every branch, who will hold their service in 
the army as their lives’ work.” See Rüdiger Wenzke, „Auf dem Weg zur Kaderarmee,“ in Thoß, ed., 
Volksarmee schaffen - ohne Geschrei, 261f.
22
 Speech during the tenth meeting of the SED’s ZK, November 22, 1952, quoted in ibid., 126.
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“defend the farmers’ soil which they have fertilized with their on sweat against the greed 
of the militarist Junkers,” and to defend the “schools, academies, … universities and 
institutes against those who want to deprive [the youth] of their right to education?” The 
answer was no, because it was the “perceivably most just matter in the world” to defend 
the achievements of socialism.
23
 Still, the SED remilitarization campaign had to address 
the question why the “camp of peace” needed to be armed at all. Ulbricht explained this 
at the II. Party Conference in 1952 by assuring the public that the creation of armed 
forces meant “by no means that we have to go to war against anyone. That would be 
absolutely incorrect. Our banner remains invariably the banner of peace!” If, however, 
“the imperialists instigated the Third World War, then this war must and will become the 
grave of not only several Western European capitalist countries but of world 
imperialism:” 
We don’t want war, and we will do everything to prevent it. But precisely in order to seize the 
imperialists’ lust for war adventures in the heart of Europe we have to create our own strong national 
armed forces which command all weapons of modern war technology on land, on the seas and in the 
air.
24
The creation of armed forces in the GDR was presented as a military new beginning in 
German history. The SED-regime considered the question of the heritage of the 
Wehrmacht irrelevant since the NVA was to serve the “great idea of defending freedom 
and independence of our republic,” and its soldiers were to be educated in “the spirit of 
internationalism, in the spirit of respect for other nations, in the spirit of love and respect 
for the workers of all countries, in the spirit of keeping and strengthening peace between 
23
 Ulbricht in the discussion following his speech to the II. party conference in 1952. Quoted in 






 This programmatic peace rhetoric became henceforth a central element of 
SED propaganda and an ever-recurring theme – presented as the ultimate lesson learned 
from history – in the official commemoration of the Nazi war against the Soviet Union. 
In essence, the NVA was the embodiment of this lesson. On the one hand, it was to be the 
army of peace ready to confront and crush Western aggression. On the other hand, it was 
to be the socialist antidote to everything the Wehrmacht had stood for. 
This, however, did not mean that the NVA was a-historic. The maintenance of 
tradition – Traditionspflege – was a central component of the political-ideological 
training aiming at establishing a counter-heritage to the Wehrmacht. Almost comparable 
to the attempts to morally ground the Bundeswehr on the legacy of July 20, 1944 in the 
West, the SED invoked the NKFD and BDO, the two wartime military antifascist 
organizations run by German and Soviet communists on the Eastern Front, as the 
historical reference points for the NVA’s self-image. A campaign for intensified military 
historiography kicked off in 1963, the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the 
NKFD, was to shed light on its exemplary “work on the front” and the roots of the 
“brotherhood in arms” between NVA and Red Army.
26
 In March 1963, the “Institute for 
Military History” held a conference on recent research into the history of NKFD and 




 Note the personal continuities between NKFD and NVA: for example, Hans Gossens, propaganda chief 
in the NVA, had served as “front deputy” of the NKFD; Heinz Keßler, another former “front deputy” 
functioned first as Deputy Minister of National Defense (1957-1967) and became Minister in 1985 (until 
1989). See Paul Heider, “Das Nationalkomitee ‘Freies Deutschland’ und der Bund deutscher Offiziere in 
der Historiographie der DDR und der Traditionspflege der NVA,” in Detlev Bald, Andreas Prüfert, eds., 
Vom Krieg zur Militärreform: Zur Debatte um Leitbilder in Bundeswehr und Nationaler Volksarmee 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1997), 23ff.
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convince the Wehrmacht of its erroneous mission in Hitler’s name. NVA soldiers were to 
identify with this anti-Hitler segment of the German officer-corps. Moreover, major 
lessons for future warfare could be drawn from the NKFD’s fight on the Eastern Front, 
because “the Bonn regime and its armies” were “in terms of class (klassenmäßig) the 
same dangerous enemy” as the Wehrmacht during World War II.
27
 This necessitated the 
“deepening of the hatred against German militarism in order to be ready at any time to 
obliterate any aggressor together with the Red Army.”
28
 History’s lessons, once again 
suited perfectly to explain current “threat scenarios” and to justify the means and 
measures required to deal with these scenarios.
The ideological foundation for the new military doctrine thus originated in a highly 
selective interpretation of the Eastern Front war. Although soldiers of the NVA were 
officially trained to defend the “achievements of socialism,” their constant and effective 
indoctrination aimed at placing their service into a Manichean worldview and at fully 
merging the military with the political sphere. According to Ulbricht, the practical 
commander-in-chief, the “national armed forces shall be filled with the hatred of the 
American, English and French imperialists” and “with the unbreakable friendship with 
the Soviet Union.”
29






 Speech to the II. Party conference. Ulbricht, Zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, vol. IV: 
1950-1954, 424.
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resulted in a doctrine of constant threat and the “repeated assertion of an immanent 
imperialist aggression.”
30
In order to be prepared for such an aggression, the superior military forces of the 
Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Pact were kept in a state of combat-readiness at 
all times. In case of war, the socialist camp’s immediate response was a counter-attack 
against the West aimed at its ultimate “annihilation.” The memory of the brutal reality 
under Nazi occupation in Eastern Europe heavily influenced the formulation of these 
doctrines, in particular the objective to center military actions on the aggressors’ 
homeland.
31
 Moreover, the next war was considered the “last of all wars,” the “last, 
decisive conflict with the class enemy.” The administrative and military leadership in the 
GDR expected one million civilian victims and 100,000 military casualties within the 
first nine days of this war and anticipated the “almost complete collapse of the civil 
infrastructure” in East Germany. For the West, five million civilian and 800,000 military 
casualties were expected in the same period.
32
 The desirable outcome of the war was not 
the status-quo-ante but the destruction of capitalism. Hence, if it broke out, it was “worth 
every sacrifice.”
33
In order to motivate East German men to enlist in a socialist army whose worst-case-
scenario was a third world war, it was necessary to create a convincing narrative of why 
30
 Horst-Henning Basler, „Das operative Denken der NVA,“ in Naumann, ed., NVA. Anspruch und 
Wirklichkeit, 180. Although Basler’s conclusions are based on selected documents from the 1970s and 
1980s – most relevant documents on the operative planning of the NVA were destroyed by the regime in 
1989 – he suggests that from the early days of its creation, the NVA’s operative thinking centered on a 








the socialist camp – the “camp of peace” – needed armed forces and how militant 
pacifism could still be pacifist. Central to this narrative was the Red Army and its 
victorious role during World War II. In contrast to the remembered “war of conquest and 
extermination” of the “fascist Wehrmacht,” the Red Army’s fight was glorified as a “war 
of liberation.” It was the historical example for a “just war” and the history of the Red 
Army’s invasion of Eastern Europe and Germany was cleansed of its criminal record: of 
mass rape, robbery and pillage. Whenever VE Day was commemorated in East Germany, 
the “glorious” and “invincible” Red Army played the key role in speeches and 
announcements.
34
 Moreover, the SED remembered the founding of the Red Army on an 
annual basis. It regularly sent “greeting telegrams” to the CPSU congratulating and 
thanking the “Soviet peoples” for their “victory over Hitler fascism.”
35
 Accordingly, the 
NVA was to be created as the Soviet Army’s little brother.
In an article for the KVP journal “Hefte der Kasernierten Volkspolizei,” the head of 
the KVP’s political division, Rudolf Dölling (1902-1975)
36
, celebrated the decision to 
remilitarize East Germany as „historical turning point“ and pointed out that the Soviet 
34
 It was refered to as the “Red Army” only for the wartime period, after the war, the SED spoke of the 
Soviet Army. On the commemoration of the Red/Soviet Army on VE Day see for example Pieck’s and 
Grotewohl’s Open Letter to „Comrade Stalin“ „Zur 5. Wiederkehr der Befreiung vom Joche des 
Hitlerfaschismus,” printed in Dokumente der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands, vol. III (Berlin 
(Ost): Dietz, 1948ff.),  25f.
35
 See for example „Telegramm führender Persönlichkeiten zum 20. Jahrestag des Sieges des Sowjetvolkes 
über den Hitlerfaschismus,“ May 8, 1965, printed in ZK der SED, ed., Dokumente der Sozialistischen 
Einheitspartei Deutschlands. Beschlüsse und Erklärungen des Zentralkomitees sowie seines Politbüros und 
seines Sekretariats, vol. 10 (Berlin (Ost): Dietz, 1948ff.), 401-403. And „Gemeinsames Grußschreiben der 
DDR-Repräsentanten and die Partei- und Staatsführung der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken 
anläßlich des 25. Jahrestages des Sieges des Sowjetvolkes und seiner ruhmreichen Armee über den 
Hitlerfaschismus und die Befreiung des deutschen Volkes vom Hitlerfaschismus,“ 8 May 1970, printed in 
ZK der SED, ed., Dokumente der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands, vol. 13, 22-25.
36
Dölling served as deputy minister for defense and head of the political division of the NVA between 
1957 and 1959.
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Army was the “strongest factor in the peace camp.” It was exemplary, not only because 
the Soviet troops had “opened the path towards socialism to the German people” but 
because their interests coincided with those of the “future people’s army” in the GDR, 
namely the “securing and defense of peace.” These common interests would constitute 
the “firm basis of their fighting community (Kampfgemeinschaft).” Therefore, the 
political indoctrination was to be intensified and expanded so that every serviceman 
developed the necessary “socialist consciousness.”
37
 Shortly thereafter, Dölling’s 
superior, Defense Minister Heinz Hoffmann (1910-1985, SED), gave a programmatic 
speech to the tenth SED ZK meeting in late 1952 in which he reemphasized the need to 
learn from the Soviet Army and stressed in particular the necessity to “educate the 
officers to [become] the educators of the soldiers.”
38
 Referring to the fighting between 
Wehrmacht and Soviet forces on the Eastern Front, Hoffmann detailed what exactly 
German soldiers in the NVA could and should learn from their Soviet “brothers in fight:”
It is clear, that the Soviet Union has achieved its great successes in the fight for the liberation of the 
Soviet land ... only because every soldier, every battalion leader and every officer went into battle with 
the firm consciousness for the justness and insuperableness of his cause. Such a high degree of 
patriotism and socialist consciousness could only be achieved, because officers stood at the top of the 
Soviet Army, the army units and battalions who are not mere commanders of their units, but in the 
daily work are educators of every single of their subordinate soldiers.
We have learned much already from the Soviet Army. But now it is necessary, that we not only learn 
from the Soviet Army technically but that we learn in the first place how the Soviet Army trained its 
officers to be educators of the soldiers.
39
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 Rudolf Dölling, „Ein historischer Wendepunkt,“ in Hefte der kasernierten Volkspolizei, 14 (1952), 4. 
Printed in Die Militär- und Sicherheitspolitik der SED 1945-1988, 123-125.
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 „Aus der Diskussionsrede des Mitglieds des ZK der SED, des Stellvertretenden Ministers des Innern und 
Chefs der Kasernierten Volkspolizei, Generalleutnant H. Hoffmann, auf der 10. Tagung des ZK der SED,“ 
22 November 1952, printed in ibid., 127f. Hoffmann here picked up the phrase “Offiziere als Erzieher” 




Hoffmann’s call to “overcome the separation of political work and military-technical 
training” speaks to the NVA’s complete indoctrination with socialist ideology. Far from 
just constituting the military arm of the SED state, the new East German army was to 
serve as a “people’s army” fully permeated with the socialist worldview. It was thus, in 
ideological design and political instrumentalization, closer to the National Socialist 
Wehrmacht than the SED would ever have wanted to admit.
The rhetoric of militant pacifism intensified as the West German parliament passed 
legislation to form a federal army – the Bundeswehr – in the fall of 1955. In January 
1956, Albert Norden once again contributed a tartly worded article to Neues Deutschland 
in which he attacked the “West German Wehrmacht” as a foreign army run by the neo-
fascist imperialists and contrasted it with the truly “German people’s army.” While the 
Bonn government conspired with the Americans in “criminal furore” to launch a new 
attack against the “peoples East of the Elbe River,” the NVA was a true German 
Volksheer because the government of the GDR assumed and acted only in accordance 
with “German interests.”
40
 Again, Norden effectively used the questionable reemployment 
of former Wehrmacht generals in the Bundeswehr to denounce the entire undertaking as 
the effort to revive Hitler’s army: 
Hitler’s paladins who attacked Poland, Denmark, Norway, the Balkans, Western Europe and the Soviet 
Union – those Keitel, Jodl, Dönitz waded in the blood of millions and they were tried before the 
tribunal of mankind. Bonn, however, rehabilitates them and turns them into honourable men (by the 
way, not only the higher but also the lower positioned mass murderers of the Hitler-era; the not-to-be-
amnestied war criminals like [Gustav] Sorge and [Wilhelm] Schubert who daily and nightly slew 
German antifascists and Jews in the concentration camp at Sachsenhausen and who killed personally 
thousands of Soviet POWs by shot in the neck were not imprisoned [upon their release to the West in 
1956] but awarded … with 6,000 Marks and let loose again on humankind!)
40
 Albert Norden, „Die deutsche Armee des Friedens und der Demokratie,“ in Neues Deutschland, January 
24, 1956. Printed in Norden, Die Nation und wir, 619-627.
306
He who accepts Hitler’s high commanders and thus his annexation goals, he who puts Hitler’s 
operational chiefs and other military exponents of his world war in all the crucial positions of the Bonn 
Wehrmacht, he who paves the way again for Hitler’s murderous scoundrels [Mordkanaillen], has evil 
in mind and seeks to continue the politics of dead Hitler with his living generals.
41
Keitel and Jodl were both sentenced to death by the Nuremberg Tribunal and executed in 
1946. Norden nonetheless used their names here to dramatize the personal continuities 
between the Nazi era and rearmament in the FRG. Former Admiral Karl Dönitz (1891-
1980), Hitler’s short-term successor, was sentenced to ten years in prison. After his 
release in 1956, he indeed assumed a respectable position in the West German public by 
publishing several autobiographical and military works until his death in 1980. The 
mentioned convicted war criminals Gustav Sorge and Wilhelm Schubert, two former SS 
guards of KZ Sachsenhausen, released by the Soviets in January 1956, were all but “let 
loose again on humankind.” The state prosecutor in Bonn opened preliminary 
proceedings the same year and investigations led to the “Sachsenhausen trial” in 1959 at 
the end of which both defendants were sentenced to life in prison.
42
Beyond this accumulation of untruths, the article is particularly noteworthy because 
it exemplifies a quiet but crucial shift in SED propaganda regarding Hitler’s war against 
the Soviet Union. Instead of solely highlighting the gruesome details of the Wehrmacht’s 




 Brochhagen, Nach Nürnberg. 290. On February 6, 1959, both were found guilty of mass murder of about 
10,000 Russian POWs in the execution barrack of KZ Sachsenhausen [Genickschußbaracke], attempted 
murder of numerous other prison inmates, and complicity of murder and manslaughter. See the online 
documentation http://www1.jur.uva.nl/junsv/brd/Angeklengfr.htm [June 2006]. Sorge was first put on trial 
before a Soviet Military Tribunal in the so-called “Berlin trial” in October 1947 where he along with Alfred 
Kaindl, the former commandant of KZ Sachsenhausen, and 14 other SS men were sentenced to life in 
prison for murder. The Soviet NKVD took over the prisoners thereafter and transported them to a camp in 
Workuta where six of the twelve men died with the next year (including Kaindl). The rest of them were 
released after Adenauer’s Moscow visit in January 1956.
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peace and security in East Germany and introduced an explicitly nationalist tone. The 
fear of war was no longer engendered and sustained by merely invoking past horrors on 
the Eastern Front in Russia, but by pointing increasingly to the immanent dangers of 
military conflict in Germany. Worse even, this conflict would play out as nuclear war.
43
 In 
contrast to the NVA’s secret operative planning which anticipated the next war to take 
place in Western Europe, Norden played with the fear of nuclear war on the territory of 
the GDR (the first people “East of the Elbe River”): “The murderers of the German 
people arm again, they are setting up their aggressive army.”
44
 It was thus an imperative 
to arm all “honest Germans” who said “no to the Wehrmacht of imperialism who stabs 
Germany in the heart,” and “yes to the National People’s Army that makes our families, 
territory and the plan victories (Plansiege [sic!]) untouchable.”
45
 Norden insisted that the 
NVA was a “real army of the people and of peace.” And even though millions of German 
workers had served in Hitler’s Wehrmacht, he claimed that “never have armies of 
workers and farmers undertaken an aggression” – ignoring also, for example, the Soviet 
Union’s intrusions into Poland, Finland and the Baltic states in 1939/40 – and that it was 
not in the nature of a workers and farmers state to wage “unjust and exploitative wars.”
46
The radicalization and intensification of the militant rhetoric against the West 
continued unremittingly until August 1961 when the SED declared it vital to erect a 
“protection wall” against the immanent imperialist threat. I have already demonstrated 
43
 By the mid-1950s the global nuclear arms-race was in full swing. In 1954, the United States tested 
successfully its first deliverable thermonuclear weapon; the USSR responded by testing its first megaton 
device in 1955. Thus, by the end of 1955 both superpowers had “fully functional thermonuclear bombs as 
well as long-range bombers from which to drop them” at their disposal. Gaddis, We now know, 111.
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how the SED created a direct link between the “lessons of 22 June 1941” and the events 
of the summer of 1961. The war against the Soviet Union continued to not just loom 
through the numerous official announcements, speeches and texts dealing with the 
“threat” of a new “Barbarossa.” By foreshadowing the potential outcome of socialism’s 
retaliation, it retained its prominent role also because it was the prime historical example 
of deterrence. 
III. Citizens in Uniform: The Eastern Front in the Bonn Remilitarization Debates
As in the GDR, West German political culture during those years was marked by 
global enmity, fear of nuclear war as well as a reluctant and selective rapprochement to 
the horrors of the past. During the remilitarization debates between 1949 and 1957 in the 
Bundestag the criminal legacy of the Wehrmacht’s fight on the Eastern Front was faded 
out and it was mostly left to a handful of radically agitating KPD representatives in the 
first Bundestag to recall the crimes committed during the war of extermination against 
the Soviet Union. The following paragraphs deal with the public debates in the German 
parliament during the 1950s which can be expected to have included references to the 
German-Soviet past. In particular, I am looking at the debates dealing with the remaining 
German POWs in Soviet captivity until 1955/56, and with the question of rearmament. 
Both issues entailed addressing the legacies of the Eastern Front in one way or 
another. In context of the POW debates, the question of war crimes committed on the 
Eastern Front by some of the remaining German prisoners remained marginal throughout 
the years except for a few effectual rhetorical interventions by KPD representatives 
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whose faction held 15 seats (or 5.7 percent) in the first legislative period.
47
 With regards 
to the remilitarization and integration of West Germany into a Western security alliance, 
the debates between 1950 – when the Wehrbeitrag was discussed for the first time – and 
1956 – when the Bundeswehr legislation was passed – focused on present-day security 
concerns in view of the Soviet position and policies in Eastern Europe and the GDR. 
Occasionally speakers from various parties reflected on the historically rooted and thus to 
a certain extent understandable security concerns of the Soviet Union. Yet, no explicit 
reference was ever made to the German invasion in 1941 and the unprecedented brutality 
of the German-Soviet war which it ensued. If the Wehrmacht was occasionally a topic of 
discussion, deputies raised their voices to save the German soldiers’ “honor” from the 
unfair verdict of history and to advocate the amnesty and rehabilitation of the “still” 
imprisoned “so-called war criminals” (such as Karl Dönitz, Erich von Manstein or Albert 
Kesselring). The almost complete absence of the Eastern Front in the West German 
parliamentary debates during the 1950s is a good example for what Hermann Lübbe once 
described as “communicative silence:” the “public reluctance” to address the issues of 




 In the 1953 federal elections the KPD won only 2.2 percent of the votes and were no longer represented 
in the Bundestag. In 1956 the KPD was outlawed by the Supreme Court.
48
 Which in Lübbe’s view was a major precondition for the later sincere and thus successful process of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung,; moreover, this “certain silence” (gewisse Stille) was „the necessary medium 
for the transformation of postwar Germans into citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany.” Hermann 
Lübbe, “Der Nationalsozialismus im deutschen Nachkriegsbewußtsein,” Historische Zeitschrift, vol. 236, 
1983, 579-599, quote on 585, 587, 594. [Emphasis added.] Lübbe’s often rejected argument nonetheless 
offers a sophisticated explanation for the remarkable democratic transformation of postwar West German 
society: Lübbe contended that Germans’ “accommodation into the statehood of the second German 
democracy [Einrichtung in die Staatlichkeit der zweiten deutschen Demokratie] took place in the “public 
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During those years, the popular memory of “Operation Barbarossa” was largely 
shaped by personal recollections and mass media publications. In 1951, the press paid 
little attention to the tenth anniversary of the attack, and even quality papers such as Die 
Zeit commented the invasion from a contemporary perspective stressing the danger of a 
new war with Russia.
49
 Even ten years later, the then much greater media attention 
focused on the Hitler-Stalin pact, Soviet interpretations of the war, or Stalin’s role. 
Readers learned very little about Nazi occupation plans or war crimes in the Soviet 
Union.
50
 Similarly to the press, school books at that time largely avoided the question of 
war crimes on the Eastern Front. The Holocaust was still a marginal event in German 
memory of the Nazi period, the occupation of the Soviet Union and its consequences 
received even less attention.
51
 In the Bundestag, the crimes committed by the Wehrmacht 
on the Eastern Front were explicitly mentioned in only two instances, namely in 1949 and 
1950 in context of the repeated protest of the Bonn government against the continuing 
incarceration of German POWs in the Soviet Union. Already in his first government 
statement (Regierungserklärung) on September 20, 1949, chancellor Adenauer lamented 
the fate of “millions of POWs” still being detained by the Soviet government and called 
this a “serious and important chapter” of his political agenda: 
protection of publicly unquestioned normative principles” – the official acknowledgment of the political 
and moral defeat of Nazism as one of the central legitimating elements of the young FRG, and the 
resumption of those “cultural traditions” liquidated by the Nazi movement in 1933. Ibid., 585. 
49
 Gerhard Schreiber, „Zur Perzeption des Unternehmens ‚Barbarossa’ in der deutschen Presse,“ in 




 See the meticulously researched, depressing analysis by Bodo von Borries, „The Third Reich in German 
History Textbooks since 1945,“ Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 38, no. 1, 2003, 45-62.
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The fate of these millions of Germans, who have now suffered as a result of this bitter destiny for 
years, is so hard, the sorrow of their relatives in Germany so great, that all nations must help to return 
these prisoners and deported persons to their homeland and their families.
52
Adenauer’s strong emphasis on the suffering of these former soldiers and the dramatic 
numbers he stated reflected the concerns of a majority of the German population. 
Nevertheless, he robustly exaggerated the numbers by reiterating that there are “millions” 
still being held in Soviet prison camps.
53
 Moreover, he made no reference as to why these 
men were held prisoners, and thus simply factored out the possibility that real war 
criminals were likely to be amongst them.
54
 Adenauer instead condemned in a statement 
on the same issue a few months later the “crimes against humanity” committed against 
“our German brothers” in the Soviet Union and deplored “the world public” to express 
52
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(Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 1999), 44, fn. 18). The controversy was addressed in a secret “position paper” 
prepared by the United States Department of State in September 1950 for the United Nation’s General 
Assembly. The State Department claimed that Soviet official numbers were “far short of the actual number 
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sources” which indicated that “between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 prisoners of war who were in Soviet 
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Cf. FRUS, 1950, vol. II: “The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere,” 554. 
54
 On this issue see Andreas Hilger, ‘Faustpfand im Kalten Krieg? Massenverurteilungen deutscher 
Kriegsgefangener 1949/50 und die Repatriierung Verurteilter 1950 bis 1956,’ in Andreas Hilger, Ute 
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1945-1955“ (Köln: Böhlau, 2003), 273-350.
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“outrage” about this injustice.
55
 Expectedly, the KPD protested this version of the story, 
contested the numbers of remaining prisoners given by the federal government and 
recalled the historical context. Heinz Renner (1892-1964), deputy head of the KDP 
faction, lamented that Adenauer misused the issue for a “hate campaign against … the 
Soviet Union” and questioned the Chancellor’s honest commitment to helping the POWs. 
Renner then recalled in a lengthy speech the high casualty numbers incurred as a result of 
an irresponsible Wehrmacht command since 1941, and called for a historical 
contextualization of these undisputedly high casualties: 
The POW problem must be removed from the atmosphere of hate and needs to be treated with 
soberness. …A few weeks ago, the chancellor has spoken very sensitively about the desire for security 
among the Western nations. If we would only have heard similar sensitive words addressed to the 
peoples of the Soviet Union from Mr. Adenauer in recent years, … then this would have done much 
good. … A few weeks ago, [Justice Minister] Dehler has spoken about the ‘shame of Oradour’… I am 
of the opinion that the people of Czechoslovakia in their Lidice, in their Auschwitz [sic!], the people of 
Poland in their Lublin, in their Warsaw Ghetto, that the peoples of the Soviet Union have lived through 
and suffered many thousand Oradours … and that one has to approach matters at some point with a 
little bit of psychological empathy and with a sense of tact instead of engaging in an unrestrained hate 
campaign.
56
Renner further recalled the verdict in the Manstein Trial which found the defendant guilty 
of “the inhumane treatment of POWs, of shooting partisans without trial, of employing 
POWs for forbidden and dangerous work, of the commissar order, which ordered the 
shooting of prisoners and commissars, of condoning the mass annihilation of Jews, of 
shooting hostages, of unlawful employment of civilians for fortification work, of 
deportation and of scorched earth policy during the retreat.” This was the only time the 
crimes were called by their names in the Bundestag during those years. Renner warned 
deputies interrupting his speech from the ranks of the right-wing parties Deutsche 
55




Konservative Partei/Deutsche Reichsparty that they should keep quiet when it came to 
the POW issue, for “you bear a great part of the responsibility for the fact that there are 
German POWs at all.”
57
 Renner’s speech culminated in turmoil after he continuously 
accused the Adenauer administration of exploiting the POW issue for a “hate campaign” 
against the Soviet Union, of campaigning for “a new war” and of acting “according to the 
will of the USA monopoly capitalists and warmongers.” He was repeatedly interrupted 
by fuming deputies and the president of the Bundestag sought to pacify the renitent 
speaker by a call to order.
58
Speaking with more calm, Renner concluded that Germans had indeed the right to know 
the whereabouts of their POWs, yet they had a “much greater right to learn how many 
dead this total, criminal war” has cost the German nation, the war “whose aim was 
explicitly and admittedly the physical extermination of the peoples of Poland and the 
Soviet Union.”
59
 This direct reference to Hitler’s war of extermination in the East was a 
statement which positioned its speaker clearly outside the mainstream rhetoric of the day. 
Yet, Renner’s KPD remained an assembly of political outcasts because often they 
themselves acted as mere ideological agitators campaigning aggressively on their part for 










 Already in December, KPD-deputy Max Reimann (1898-1977) had caused a scandal in the Bundestag 
when he compared Adenauer to Hitler and denounced his administration as Marionettenregierung. He also 
claimed that little over five years after the end of the war Bonn was harboring “new war plans … against 
the peace-loving peoples of the Soviet Union.” Recalling in Stalin’s words, that Russians and Germans had 
suffered the most in World War Tow, Reimann warned that a third world war would largely take place on 
German soil and lead to the physical annihilation of the German nations. VDB, vol. 1, 24th Session, 
December 12, 1949, 738-740. On the West German communists in the early Federal Republic see most 
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stubbornly ignored interjections from the floor that denounced the Soviets’ oppressive 
regime in East Germany, and he refused to even acknowledge Soviet injustices done 
against Germans in the wake of the Wehrmacht’s total defeat on the Eastern Front. This 
was not a time of balancing out historical guilt and weighing the amount of responsibility 
and suffering on both sides. The insurmountable enmity of the early Cold War ruled these 
debates. Ideology, i.e. anti-communism and anti-totalitarianism, as well as a deep-seated 
mutual distrust dominated not only the global confrontation but also the internal political 
conflicts. It relegated historical facts to the sphere of irrelevance.  
During a debate on the POW question, Wehrmacht crimes on the Eastern Front were 
touched on in passing a second time. In May 1950, the Soviet News Agency TASS 
announced the official end to repatriation and declared that “overall, since the 
capitulation of Germany 1,939,063 German prisoners of war were repatriated from the 
Soviet Union to Germany.” Beyond that, 9,717 “convicted war criminals,” and 3,815 
persons still under investigation for war crimes would remain in Soviet custody.
61
 In 
reaction to this announcement, the Bundestag convened and Adenauer claimed that the 
fate of 1.5 million German soldiers remained uncertain and appealed to the “humanity” of 
the Soviet government to account for these “gruesome numbers.”
62
 The chancellor 
recalled crimes committed in the territories occupied by the Red Army and questioned –
with good reason – the fairness and validity of Soviet war crimes tribunals. Again, 
recently Thomas Kroll, “Kommunistische Intellektuelle im westlichen Deutschland (1945-1956): Eine 
glaubensgeschicht-liche Untersuchung in vergleichender Perspektive,“ in Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 33, 
vol. 2 (2007), 258-288.
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 Ihme-Tuchel, “Die SED und die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen,” 494.
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VDB, vol. 3, 62nd Session, May 5, 1950, 2282. 
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Adenauer made no mention of the historical pre- and context. After the routine attacks 
from the KPD benches – Bonn used the POW issue for “preparing psychologically a new 
war”
63
– the session ended once again in turmoil and was soon closed. A few weeks later, 
the CDU representative Eugen Gerstenmaier (1906-1986) informed the Bundestag about 
the results of a government investigation into the Soviet repatriation policies and in this 
connection a singular reference was made to the treatment of Soviet POWs in the Third 
Reich, albeit without loosing a word on the scale of the crimes and the role of the 
Wehrmacht therein: “We deeply bemoan that the rulers of the Third Reich in many ways 
violated international law with regards to the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war.” With 
his next sentence Gerstenmaier already qualified this statement: “But also with regards to 
the treatment of German POWs all captors have violated international law to a more or 
less large extent.” He criticized in particular, that the USSR refused to provide name lists 
of German POWs, that the prisoners were not permitted to contact relatives and 
denounced the proceedings and harsh sentences of Soviet war crimes tribunals.
64
While the first two legislative periods of the Bundestag were dominated by the 
question of rearmament and integration into a Western security alliance, the primacy of 
foreign policy did not entail a consistent reflection on the causes and roots of the Cold 
War enmity between Germany and Russia. To the contrary, the Cold War literally 
prohibited a sincere reckoning of past traumata and present distrust, and the likely nexus 
between the two. Throughout the Bundestag debates dealing with rearmament and the 
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on the roots, reasons and consequences of the Soviet suspicion of German rearmament 
deriving from the very fresh memories of “Barbarossa.” The war on the Eastern Front 
was mostly not even implicit in the various speeches referring to the security concerns of 
the Soviet Union. Only in a few instances detailed below did deputies recall certain 
aspects of the Wehrmacht’s invasion and occupation. Overall, the Soviet Union was 
exclusively viewed and addressed as aggressor – in present and past terms. 
On the first anniversary of the Bundestag’s convention officially labeled the “Day of 
Commemoration of the German People,” president Theodor Heuss addressed the 
parliament during a formal ceremony. Speaking at first, chancellor Adenauer condoned 
Germany’s division and the threat looming from the East, and stressed the need to solve 
conflicts peacefully. Heuss’ then following speech was in one sense extraordinary. In his 
historical reflections he included an explicit acknowledgment of Soviet suffering during 
World War II – something entirely inopportune at a time during which, as he himself had 
stressed earlier in the same speech, the East witnessed once again a totalitarian 
“ideological terror (Gesinnungsterror)” reminiscent of the time after 1933. Heuss 
appealed to the need to remember the unprecedented suffering “of all” as well as to the 
“ability to forget” in order to prevent another war. Remilitarization was to him an 
unthinkable and unacceptable political endeavor. With the Wehrmacht crimes in mind, he 
could not imagine German soldiers bearing arms again, because “the miles gloriosus … 
has perished after his hubris has made him the gravedigger of the fate of a nation.”
65
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German foreign policy makers, he warned, had thus to reflect and administer this horrible 
legacy with “responsibility and prudence:” 
It is not about fame and not about revenge but about being able to live. We have seen death striding 
over our home land, we have carried it ourselves to many countries. There is no one amongst us in this 
assembly there is no family in Germany who does not have to bemoan its dead. And it is not much 
different in most of the countries on the continent. One used to speak of the ‘knightly war.’ It may still 
exist in folk songs and school text books. Yet in reality, war has become a technical, factory-like great 
enterprise for the annihilation of humans and values, a force raging in anonymity [and] searching 
planlessly for its victims. That shall, that must be in the conscience of the decision-making men. The 
mothers in Russia think no different about this than the mothers in America.
66
Heuss concluded his thoughts on the unacceptability of war with an implicit call to the 
Soviet leaders to overcome a Deutschlandpolitik based on “their war psychosis and war 
experience, because they know and sense themselves how shortsighted and erroneous this 
approach is.”
67
If Heuss’ rhetoric was probing the limits of opportune memory in this speech, 
Adenauer stuck to Realpolitik and to his Cold War foreign policy paradigm. His analysis 
of the Soviet threat focused on this threat only. Until his earlier discussed remarks on the 
legacy of the German-Soviet war made in Moscow in 1955, the chancellor made no 
public reference to the years of the German occupation of Soviet territory before 1945. 
During the first debate on the German Wehrbeitrag, Adenauer started his historical 
remarks about the “totalitarian” Soviet Union in 1944, not in 1939 or 1941:
After the experiences which the Germans had made with the totalitarian regime of the Nazi period, 
after the experiences which the world has made with the totalitarian Soviet Russia since 1944 … one 
thing should be the common conviction of all Germans: totalitarian states, particularly Soviet Russia 
don’t know law and liberty as the principal factors in the coexistence of peoples and nations; they only 
know one decisive factor: power. Thus, with a totalitarian state potentially successful negotiations 
about the solution of international questions can only be conducted if he who leads these negotiations –
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This is the quintessence of Adenauer’s stand towards the Soviet Union throughout the 
1950s. He – realistically – perceived the Soviet Union as the other totalitarianism of the 
twentieth century and in its declared expansionist aspirations as threat to Western 
democracy. The concept of the “policy of strength” which he deduced from these 
perceptions simply forbade any reference to a time when the Soviet Union was primarily 
the victim of aggression, namely between 1941 and 1944. The Soviet threat was not 
surprisingly a constant theme in the foreign policy debates of the Bundestag. Even before 
1954, when Adenauer declared in the Bundestag that the ultimate goal of Soviet foreign 
policy was the “takeover” of Western Europe from the United States and thus the 
domination of the European continent,
69
 the Soviet threat was a recurring point of more or 
less balanced discussion. 
During a debate on the EDC and NATO in February 1952, Franz-Josef Strauss
(1915-1988) of the Christian-Social Union (CSU), the later minister of defense (1956-
1962), connected the current Soviet power aspirations to the Red Army’s victory over 
Hitler: since 1945, Moscow had used the triumph over the Nazis as “steppingstone for an 
expansion of the Bolshevist sphere of influence.” He also reminded the parliament that 
the Soviet Union had started the war in 1939 along with the Nazis and that its sphere of 
influence has “immensely expanded” ever since.
70
 Its long-term goal was the “shattering 
of Europe” and the “Bolshevization of Europe.”
71
 Once history entered the debate, also 
other deputies felt prompted to comment on the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union and 
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the brutality of the Red Army. August-Martin Euler (1908-1966, FDP) underlined 
Strauss’ threat analysis adding that on the road to independence and equality among all 
nations, Germany needed to get back its prisoners from foreign countries. Specifically, 
Euler referred to the German POWs in the Soviet Union. It was “unjustifiable that 
German soldiers remain imprisoned who [had done] nothing else but to protect their lives 
and those of their comrades against the perfidious warfare of civilians.”
72
 This refers to 
the Soviet partisan war on the Eastern Front which the Wehrmacht used as pretext to hunt 
down and kill civilians deemed “partisan fighters” or their alleged supporters and 
sympathizers. Moreover, Euler sided with convicted war criminals such as Manstein and 
Kesselring and conditioned the rearmament of Germany with their release:
I cannot imagine that new German troops march under the windows of the [Allied] prison in Werl as 
long as there are sitting many deserved officers and ordinary folks next to the General Field Marshals 
Manstein and Kesselring, who can be blamed for nothing but to have made use of all possibilities of 
warfare … in order to simply secure one’s own life against a brutal and perfidious warfare. Eventually, 
even the American troops in Korea could not defend themselves in any another way [caught] in a 
conflict with perfidious, brutal bandits. These things must be plainly spoken out.
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Euler was thus well aware of the critique of the Wehrmacht’s criminal warfare but 
declared the excessively violent conduct of war on the Eastern Front a matter of self-
defense. The Korean War served as an additional welcome vehicle for the justification 
and retrospective absolution of Wehrmacht crimes committed in recourse to the “partisan 
war.” 
It was the SPD under Schumacher’s successor Erich Ollenhauer (1901-1963) who 
occasionally cautioned that the Adenauer administration should take Soviet security 






people.” it was occupier and a major global player, Ollenhauer noted in a debate 
scheduled after the West German ratification of the EDC treaty in the spring of 1954. 
Further, despite the Social Democrats’ continuous anticommunist stand, Soviet security 
concerns should be granted some validity since these were “certainly the result of 
realistic and interest-directed considerations” on the part of the Soviet Union. Moscow’s 
suggestions for a consensual security system should be taken seriously, and not all 
suggestions should be dismissed as “communist agitation or Bolshevist manoeuvring.”
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In spite of the SPD’s opposition to Adenauer’s „policy of strength“ and the 
remilitarization of West Germany, the conservative majority in the parliament deliberated 
and passed legislation on the establishment of the Bundeswehr and its integration into the 
Western alliance system between 1950 and 1956. The creation of armed forces inevitably 
placed the Wehrmacht heritage and German military tradition on the political agenda. 
Yet, only one aspect of the Wehrmacht’s war of extermination in the East was discussed 
in this context – and not particularly intensely. The question of obedience and 
disobedience to military orders in the new army entailed addressing the legacy of the 
infamous “Criminal Orders” based on which Wehrmacht units committed countless 
criminal acts in the course of “Operation Barbarossa.”
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 Those are “Order No. 21 Concerning Jurisdiction of Military, SS, and Police Forces During 
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Before looking at these considerations in connection with the Soldatengesetz in 
1954, some remarks should be made on the general character of the Bundeswehr and its 
soldiers as the Adenauer administration envisioned it. The principle of integrating the 
armed forces into a democratic system was formulated early on, and it was done so by 
implying that an overall honorable Wehrmacht tradition could be resumed. After all, the 
number of “truly guilty higher officers” was so “extraordinary small,” so that Adenauer 
saw “the honor of the Wehrmacht … not derogated by that.”
76
 In a second explicit 
reference to the “honorable fight of the Wehrmacht,” the chancellor envisioned the 
“amalgamation of the moral values of the German soldierdom with democracy.” In a 
speech to the Bundestag on December 3, 1952, Adenauer stressed the – in his view –
historical achievements of the German military tradition and its lasting value for a future 
West German army:
I want to declare today before this High House [and] in the name of the federal government that we 
respect all weapon-bearers of our nation, who have fought honorably in the name of the noble soldierly 
tradition on land, on the seas and in the air. We are convinced that the good reputation and the great 
achievements of the German soldier are and remain alive in our people in spite of all defamations of 
the past years. It must be our joined task – and I am certain we will solve it – to amalgamate the moral 
values of the German soldierdom with democracy.
77
The fusion of the “honorable” military tradition with democracy was not a mere 
rhetorical set phrase but constituted the legal and political foundation of the Bundeswehr. 
Such declarations of honor for the old Wehrmacht were repeated in other statements by 
Bundestag deputies in reference to the character of the new army. Eugen Gerstenmaier of 
Auftakt zum Vernichtungskrieg. Die Wehrmacht in Polen 1939 (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 2006), shows that 
the first criminal order of the Wehrmacht were issued and executed already during the invasion of Poland 
not only in the spring of 1941. The war against Poland was thus quasi the “prelude” to the war of 
annihilation waged against the USSR two years later.
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 Adenauer made this comment during a parliamentary debate in 1951. Quoted in Reichel, 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung in Deutschland, 100. See also my discussion in Chapter 2. III.
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the CDU made it clear during a debate on the EDC in July of 1952 that “from the very 
beginning we deemed the idea of a German national army unrealistic, and that is not … 
because we would capitulate before the world’s suspicion of a German army or because 
the German soldierdom as such has become suspicious to ourselves. Not at all!” Rather, 
Gerstenmaier continued, a future army would indeed “be worthy of the great tradition of 
the real German soldierdom” albeit inspired by the ideal of a European federation and 
integrated into European armed forces.
78
 History, namely the story of the criminal 
culmination of the German military tradition on the Eastern Front during World War II, 
remained irrelevant when it came to justifying the resumption of this more than 
ambivalent tradition. A clear break, a distancing from the Wehrmacht’s criminal legacy 
of World War II, was not deemed appropriate or necessary in the Adenauer
administration. Neither was it demanded on the opposition benches in the Bundestag.
A similar pattern of strictly eluding and selectively invoking history surfaced during 
the discussions over the question whether to keep the name Wehrmacht for the new army.  
In the spring of 1956, when the Bundestag deliberated the Soldatengesetz in a second and 
third reading several speakers addressed this issue. Smaller parties such as the FDP or the 
DP (German Party) demanded to stick to the name “Wehrmacht” for this was after all no 
“Nazi invention.” Besides, Germans had no reason at all “to be ashamed of this 
expression, neither at home nor … abroad.”
79
 Yet, Richard Jaeger (1913-1998), speaking 
for the CDU, clarified that his faction did not favor a new name because “we Germans 
must feel ashamed of the name ‘Wehrmacht,’” but because it would signal “a new 
78
VDB, vol. 12, 221st Session, July 9, 1952, 9803. 
79
VDB, vol. 28, 132nd Session, March 6, 1956, 6828f..
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beginning” and the name “Bundeswehr” (literally translating as Federal Defense Force) 
also stressed the “defensive character” of the army.
80
 Jaeger also admitted that “for the 
man on the street in the territories formerly occupied by the Wehrmacht a shadow lays on 
this name.” He quickly added though that “the soldiers of the old Wehrmacht could not 
be blamed for that.” They simply had been members of an army under that name. This 
remark apparently paid only respect to the war memories of the Western allies; the Soviet 
Union or Poland, or the Baltic States were not on Jaeger’s mind as he concluded that “in 
view of these shadows it seems functional to us to avoid resentments in the allied 
countries.”
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Never in these debates was a precise and explicit connection made between the 
persisting “resentments” abroad and the Wehrmacht’s role in the former occupied 
territories. During the first reading of the Soldatengesetz in 1955, the parliament briefly 
discussed the question of the soldier’s duty to obey and his right to disobey (criminal) 
orders. Theodor Blank, Adenauer’s deputy for rearmament and first Minister of Defense 
(1955-1957), gave the key speech on what he called the “basic law [Grundgesetz] for 
soldierdom” and emphasized that the rule of law was the central principle of the new 
army. Thus, the democratic soldier was “exempt from obeying criminal orders:”
In a constitutional state it must be a commonly accepted principle that freedom will be curbed and that 
soldiers are subject to superior orders only so far as the special purpose and the duties of the soldier 
make it necessary. ... If the soldier is exempt from following criminal orders then this basic principle 
shines through. The question of how far [civil rights] can be curtailed, of how much the soldier’s 
freedom of opinion can be restricted must be decided in view of the general assessment of the soldier’s 




 Ibid. Jaeger also mentioned an interesting contemporary poll according to which indeed 35 percent of the 
population favored the name “Wehrmacht,” but 20 percent opted for “Bundeswehr” although the 
administration had not even started to popularize the latter name.  
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– is of little help here. Today we want and we must set up a Wehrmacht of the whole nation based on 
the draft, and this Wehrmacht must live in and with democracy.
82
Blank implicitly addressed the complex legacy of the Wehrmacht in the Third Reich and 
– specifically without being specific – referred to the infamous criminal orders which 
regulated the military conduct on the Eastern Front and as a result of which thousands of 
German soldiers committed worst atrocities. To him this question was nonetheless a 
question of calculating current objectives, not of reckoning with past crimes. In the few 
instances where the debate touched on the complex problem of differentiating between 
soldierly obedience and individual accountability, the speakers gave the former 
Wehrmacht soldiers the benefit of the doubt. Hans Merten (1908-1967), speaking for the 
SPD, argued that the Soldatengesetz solved the problem only insufficiently and that it 
failed to “protect subordinates” against unfair prosecution because it “ultimately burdens 
the subordinate with all the risk connected to the execution of a criminal order.” He 
added that apparently no lessons had been learned from “the last war and the trials that 
were held against former German soldiers by foreign powers.” In the end, those had been 
punished who “had feared loosing their life for disobeying an order.”
83
 This had been the 
“tragedy of many soldiers in the past war,” concluded Hasso von Manteuffel (1897-
1978), a FDP deputy and decorated retired Wehrmacht general.
84
 Less apologetic, but 
equally nebulous was a general remark made by Blank’s colleague Georg Kliesing (1911-
1992, CDU). Kliesing’s statement encapsulated both, the parliament’s meek stand on the 
82




 Ibid., 5794. On numerous occasions, Manteuffel demurred the „fate“ of the imprisoned Nazi war 
criminals, denounced the military resistance against Hitler as act of treason and cowardice, and advocated 
the introduction of a military oath comparable to the Fuhrer oath.
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criminal Wehrmacht legacy as well as a sincere commitment to a democratic Bundeswehr
and the ideal of soldiers as “citizens in uniform.”  Kliesing warned in the course of the 
debate that only if “state and Wehrmacht stood united and ready to vouch for one 
another” it was possible to “avoid evoking the dark shadows of a fateful unselige past.” 
Only then, the future German soldier would become “a democratic citizen in uniform” –
not a “burden hindering the democratic development of our nation, but a force cultivating 
it.”
85
There is no doubt that the Eastern Front memory had a significant impact on the 
political culture in both Germanys even though this chapter has demonstrated that the
past was in hiding in West remilitarization, and that it was ubiquitous in the official 
propaganda in the East. It was only in context of the thaw in German-Soviet relations, 
that West German memory of the Eastern Front gradually eroded. The success of 
Ostpolitik was intricately tied to a change in the political memory of the West German 
political establishment, a change initiated by chancellor Ludwig Erhard (1897-1977, 
CDU)and fully brought out by Willy Brandt (1913-1992, SPD) during the later 1960s. 
Contrasting Adenauer’s position and conduct in Moscow in 1955, and the Bundestag’s
treatment of the Eastern Front leagy in the remilitarization debates with Brandt’s political 
speech in 1970, demonstrates how memory formed the “cultural parameters” of West 
German foreign policy: while the basic parameters of Bonn’s foreign policy – Western 




neighbors” – remained unaltered for five decades, the open confrontation and integration 
of the Nazi past since the 1960s testifies to the profound transformation of German 
foreign policy which until 1945 had been dominated by notions of nationalism and power 
politics.
86
 The gradually changing memory of the Eastern Front war in West Germany 
was a crucial part of this transformation. Without it, Ostpolitik would have been 
unthinkable, and the Bonn Republic would not have risen to the position of a widely 
respected player for peace and security since the 1970s. 
For the moment, however, I will leave the political sphere and shift focus to the no 
less complex relationship between history and individual memory. Unlike after World 
War I, there was no “myth of the war experience” after 1945. The soldier did not come 
out of this war as hero; fighting and dying for one’s fatherland did not become a way of 
life in postwar Europe as it did after 1918.
87
 “The Second World War was a different kind 
of war that would blur the distinction between the front line and the home front … and 
where defeat and victory were destined to be unconditional.”
88
 To former soldiers, 
American, Soviet, or German war veterans alike, it embodied the ultimate sacrifice and 
suffering a soldier could endure while serving his country. To German intellectuals, 
World War II was a “non-redemptive apocalypse” in which the image of war was 
fundamentally changed, and the monstrosity of the crimes ultimately marked what 
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Hannah Arendt has called a “rupture with civilization.”
89
 That the collectively shared 
experience of individually endured, witnessed and/or caused extreme violence would 
make it incomparably harder to come to terms with one’s own and others’ sufferings is 
quite obvious. Stalingrad and the brutal warfare on the Eastern Front were the central 
historical reference points around which such a discourse circled, often dodging, lurching 
and manoeuvring. The facts unearthed in the course of the war crimes trials as described 
above were thus heard but not comprehended in their full meaning of being “evil.” As 
New York Times correspondent Raymond Daniell phrased it in one of his comments on 
German reactions to the Nuremberg trial in 1946, there was an “ethical lacuna” which 
made it possible to accept the historical reality of certain crimes “without recognizing the 
concept of evil … which is implicit in [these deeds].”
90
 Apart from the political arena in 
which the truly shocking evidence for the magnitude of German war crimes should have 
received permanent and prominent attention, individual memories and narratives were 
dominated by the question of suffering. Often the question of guilt therefore could more 
or less comfortably be blended out. Yet, during the first postwar decade, as the following 
chapter demonstrates, the moral premises of these narratives did not necessarily collide 
with the respective official political discourse about the war on the Eastern Front as long 
as they fit into the demands of every-day Cold War politics.
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Chapter 7
Peacetime Wars: Official Memory and the Integration of Individual 
Wartime Experiences in Postwar Germany
“Escape and escape again – only that is the future: conversion and forgetting.”
From Stephan Hermlin’s Lieutenant Yorck of Wartenburg
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I. Soldiers as Perpetrators and Victims: Historical Truth, Personal Realities and the 
Memory of the Eastern Front
FORGING “LEGITIMATE NARRATIVES” OF WAR
This chapter analyses the narratives crafted in the veteran communities of East and 
West Germany in the 1950s about the war on the Eastern Front. The first part deals with 
the higher echelons of the Wehrmacht, with the historical memory of Stalingrad and the 
Eastern Front among the former military elites, generals and officers. A particular focus 
rests on the political aspects of this memory, its potential for instrumentalization in Cold 
War politics along the lines of the respective official narratives, and its usefulness for the 
integration of former Wehrmacht officers into the two opposing political systems. The 
second part is concerned with the political and societal roles attained by former rank-and-
file soldiers – including returning prisoners of war from the Soviet Union – as they 
decided to become involved with veteran and party politics throughout the 1950s. In East 
Germany, returnees were channeled into the National Democratic Party where they were 
to lead the “German front generation” towards a peaceful future in a socialist Germany, 
or into the DSF where their experiences endowed the SED’s German-Soviet Friendship 
project with additional credibility. This Germany was said to have learned its lessons 
from the past, and its citizens pledged and practiced eternal friendship with the Soviet 
Union. Veterans in the West, in contrast, successfully integrated into the new pluralistic 
society and profited greatly from the core principles of democracy – freedom of speech 
and the guarantee of political and civil rights. The interest groups and lobby associations 
of Wehrmacht veterans participated most lively in public debates during the 1950s, and 
thanks to free speech, were able to interpret the legacies of “Barbarossa” as a grandiose 
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albeit failed military undertaking without much moral regret. The analysis of a sample of 
veteran publications in the FRG will illustrate how the Eastern Front war came to serve 
as blueprint for a future – ultimately inevitable – confrontation with Soviet Bolshevism. 
The lessons drawn were exclusively debated in terms of how an incompetent leadership, 
strategic miscalculations and tactical mistakes led to total defeat in 1945. The criminal 
nature of “Operation Barbarossa” was practically absent from this discourse and it thus 
closely resembled the contemporary political memory of the Eastern Front in West 
Germany. 
Individual memory often collides with historical facts. This is not only a natural 
consequence of the limitedness of human experience but also the result of a subjective 
interpretation of what happened to someone or with someone.
1
 Yet, this is not to say that 
individual memories per se are potentially false or flawed just because they represent a 
personal, subjective view of the past. After all, remembering is a form of coping with 
experience. The ability to remember and thereby to integrate personal recollections into 
one’s self-image and world-view is essential for the emotional and physical well-being of 
human beings in a society.
2
 In times of extreme crises such as war, violence, hunger or 
natural disaster, this ability becomes even more crucial for the individual and also 
collective survival in and as a community. However, individual memories tend to cleanse 
the past off the unpleasant, uncomfortable or even unbearable puzzle pieces, the more so 
1
 See Johannes Fried, Der Schleier der Erinnerung. Grundzüge einer historischen Memorik (München: 
C.H. Beck, 2004).
2
 Some argue that the ability to forget is of equal importance, cf. e. g. Gary Stark, Henderk M. Emrich, eds., 
Vom Nutzen des Vergessens (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1996). 
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if these pieces contain memories of one’s wrongdoings, failures, violent deeds or inability 
to prevent “evil.”
3
For soldiers, remembering war means just that: coming to terms with an experience 
of extreme violence and with an experience of possibly having crossed boundaries of 
previously held moral standards – given such a sense of right and wrong has prevailed, or 
reemerged after the event.
4
 In war, participants can be both, executors of violence and 
victims thereof. The war on the Eastern Front saw the total brutalization of warfare 
climaxed by the explosion of the atomic bomb at the end of this war. Military traditions 
with regards to the conduct of warfare, of strategy and tactics were reduced to a mere 
technical status. A battle for pure survival threw conventional notions of a natural 
boundary between the military and civilian spheres over board and ultimately called for 
the physical destruction of anyone deemed an enemy. 
Modern aggressive war as waged by Nazi Germany on Europe and beyond had 
changed the meaning of war for it no longer “just” constituted the “continuation of 
politics by other means” – a dictum cynical enough in itself. World War II was the 
continuation of Nazi policy and ideology. Yet, with the execution as “war of 
extermination” in the East, it also became a substitute for politics and law altogether, a 
way of reorganizing society according to the principle “survival of the fittest,” a way of 
3
 For an introduction on the problem of individual vs. collective memory cf. Joanna Bourke, “Introduction 
‘Remembering War’,” Journal of Contemporary History 39, 4 (2004), 473-485. Rainer Schulz, “Memory 
in German History: Fragmented Noises or Meaningful Voices of the Past?,” ibid., 637-648. Also instructive 
and with a focus on the correlation of memory and power is Müller, “Introduction,” in Müller, ed., Memory 
and Power, 1-35.
4
On the problem of NS morality and traditional morality and the subsequent lack of such as sense of right 
and wrong among many Germans after 1945 see Schwan, Politik und Schuld, 69-123.
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life, an end in itself.
5
 Many men fighting and surviving such a war, returned home filled 
with the need “to ‘bear witness’” in peacetime and a desire to make sense of what they 
had experienced.
6
 Attempts at mastering the past on a personal level were manifold and 
ranged from sincere reckoning with one’s own role and responsibilities, to romanticizing 
the front experience as a tale of comradeship, suffering and heroism, to whitewashing it 
from any criminal acts, and to suppressing the war experience all together, never 
speaking of it to anyone. I call these personal struggles with memory “peacetime wars” 
because they challenged both, individual conceptions of  the self, of past and present 
values and believe systems as well as the officially crafted and communicated memories 
of the Second World War. 
5
 This originates in the aestheticized war experience of World War One and its appropriation in European 
societies during the interwar period. See George L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers, esp. 53-106, 201ff.
6
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person’s mental and physical health: “Despite the human capacity to survive and adapt, traumatic 
experiences can alter people’s psychological, biological, and social equilibrium to such a degree that the 
memory of one particular event comes to taint all other experiences, spoiling appreciation of the present. 
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When people come to concentrate selectively on reminders of their past, life tends to become colorless, and 
contemporary experience ceases to be a teacher.” See Bessel A. van der Kolk, Alexander C. McFarlane, 
“The Black Hole of Trauma,” in van der Kolk, McFarlane, Weiseath, eds., Traumatic Stress, 4.
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“perpetrators” of WWII, particularly as suggested recently by Bernhard Giesen. Giesen’s approach suggests 
that not the experience of brutality alone contributed to the “traumatization” of many Germans during the 
war – implying that experiencing violence as perpetrator can cause traumatic stress similar to that of his 
victims – but that it was the experience of loosing power and dominance in the moment of total defeat and 
destruction which caused a collective trauma among many Germans at the end of the war. Ultimately, this 
line of argument dissociates the psychological term “trauma” from the fundamental experience of  being 
both powerless and victimized as the central emotions in a traumatic situation, and, moreover, places the 
responsibility for an alleged “perpetrators’ trauma” on the victory of the Allies. See Bernhard Giesen, 
Christoph Schneider, eds., Tätertrauma. Nationale Erinnerungen im öffentlichen Diskurs (Konstanz: UVK 
Verlag, 2004), particularly Giesen’s introduction therein. And Bernhard Giesen, Triumph and Trauma 
(Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2004).
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As German veterans of the Eastern Front returned to an occupied and soon divided 
country, the conditions for these mastering attempts became increasingly diverse. Yet, 
what returnees to the Eastern and Western parts shared was the need to rebuild a country 
and to integrate former combatants into a peaceful society that was soon believed to be 
threatened by a new conflict, only that this time a conflict could culminate in nuclear war. 
The demands of every-day-life and the political-ideological battles that loomed along 
with the daunting Cold War constituted the material, social and political context for the 
process of remembering war. This was the case in most European countries after 1945. 
What made the situation special and more complex in postwar Germany was the fact that 
German veterans had fought on the aggressor’s side and had lost the war. For them the 
question of guilt was and remained a crucial issue notwithstanding whether it was dealt 
with by actually addressing it or by purposefully avoiding it. Memory to someone who 
had survived being a (potential) perpetrator was indeed not a matter of either ‘forgetting’ 
or ‘remembering’ but of “finding a legitimate narrative that can ‘place’ the self in a way 
that is both coherent and convincing.”
7
Legitimate narratives do not necessarily involve historical truth; they rather reflect 
the individual desire to make sense of the past, and add up to a collective memory of 
groups such as the veteran community. These agglomerations of legitimate, indeed 
legitimizing, narratives can also generate collectively nurtured historical legends and 
“myths.” In general, West German society is said to have subscirbed to the “myth of the 
clean Wehrmacht” which held that overall German troops fought within the rules and 
7
 Bourke, “Introduction ‘Remembering War’,” 480. 
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regulations of conventional warfare, dutifully and patriotically executing the nation’s call 
to arms (and here, of course, “myth” is used in its popular meaning, namely that the core 
of it is false and historically incorrect). In this “abbreviated story of National Socialism” 
a few fanatic Nazis were responsible for violent excesses, if they had occurred at all. 
Hitler was to blame for the war and its loss: “all Germans – [including former soldiers] –
were ultimately victims of a war that Hitler started but everyone lost.”
8
 In the East 
German case, not the Wehrmacht itself was the source for the primary “political myth” –
the foundation narrative of the GDR – but the antifascist resistance.
9
 Yet, an integral part 
of the “antifascist myth” was to claim that while crimes admittedly took place on the 
Eastern Front a transformation experience in Soviet prison camps enabled former soldiers 
and officers to balance out the guilt of the past. By subscribing to Soviet-style socialism, 
these former Wehrmacht soldiers turned around on the wrongful path and manifested this 
“inner reversal” (innere Umkehr) by reorienting their lives towards socialist antifascism. 
In other words, what might be called the “red version”
10
 of the “Wehrmacht myth” 
8
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represented a similar eagerness to settle once and for all the question of crimes of the past 
by confessing to them ostentatiously, and at the same time writing off this responsibility 
by professing a more or less sincere affiliation with the “new Germany.”
REMEMBERING WAR: OF “LOST VICTORIES” AND “WON DEFEATS” IN GENERALS’
MEMOIRS
The group which most strongly advocated such diffuse readings of Wehrmacht and 
German military history was the group of former generals and officers in both, in East 
and West Germany. The following paragraphs examine the motives and themes in the 
narratives of former high-ranking military men addressing the legacy of the Wehrmacht 
during the early 1950s. These narratives, it may be recalled, were bordered 
chronologically and thematically by the findings of the Nuremburg Tribunal and its 
successor trials of the late 1940s and the issue of rearmament and remilitarization of 
Germany in the mid-1950s. The division of Germany in 1949 serves as the vantage point 
for my analysis because discourses on either side of the Iron Curtain were by now 
overshadowed, even determined by the Cold War. And for generals and officers in East 
and West alike, the division of Germany served as “cover-up memory” 
11
(Deckerinnerung) for respectively unwelcome realities of the past: in the West, 
“Bolshevist aggression” posed a new threat to a world divided into the “free” and the 
“oppressed” nations. Therefore, recalling crimes committed against the Soviet Union 
Generäle. Zum Frontwechsel deutscher Soldaten auf die ‚Siegerseite der Geschichte,’“ in Heinrich-Böll-
Stiftung, ed., Gedächtnispolitik. Eine kritische Zwischenbilanz (Berlin: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, 2003), 57-
93.
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during World War II was not on the political and popular agendas. In the East, the 
perceived division of the world into the imperialist camp led by the United States and the 
community of “peace-willing countries” led by the Soviet Union called for an opportune, 
well-dosed invocation and commemoration of crimes committed during the war on the 
Eastern Front. Here too, identifying who was responsible for what crimes and in which 
way, was less relevant than the potential to use “anti-Soviet” crimes of the “fascists” in 
order to denounce the West for plotting a new aggressive war against the Soviet Union.
One of the earliest postwar documents auguring a “legitimate narrative” of the war as 
drafted by former high-ranking Wehrmacht generals was the so-called Denkschrift der 
Generäle (“Affidavit of the Generals”). It was prepared by former Field Marshal Walther 
von Brauchitsch (1881-1948),
12
 and submitted to the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg on November 19, 1945 in order to “bear witness in the name of the entire 
German army.” The five signatories were the prominent generals Erich von Manstein, 
Franz Halder (1884-1972), Walter Warlimont (1894-1976) and Siegfried Westphal
(1902-1982).
13
The declared goal of the pamphlet was to demonstrate that the German 
Wehrmacht had stood in firm opposition against the Nazi Party and the SS throughout the 
existence of the Third Reich. It also argued that the Wehrmacht leadership had 
12
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disapproved of nearly all of Hitler’s central decisions and that they had protested war 
crimes. 
Defensive in tone and providing no written evidence for these claims, the 
Denkschrift did little or nothing to establish the innocence of the generals accused of the 
thoroughly-documented charges the Allied prosecution argued before the Nuremberg 
Tribunal. It reflected a “cleansed memory” of the war.
14
 Beginning with the Nazi seizure 
of power the document stated that the army leadership was uninvolved in and largely 
unsuspecting of Hitler’s domestic policy agenda, and full of qualms with regards to his 
aggressive foreign policy. The ideological and factual proximity between National 
Socialism and the German military remained unmentioned. No word was said about the 
degree of political indoctrination and Nazi infiltration of the German armed forces 
between 1933 and 1939. The Denkschrift explained the road to war by exculpating the 
military leadership from any responsibility, ultimately arguing that the army was taken by 
surprise when Hitler decided to wage war. With regards to the war against the Soviet 
Union, the text initiated the “premature birth of the preventive war theory for use in 
postwar society.”
15
 Hitler, the argument went, realized in July 1940 that Russia might 
enter the war so Germany was forced to prevent such an attack by going into the 
offensive. These claims contradicted historical reality as the Allied prosecution had 
discussed it in their indictment. The evidence for a conspiracy to wage aggressive war 
was overwhelming and the Wehrmacht leadership’s active involvement was undeniable.
16
14




 See my discussion in Chapter 3. I., II.
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More than just the birth certificate of the preventive war theory, the Denkschrift was a 
complete distortion of the past.  
For those adhering to the theory of preventive war, the innocence of the Wehrmacht 
was not only a necessary and logic conclusion but a natural, self-evident fact. Even 
though the Red Army fought an extremely brutal war and the partisan war disregarded 
conventional military tactics and strategy, the generals argued, Wehrmacht commanders 
undertook no measures that “stood in contrast to German views of discipline.” Although 
the infamous criminal orders for warfare on the Eastern Front were drafted under 
Halder’s auspices in the General Staff, the Denkschrift denied any share of responsibility 
for the ensuing war of extermination. It is thus one of the most important documents for 
the history of the diminishment of the Wehrmacht’s role in the Second World War. It is 
just as sad as it is shocking how completely remorseless and morally detached German 
military leaders emerged from this war – a war marked by crimes which in their 
dimension, radicalism and brutality could simply not have been committed without the 
Wehrmacht’s active involvement.
Manstein himself emerged as the strongest defender of this position. His trial in 1949 
and the subsequent publication of his memoirs contributed to the popularization of the 
“Wehrmacht myth.” Manstein’s argumentation was a prime example of the 
amalgamation of prevailing anti-Russian sentiments and new Cold War necessities. 
Already during his trial before a British military court in Hamburg in late 1949, Manstein 
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had invoked the “Asiatic face of the war in the East” which the enemy could not escape.
17
In his view, the Soviet Union never was and never would be part of Europe: “the shadow 
of Asiatic despotism” lay over land and people.
18
 It was one important lesson of the (very 
recent) past that this country was at once demonic and threatening to the West. Erich von 
Manstein, who as former commander of Army Group South under Hitler had been one of 
the most important military leaders of the Nazi campaign on the Eastern Front,
19
 managed 
to portray himself as the victim of a misled sense of justice: not those fighting the 
“threat” from the East should be held accountable but Russia itself. Moreover, in fighting 
so unremittingly against the “barbarian Russians” on the Eastern Front, Manstein claimed 
in his memoirs “Lost Victories” to have acted out of “responsibility for his own soldiers.” 
This had been his first priority as military leader and thus also more important than 
fighting the National Socialist regime.
20
Now, four years after the end of the war and with 
the Cold War reaching its first peak, Manstein further claimed during his trial that all 
17
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energies were to be concentrated on resuming the quasi-interrupted, unfinished fight 
against a familiar enemy: the Asiatic hordes, the Bolshevik menace in the East. Even as 
late as in 1983, when Manstein’s autobiography was republished ten years after his death, 
these reflections of a “soldier in the twentieth century” were nothing more than a self-
referential and exculpatory narrative carefully re-edited by Manstein’s son Rüdiger. The 
fact that Manstein as the head of Army Group South had knowledge of and actively 
participated in war crimes against Jews, Soviet civilians, and POWs in the USSR 
remained something to be documented by later historians.
21
But Manstein was only one of several former Wehrmacht generals and officers who 
enjoyed public attention and sympathy in the 1950s for writing down and publicizing 
their “strategic memories” and thereby creating their own genre in early West German 
literature.
22
 Next to Manstein, the memoirs of Franz Halder entitled “Hitler as 
Commander: The Former Chief of General Staff Reports the Truth” (1949) and the 
“Memories of a Soldier” (1950) by Halder’s later successor as Chief of Staff of the 
Army, Heinz Guderian (1888-1954), are two other examples of this rehabilitation 
literature. While Halder’s and Guderian’s military careers were over with the end of the 
war, others such as Hans Speidel (1897-1984), the former military commander in 
occupied France and Eastern Front veteran,) and Adolf Heusinger (1897-1982), between 
1940 and 1944 chief of the operational division of the Army General Staff, actively 
21
 See recently the detailed account in Marcel Stein, Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein, esp. chapter 
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22
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participated in the creation of the new West German army, the Bundeswehr.
23
 These 
men’s memoirs denied any criminal acts by the German Wehrmacht. War crimes either 
did not occur, or if so on rare occasions, not under the generals’ watch, and were 
scattered outbursts of violence among a few brutalized soldiers.
24
 From the perspective of 
military leaders who were responsible for the strategic, tactical and logistic planning and 
execution of war plans, these former Wehrmacht generals limited their recollections to 
the narrow worlds of their desks, military maps and planning tables. Lamenting the 
incompetence of Hitler as commander-in-chief, they mourned “lost victories” and 
“betrayed battles.” It was not on the authors’ agenda to reflect on the victims, the 
tremendous human costs caused by the war on the Eastern Front. They were too 
“preoccupied with the humiliation of defeat.”
25
Just as former high-ranking officers and generals created their legitimizing versions 
of the Second World War in West Germany, their former colleagues now residing in East 
Germany designed equally elaborate narratives of their own. If the strategic memoirs and 
memories of Manstein & co. can be subsumed under the slogan “lost victories,” those 
former generals who opted for the path towards socialism in the GDR turned their 
historical experience into “won defeats.” The defeat at Stalingrad functioned as the 
central turning point in these generals’ military careers and personal biographies. It were 
23
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Stalingrad veterans like those organized in the AeO in particular who became actively 
involved with the SED regime. Their ambivalent pasts as high-ranking officers in Hitler’s 
army were not much of a burden for this ballast was simply transformed into ideological 
capital: by confessing wholeheartedly to having been misled under Hitler, by citing the 
experience of Soviet imprisonment and by claiming a complete antifascist turn-around 
following the defeat at Stalingrad the generals managed to smoothly integrate into the 
new socialist state in East Germany. Moreover, their biographies seemed not even to 
suffer a deep eruption at the end of the war; instead, the “Stalingraders” were able to 
swiftly change sides and emerged untainted on the victor’s side of history.
26
Most prominent among them were former generals Wilhelm Adam, Heinrich 
Homann, Otto Korfes, Arno von Lenski (1893-1986) and Vincenz Müller – a group of 
men who after war and imprisonment were politically socialized in the National 
Democratic Party of Germany (NDPD) and with careers in the GDR military and police 
forces. The fact that the SED created a special political party to appeal to former soldiers, 
officers and NSDAP members allowed the SED to contain and channel the political 
aspirations of Wehrmacht veterans in the GDR. In the East German one-party state, a 
“national front” of “bloc parties” underlined the SED’s understanding of “democracy.” 
The NDPD, as all other bloc parties, became an inseparable part of the “antifascist-
deomcratic front.” It was established during a time when the SED’s efforts to gain control 
over all parties and to press them into an antifascist bloc underwent a deep crisis. In 1947 
26
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two other bloc-parties, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Liberal 
Democratic Party of Germany (LDP), had resisted the SED’s gradual attempts to 
centralize economic and social policy decisions, thus refusing to accept the SED’s claim 
to leadership in East Germany. The SED’s response to this resistance was to include mass 
organizations, labor unions and newly founded parties into the “antifascist-democratic 
bloc” in order to “stabilize the cooperation between the parties.”
27
Moreover, in February of 1948, SVAG order No. 35 announced the formal end of 
denazification in the Soviet occupation zone. With this order former unbelastete Nazi 
members (so-called Parteigenossen (Pgs), former NSDAP members not accused of 
severe crimes) and Nazi followers received the chance to “honestly participate in the 
securing and democratic development of Germany together with all democratic forces in 
society.”
28
 The NDPD was officially founded soon after with a license from SVAG dated 
June 16, 1948. There were about 500,000 former NSDAP members, in addition to 
700,000 former Wehrmacht soldiers and officers residing in the Soviet zone. The primary 
motivation of SED and SVAG to establish a national-democratic party was to secure a 
smooth as possible integration of these groups into East German society. The NDPD was 
to serve as a “collecting basin” for denazified Nazis.
29
Vincenz Müller, first head of the NDPD between 1948 and 1952, also became the 
first chief of staff of the GDR’s paramilitary People’s Police (KVP) and the National
27
 Dietrich Staritz, „National-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands (NDPD),“ in Martin Broszat, Hermann 
Weber, eds., SBZ-Handbuch. Staatliche Verwaltungen, Parteien, gesellschaftliche Organisationen und ihre 
Führungskräfte in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands 1945-1949 (München: Oldenbourg, 
1993), 574-583, here 574.
28
 Andreas Herbst, Winfried Ranke, Jürgen Winkler, eds., So funktionierte die DDR. Lexikon der 
Organisationen und Institutionen, vol. 2 (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1994), pp. 713f.
29




 Heinrich Homann served as deputy head of the NDPD between 
1952 and 1972 and thereafter as the party’s head until the end of the GDR in 1989. 
Wilhelm Adam became commander in the military academy in Dresden. Otto Korfes and 
Homann also belonged to the “initiative group” put together by the SED politburo to 
prepare the founding of the AeO in 1958. As a previous chapter has demonstrated, their 
monthly publication Mitteilungsblatt discussed a wide range of military and historical 
topics throughout the next decade or so, and thus constitutes an important source for the 
semi-official discourse about the Eastern Front and Stalingrad in the GDR. Many 
activists in the AeO who willingly lent their biographies, expertise and voices to the 
SED-regime even when it walled in the country in 1961 and permanently sealed the 
division of their fatherland, were politically socialized in the circle around Müller and 
Adam in the early 1950s – a circle in which the former Wehrmacht officers’ narrative of 
Stalingrad and the Eastern Front war was rooted.
Wilhelm Adam was one of the leading figures among former Wehrmacht generals in 
the young GDR. He exerted great influence on the interpretative and ideological 
appropriation of the memory of Stalingrad in East Germany. As a “Stalingrader,” as he 
would call himself, he claimed to speak for all those former soldiers for whom the “hell 
of Stalingrad” had been the life-altering experience. Adam, a learned math teacher in 
civilian life and veteran of two world wars, had – long before his “conversion” at 
Stalingrad – been an early member of the Nazi Party and had even been actively involved 
30
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in the Hitler Putsch in Munich in 1923. In World War II, Adam had witnessed the war on 
the Eastern Front and the battle at Stalingrad from within the central command of the 
Sixth Army. As Paulus’ personal adjutant he was confronted not only with the miserable 
conditions under which the Sixth Army perished, but he had detailed knowledge of the 
Wehrmacht’s criminal conduct of war on the road to Stalingrad. The Sixth Army was just 
as complicit in the war of extermination as other parts of Hitler’s Wehrmacht – a fact 
rarely ever mentioned in accounts of the Sixth Army’s ordeal: on its way towards 
Stalingrad, it followed orders to shoot “all Asians, whether soldiers or civilians” in order 
to take revenge for the “atrocities against our soldiers;” routinely, “political commissars” 
and “sectarians,” i.e. civilians, were reported captured and “dealt with” in accordance 
with the infamous “criminal orders” on warfare on Soviet territory.
31
 According to the 
Sonderkommando (special command) 4a of the SS-Einsatzgruppe C, which followed the 
Sixth Army behind the front lines, the execution of 55 432 “political commissars, active 
communists, saboteurs, and most of all Jews of which most were captured and handed 
over by the Wehrmacht as Jewish POWs” could be reported in October 1941, just over 
three months after the invasion had begun.
32
 Just as Wehrmacht soldiers stuck in 
Stalingrad in the winter of 1942/43 wrote letters to their loved ones about their torment, 
they had written letters home during the previous year and a half in which they 
approvingly detailed the “measures of revenge” taken against Jews and other civilians 
31
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 By August 1941, the killing of Jewish women and children was 
routinely accepted and actively supported by Sixth Army units who thus “knowingly 
became accomplices of genocide.”
34
 Not surprisingly the later letters from Stalingrad 
rarely made mention of this brutal prehistory of the battle.
35
It is important at this point to realize these historical realities for despite the SED’s 
eagerness to “come to terms” with German – or rather “fascist” – war crimes committed 
in the Soviet Union, statements of potential perpetrators were vague, recollections fuzzy 
and crimes hardly called by their names. Former adjutant Wilhelm Adam, by 1950 one of 
the leading activists in the NDPD with a military biography, exemplifies this strategy: on 
the one hand he capitalized greatly from the fact that he had once been on an erroneous 
path – and not just as a soldier, but as member of the command structure – and from the 
fact that he had transformed and returned from this path by devoting the remainder of this 
life to the new German-Soviet alliance. On the other hand, however, he was never 
confronted by the SED with the extent of his personal knowledge of and involvement in 
such “crimes.” He repeatedly referred to them exclusively as the starting point of his 
33
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inner return, but not for the sake of identifying and acknowledging the victims thereof. 
This subtle dialectic of admitting and erasing guilt in one stroke was a characteristic 
feature of Vergangenheitsbewältigung in the GDR.
36
As head of the NDPD, Adam delivered a speech to the “Volkskammer” – the puppet 
“people’s parliament” in the GDR – in January 1951 on the occasion of a joint 
declaration calling on the West German Bundestag to establish an “All-German 
Constitution Assembly” in order to settle the “German question” once and for all. In his 
role as a war veteran, Adam invoked his ambiguous past to appeal to “millions of 
unknown officers and soldiers who – led by us elder officers – went down a wrong path 
in error and guilt as a result of a false understanding of comradeship and faith.”
37
 This 
Volkskammer session took place on January 30 and Adam used the date to recall recent 
German history according to the official East German view of history. World War II was 
retrospectively transformed into a war against the Soviet Union, against “the Soviet 
system and Slavs [Slawentum].” The more ideologically necessary and politically 
opportune the invocation of the German-Soviet friendship born in the ashes of a deadly 
arch-enmity became, the more one-dimensional evolved the history of World War II in 
the GDR. Just as this view of history marginalized the genocidal character of the mass 
murder of six million Jews, it marginalized other theaters of war, other victims of Hitler’s 
aggression. In turn, the Eastern Front in the Soviet Union with the battle of Stalingrad as 
36
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its legendary climax emerged as central historical reference point for any recollection of 
the entire war. It became the linchpin of remembering war in East Germany altogether. In 
Adam’s words, January 30, 1951 offered the appropriate starting point to observe 
history’s lessons as well as striking parallels to the present:
Today is the anniversary of this shameful day on which power in our fatherland was handed over to 
Hitler. It is the anniversary of that January 30, 1933, the day which millions of Germans saw as the 
beginning of the road towards military sovereignty and emancipation, as the beginning of a decisive 
fight to defend German customs and culture against the Soviet system and Slavdom [Slawentum], and 
precisely for that reason, they greeted it in their delusion with exultation.
38
Hitler’s crusade against Europe was first and foremost interpreted as a crusade against the 
Soviet Union and the Slavs, not as a race war against the Jews and “Jewish Bolshevism.” 
Just as the German nation had yawned for military dominance in the 1930s – ultimately 
turning their aggression mainly against the Soviet Union – Adam implied that this was to 
happen again if the “other Germany,” the GDR, was unable to stop the aggressive plans 
of Adenauer and Truman against the USSR. But he also recalled a second anniversary –
Stalingrad:
Today is also the anniversary of January 30, 1943, the tenth anniversary of the Hitler regime, the day 
on which Hitler himself did not dare anymore to open his mouth, the day on which on his behalf 
Göring held the funeral eulogy to us Stalingraders [uns Stalingradern die Grabrede hielt]. I say “us 
Stalingraders” because I experienced the battle of Stalingrad from the first to the last day, and today 
eight years ago, I also listened to Göring’s speech coming out of the loudspeakers, I as the former 
colonel in Hitler’s Wehrmacht and adjutant of Field Marshal Paulus.
39
Adam then set out to illustrate what being a “Stalingrader” meant in his times, and he 
applied this title not only to those who had actually participated in the battle in 1942/43, 
to those who “survived the hell of Stalingrad,” and those who had perished, but also to all 






“must be a memorial and a call to reflection and return [Einkehr und Umkehr].” 
Ultimately, Adam declared every German soldier, dead or alive, a “Stalingrader:”
In this sense, every German who wore the uniform in the first and second world war is a Stalingrader. 
In this sense, millions of dead Germans on the battlefields of two world wars are Stalingraders, 
millions who survived in lingering misery and horror – a grey army of Germans that in its size exceeds 
any social class and stratum, any party, any professional organization.
40
Directly attacking former generals Halder, Guderian, Speidel and Heusinger who 
allegedly continued their anti-Soviet militarism under Adenauer’s command in the West, 
Adam explained why remembering Stalingrad could only lead to total inner 
transformation. Stalingrad was not only “the turning point of the war but it was the 
turning point for each and every one of us.” Recalling the misery of the German soldiers 
at Stalingrad – “privation,” “hunger”, “cold” and “total decay of all physical powers” in 
this “battle of extermination” – it was this very suffering which according to Adam has 
prompted his antifascist turn, not the realization and acceptance of guilt for the suffering 
of others. In contrast to the numerous claims after the war, that East German citizens had 
learned their lessons from the great crimes committed against the Soviet Union, this 
narrative illustrates a much narrower understanding of “learning lessons:” “The 
realization [Erkenntnis] of the senselessness of our fight … led to the realization of a new 
meaning in our lives.”
41
 In other words, the antifascist turn might well not have occurred 
or deemed necessary if the fight had not been senseless and doomed. Indeed, as long as 
the Wehrmacht was fighting on the offensive, none of the later antifascist activists in 






on the Eastern Front. Adam thus came to the conlcusion, that “we former officers [have 
been] victims and tools” of this war, but not its motor.
Adam’s call for “civil courage” and a firm stand against “Truman’s army” – whose 
warfare (in Korea), he claimed parenthetically, was just as “bestial” as that of Hitler’s 
army – was deduced from personal experience and it had political consequences. On his 
side of the Iron Curtain, the only legitimate lesson to be learned from the past was that 
“there is nothing more devastating to peace, to the existence and future of our German 
people as the hate-propaganda against the Soviet Union, communism, and Slavs.”
42
 Two 
years after the SED had succeeded in imposing the Soviet system on East Germany by 
depriving its population of the basic democratic rights and by inflicting on them an 
oppressive regime based on a security police network and political justice system, 
established bloc parties like the NDPD had fully absorbed their puppet function and 
backed the SED’s canting routine call for German unity and militant pacifism. 
In the peculiar wording of the leader of the most nationalistic party legalized in the 
GDR, Adam’s National Democrats, this propaganda struggle for national unity went not 
without familiar chauvinistic undertones. Not only constant reference to Stalingrad but 
also the resumption of nationalistic sentiments characterized the NDPD’s political 
propaganda in the 1950s. It appealed to the “German front generation,” the party’s most 
important constituency. Adam explained why of all people former Wehrmacht officers 





There is this beautiful and sacred word of Germany’s unity. We must be the spokesmen of a new
Germany, a beautiful and strong Germany; indeed, we are not ashamed to use this word, a beautiful 
and strong Germany, a Germany that is beautiful and strong because it lives in unbreakable unity and it 
serves peace unremittingly. ...
Yes, we want to live in honor, we want to attain honor. … We have done a lot that has not been 
beneficial to our people, its history and the German honor we all share. Now we want to do everything 
so that history once will write of us former officers and soldiers: they have erred a lot, but they have 
done even more good. They served war and consequently ended in defeat and catastrophe. But then 
they served peace, and here they participated to help peace prevail over war. They did it by 
participating in the creation of a united Germany. They participated by resiliently responding to those 
who sought to call them back on the old path “Without us,” and by reaching out their hands to the 
German people in the hour when it called upon them “With us! Join in!” and they responded in the
words of a holy commitment:
With our German people!
For Germany and Peace!
43
This statement illustrates the self-image and self-stylization of former Wehrmacht 
officers in the GDR and demonstrates how it was possible that more than a few of 
Hitler’s former soldiers were able to integrate quite well into a socialist Germany. The 
claimed settlement with the burdens of the past was the major precondition for these 
veterans’ integration into GDR society and politics. Stalingrad functioned as the
diachronic key metaphor in this “legitimate narrative” of the war. It encoded not only 
retrospectively the climax of the war against the Soviet Union but it was charged with a 
symbolism that included all things military in its meaning; it promised the future 
successful implementation of the war’s supposed lessons, namely the creation of a 
socialist Germany founded on two corresponding raisons d’etre: anti-fascism and 
alliance with the Soviet Union. This was thus a process of ostentatious personal 
transformation starting with the immersion in guilt and shame over participation in the 
43
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war, and followed by redemption and salvation through membership in the new 
antifascist Germany.
44
That “regretful” former Wehrmacht soldiers and officers including POWs returning 
from the Soviet Union were the most credible groups to represent and advocate this goal 
was widely believed among SED and NDPD officials. Adam’s comrade and deputy as 
head of the party, Heinrich Homann, also saw it as a priority to integrate former 
Wehrmacht soldiers into the socialist project by invoking the past as it suited. Homann 
confessed to having been a great believer of Hitler’s program himself who experienced 
his antifascist turn in Soviet imprisonment.  He was one of the spiritual fathers of the 
NDPD’s appeal to former Wehrmacht soldiers. The way he sought to justify and 
legitimize the inclusion of former Nazis and soldiers exemplifies just as well how 
Wehrmacht officers viewed their own role in past and present. And again, the war on the 
Eastern Front served as legitimizing linchpin. Yet, what exactly there was to be regretted 
or made up for remained unspoken. In the “red version” of the “Wehrmacht myth” the 
ordinary soldier was misled but not criminal, guilty by association not by deed. As the 
NDPD’s party program of 1951 detailed: it must be differentiated between those former 
members of the NSDAP and former soldiers “who committed crimes” and those “who 
are not guilty of any crimes; between those who lied and those who erred.”
45
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What counted most for Homann was to prove one’s commitment to the new system. 
Former officers and soldiers must demonstrate that they had “drawn the right 
conclusions” from the “realization” that they had given “their best to a bad cause” 
without ever having to spell out what exactly the deeds were from which to learn it was 
now their “duty.” Yet, in working for peace with the “greatest energy” in 1949, it would 
be “forgotten, what they have done in the past, and they will be given credit for what they 
do in the present.”
46
 Willing veterans were ultimately given the opportunity to “erase [sic] 
the guilt and errors of the past by actively supporting the creation of a new Germany.”
47
 It 
remained unclear how this distinction should and could be determined.
Reflecting matters of crime and guilt with regards to the war on the Eastern Front 
was thus something also former Wehrmacht officers in East Germany did only in 
insinuations and vague recollections – despite the fact that they called this war the 
“greatest crime in history.” How shallow this process of remembering war remained even 
though the Eastern Front war achieved so much attention in the official GDR propaganda 
is illustrated by one of Wilhelm Adam’s rare detailed reference to his experience in the 
Eastern war. During a speech to the NDPD’s IV. Party Congress in 1952, Adam 
explained why he had long remained indifferent to the war crimes committed against 
civilians in the name of his fatherland:
I believed the propaganda about the threat to our fatherland. Sure I saw that we brought misery and 
desolation, death and extermination to the people we attacked; but these were consequences of the 
aggressive war I deemed necessary. I too was intoxicated by success. One suppressed pangs of 
46
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conscience which emerged as a result of numerous witnessed incidents in the occupied territories. To 
think about them was in my view softness unworthy of an officer.
48
These “numerous incidents” most likely included the shooting of women and 
children, the hunt and execution of Jews and the arbitrary killing and starvation of Soviet 
POWs. Adam and his comrades allowed no more of the true extent of German war crimes 
to surface in the political debate as deemed opportune to fulfill the ideological agenda. As 
historical analogy, Stalingrad and the Eastern Front war provided a suitable legitimizing 
narrative to these former officers and their political allies in the SED. As complex 
historical event, as historic crime scene, the war on the Eastern Front remained a blurry 
propaganda picture.  
While on the one hand, the SED greatly profited from the officers’ commitment to 
“peace” and “socialism,” the regime also followed these activities with much suspicion. 
Despite their evident commitment to the “other Germany,” many of the former 
Wehrmacht officers were still believed to be “politically uncertain” and ideologically 
unreliable. The Ministry for State Security (MfS) ever since it was established in 1950, 
systematically observed the political and professional activities of these men and stood in 
close contact with the responsible cadres in the SED Central Committee, among them 
notably Erich Honecker’s Division for Security Matters.
49
 Yet, because the SED deemed
those former Wehrmacht leaders not only useful for the moral legitimization of its rule in 
East Germany but also indispensable for the creation and training of the GDR’s armed 
48
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forces throughout the 1950s, Hitler’s ex-officers were widely involved in matters of 
military and security policy.
50
 Crucially, the SED used the unsettled question of personal 
responsibilities in Hitler’s war against the Soviet Union as political pawn, as an always 
welcome means to put pressure on them.
51
 Thus it was indeed in the interest of the SED to 
keep the details of these men’s erroneous pasts undisclosed or at least not publicly 
debated in order to preserve a certain leverage on them in case their political reliability 
proved questionable. For now it is important to notice that the self-image of former 
Wehrmacht officers in the GDR greatly harmonized with the official reading of the war 
on the Eastern Front and the Wehrmacht’s role in it. As with the individual “worker 
soldier,” the SED was mostly uninterested in the officers’ personal responsibilities for 
crimes committed there.
52
 The declared culprits of the “fascist” Wehrmacht remained 
locked away in Soviet captivity – those already-mentioned 23,000 German POWs who 
did not return to Germany until 1955/56. 
By turning attention to the issue of Eastern Front returnees repatriated by the Soviet 
Union and the question of guilt, the following paragraphs discuss the more or less 
50
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successful integration of those thousands of POWs who returned to Germany until 1949 
and who in both Germanys came to exert influence on public life and political agendas –
albeit in very different ways. Joining the new political community one way or the other 
was one form of coping with individual memories of the Eastern Front. The extent to 
which these veterans’ personal recollections of the Eastern Front war shaped their 
political views and commitments will be the focus of the next section. Yet, getting 
involved is only one and not necessarily the most common form of “remembering war.” 
A majority of former soldiers, it can be said, withdrew from public life, hardly discussing 
their war experience at all beyond the private sphere. For them, as I will demonstrate in a 
subsequent chapter, literature offered both a refuge from and a haven for war memories. 
The comparative look at the war literature of the first postwar generation of writers in 
East and West Germany will thus complement this chapter’s digression into the tangled 
webs of individual and collective, private and public memory.
II. Soldiers as Citizens: Between Individual Memory and Political Integration
BUILDING THE OTHER GERMANY: SOLDIERS AS CITIZENS IN THE GDR
Of special and exemplary interest for the study of the political and social 
reintegration of former Wehrmacht soldiers into East German society are German POWs 
returning from the Soviet Union between 1945 and 1956.
53
 These returnees all shared the 
Eastern Front experience and they had spent several months or years in Soviet prison 
53
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camps. In addition to the brutalized warfare, they had thus also suffered the humiliations 
and deprivations of imprisonment. Since veterans can be said to embody the living 
memory of a past war in a society, the successful reintegration of thousands of often-
traumatized men poses an enormous challenge to any government seeking to implement a 
successful material and spiritual reconstruction process. 
Out of about two million German prisoners of war repatriated from the Soviet Union 
between 1945 and 1949, roughly 700,000 returned to their homes in the Soviet 
occupation zone.
54
 From 1950 to 1956, at least 23,000 German POWs remained in Soviet 
captivity as ‘war criminals.’
55
 Those last prisoners were subsequently pardoned and 
released in several waves of amnesties until 1956, most of them after Chancellor 
Adenauer’s visit to Moscow in 1955. With the officially last prisoners of war transports 
arriving at the East German-Polish border in Frankfurt (Oder) in early 1950, it was still 
official SED policy to welcome returnees as contributors to the building of socialism.  
This would change dramatically thereafter. When Moscow announced that the 
repatriation process had come to a conclusion, it declared the remaining POWs 
“convicted war criminals” (in the SED’s language also called “war convicts”). On May 5,
54
 Frank Biess, “’Pioneers of a New Germany,’ 144f.
55
 Andreas Hilger estimates that roughly 20,000 persons have been repatriated between 1950 and 1956. See 
Andreas Hilger, ‘Faustpfand im Kalten Krieg? Massenverurteilungen deutscher Kriegsgefangener 1949/50 
und die Repatriierung Verurteilter 1950 bis 1956,’ in: Andreas Hilger, Ute Schmidt, Günther Wagenlehner, 
eds., Sowjetische Militärtribunale. Band 1: Die Verurteilung deutscher Kriegsgefangener 1941-1953 
(Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2001), 211-271. Karner counted 25,624 returnees from 1951-1957. See: Stefan 
Karner, Im Archipel GUPVI. Kriegsgefangenschaft und Internierung in der Sowjetunion 1941-1956 (Wien, 
München: Oldenbourg, 1995), 204. I follow my own estimates resulting from the evidence I examined and 
presented in my Masters Thesis: about 400 air force specialists and their families (totaling 1,000) were 
repatriated in November/December 1952, another 12,000 ‘convicted war criminals’ after the June uprising 
in 1953 and roughly 10,000 ‘war criminals’ in late 1955 and 1956. See Mayer, “Friends or Enemies,” 15-
30.
358
1950, the Soviet news agency TASS officially announced the end of the repatriation. The 
Soviet Union declared that “overall, since the capitulation of Germany, 1,939,063 
German prisoners of war had been repatriated from the Soviet Union to Germany.” 
Beyond that, 9,717 prisoners of war, who were “convicted of serious war crimes,” and 
3,815 persons, who are “being investigated for war crimes” would remain in Soviet 
custody.
56
 This group of unreleased POWs (which in reality was much larger numbering 
about 23,000
57
) would eventually become the SED’s collective scapegoat for war crimes 
committed in the Soviet Union. 
The SED attributed the cathartic experience described by former generals in East 
Germany also to those pre-1950 returnees who were willing to join the socialist 
reconstruction effort in the GDR, or who at least silently accommodated in the new 
political system by withdrawing into their private lives. As former soldiers in Hitler’s 
army and as returning witnesses to the Soviet system, these men promised to lend the 
SED-regime moral credibility given they could be won over for the realization of the 
socialist project in a “new Germany.” Indeed, quite a few decided to share their 
56
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experience in the Soviet Union with the public and to position their personal stories of 
war and imprisonment into the rights and wrongs of recent German history. The 
foundation for this process of cooperation and accommodation with the new political 
situation was laid during the first GDR-wide “central meeting” of returnees in October 
1949. It ran under the motto: “Returnees are and will be Friends of the Soviet Union.” 
Speaking at this “central meeting of returnees” on October 29, 1949, just two weeks 
after the founding of the GDR, the new head of state, president Wilhelm Pieck, reassured 
the public that he “had been given a categorical pledge [by the Soviet government] that 
by January 1, 1950 all prisoners of war in the Soviet Union will have returned to their 
homes.”
58
 Pieck’s presence at the conference emphasized the SED’s intention and 
commitment to include returnees into the political campaign for internal and external 
recognition and legitimization of the newly-found GDR. They were seen as the ideal 
“mediators between the German people and the peoples of the Soviet Union,” as Minister 
for Health Services and Eastern Front veteran Luitpold Steidle pointed out in his speech 
to the central meeting.
59
 The challenge of forging lasting peace and friendship between 
the new Germany and the USSR could be mastered easier and faster if the returnees 
participated in this task “with honor.” President Pieck praised the returnees’ contribution 
to restitution in the USSR during their imprisonment where most of them had performed 
forced labor. He eloquently paid tribute to the POWs’ work: “With their hands’ work in 
58




the Soviet Union they have contributed to the dismantling of the wall of hate that Hitler
had erected.”
60
Earlier in the year, the SED had already instructed the Länder to properly greet the 
returnees upon their arrival, to offer them a warm and understanding welcome, to make 
them feel needed and to convey a sense of gratitude for their time served in Soviet prison 
and labor camps. Paul Merker, the former war-time member of the NKFD in Mexico City 
and by 1949 a leading SED official in the repatriation administration, had set the tone for 
this welcome in a memo to all Landtage (the regional parliaments) to which he attached a 
draft address to be read before returning soldiers. In his suggestions for an appropriate 
welcome speech, dated April 29, 1949, Merker linked the question of guilt directly with 
the reconstruction effort emphasizing the returnees’ double value as workers for 
restitution in the Soviet Union and as contributors to the reconstruction under way in East 
Germany: 
Our entire nation is filled with great joy over the final return of the remaining German prisoners of war 
who had to spend several years in prison under harsh conditions. ... As much as the bitter past, as much 
as the Nazi war against other people which got back on our own people the most, will stick in our 
memory we still want to look ahead. Germany must again become a happy and beautiful country. ...
We shall not forget that the majority of the prisoners of war, particularly in the Soviet Union, have 
already rendered great service to our country through their participation in the reconstruction work 
there. In the areas destroyed by the German armies, they have already greatly contributed to the 
restitution of part of the damage that Hitler had caused other peoples. For this reason too, these 
returnees deserve our help and support for they will participate even more eagerly in the peaceful and 





 Paul Merker, SED Zentralsekretariat, an alle Landesvorstände der SED, April 29, 1949, BA/SAPMO, 
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Merker was an advocate of paying restitutions not only to the former occupied territories 
but also to Hitler’s main victim group, the Jews of Europe – a commitment which later 
cost him his position and all influence within the SED.
62
The way Merker, Pieck and other leading SED members addressed the question of 
how to deal with the horrendous legacy of Nazi war and occupation in context of the 
return of German POWs probably represents the most thorough examination of this 
difficult issue in the early GDR. Far from naming concrete acts of crime, concrete crime 
scenes and individual perpetrators, the SED found a strategy that promised to settle the 
question once and for all. The general admission of responsibility for death and 
destruction and the simultaneous promise of active compensation by offering reparations 
to and forced labor in the Soviet Union put the SED – dwelling on the returnees’ 
contribution – into a position of moral superiority.
63
 History was paid its dues; past guilt 
could be redeemed with present activism, punishment accepted and atonement rendered. 
The official efforts to reconcile the history of the deadly German-Soviet hostility 
mounted in such absurd acclamations as the following published in a Neues Deutschland 
editorial published shortly after the founding of the GDR in October of 1949: “The 
experience of the last war has shown that the German and the Soviet people have made 
the greatest sacrifices, that those two peoples have the greatest potentials in Europe for 
the achievement of great deeds with global importance.” The authors of the editorial 
entitled “Everything for the Buildup of the German Democratic Republic” went on to 
62
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invoke the “determination” and “exertion of the energies” with which the two countries 
had fought – against each other – during World War II. Providing they displayed the 
same resolution after the war, “peace in Europe” would be “secured.”
64
 This borrows from 
a remark made by Stalin in a telegram congratulating the SED on the founding of the 
GDR.
65
 By comparing, indeed equalizing, the suffering of the people in Germany and the 
Soviet Union during World War II, this East German version of the war in the East 
nurtured two fatal notions. First, this comparison simplified and thus relativized the 
tremendous losses of the Soviet Union – at least 20 million dead – and especially the 
unprecedented criminal energies invested in the industrialized mass murder of the 
European Jews. Secondly, this stream of thought blurred the line between perpetrators 
and victims, and thus sustained the campaign for the collective redemption of the East 
German population. 
The rather speedy official settlement of the troubled German-Soviet past is 
splendidly exemplified by a decision of the SED to declare February 2, 1950, the 
anniversary of the Sixth Army’s capitulation at Stalingrad, a day of “Never Again!” 
Interestingly, the initiative to make February 2 a memorial day came from the DSF in 
August 1949. On August 16, 1949, during a Politburo meeting, Pieck, Ulbricht, Merker
and Ackermann discussed this DSF proposal which requested to declare February 2 
“Stalingrad Day.” The Politburo “approved” of the idea but added that “the day shall not 
be celebrated as returnees’ day but shall be commemorated under the motto ‘Never Again 
64
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War against the Soviet Union.”
66
 Stalingrad was not to become a symbol for the 
returnees’ fate but its metaphorical meaning was to be exploited for pro-Soviet 
propaganda. Unlike in West Germany during the 1950s, where Stalingrad came to be a 
synonym for the senseless suffering and mass death of German soldiers, the East German 
memory of Stalingrad emphasized the battle’s potential to transport the “right lessons” of 
the past. The SED assured that this message was disseminated among the lower echelons 
of party and mass organizations. During the aforementioned first and largest “central 
meeting of returnees” in the GDR in October 1949, February 2 was explicitly referred to 
as a day of warning. A resolution of returnees from the Soviet Union fully mirrored the 
SED’s position on Stalingrad’s symbolic meaning and instrumental importance in a 
nutshell:
The day of the end of the battle of Stalingrad, the grandiose victory of the Soviet armies, the turning 
point in the history of the Second World War, February 2, 1950, shall become the day of warning and 
reflection [Mahnung und Besinnung]. On this day in particular, we want to devote all our energies to 
peace under the motto: never again war against the Soviet Union.
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Along with this declaration the returnees pledged to fulfill the „most honorable task of 
spreading the truth about the Soviet Union” and to “smash offensively every form of anti-
Soviet hate propaganda, in whichever form it may occur.”
68
 The tough wording suggests 
how smooth the transition from Wehrmacht soldier to socialist activist, from war veteran 
to peace fighter, could progress in a best-case-scenario. 
Since prior to the foundation of the elitist AeO in 1957/58 no veterans organizations 
were permitted in East Germany, returnees had to find private ways of communicating 
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with each other about common experiences such as war injuries, traumas, nightmares, 
heroic deeds, crime scenes. More often, they just remained silent and confined to their 
families. Yet in some cases, the party invited collective communication among former 
Wehrmacht soldiers, the largest example of which was the “central meeting of returnees” 
in late 1949. Here it became clear that quite a few returnees used the window of 
opportunity provided by the SED to settle once and for all with their own personal pasts. 
At the “meeting” several statements by former POWs now organized in the DSF testified 
to this rather successful integration process. Speaking in the name of all returnees in the 
GDR, Klaus Willerding, elected representative of all former POWs in the Soviet Union, 
pledged: “Never again we will go to war against the Soviet Union or against any other 
democratic country;” “minute-long applause” followed according to Neues Deutschland
.
69
 In the recollection of his Eastern Front experience, Willerding adopted the official 
tendency to equal the war against the Soviet Union with World War II. In SED 
announcements of that time, “Operation Barbarossa” was increasingly portrayed as 
marking the actual beginning of the war; according to this interpretation, 1941 was the 
most crucial year of recent German history – not 1933, not 1939. With the invasion of the 
Soviet Union, this “greatest crime” in history, Hitler’s war was to fulfill its actual 
purpose: the destruction of the Soviet state and the extermination of “Jewish 
Bolshevism.”
70
 In Willerding’s words: the “path of horror which drove us into 
imprisonment began on June 22, 1941;” it was on that day “that the greatest national 
catastrophe, the greatest mischief of our people saw its beginning.” And he continued that 
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this “path was marked by crime and turpitudes (Schandtaten) which will forever remain 
an eternal monument in the history of the German people.”
71
 It was paved with the names 
of Auschwitz, Maidanek, Treblinka and Lidice. The eleven-pages-long speech 
manuscript contains the main themes of the veterans’ stories as narrated in East 
Germany: on the wrong path fighting in Hitler’s army, awakening and transformation in 
Soviet POW camps, the antifascist turn as life-altering experience, lessons from the past 
leading directly to socialist activism in the present. The criminal character of the war 
against the Soviet Union served as the necessary initiating motif from which all further 
events resulted. The ritualized admission of responsibility again remained superficial and 
almost a matter of routine. Regardless of the fact what exactly one particular soldier had 
done or witnessed, the headlong admission of guilt was a necessary precondition for 
joining the community of transformed antifascists. 
This kind of confession never prompted a criminal investigation. Former Wehrmacht 
soldier and prisoner Willerding is a superb example for this standardized narrative of war. 
He portrayed himself as one of the perpetrators without ever being precise, and without 
ever fearing or facing legal ramifications. What he described as having witnessed were at 
once concrete crimes and impersonal acts of brutality. Victims and perpetrators existed as 
historical bit players, not as real human beings. Referring to the time of his 
imprisonment, Willerding reflected his memories of guilt with the following words:
In a metaphorical sense, we were in the position of arsonists who for some coincidental reason could 
not get out of the house they had just burned, and who now had to put the fire out together with the 
tenants of the house. The destruction we had caused in the Soviet Union as soldiers in the fascist 
71
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armies were gigantic in extent. The misery we inflicted on the Soviet people was so great that all 
German soldiers shivered in view of the anticipated revenge.
72
At this point, however, the Soviet man emerged in “all his greatness,” for German 
soldiers were treated as “humans beings.” However cruel the deeds of the German armies 
might have been, Soviet humanism was greater, and mercy came before revenge. 
Reminiscent of the arguments exchanged during the debate “About the Russians and 
About Us” in 1948/49, this instrumental narration of war crimes – instrumental because 
without them the Soviet Union would not have had a chance to prove ostentatiously its 
courage and humanism – turned history into a store of gruesome tales about war which 
were at the free disposal of those seeking to forge a suitable, legitimate memory of this 
war. 
From here on the present and future role of the Soviet Union in German history and 
politics was self-evident. Moreover, it emerged as the logical conclusion and causal 
outcome of history. For those like Willerding who claimed to have undergone a complete 
moral and ideological make-over, the greatest lesson learned in Soviet prison camps was 
that the Soviet Union was the actual opposite of everything the Nazi propaganda had 
claimed. “Everything, all but everything, what they told us about the Soviet Union, had 
been a lie, nothing but a lie.”
73
 While imprisoned, the soldiers not only got to know the 
“great achievements” of Soviet culture – “the greatest culture in the twentieth century” –
but were also given the opportunity to become familiar with the “cultural creations” of 






Marxism. Working jointly with the Soviet population to rebuild the country, the POWs 
had started to build German-Soviet friendships even before the war was over, the story 
continued. The more they became familiarized with the “nature of the Soviet state” and 
the more they realized “the absolute honesty of Soviet politics,” the “greater was [their] 
acknowledgment of [their] own guilt which [they] had loaded on [themselves] by 
participating in the fascist Hitler-war.”
74
In reality, hundreds of thousands of German POWs served years of forced labor, 
many of whom were convicted to twenty-five years imprisonment for “war crimes” 
before a Soviet military tribunal void of any legal principles.
75
 Estimates claim that out of 
three million German soldiers captured by the Red Army, about one million died while 
taken captive, on their way to the prison camps or in Soviet captivity.
76
 A significant 
number of former Wehrmacht soldiers and officers, however, had joined or were forced 
to join the antifascist movement in the Soviet Union during the war. This group of 
veterans had, of course, a different, a positive story to tell. In most Soviet prisoner of war 
camps “antifascist committees” were set up to recruit soldiers for the cause of antifascism 
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schools” were set up all across the Soviet Union.
77
 The general goal of these re-education 
efforts was to familiarize the POWs with the works of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, 
Vladimir I. Lenin and Joseph Stalin and to instill them with a new understanding of 
German history, i.e. as the history of of class struggle and revolution. After the end of the 
war, the political message in these schools shifted from antifascism to anti-Imperialism. 
Returnees from these schools played not only an important role in the SED’s official 
history propaganda but they attained political and strategic value: an internal SED 
statistic of 1951 shows that by that time, 5,776 Antifa-school graduates held positions in 
the GDR government or the public service, including the police and security apparatus.
78
Returnees with Antifa-school education thus played a major role in assuring the socialist 
reconstruction of East Germany, and were especially valuable for the establishment of a 
modern police state.
79
The reintegration experience of former POWs returning from the Soviet Union to 
East Germany thus ranged from ‘significant conflict’ with the new political order to 
77
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‘acquiescence, accommodation, and appropriation’ in the Soviet zone.
80
 Frank Biess has 
approached the question of the post-war returnees’ reintegration by focusing on the (re-) 
creation of male and military identities and citizenship.
81
 The reality of war and 
imprisonment, however diverse it may have been, was tuned into a story of “reflection 
and return” among those returnees who actively sought integration into a socialist GDR. 
Like former Wehrmacht generals, former soldiers too crafted and aestheticized their 
personal ordeal into a “legitimate narrative” of war and thus became an important lender 
of legitimization to the SED regime. Willerding’s “Never again”-pledge represents an 
example for the partial success of the SED’s strategy to remake former Wehrmacht
soldiers into “friends” and “brothers” of the Soviet Union. A significant number of 
returnees catalyzed the war experience into the peace rhetoric of the ruling party and 
became faithful supporters of the SED regime. 
These considerations, however, apply only to those POWs returning before 1950. 
Those former soldiers remaining in Soviet capitivity after 1949, the declared “war 
criminals,” were per se excluded from the creation of a new, socialist, antifascist 
collective consciousness in East Germany. If they returned to the GDR and decided to 
80
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stay there, they found their way into society by confining themselves to their workplaces 
and families with no participation in the political process whatsoever.
82
Hence, among Eastern Front veterans returning to East Germany responses to this 
mode of Vergangenheitsbewältigung varied and ranged from “open resistance” to 
“accommodation and genuine consensus.”
83
 Some like Klaus Willerding managed to 
accommodate and became involved in the socialist experiment by settling the question of 
personal guilt as described above: subscribing to antifascist socialism promised and 
delivered redemption from the crimes and errors of the past. Beyond the putative radical 
break during the “reflection and return” process in Soviet prison camps, this political and 
mental settling in to the new system in East Germany was by no means the result of a 
total negation of the past. Rather and in a very subtle way, the willingness to cooperate 
and support the GDR “was based to a considerable degree on the continuity of certain 
mental dispositions among returning POWs from the war to the postwar period, such as 
the adherence to a distinct ethic of performance or to a rather militaristic emphasis on 
struggle and fighting.”
84
 What appears to be a contradiction to official SED policy in 
terms of coming to terms with the Nazi past was, in fact, very much in congruence with 
the SED’s interpretation of history and its implications for the present. As the official 
attempts to connect the fate of the Soviet people to that of the Germans demonstrate, the 
SED sought to include past strengths and traditional virtues, such as determination to 
fight a war, among the principles upon which the GDR was to rest. The emphasis on the 
82
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two peoples’ “greatest potentials” that had clashed in the war between Nazi Germany and 
the Soviet Union – invoking the extraordinary “exertion of energies”
85
 with which the 
Eastern Front war was fought – supports Biess’ observation that postwar communist 
antifascism matched well with the prevailing militaristic sentiments among returning 
soldiers. 
Antifascist returnees, in particular, cherished and nurtured certain continuities 
between their past in the Wehrmacht and their present commitment to the socialist state. 
Before 1945, they had fought for a “final victory” in Hitler’s army; they filled their “new 
roles as fighters for the ‘forces of progress’” with similar fervor and dedication.
86
Returnees who supported the SED were thus able to “hold on to militaristic ideals of 
manliness which had determined their earlier life as Hitler’s soldiers and continued to 
shape their postwar lives as party soldiers.”
87
 In a poem, entitled “Fight” and dedicated to 
the SED in 1948, a returnee formulated why and how the “fight” has to be continued: 
We see in this struggle between the elements
a parable of our own struggle
a glance as the future opens up
and the certainty reaches all of us:
victory is ours
because time is ripe
and everybody takes an oath anew at this hour
fight!
fight and victory!
loyally following the red flag
through the roaring into the last battle
until it breaks through the night of the peoples
as a shining signal.
88
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 Quoted in and translated by Biess, Ibid., 178.
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A “Pledge of the Antifa-Students,” drafted by German POWs in Moscow in 1949, struck 
a similar tone. Both in language and style it testified to an attitude reminiscent of the total 
dedication to “Fuhrer, nation and fatherland” under the Nazis:
I – son of the German nation – pledge to fight out of glowing love for my people, my homeland and 
my family until my people is free and happy, until the dishonor and shame of fascist barbarism is 
washed away, until Hitler fascism is extinguished. 
I pledge: To invest all my abilities, all my energies and my life unconditionally and to be faithful to my 
nation until the last drop of blood.
This pledge bonds me with all antifascists in the brotherly and loyal struggle until the final victory of 
our sacred cause.
89
The SED was certainly aware of these continuities, not least because some of its 
functionaries shared authentic similar war or resistance experiences. Ironically, the 
synthesis between the official concept of the East German nation and the prevailing 
“mental dispositions” of returning POWs quite successfully facilitated the “fashioning of 
new social identities”
90
 among antifascist returnees. 
Another social haven and “collective basin”
91
 for former Wehrmacht soldiers and 
former members of the Nazi party alike was the already mentioned NDPD. Most of the 
founding members were former NSDAP members, returnees from Soviet imprisonment 
and former Wehrmacht officers such as the “Stalingraders” around Wilhelm Adam. Thus, 
the SED ensured that the NDPD would be dominated by reliable leaders, one of whom 
was Lothar Bolz (1903-1986). Bolz had spent the wartime years in Soviet exile, teaching 
in Antifa-schools and POW camps for the NKFD. From 1953 until 1965 he served also as 
89
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Foreign Minister of the GDR. As already discussed, the NDPD struck a nationalistic tone 
in its program and rhetoric, and put the main focus on the “German question.” The 
NDPD did not call for a clear break with Germany’s nationalist and militaristic past, but 
rather built upon and encouraged old “patriotic” sentiments. The self-proclaimed key 
principle of the party was to “put the nation’s interests above everything else.”
92
Apparently the party was an appealing alternative to veterans, nationalists and former 
National Socialists in the one-party-state. In 1951, denazified Pgs alone made up forty-
two percent of all 100,000 NDPD members.  In the spring of 1953, the membership 
numbers had more than doubled to 232,605. By then the NDPD had become the strongest 
party within the “antifascist-communist bloc.”
93
One likely reason for the rapid increase in membership was the party’s campaign 
“Call to the German Front Generation of the Second World War” initiated by the IV. 
Party Congress in June of 1952 in Leipzig. The head of the Berlin regional branch, 
former Air Force major Egbert von Frankenberg (1909-2000),
94
 presented a paper entitled 
“Germany’s Future – not Destiny but Self-Determination.” He began with a “call to the 
front generation” and declared that the NDPD, above everything else, condemned the 
continuous presence of the four occupation powers in Germany seven years after the war. 
According to von Frankenberg, “this [was] a humiliation of our German nation and an 
insult to our national pride.” The “Call,” soon thereafter published in the form of a leaflet, 
92
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attacked the Western rejection of Stalin’s “peace offensives” of March 10, 1952,
95
occasionally perceived as a missed opportunity for the unification of Germany. And – in 
the struggle for German unity the “German front generation” was to be appreciated as a 
“great national force that must not be excluded or ignored.”
96
The use of nationalist sentiments to further a political cause was part of the SED’s 
propaganda and strategy from the very beginning.
97
 There was no choice but to address 
public concerns about a permanent division of Germany, even if it meant to nurture 
nationalism, which in communist thinking was an obsolete bourgeois construct. Resulting 
from the inherently contradictory juxtaposition of Marxist-Leninist socialism and 
nationalism, the “SED’s policy regarding the state of the German nation was always 
subordinate to other policy objectives.”
98
 Conveniently, the NDPD could more or less 
freely incorporate and express strong nationalist views. Sanctioned by the SED, it became 
a party that constituted the perfect ideological home for former members of the 
Wehrmacht and the Nazi Party. While the SED could not and would not – outwardly –
carry on political and militaristic ideals of the Third Reich, the NDPD did so. Reviving a 
certain terminology (e.g. struggle, fatherland, patriotism) and traditional values, it 
resumed deeply rooted visions of a strong, unified and independent Germany. The 
“Call’s” central message was thus:
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In Germany there are two states today, two governments and many parties. But there is only one 
German people, who has only one longing: unity and peace for our fatherland! The love and loyalty of 
our common fatherland unifies all classes of our people. ...
Germany’s future is not destiny, but self-determination. Let us Germans take the creation of our future 
in our own hands at last! Then we will be the masters over all of Germany!
99
This self-confident reassertion of Germany’s strength and sovereignty was balanced with 
the equal emphasis on the GDR-USSR alliance and friendship. “Russia will always be 
our greatest and most powerful neighbor,” the “Call” continued and claimed that 
Germany had always faired well as long as it maintained friendly relations to “Russia” in 
the past. Without sparing a word on the German invasion of the Soviet Union and the 
Eastern Front war, the pamphlet brushed over the recent past and reiterated the 
importance of “Russia” today:
The weight of the Soviet Union in global politics has grown by a multiple compared to old Russia. A 
good neighborly relationship with the Soviet Union is the foreign-policy precondition for a successful 
national policy, the guarantee for securing peace in Europe.
100
With this sophisticated synthesis of the concept of the classless society and the idea of 
national unity on the one hand, and the emphasis on the Soviet Union’s historically risen 
role as the protégé and eternal friend of Germany on the other, the NDPD could function 
as an integrative force linking together nationalism and socialism, particularly for those 
who potentially remained rather skeptical of the new socialist system in East Germany. 
In an additional effort to further those persons’ political and social integration, the 
SED politburo accepted on September 2, 1952 the draft for a “Law on the Annulment of 
Restrictions for Former Members of the NSDAP and its Subdivisions and Former 
99





Officers.” In its commentary to the law, the politburo stressed that the “overwhelming 
majority” of former NDSAP members and officers of the “fascist Wehrmacht” had 
“actively participated” in the reconstruction of “political, economic and cultural life in a 
peaceful and democratic Germany.” Furthermore, the Politburo clarified that the SED’s 
policy towards these groups was never “based on feelings of revenge” but instead sought 
to provide “every German who loves his fatherland with unrestricted possibilities to 
participate in the construction of socialism.”
101
The NDPD soon felt the effects of the new 
law as its membership numbers doubled between 1951 and 1953. Ever since its 
establishment the party had addressed the issue of rehabilitation the most explicitly. A 
lecture guide for the NDPD’s party-school [Parteischule] made an explicit connection 
between the “Call to the Front Generation” campaign and the rehabilitation law of 
September 1952. Echoing the Politburo’s view, it was stressed that once they had 
“realized their political errors,” former NSDAP and Wehrmacht members could 
“compensate” through “powerful assistance in the reconstruction.” The guiding principle 
was: “First one must give something to the nation before one can receive anything from 
it.”
102
 Joining in the official SED line, the NDPD’s “Call” campaign manifested that the 
“question of former members of the NSDAP and former soldiers and officers” had been 
resolved in the GDR.
103
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By 1952, denazification was officially declared a success and completed in the 
Eastern part of Germany. The mechanism of redemption by affiliation with the new 
system proved to be a useful instrument facilitating the integration of war and Nazi party 
veterans. Both groups were offered the chance to redeem themselves by embracing 
socialism as Germany’s future path. It is remarkable how strongly SED, NDPD and 
organized veterans in the GDR believed in the possibility of “making up” for historical 
guilt, of “washing it away” as the “Pledge of the Antifa-Students” had phrased it.
104
 In this 
peculiar sense, East German society was more thoroughly pervaded by a Schlußstrich
mentality than West Germany. While this mentality largely disappeared from the political 
memory after the end of the era Adenauer in the West, it remained a constant theme in 
the “antifascist” GDR which had settled the question of German guilt by in fact 
“externalizing” the Nazi past to the “reactionary” Bonn republic. 
INTEGRATION VS. MEMORY: THE EASTERN FRONT EXPERIENCE AND THE POLITICS OF THE 
PAST AMONG THE VETERAN COMMUNITY IN ADENAUER’S GERMANY
Reintegrating former Wehrmacht soldiers into a socialist Germany was a difficult but 
not impossible task. Equally ambiguous, yet certainly more successful were the politics 
of integration and rehabilitation in Adenauer’s West Germany. Norbert Frei has 
characterized the 1950s as the era of the “politics of the past” (Vergangenheitspolitik), i.e. 
the process of “amnestying and integrating former supporters of the Third Reich on the 
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one hand, completing a normative separation from Nazism on the other.”
105
 Frei has 
demonstrated that the politics of the past aimed not only at the complete political, 
economic and social rehabilitation of former members of the NSDAP, Wehrmacht and 
even Waffen-SS. Vergangenheitspolitik also fulfilled a public desire to settle once and for 
all with the past, to draw a final line under history (Schlußstrich) and to identify 
convicted war criminals as “victims” of “victors’ justice” and to defend these “war 
convicts” along with all Germans against the supposed collective guilt campaign of the 
Allies.
106
 As a result of this collective consensus to selectively remember the past as it fit, 
the postwar integration of former members of the Nazi Party, Wehrmacht soldiers and 
veterans of the Waffen-SS, is widely regarded as having been successful.
107
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Bundesrepublik,“ Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, 53, 2 (2005), 149-166, deal with the political and 
legal rehabilitation and social and material provisions for members of the former Waffen-SS. HIAG 
worked successfully for the recognition of this group in the West German public by arguing that veterans of 
the Waffen-SS were soldiers just like any other; therefore they profited greatly from the “clean 
Wehrmacht”-myth. Finally, Robert Moeller’s work on POWs and expellees in the 1950s must be 
mentioned which illustrates the great importance of collectively shared images of the past as they were 
formulated by but more often about returnees and expulsion victims in literature, the print media, in 
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the remilitarization and international integration of West Germany secured a firm and 
rather smooth transition of former soldiers into the new armed forces based on 
democratic principles and rooted within the Western alliance system. A more than 
decade-long debate surrounding the rearmament process renegotiated older military 
traditions as well as character and role of the “German soldier” in modern war in light of 
the Wehrmacht legacy even if the criminal part of the story was neglected well into the 
1960s.
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The process of Vergangenheitspolitik encompassed and nurtured an atmosphere of 
collective negation of individual guilt. The famous dictum coined by Eugen Kogon in 
1947, that everyone must be granted the “right to political error” became the basic 
principle of the politics of the past in Adenauer’s Germany. Not dissimilar to the results 
of the “inner turn” propaganda in the East, former soldiers of the Wehrmacht were given 
a democratic way out of the intricate question of guilt: at the expense of historical truth, 
war veterans could forge their narratives of the war without addressing explicitly its 
criminal history and legacy. Claiming that fighting on the German side in World War II 
was just as patriotic a duty as fighting on the other sides of this war, veterans could imbue 
their experiences and memories with a meaning. The criminal character of the aggressive 
numerous radio and television pieces, and in movies. These popular modes of selectively coming to terms 
with past – of finding a “usable past” in individuals’ “war stories” had but one central motif: the 
victimization of the German people, and one central function: the integration of these millions into West 
German society – it was a discourse of victimhood fit to integrate individual suffering into a narrative of 
new national identity and collective memory, a discourse void of the question of guilt. See Moeller, “War 
Stories.” Idem, War Stories. And idem, “Heimkehr ins Vaterland: Die Remaskulinisierung 
Westdeutschlands in den fünfziger Jahren,” Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift, 60 (2001), 403-436.
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wars waged by Nazi Germany was persistently brushed aside.
109
 Moreover, the Cold War 
provided this discourse with the necessary interpretative framework within which World 
War II, and particularly the war against the Soviet Union, attained political meaning, 
even retrospective legitimization. The continuity of anti-Bolshevist rhetoric in the early 
FRG is a striking and disturbing aspect of the discourses over the past and the selective 
memory of the war on the Eastern Front makes this scandalum most clear and visible. 
This can be illustrated with excerpts from various important publications circling 
among organized veterans in the 1950s, i.e. monthly journals and member newsletters of 
the two largest veteran organizations: the publications Soldat im Volk and Mitteilungen of 
the “Association of German Soldiers” (Verband deutscher Soldaten e. V.) as well as the 
journal Wehrkunde of the “Association for Military Studies” (Gesellschaft für Wehrkunde 
e.V.). Truly representing the “front generation” and followers of a sovereign and 
remilitarized albeit peaceful Germany, these publications reached thousands of interested 
readers. They greatly contributed to both the integration of former soldiers into a 
democratic political culture, and the articulation of distinct veteran positions on issues of 
present-day politics and historical significance. They are a hitherto neglected but 
extraordinary rich source for the genesis of historical memory among German war 
veterans as they articulated a peculiar mix of individual (hi-)stories and collective 




 Frei, Vergangenheitspolitik, 405. See on the context also Chapter 5.II. and 6. III.
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The discourse among former Wehrmacht soldiers and officers about the legacies of 
Stalingrad and the Eastern Front in West Germany reached in part obscure dimensions. 
As a rule, far from being marginalized as in the political debates, the Eastern Front was
discussed prominently, namely as an avoidable military disaster from which Germany’s 
modern armed forces were to learn the right lessons. The fact that “Barbarossa” had been 
an aggressive war, that it had been waged in violation of international law and in breach 
of a bilateral contract remained unreflected. At most, it was falsely claimed, that the 
entire Wehrmacht leadership opposed Hitler’s plans to attack the Soviet Union and 
proceeded with the invasion more or less unvoluntarily. According to the West German 
veterans narratives, the Wehrmacht did not engage in any criminal actions in the course 
of this reluctant fight except to fight patriotically and dutifully a relentless and barbarian 
enemy with all necessary fervor and under great sacrifices.
Before getting into the analysis, a brief discussion of the societal context seems in 
place in order to assess the contemporary value and role of the sources presented here. 
Veteran journals like Soldat im Volk and Wehrkunde reached largely an audience of 
former Wehrmacht soldiers, SS-veterans and contemporaries interested in the history of 
the German military as well as in the politics of rearmament. Authors included former 
high-ranking Wehrmacht officers such as Hans Reinhardt, Hermann Hoth (1885-1971) 
and Hans von Salmuth (1888-1962). All three had been defendants in the OKW trial and 
had been sentenced to 15 to 20 years in prison.
111
 Their articles reflected and resonated the 
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prison. Reinhardt therefore had first-hand knowledge of warfare on the Eastern Front and became head of 
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main themes of the political debates of the 1950s and much of the opinionated material 
corresponded with the general public’s opinion on the past war and the military at that 
time. That assertion can be supported with two contemporary studies conducted in order 
to evaluate German public and non-public opinion in the 1950s. The first, the well-known 
surveys carried out for the U.S. High Commissioner in Germany (HICOG) between 1949 
and 1955 in West Germany and West Berlin, provided the American occupation forces 
and the U.S. government with valuable insight into Germans’ minds about a wide range 
of relevant topics: coming to terms with the Nazi past (Nazi System, World War II, 
Treatment of Jews, war crimes trials, denazification), foreign occupation, independence, 
Germany in the world and so on.
112
 Overall, these surveys indicated that the American 
reeducation efforts had rendered only limited success. Although most Germans 
condemned the failures and atrocities of National Socialism they also refused to reject the 
National Socialist idea on the whole and largely denied a share of responsibility for the 
regime’s rise and criminal actions.
113
the “Society for Military Studies” (Gesellschaft für Wehrkunde) in 1954 (together with Admiral Friedrich 
Ruge), which published the journal Wehrkunde in order to “collect and assess the military experience from 
World War II and to utilize them in case for a reestablishment of German armed forces.” See the foreword 
in Fall 12, 18. 
Hermann Hoth was Generaloberst, 1940/1941 Commander of Panzer Group 3, 1941/1942 Commander-in-
chief of 17
th
 Army, 1942/1943 Commander-in-Chief of 4
th
 Panzer Army, sentenced to 15 years in prison. 
Hans von Salmuth was Generaloberst, 1937 to1939 Chief of Staff of the Army Group Command 
(Heeresgruppenkommando) 1, 1939 Chief of Staff of Army Group North, 1939 to 1941 Chief of Staff of 
Army Group B, thereafter Commander-in-Chief of several Armies until 1944, sentenced to 20 years in 
prison. Salmuth became president of the “Association of German Soldiers” (Verband deutscher Soldaten e. 
V.) in 1958.
112
 Anna J. Merritt, Richard L. Merritt, eds., Public Opinion in Semisovereign Germany: The HICOG 
Surveys, 1949-1955 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1980). Surveys dedicated to views of the Nazi 
past on pages 6-11. The documentation also contains a brief section summarizing surveys conducted with 
East Germans on various issues such as “Life in the GDR” and  “The West,” see pages 31-34.
113
See for a summary Richard L. Merritt, „Digesting the past: Views of National Socialism in Semi-
sovereign Germany,” Societas, 7 (2), 1977, 93-119. 
383
The second study, a “Group Experiment” conducted by returning “Frankfurt School” 
scholars in 1950/1951, is less well-known and rarely cited in connection with German 
views of the past during the early postwar years. This first larger study conducted by the 
remigrated Institute for Social Research at the University of Frankfurt (Main) was a 
“pilot study” intended to contribute “to the study of public opinion” in the early Federal 
Republic.
114
 It is of particular interest because this survey, located at the intersection of 
“non-public” and “public-opinion,” was conducted among various social groups, amongst 
them several groups of veteran career officers. The “Group Experiment” shows that 
former military leaders not only shared most popular views about National Socialism, 
World War II and the Holocaust at that time. They also show that their peculiar outlook 
on the past represented the public mood quite correctly even though they articulated 
opinions about German guilt and responsibility in an acuminated form. 
The experiment began with the assumption that beyond “public opinion” there was 
something like “non-public opinion” in (West) Germany and that the latter differed 
greatly from the first – something “every visitor, tourist and journalist touring Germany 
can hear whistled from the roofs.” It was its declared goal to “make this non-public 
opinion of a nation the subject of the public political and academic discourse.”
115
Throughout the study, the conductors of the experiment were most stricken by the fact 
“how the opinion of the actual published opinion had bounced without any effect from 
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the heads and souls of a very large part of our population.”
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 As I have demonstrated by 
way of other evidence in the chapter on the reception of the war crimes trials in postwar 
Germany, the countless reports and opinion pieces on Nazi and war crimes flooding the 
mass media in the immediate postwar years had a very limited influence on German 
collective and political memory – and as the “Group Experiment” proved, individual 
memories were left untouched in a similar way.
At the heart of the experiment was a text, the so-called basic impulse (Grundreiz), 
written by a fictitious American GI named Colbourn shortly after the end of the war. 
Colbourn had fought the Germans until 1945 and had served thereafter in various 
positions in the US occupation administration, thus claiming to have obtained a broad and 
thorough knowledge of German customs, thinking and emotions. In his fictitious letter, 
Colbourn listed the “good” and the “bad” sides of the “Germans” emphasizing both their 
alleged positive virtues such as discipline, cleanliness, and willingness to work hard, as 
well as their negative features such as a sense of superiority, of being eternally victimized 
by world history, and a proneness to run after the “strong man.”
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 During the winter of 
1950/51, this letter was used as initiating trigger for a series of group discussions led by 
trained discussion leaders in groups of eight to ten persons totaling 1,800 participants 
from all social classes and backgrounds. For example, there were 33 youth-groups 
(students, Christian youth, political clubs ect.), 31 women groups (refugees, catholic, 









 The discussions were structured according to twelve 
thematic categories and the participants were encouraged to speak their hearts and minds 
freely; confidence and anonymity were assured. Out of the twelve thematic categories, 
three are of interest as discussed in the officer groups: the question of war guilt, 
responsibility for crimes in concentration camps and war crimes, and the countries of the 
Eastern bloc.
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The analysis of the various (recorded) group discussions demonstrated that 51 
percent of all participants refused to admit any individual responsibility for the crimes of 
the Nazi regime, while it was neither uncommon to express outrage about the collective 
guilt charge nor to articulate some understanding of the collective dimension behind 
Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy.
120
 Twenty-one percent were willing to admit a share of 
personal responsibility for war crimes and crimes committed in concentration camps 
while 60 percent denied such responsibility in one way or another (154f.) In the officer 
groups, participants tended to discuss the question of guilt in a “philosophical” way, 
pointing on the one hand to the difficulty of “defining what guilt means,” and to the 
metaphysical nature of individual guilt (“everybody is more or less guilty”, 318). On the 
other hand, they tended to refer to the collective guilt of “all nations” for world wars, 
claiming that there was a need to settle once and for all with this issue, and then to move 
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on (375). The “East” was still and strongly perceived as a continuous threat: much like 
the other groups, the officers overwhelmingly expressed negative sentiments for the 
“East,” namely the Soviet Union.  Eighty-three percent of the participants displayed a 
“radically deprecating position” (188) and reasoned this position with the lack of freedom 
in the USSR, “Russian imperialism,” brutal treatment of German POWs and the 
occupation regime in the Eastern zone. The thematic category “Eastern bloc” was the 
category to which the participants responded the most homogenously regardless of social, 
political, educational, and professional background. The legacy of the Eastern Front war 
was completely absent from these discussions. Rather, the present ruled the past, the 
realities of the Cold War allowed for the relativisation of guilt. As one discussion 
between two officers about “moral and foreign policy guilt” (moralische und 
außenpolitische Schuld) demonstrated – regardless of the fact that Germany had totally 
lost the war against the Soviet Union – the “world enemy” remained to be dealt with. 
Thus, the question of guilt was a twisted one:
G.: Are we talking about moral guilt or about guilt in terms of foreign policy? If we are talking about 
moral guilt ... this…
H.: Belongs into the confessional!
G.: … then this belongs not here tonight, I believe, because in my view the Americans are just as guilty 
in moral terms, they are just as bad and just as good as us. If this is about guilt in terms of foreign 
policy, then I think the events have already overrun this question, because if [the Allies] call upon a 
nation to join the same army, in which oneself serves, in order to fight a world enemy [i.e. the Soviet 
Union], then the question of guilt is settled for there can only be a co-fighting on equal terms. (318f.)
With this reference to the new international balance of power in which the Western Allies 
sought to enlist a rearmed West Germany into the fight against Soviet communism, the 
question of guilt indeed seemed to have become obsolete, for the old enemy was also the 
new enemy. 
Just as the war against the Soviet Union was in this way easily reduced to a mere 
anecdote in history, the “Jewish question” was ostentatiously and equally unreflectively 
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avoided in the officer groups (162). If it was discussed on rare occasions, the mass 
murder was either flatly denied (295) or the Jews were blamed for their own fate (392). 
These were views particularly often and strongly voiced during the two social gatherings 
among Bavarian military and noble dignitaries. In one instance, a discussion leader was 
even physically threatened by an officer who grew outraged by the insinuation that the 
Wehrmacht had knowledge of the extermination process (286). And finally, reflecting the 
basic conclusion of my own observations so far, crimes – if they were mentioned at all –
were referred to only in passing. Occasionally, participants admitted reluctantly having 
witnessed war crimes but always refused to recall details and to give more concrete 
information (288f). The final analysis of the experiment summarized this phenomenon 
with the following words:
At first, knowledge is denied, albeit with such specious arguments that the participants obvisouly feel 
uncomfortable themselves. After an intervention of the discussion leader, however, the participants 
take courage and relieve themselves by concrete hints, which culminate in the expression “having seen 
with my own eyes.” What was seen with their own eyes remains untold here as in so many other 
discussion situations. Incidentally and despite of it all, nescience is pleaded compulsively again and 
again.
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This mind-set was characteristic of the veteran community at large. On the whole, the 
results of this study of the “non-public opinion” of former Wehrmacht officers provide a 
superb background for the reading of contemporary veteran publications in which 
veterans reflected on the presence of the past. As I will demonstrate in the following 
paragraphs, this public discourse in journals and newsletters was, unlike published 
opinion in the mainstream media, very much in sync with private memories of World 




veterans could search and find “legitimate narratives of war,” and thus seemed ultimately 
to be able to move beyond the encumbering, painstaking and solitary endeavor of 
truthfully reckoning with the past.
Ten years after the end of the war, an anonymous editorial of the most important 
veteran journal of the 1950s, Soldier in the People, commemorated the end of World War 
II along with the demise of the once mighty and respected German Wehrmacht. The 
piece was entitled “Criminals in Fulfilled Obedience – On the Anniversary of the 
Capitulation” and it dealt with the problematic legacy of the German military. The title 
chosen by an unnamed author mirrored the reluctant ambiguity with which the organized 
veteran community remembered the criminal conduct of warfare (not only) on the 
Eastern Front and it encapsulated all the elements of the resultant Wehrmacht memory: 
historic defeat, exemplary and dutiful sacrifice, the “tragedy” of having served a wrong 
cause, and the in brutality and extent unprecedented complacency of many German 
soldiers in war crimes and crimes against humanity. Yet, the admittance of crimes 
implied by the catchy title did not go very far. The author encouraged the reader to put 
himself into a former soldier’s position and to consider “what it really must have meant 
[after the war] to be accused of and convicted for acts which were not inspired by one’s 
own initiative but were the consequence of an inescapable coercion of order?”
122
 And if 
one was to accuse these soldiers of being criminals, then, the author continued, they had 
become criminals in obedience to superior orders. Yet, German soldiers had followed 
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Volk, 5, 1955, 2.
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military orders not with “slavish obedience” (“Kadavergehorsam”), their actions had not 
been the result of a “dehumanization of duty and honor.” They even were aware of the 
fact that some orders were “morally wrong” but they nonetheless had bowed to the force 
of command and thus fulfilled the first duty of every good soldier: to obey. The scandal 
thus was not committing crimes against Soviet POWs, Jews and other civilians on an 
unprecedented scale but the unjust judgment, i.e. victimization, of German soldiers after 
the fact – in judging them for actions which had been beyond their control. The author 
concluded his call for a political, legal and moral rehabilitation of the German soldier by 
recalling that “thousands of Germans” had therefore become “victims” of Allied justice 
after 1945, convicted of crimes which had not been considered crimes before 1945. To 
him this seemed particularly absurd since one central theme in the contemporary 
discussions about the creation of a new West German army was indeed the need for a 
soldier to fully comply with superior orders, for “without discipline, no armed forces can 
be established.”
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In a similar tone, stressing the victimization of the German military, the tenth 
anniversary of the capitulation was commemorated. “Ten Years After,” in 1955, a retired 
major general celebrated the “great achievements” and “great sacrifices” of the 
Wehrmacht without once questioning the causes and consequences of this war for 
Germany’s former near and distant neighbors.
124
 Instead he elaborated: “we knew that we 
weren’t fighting out of lust for wars and for killing but in good faith and willingness to 
sacrifice our lives for the protection of our nation, our homeland and our families.” The 
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author pondered over the reasons for the loss of the war and pointed out that not the 
ordinary soldier was to be blamed for the historic defeat of the German Wehrmacht but 
the “political leaders” of the nation.
125
 This was an argument which resembled attempts to 
revive the stab-in-the-back-legend, for, as in 1918, not the military leadership was to be 
blamed for defeat, but “politicians” yet again. Worse, the consequence of this perceived 
historic failure was that a semi-sovereign West Germany (“the thus far only free part and 
therefore nucleus of a new German Reich”) continued to face the ever-looming “threat 
from the East” and was in urgent need of defense. Moreover, the – for the moment –
“cold” war with the Soviet Union should thus reflect in its conduct and assure in its 
outcome that the German soldiers’ countless sacrifices had not been in vain.
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 The well-
known arguments of the era of Vergangenheitspolitik during the 1950s about the role of 
Hitler as the great abuser and seducer of the German people, the dutifully fighting 
German soldier, and the after all not completely unjustified crusade against the 
Bolshevist threat in the East, were articulated in a particularly passionate manner in 
veteran journals and with a special emphasis on the “achievements and sacrifices of the 
German soldier.”
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 While – at most – a “conflict of conscience” might have existed in 
some soldiers’ minds the whole sphere of actual fighting, the concrete events during and 
after the invasion of a foreign country, the methods used to fight enemy forces and to 






 See for example also Gerhard Ludwig Binz, “Wert und Ehre des deutschen Soldaten,“ Soldat im Volk, 8, 
1955, 1f.
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With regards to the war on the Eastern Front, the commemoration among West 
German veterans was extraordinary in two respects. One, there was a lasting and intense 
interest in all question of military strategy and tactics, i.e. in the practical “lessons” to be 
learned from “Operation Barbarossa” – always implying that a victory of Hitler’s troops 
had been both desirable and possible.
128
 Secondly, dealing with these military questions 
entailed addressing the nature of modern warfare and the soldier’s role and responsibility 
in it. Wehrmacht retirees discussed mass extermination of civilians in the wake of 
modern war in great detail and on a highly theoretical level in numerous articles.
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However, the realities of World War II, of the Eastern Front war in particular, remained 
nebulous and marginal despite the fact that this was the omnipresent historical reference 
point in these texts. 
In order to capture the spirit of these debates it suffices to look more closely at 
two of these “expert” pieces in which the Eastern Front war functioned as historical 
lesson. In 1954, former lieutenant general Helmut Staedke contributed a lengthy text 
about the “Soldier in Service of the Modern War Apparatus” to the military journal 
Wehrkunde.
130
 In a rather philosophical manner the author set out to describe the 
technologization of modern warfare tracing this development back to the First World War 
in the course of which killing became an “anonymous” ritual and the “shared fighting 
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experience” ceased to be a central feature of the experience of war.
131
 In this reading, 
World War II with its propaganda, partisan wars, air-raids and nuclear culmination 
“almost completely destroyed the human relations between those fighting.” Peculiar was 
Staedke’s characterization of a future war, a “push-button war” as he coined it: it would 
entail “mass extermination without faces,” it would make “no distinction between soldier, 
woman or child”
132
– as if this had been the case in the concentration and extermination 
camps and on the battlefields of the World War II. The author also observed that modern 
wars were wars of opposing world views. Already Hitler and Stalin had torn down the 
last moral barriers so that a future war would be a “total and global civil war” (“totaler 
Weltbürgerkrieg”),
133
 again implying that World War II had not been total and global. In 
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The idea of World War II as „Weltbürgerkrieg“ was shortly later elaborated by the German historian 
Ernst Nolte in his first major work Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche. Die Action Française. Der 
italienische Faschismus. Der Nationalsozialismus (München: Piper, 1963). Borrowing from Lenin who had 
– erroneously – projected that the Communist revolution in Russia would trigger a “European civil war,” 
Nolte suggested that, basically, European fascism evolved as a reaction and in response to the rise of 
Bolshevism in the Soviet Union and that the global contest of the two ideologies culminated in a global 
civil war, i.e. the Second World War. The German-Russian war of 1941-1945 was in his view as a “world
fight” and “bore the characteristics of an international civil war.” See the more recent piece by Ernst Nolte, 
“Weltbürgerkrieg 1917-1989?” in Eckhard Jesse, ed., Totalitarismus im 20. Jahrhundert. Eine Bilanz der 
internationalen Forschung (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 1999), 391-403, quote on 397. 
In the wake of the Historikerstreit in the mid-1980s in Germany, Nolte repeated this theory and 
encountered much resistance among colleagues. In his infamous article “A past that doesn’t go away” (“Die 
Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will. Eine Rede, die geschrieben, aber nicht gehalten werden konnte,” 
printed in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 June 1986) he asked provocatively „vollbrachten die 
Nationalsozialisten, vollbrachte Hitler eine ‚asiatische Tat’ vielleicht nur deshalb, weil sie sich und 
ihresgleichen als potentielle oder wirkliche Opfer einer ‚asiatischen Tat’ betrachteten? War nicht der 
‚Archipel GULag’ ursprünglicher als Auschwitz? War nicht der ‚Klassenmord’ der Bolschewiki das 
logische und faktische Prius des ‚Rassenmords’ der Nationalsozialisten?“ In reaction to this article Nolte 
was accused of equating Communist, Fascist and National Socialist crimes and of playing down the 
uniqueness of the industrial murder of the European Jews on the hands of the Nazis by claiming that 
Lenin’s and Stalin’s mass terror (“class murder”) merely predated the Nazi Holocaust and was in fact 
equally brutal and massive in quality and extent. The “historians debate” is documented in Rudolf 
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the war of the future, the “technocratic West” with a “Christian conscience” would face 
the “unscrupulous (hemmungslos) technocratic East.” Staedke added that it was the West 
who had genuinely contributed to the modernization and technologization of modern 
warfare. In the “East”, the Soviet peoples had no “internal relationship to technology” 
which, the author pointed out, provided the “occident” with the “great chance” to prevail 
over its Eastern enemy.
134
 Here the war on the Eastern Front comes in as historic lesson: 
the “occident” could only triumph if these lessons were heard and the bitter experience of 
defeat was transformed into profitable know-how of how to successfully wage war 
against the Soviet Union in the future. It is no surprise that SED agitators such as Albert 
Norden on the other side of the wall used these arguments as material in the anti-Western 
propaganda war. 
Finally, Staedke introduced what could be called the democratic version of Goebbels
“total war” idea: 
Here lies a great chance for the occident if it can supply apt and independent people on all levels of 
politics, science, production and military apparatus, who are not just intellectually dead tools of a 
central will but who live up to the respective requirements as a result of their own impulse and in 
voluntary service to a common idea – even if the apparatus is tarnished here and there. In a four-year-
long struggle with the East we have seen the superiority of the German fighter flash up again and again 
from the infantryman to the general and we have no reason to believe that this substance is already 
exhausted.
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In concrete, in a future “struggle” it would suffice to “spare the disabled enemy and 
civilians” in order to win the suppressed Russians over for the fight against Soviet 
tyranny. If the rule of law and respect of human dignity would “ensoul the military 
Augstein, ed., „Historikerstreit.” Die Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit der 
nationalsozialistischen Judenvernichtung (München: Piper, 1987).
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apparatus” of a future German army, the Soviet peoples would soon gain confidence that 
this war was a war of liberation from Bolshevist oppression. This sort of warfare would 
ensure the “justified measure of means and methods” and thus “Katyn, Hiroshima or 
Dresden” would be just as impossible as the “commissar order”
136
– a curious list of 
historic examples which left out, for instance, Auschwitz and Babi Yar, and at the same 
time implied the moral equivalence of Soviet, American, British and German crimes and 
actions during World War II. 
Without ever going into more detail on Wehrmacht crimes as part of the “historic 
lesson”, the author referred only implicitly to war crimes on the Eastern Front between 
1941 and 1944. Not “Operation Barbarossa” as such had been a criminal war but the way 
it was carried out in some places and instances. Moreover, just as Hitler’s war in the East 
promised “Europe’s liberation” from the Bolshevist grip, the future, quasi sequel-war to 
be launched in defense against persisting Soviet expansionism could easily be won if the 
“Soviet peoples” could be convinced that a victorious West would bring a “more human 
and peaceful order.”
137
 Similarly, one would have approved of Hitler’s war if they had 
only treated the local population more humanely. In this sense, dealing with the criminal 
legacy of the Eastern Front war entailed at most an implicit admittance of war crimes. 
This is a good example for Vergangenheitsbewältigung in the Adenauer era: not denial or 
complete silence was the order of the day, but rather a superficial referral to Wehrmacht 
crimes on the Eastern Front revealing an astounding lack of emphatic interest in the fate 






Another way of looking at the “lessons” of the Eastern Front was to address the 
question of what the new German Bundeswehr could and should be learning from 
Germany’s recent military history. Hans Reinhardt, an experienced former general who 
participated in the war against the Soviet Union and was sentenced to 15 years in prison 
in the OKW-Trial in 1949, contributed articles to Wehrkunde, particularly on the subject 
of warfare in the East and the Bundeswehr.
138
 He became the head of the “Society for 
Military Studies” in 1954, and the fact that he was a convicted war criminal did not 
hinder his career as military “expert” and veteran lobbyist in the young West German 
republic. In an article on the “Instruction in the History of Warfare,” Reinhardt argued 
that the teaching of military history is of vital interest to a “future German Wehrmacht” 
because soldiers needed to know about “the great deeds and contexts,” and the role of the 
great “leaders” in leading an army to success or failure.
139
 The last war in particular 
provided in the view of the author a range of examples for good and bad leadership 
decisions. Compared to more distant military adventures in German history, it was for 
instance possible to demonstrate the great failure of Hitler’s “stubborn stick-it-out 
tactics” (starre Haltetaktik) on the Eastern Front – again implying that the war should and 
could have been won if someone more “professional” would have been commander-in-
chief.
140
 Therefore, “not the ‘how’ of the war, but the ‘why’ of its success or failure must 
be the primary focus of instructions in military history.”
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These examples of “expert pieces” on the lessons of “Barbarossa” illustrate the 
general mind-set among (organized) West German veterans. In order to provide their 
readers with additional historiographical and military expertise, Wehrkunde and Soldat im 
Volk carried reviews of recent books on Stalingrad and the war on the Eastern Front on a 
regular basis. The main criteria for the selection of the reviewed books seemed to have 
been whether their content contributed to the “fight against the defamation of the soldier 
and his leaders”
142
 and to the honorable memory of the “German soldiers’ 
achievements.”
143
 Noteworthy in this sense was, for example, Hans Latenser’s 
Verteidigung deutscher Soldaten (“Defense of German soldiers”), a documentation of the 
author’s pleadings in his function as defense lawyer of the accused OKW-members 
before the Nuremberg Tribunal in 1946. In the view of the reviewer, it was Latenser who 
convinced the court that the “General Staff and OKW” were not to be judged as “criminal 
organization” as the indictment suggested. His defense strategy had further provided 
“convincing evidence” that the 
“…military leaders by no means had ‘actively participated in all these crimes, or sat silent and 
acquiescent, witnessing the commission of crimes on a scale larger and more shocking than the world 
has ever had the misfortune to know,’ as the International Military Tribunal’s verdict of October 1, 
1946 claimed. Rather, they had acted in accordance with their conscience and had drawn their 
conclusions if they failed to convince Hitler.”
144
Two of the generals on trial, Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb and Wilhelm List (1880-1971), 
who both had served as military commanders on the Eastern Front and shared an 
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ambivalent personal history of obeying and opposing Hitler’s orders, were mentioned 
specifically to underscore that “amidst all turmoil of a dictatorship,” German generals 
had upheld the “Soldatentum” – the soldierly tradition. This was the complete opposite of 
what the Nuremberg judgment had maintained. The exculpatory character of Latenser’s 
commitment to defending the accused generals was explicitly praised by the reviewer. In 
his view, the book contributed “to restoring the reputation of the military leadership and 
the German soldier and to convincing public opinion in the victorious nations that the 
revision of the verdicts by release of those generals already in year-long imprisonment 
[was] inescapable.”
145
Within this line of argument, the events at Stalingrad served as the grand historic 
drama embodying all the good the German soldier was capable of: unconditional 
obedience and discipline, an unbreakable fighting morale, and the willingness to die for 
the German fatherland. One noteworthy version of this drama was Heinz Schröter’s 
Stalingrad…Bis zur letzten Patrone (1953). The book by a former war correspondent had 
already been written in 1943 „on Goebbel’s instruction and in Hitler’s name,” as the 
author noted, but was not published under the Nazis because Goebbels was “aghast” in 
light of the account of the battle details and decided that this was “intolerable for the 
German people.”
146
 In 1953, Schröter published the work by himself in West Germany 
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and reached an interested audience. The review in Wehrkunde, though critical of a few 
incorrect military terms and titles, predicted the “great impression” this account of the 
fighting of the Sixth Army would make on every reader. “With his work the authors has 
erected a worthy monument to all fighters of the Sixth Army – dead or alive.” Though it 
dealt with “much suffering and great misery,” this “eulogy to German soldierdom” was 
nonetheless to be recommended “most warmly.”
147
 Stalingrad, the “bitterest chapter of 
World War II,” was remembered exclusively for the suffering of German soldiers. 
Context and consequences remained marginal, in effect were still absent a decade after 
the Wehrmacht was defeated on the Eastern Front. 
Another book reviewer ventured to enter the sphere of historical speculation after 
having read Manstein’s Lost Victories. He agreed with Manstein that Stalingrad by no 
means was the turning point towards defeat but Hitler’s decision to halt the “Operation 
Zitadelle” (the battle for Kursk) in July of 1943. In this view, the death of thousands of 
German soldiers in Stalingrad had not been senseless at all. It had “stabilized the front 
once again in early 1943” and had it not been for Hitler’s inconsequence and 
“dilettantism,” the Eastern Front war could have ended in a “draw solution in the East” 
(“Remislösung im Osten”).
148
 The reviewer thus noted regretfully that this opportunity to 
escape total defeat had been missed “again and again,” and that Manstein’s 
argumentation was conclusive: “through a clear strategic conception and operative 
flexibility along with bold decisiveness a tie could have been accomplished in the East -
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 Neither Manstein nor the reviewer gave a thought to what exactly this “tie” 
would have meant for the occupied territories. 
Yet, in rare instances war crimes on the Eastern Front were addressed, not discussed 
but mentioned. A review of Wladyslaw Anders’ Hitler’s Defeat in Russia (1953) granted 
the author a realistic view on the Wehrmacht’s criminal record in Russia. Anders had 
been a leading figure of the Polish military resistance against Nazi Germany (as supreme 
commander of the Second Polish Army Corps in the Soviet Union). The reviewer briefly 
alliterated the crimes Anders documented in his book. Yet, the “honorable” memory of 
the German soldiers was once again subject to defamation:
The author dedicates separate chapters to the treatment of the Russian prisoners of war, the 
“Ostfreiwilligen” [Eastern volunteers] who fought on the German side, the treatment of the Russian 
people and to the partisan warfare .... The sufficiently known mistakes and inhumanities with regards 
to the treatment of the Russian peoples, of the POWs and the Ostfreiwilligen are depicted soberly and 
clearly. Unfortunately, generalizations slipped in the description of the behaviour of German soldiers, 
and details from other sources for which one would have liked to see the evidence were incorporated 
without references to names and places. The way these details are presented here is likely to generate a 
skewed picture.
150
To be clear, this was a rare instance in which the crimes against Soviet POWs, forced 
laborers and civilains found mention. Commonly they were not part of the public 
discourse at the time. Yet, even when recounting historical facts – the “sufficiently 
known mistakes and humanities” – the imperatives of the defensive veteran memory were 




 Review of Wladyslaw Anders, Hitler’s Defeat in Russia (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953), in 
Wehrkunde, 1 (1955), 38.
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the dangers of generalization when it came to (the un-detailed) atrocities committed by 
German soldiers. 
The mainstream mindset among organized veterans largely evaded the question of 
war crimes altogether and in a particularly striking way articles commemorating 
important military anniversaries such as the beginning of “Operation Barbarossa” (June 
22, 1941) and the capitulation at Stalingrad (February 2, 1943) illustrate this comfortable 
consensus. World War II, in general, was viewed as the Wehrmacht’s “self-sacrifice 
without comparison” (“Opfergang ohnegleichen”). Commemorating the fifteenth 
anniversary of the beginning of the war, Soldat im Volk carried a front page article in 
September of 1954 which contained a brief version of the current official reading of the 
Eastern Front in West Germany. German soldiers had fulfilled their patriotic duty “until 
the end” (adding parenthetically “no army can exist without unconditional obedience”), 
Hitler was the great failure in recent German history, and the war against the Soviet 
Union had been an adventure inspired solely by Hitler’s overestimation of his own 
abilities and the armed forces. From the very beginning, “Operation Barbarossa” was 
doomed for the Russians turned out the most tenacious fighters. Stalingrad, the perceived 
epiphany of Hitler’s inabilities as supreme commander, was the “most terrible defeat of 
the Wehrmacht” and the decisive “turning point of the war.”
151
 This recollection of the 
war focused to a large extent on identifying and analyzing the missed opportunities; its 
motivations and consequences remained unspoken. In a sober tone, the author, a veteran 
of World War II himself, presented a sweeping summery of the war in Russia. He 
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considered the “preconditions for the success of this operation” and concluded that 
Hitler’s order to attack came too late (in view of the harsh Russian winter) and that, 
ultimately, he had sacrificed military strategic imperatives to economic and prestige 
reasons. 
Hitler had failed to realize the importance of taking Moscow where all train lines of the huge country 
come together. To him it was most important to take the U k r a i n e and L e n i n g r a d, because he 
hoped to boost his personal prestige in the latter – the breeding- and birth place of Bolshevism, and to 
gain economic profit in the first. He thus had put political and economic desires over military necessity 
and, hence, had sawn the seed for the failure of the First Russian campaign. 
This is not the place to recall the course of events in the entire campaign against Russia; apparently it 
went according to the OKH plans in the beginning, the names of the great battles might not matter; Bi 
a l y s t o k, M i n s k, S m o l e n s k mark the victories of the Army Group Center. Again, the tank 
divisions crushed the enemy front lines into the rear of the enemy who resisted fiercely; again, the 
infantry divisions rushed after them in order to complete the grip and encirclement. This succeeded and 
the result was that masses of prey and prisoners were made as never before in a war. ...
The campaign in the East failed [in the winter of 1941/42 near M o s c o w]. Greatest devotion, bravery 
and the will to victory among the troops; their unimaginable suffering in mud and dirt, in the Siberian 
cold had not sufficed to prevail over the Russian masses who were equipped for the winter. To the 
contrary: the Russian had enough energy to take the offensive. ...
The belief in himself led Adolf Hitler towards S t a l i n g r a d and the C a u c a s u s. He ordered an 
operation which slapped every healthy military thinking in the face. According to the lessons of 
Clausewitz one attacks an enemy with a baled fist not with spread fingers. Yet, that is exactly what the 
‘supreme commander of the Wehrmacht’ did. He also forgot the lessons of Moltke and Schlieffen 
according to which one gives an assignment to a military leader but leaves the execution to him and 
that it is the local commander’s decision whether such assignment can be executed or not. ...
Stalingrad, the worst defeat a German army has ever suffered, became the turning point of the entire 
war. Here originated the lack of energy which soon became cataclysmically tangible everywhere.
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In other words, had the Wehrmacht been commanded according to the professional 
German military tradition, the Eastern Front war could actually have been won. That in 
the course of this campaign unprecedented “masses of prey and prisoners” were made 
was worth no more words than that. And, saving the reputation of the brave German 
soldiers, Stalingrad served as the cataclysmic event of World War II codifying the 
collective “self-sacrifice” of the Wehrmacht. Fifteen years after the outbreak of the war, 
the entire article makes no mention of civilian victims, let alone especially targeted 
152
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victim groups such as the Jews. Curiously, a table right next to the text listed – mostly 
incorrectly – the war losses in 17 nations: Germany was said to have lost 3.2 million 
soldiers and two million civilians; Poland, in comparison, lost 500,000 soldiers and 6 
million civilians. The Soviet Union was listed to have lost seven million people overall, 
yet here the chart made no differentiation between military and civilian victims. A note 
below the chart adds that the total losses of 23 nations amount to 26 million, out of which 
11.5 million soldiers were killed in action or from injuries, and 15.5 million “civilians 
died of prohibited means, especially of bombing terror.”
153
 The author of this sketch 
apparently considered the Allied air war against Germany as a war of “prohibited means” 
but felt no need to count the victims in concentration and extermination camps, gas 
chambers, mass shootings, euthanasia programs, or forced labor camps.
Looking back on VE Day in 1955, the front-page editorial in Soldat im Volk recalled 
the “great victories” of the Wehrmacht and clarified yet again that the Furher alone was 
to be blamed for total defeat. Obedience had been the soldier’s fate, the text continued, 
therefore he deserved respect and honorable memory. Moreover, a direct link existed 
between the “unsolved relationship between the Soviet system and the non-Bolshevist 
world,” and the current state of affairs.
154
 In 1955, at the height of the rearmament debate 
in West Germany, the veteran community felt obliged to remind the rest of the republic 
of the threat looming in the East, and of the duty to resist it. A second editorial on the 
same front page thus called for a “spiritual remilitarization first.” Reminding the reader of 
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the precarious international situation, it pondered “if all attempts at preventing a new war 
failed,” the alternative was: to “yield to the attacker defenselessly, or to defend oneself 
with all means.” In order to be prepared, however, the 
chancellor and his ministers must finally emphasize on every occasion clearly and unambiguously that 
the Federal Republic is the only legitimate successor of the German Reich and that the Federal 
government’s authority over the territories East of the zonal border is merely hindered temporarily by 
foreign usurpation. ...
When will they finally point to the daunting endangerment of the economic and social progress in the 
Federal Republic from the East and call for its defense?
155
It was thus a new generation’s task to determine whether the death of millions on the 
Eastern Front “had been in vain,” whether the “capitulation was final or whether a new, 
hopeful life for our people can emerge from the ruins of collapse.”
156
 This shade of the 
West German Eastern Front memory implied that while the fighting on the Eastern Front 
had come to a shameful end in 1945, its resumption remained an option, possibly even a 
necessity of Realpolitik in a world continually threatened by Bolshevism. 
A front-page article commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the beginning of 
“Fall Barbarossa” in the July 1956 issue of Soldat im Volk illustrated how barbaric 
Bolshevism could be at its worst. Two pictures accompanied the text: one showing a 
group of German soldiers during the invasion of France – decorated with flowers and 
apparently in good physical and mental condition; the other photograph depicting 
exhausted infantrymen in worn-out uniforms in Russia. As the pictures implied, 
“Operation Barbarossa” was the “greatest offensive in military history,” a “grim struggle 
for life and death” whose “outcome and consequences keeps the world electrified to this 
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 The German Landser realized in the first hour what kind of adversary he was 
facing: the “Asiatic, cruel enemy instigated and fanaticized by Bolshevism.” What 
followed was a story of triumph and tragedy of the German armies, and had it not been 
for the incompetent military leadership, the Wehrmacht could have “annihilated the Red 
Army completely” after the series of “truly grandiose successes in the summer battles of 
1941.”
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The misery and death of millions of German soldiers remained the central motive in 
this memory of the Eastern Front with no reflection on either the losses of the “masses of 
the Red Army” or the fate of the civilian population. Even though Cold War tensions and 
the realities of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe make this indifference somewhat explicable, 
it remains incomprehensible that a historical event of such horrific extent and a battlefield 
about which so many details were known in public can be remembered without even 
mentioning that beyond military defeat there was unprecedented human suffering among 
millions of non-Germans across Eastern Europe.
This lack of empathic imagination as to the gruesome realties of this war on the other 
side of the front is the common feature of all published texts dealing with the war against 
the Soviet Union in veteran publications of the 1950s and early 1960s – and it reflects a 
central aspect of the political memory at the time. Military-strategic mind games, 
historical speculations and the celebration of so-called soldierly achievements merged 
into a peculiar hodgepodge of textual contributions to the memory of the Eastern Front in 
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two ways: it romanticized the Wehrmacht and it relativized its complicity in Hitler’s war 
of extermination on the Eastern Front. The iconographic event of “Stalingrad” served as 
the link between the two in so far as it embodied both stunning bravery and 
immeasurable suffering of the German soldier. In view of this perceived awe-inspiring 
legacy it may become somewhat plausible that there was no emotional and intellectual 
room for pondering the losses of the other side. 
III. Dictating History? Official vs. Private Memory 
There was all but silence with regards to the Eastern Front among German World 
War II veterans in East and West. Even crimes were addressed to some extent: never 
directly but rather implicitly, vaguely and purposefully. Either they formed the basis for a 
complete personal transformation in the socialist GDR, a process which began with the 
expression of remorse and shame, and ended with the declared “eradication of guilt and 
errors.”
159
 Or, Western veterans such as lieutenant general Staedke mentioned them in 
passing while the actul focus was on working out the military lessons to be learned from 
the lost war. The moral premises of these individuals’ narratives did not necessarily 
collide with the respective official political-intellectual discourse about the war on the 
Eastern Front as they fit well into the demands of every-day Cold War politics. In both 
Germanys veterans shaped the political memory in so far as they participated in the 
official discourses about the war against the Soviet Union, naturally based on contrasting 
premises: in the GDR, veterans could successfully integrate themselves into the one-
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party-state if they were willing to place their own individual war stories within the SED 
interpretation of recent German history. In the FRG, veterans participated voluntarily, 
even enthusiastically in the societal discourse about the past. By doing so, they each 
sought to establish a sustainable, legitimate narrative reflecting their personal war 
experiences, and to (re-)gain public recognition as experts on military affairs in past and 
present. Both strategies offered Eastern Front veterans in the two Germanys an 
opportunity to make sense of the war. 
In context of Cold War politics, both veteran communities more or less willingly 
served the interests of the state in fighting their distinct peacetime wars. They advocated 
eternal German-Soviet friendship as first lesson of the criminal war against the Soviet 
Union in the GDR. And they engaged in the fight against the alleged persisting 
Bolshevist threat to Western democracy in the FRG. In the course of these attempts to 
forge “legitimate narratives of war,” these veterans formulated their distinct narratives 
about the past but found little or no regards for the historical truth in its details.
It was postwar German literature which offered a rare refuge for historical reflection, 
for a closer examination of historical reality and some of its painful truths. Unlike the 
emerging political and veteran memories of the Eastern Front war described thus far, a 
number of literary works created between 1945 and 1960 addressed this war with an 
often subtle, often partisan, but sometimes surprisingly sincere sense for the complexity 
and ambiguity of its history and legacy. 
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Chapter 8
War and Literature: The Eastern Front and the German Soldier in 
Postwar German Literature
„Death smelled different in Russia than in Africa.“
From Erich Maria Remarque’s Time to Live and Time to Die
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I. The Limits of Language: The Barbarization of Warfare as Literary Subject
The most reflective and critical examination of the Eastern Front war in postwar 
West and East Germany took place in literature. More so than politics and historiography, 
literary works addressed the multitude of experiences and memories connected to this 
war, even though certain motifs such as the soldier as hapless tool and victim in Hitler’s 
war also figured prominently. Sigrid Weigel has pointed out that after 1945, the literary 
confrontation of the war in general in German postwar literature has often “functioned as 
Deckerinnerung for National Socialism and its crimes.”
160
 Yet, quite a few works of the 
so-called German high literature avoided covering up Nazi crimes with illustrations of 
war as kind of a natural catastrophe. Sometimes these works included the other facets of 
war: the senseless suffering of non-German civilians, the systematic destruction of entire 
landscapes, and the not only blind naivety but willing complicity of Wehrmacht soldiers 
in the “war of extermination.” This chapter provides a comparative analysis of such 
works and defines their place in postwar German political culture. Beyond a mere content 
analysis, it begins with a thorough examination of the political-intellectual context of 
these works’ creation: the 1950s debates among literary artists inside each German state 
and also across the border, on what “war literature” (Kriegsliteratur) can and should say 
about war. 
The front experience in World War II, though it did not inspire another postwar 
“myth” of soldierly life and death, was for every single one of the soldiers a life-altering
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experience. No doubt, some veterans reflected their personal role in the war on the 
Eastern Front critically and presumably mostly in private. Many might have harbored an 
uncertain feeling of discomfort, shame or even guilt when memories surfaced. Those who 
chose to ally more or less actively with the new regime in East Germany mostly found a 
convenient way to settle their personal question of guilt. They could invest all energies, 
all frustrations and doubts into an activism that guaranteed both relieve and distraction 
from a troubled past and provided a chance to being kept busy and involved with matters 
of present-day politics. In West Germany, as discussed above, organized veterans rather 
than fighting democracy, integrated into the new system and adopted the rules of the 
democratic game in order to advance their particular social and political interests. 
Notably, in both Germanys, former soldiers were given the opportunity to resume and 
reinforce soldierly values, even to nurture continuing militaristic and (in the West) anti-
Bolshevist sentiments. The two otherwise very different spheres of veteran politics in 
East and West German thus occupied a vibrant and relevant space in the political cultures 
of both societies. 
Nonetheless, the majority of former Wehrmacht soldiers led a quiet private life after 
the war without ever becoming involved with DSF or NDPD, with the Heimkehrer-
Verband or the Bund Deutscher Soldaten. For them, literature offered both refuge and a 
place to look for the meaning of war. It was one important medium they could turn to 
without leaving the secure haven of their private worlds, an opportunity to find individual 
ways of “remembering war,” of coping with their experiences. During the 1950s, 
numerous so-called Landershefte – cheap novels depicting military adventures and 
adventurers – popped up in West Germany, generals’ memoirs flooded the book markets 
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in both Germanys and found hundreds of thousands of readers.
161
 Yet, the memory of the 
Eastern Front war was not only a recurring theme in mass literature. The more serious, 
“high” literature too grappled with the realities and legacies of the Eastern Front. A 
whole generation of German writers created what can be called a “war literature” in the 
first postwar decade and a half. Focussing on these authors, this chapter explores how the 
war on the Eastern Front figured in the literary imagination, how it was remembered and 
interpreted by the first postwar generation of writers between 1945 and 1960.
This venture into the literary arts requires, of course, a very different methodological 
approach and calls for a brief discussion of the special source base and its use. The 
question of the “usefulness and disadvantage of literature for the historical sciences” 
remains disputed until today.
162
 German contemporary historiography, in particular, makes 
little use of literature as historical source. Yet, recently scholars have pointed out that 
Germany’s post-war history can also be read in terms of its literary production and have 
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started to pay more attention to post-war literature in general,
163
 and to literary and artistic 
forms of Vergangenheitsbewältigung in particular.
164
 However, none of them discusses 
the theoretical-methodological challenges of such an undertaking.
165
I follow Umberto Eco’s famous dictum according to which there is a fundamental 
difference between interpreting literature as a text, or reading literature as a source.
166
 I 
henceforth read and “use” literature as a source for the reconstruction of a literary 
discourse over the past in search for an answer to the question how the war on the Eastern 
Front and the battle of Stalingrad were narrated, remembered, interpreted and evaluated 
in German postwar literature. Literary works thus serve not the reconstruction of past 
events but they are sources for the reconstruction of a discourse about the historical event 
163
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“war against the Soviet Union,” over its realities and lessons, its consequences and 
interpretations.
Naturally, there are limits which the historian has to be aware of. A fictitious text is 
not a “document” in the conventional historiographical sense, because it is primarily 
fiction. Yet, here it is read as an authentic source, as a contemporary document, a written 
record of the past. Further, the meaning(s) of a literary text may not reveal itself after a 
first reading, its genesis is closely connected to the author’s biographical background as 
well as to the historical context, and the views expressed in a text do not necessarily 
reflect the author’s views or those of his contemporaries. For literature can not only 
create an image or mirror of a certain reality but it is also a product of this reality. Thus, 
literary creation can and should be understood as “social process.”
167
In focusing on some of the main works created between 1945 and 1960, I offer a 
concentrated analysis of the literary attempts of the “long” war generation born between 
1890 and 1930 to come to terms with the legacy of the Eastern Front war. All of the 
works under consideration saw multiple editions and were widely read often well beyond 
the year 1960. For example, Gerd Ledig’s Die Stalinorgel (“The Stalin Organ”) first 
appeared in 1955. After at least five editions, its most recent edition came out in 2003. It 
is impossible in this context to comprehensively address the reception of the works in the 
German population. However, as I am reading these works not as a literary critic but as 
pieces of evidence for postwar mentalities, their circulation is extremely relevant because 
167
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it indicates their importance and impact. Thus, where ever available, I include editions 
and circulation numbers in order to point to the potential reach of a novel or short story.
168
The chronological limitation to the years 1945 until 1960 allows for a succinct look 
at the inner-German discourse about literature and war until the building of the wall in 
1961 – a discourse highly politicized and politicizing due to a unique political 
background marked by Germany’s division and global Cold War tensions. George Orwell
with his astute sense for the significance of language in politics, wisely predicted in 1941 
that in the age of modern totalitarianism, and of competing ideologies, the “frontiers of 
art and propaganda” blurred: the literary artist was becoming a “didactic, political writer, 
aesthetically conscious, of course, but more interested in subject-matter than in 
technique.”
169
 Orwell aptly described the moral and intellectual dilemma a politically 
thinking literary person was bound to encounter – not only within the boundaries of 
totalitarian regimes: 
The writers who have come up since the 1930s have been living in a world in which not only one’s life 
but one’s whole scheme of values is constantly menaced. In such circumstances, detachment is not 
possible. You cannot take a purely aesthetic interest in a disease you are dying from; you cannot feel 
dispassionately about a man who is about to cut your throat. In a world in which Fascism and 
Socialism were fighting one another, any thinking person had to take sides, and his feelings had to find 
their way not only into his writing but into his judgements on literature. Literature had to become 
political, because anything else would have entailed mental dishonesty.
170
This is exactly the dilemma East Germany’s writers were caught up in during the early 
postwar years. And even though “fascism” was defeated in 1945, it continued to haunt 
both, East German communists in their perception of reactionary Western “imperialism,” 
168
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and West German literary intellectuals seeking to come to terms with its dreadful legacy. 
On either side, there was a strong sense emerging that creating art for art’s sake was no 
longer possible. The fact that the inner-German discourse about war and literature took 
place in two different political systems with fundamentally differing work and living 
conditions for writers, thus, is of central importance. Nonetheless, this analysis includes 
both, works of free literary expression, and works usually subsumed under the label 
“antifascist literature,” i.e. those works created in sync with the party-official propaganda 
in the early SED state.
171
Any historical analysis of literature in divided postwar Germany begins with the 
question what the written word could still express after the “rupture with civilization”
172
for which Auschwitz became a synonym. After the war, a handful of German 
philosophers who had endured the Nazi era in inner or external exile pointed to the 
seeming impossibility of a verbal mastering of the despicable crimes of the Nazi regime. 
Theodor W. Adorno believed that “poetry” – and he meant in this case arts and culture in 
general – was “barbaric” after Auschwitz. With this thought he also alluded to the 
171
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intellectual pile of rubble which confronted German writers, indeed all survivors, after 
May 8, 1945. What remained to be done in the land of writers and thinkers after the 
“German catastrophe” (Friedrich Meinecke), Adorno pondered, was to “reflect on one’s 
own failure” (Reflexion auf das eigene Versagen).
173
Hannah Arendt realized that unlike after World War I, the Second World War, 
instead of inspiring another myth of the front experience shattered the basic fundaments 
of Western civilization, unmasking man as a creature capable of unspeakable crimes.
174
Thus, only „evil“ itself could become the central theme of post-apocalyptic literary-
philosophical discourses:
The reality is that‚ the Nazis are men like ourselves; the nightmare is that they have shown, have 
proven beyond doubt what man is capable of. ... The problem of evil will be the fundamental 
question of postwar intellectual life in Europe – as death became the fundamental problem after the 
last war.
175
A third contemporary, Karl Jaspers, called in 1946 for a public reckoning with the causes 
for this “evil” within Germany. First condition for such a reckoning was to talk to each 
other about the historical facts in „full frankness and honesty,” which Jaspers knew was a 
“spiritual-political venture along the edge of the precipice.”
176
 Yet, „Germany can only 
come to [its senses] again, unless we Germans find a way to communicate with each 
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 In face of the monstrosity of the crimes and the totality of defeat this was a task 
not only for politicians, journalists or philosophers, but maybe even more so for writers, 
namely people who by profession seek to comprehend and communicate the entire 
spectrum of human experience and emotion.
Were writers then able to “reflect” on the catastrophe? Was 1945 not the end of 
“poetry”? Could, in fact, only writers in post-war Germany get near the “actual historical 
truth,” as the nineteenth-century historian Jakob Burckhardt once had claimed?
178
 How did 
they address the unprecedented and ultimate barbarization of warfare on the Eastern 
Front? What fragments of historical memory entered their novels and short stories, what 
was left aside, brushed over, warped? Was it possible to express interest in, even empathy 
for the many victims of Germany’s aggressive wars, for the suffering of the “others,” 
considering the catastrophic conditions in Germany and German suffering? And in which 
way did writers allow their voices and text to be politically instrumentalized in the 
daunting, soon all-encompassing Cold War atmosphere? If “he who in total defeat prefers 
life to death can only live in truthfulness” and critical self-reflection, as Jaspers warned,
179
was literature about the war one suitable medium and platform to attempt such a truthful 
reflection?
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II. The Politics of War Literature
Since literature is not created in a social vacuum, I briefly turn to the political aspects 
of postwar literary life and production. Particularly during the 1950s, literary men and 
women were caught up in negotiating and renegotiating their role and function in postwar 
German society. Debates circled around the question what literature could afford after 
total defeat, and they took place both inside each part of Germany as well as amongst 
them.
180
 After reconstructing this fascinating debate among German writers in the 1950s, 
this chapter concludes with a critical look in between the book covers of the war 
literature created in both Germanys between 1945 and 1960. 
In March 1950, three months before the „German Writers Union“ would be founded 
in East Berlin, the prominent East German writer Arnold Zweig debated the lessons of 
history and the “most important social role of the writers,” namely to reach the masses, in 
the Kulturbund’s journal Aufbau with the following words:
... if during the decade of the Weimar Republic those novels, dramas and poems that were directed 
against war as a social process would have reached an audience in whose school books and readings 
the real face of war would have been portrayed instead of the century-old idealization of war, of 
aggressive war, in fact, in all its needlessness in the long run, its cruelty and its exterminating 
function – it would have been impossible to catch hundreds of thousands of young people with the 
parole ‘Let’s ride to the Eastern Lands.’
181
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Hitler’s aggressive war against Europe, that is, particularly against the Soviet Union, was 
to be the subject of the writers’ literary works so that the (right) lessons could be drawn 
from the past in order to prevent the horrors of war in the future. Since the beginning of 
the 1950s, organized East German writers submitted to the ideological and propagandistic 
objectives set by the SED. During the Fifth Meeting of the SED Central Committee in 
March 1951 the party decided to take up the “fight against formalism in art and 
literature” and instead propagated the turn towards “socialist realism,” a turn also taken 
by the Writers’ Union. In the Union’s statute the members confessed to “socialist 
realism” as “method of creation” (“Schaffensmethode”), they acknowledged the “leading 
role of working class and party” and pledged to fight relentlessly “against all forms of 
ideological coexistence and infiltration of reactionary and revisionist views into the realm 
of literature.”
182
After a series of popular uprisings was crushed by East German and Soviet troops in 
June 1953, regime-friendly writers in the GDR reaffirmed this position and underlined 
that the riots proved how necessary this fight still was. The writer Anna Seghers called 
upon her colleagues to stand against “this horde of bandits” seeking to “interrupt our 
peaceful, democratic reconstruction:”
They [the bandits] succeed everywhere where there are people who are still not fully allied with us. 
They use every imperfection, every mistake, every failure, every unresolved question. Nothing can 
show the writers so clearly their tasks and their responsibility. We will continue on the chosen path 
182
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419
even more determined, more conscientious than before, allied with our government and with our 
party.
183
Against the background of the 1953 uprising, the popular revolt in Hungary in 1956 and 
the rearmament-debates in West Germany, an intense discussion about the role of the 
writer and the literary mastering of the Second World War in modern German literature 
unfolded in the monthly journal of the GDR Writers’ Union, neue deutsche literature 
(“New German Literature”). The writer Ludwig Renn kicked off the discussion in 1956 
with the question “Why no literature about the war?” He noted critically that in “our 
democratic literature, the dominant collective experience of a whole generation, the 
Second World War, was occasionally historical background but never or rarely the actual 
subject of the narrated events.“
184
 Renn further observed that if at all, the issue of war was 
only addressed by antifascists – by the “old guards” (Willi Bredel, Johannes R. Becher, 
Erich Weinert, Konrad Wolf). What was necessary, however, was a literary treatment of 
those who had not stood on the “right side” from the very beginning but who had been 
“lured or led or pressed by Hitler to the fronts of the Second World War” and for whom 
the war experience had emerged as a “juncture for inner pondering, realization and 
return.”
185
 In other words, Renn called for the literary treatment of the veteran’s 
transformation in war, the experience of “reflection and return.”
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A few months later, Rolf Seeliger resumed the discussion by pointing to the “silent 
generation” and the few “literary partisans in West Germany.”
186
 With an eye on the flood 
of Landserheften and front memoirs in the West, Seeliger demanded an utterly sober, 
realistic description and mastering of the “experienced ruptures war, death and 
catastrophe.” Only a “radicalization of the thematic agenda,” i.e. a description of „cruelly 
mutilated human beings in the madness of war” served the process of drawing lessons 
from the past. Literature about war must not be a mere “interpretation of fate” 
(Schicksalsdeutung), but should be a “doubled reality: the mirrored flashes of reality must 
whip us awake.”
187
 Among the few “partisans” in the West fulfilling this task, Seeliger 
counted Gerd Ledig and his novels Stalin Organ  (1955) – discussed below – and 
Revenge (1956), as well as Ingeborg Bachmann’s lyric.
188
This explicitly political and partisan understanding of war literature was advocated 
once more in a noteworthy essay by the writers Hermann Kant (born 1926) and Frank
Wagner in late 1957. Modern German literature was to be placed at the center, they 
argued, because what was needed was a “great requital” with imperialist war, not a 
186
 Rolf Seeliger, „Schweigende Generation? Literarisches Partisanentum in Westdeutschland“, neue 




 Literary „partisans“ are only those writers who seek to illustrate the connection between the literary 
dealing with the war with current affairs and who in conclusion condemn the „restorative development in 
the Federal Republic,“ i.e. above all its rearmament. Seeliger provides one example which in his view 
fulfils these requirements: one of Ingeborg Bachmann’s poems (ibid., 128):
Der Krieg wird nicht mehr erklärt,
sondern fortgesetzt. Das Unerhörte
ist alltäglich geworden. Der Held
bleibt den Kämpfen fern. Der Schwache
ist in die Feuerzone gerückt.
Die Uniform des Tages ist die Geduld,
die Auszeichnung der armselige Stern
der Hoffnung über dem Herzen. 
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“naturalistic reproduction of the horrors.”
189
 Ultimately, this peculiar understanding of war 
literature would work according to the rule “tell me, what you think about the past war, 
and I will tell you, how you would stand towards a coming one.”
190
 Much like Renn, the 
authors encouraged dealing not with the exception, i.e. Hitler’s opponents of the first 
hour, but with the rule – the “blinded:”
What matters is that literature gets at the nature of things, that it shall search for and describe the 
typical – and all these doubtful, suspecting or even knowing soldiers [depicted in the antifascist 
literature of the ‘old guards’] are not images of the soldier of the German Wehrmacht who has let 
himself be abused by the fascists so shamefully.
191
Here the authors not only reflected the official SED interpretation of the past according to 
which the ordinary soldier was but a passively acting, blinded worker’s son relieved of 
any responsibility for the crimes of the “fascist Wehrmacht,” but Kant and Wagner also 
sought to transport the official discourses over the past into literary life and society as a 
whole. Thus, writers too functioned as messengers of the SED’s strategy of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung.
192
 Accordingly, the essay closed with the call to create 
“positive heroes” of the antifascist fight, heroes who credibly struggled with reformation 
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 Martin Sabrow has described these mechanisms of dominance of the public and academic discourses for 
the GDR-historical sciences, using the terms „discourse on dominance/power“ (Herrschaftsdiskurs) and 
„dominance of discourse“ (Diskursherrschaft). Herrschaftsdiskurs is defined as the „mit verbindlichen 
Denkmustern, Deutungskonzepten und Ausgrenzungen besetzten Verständigungsebenen über die 
Vergangenheit in der DDR, die vor allem von den ideologischen Normen und politischen Ansprüchen der 
sozialistischen Diktatur bestimmt war.“ See Sabrow, „Einleitung: Geschichtsdiskurs und 
Doktringesellschaft“ in Idem, ed., Geschichte als Herrschaftsdiskurs, 9-35, quote on 19. Sabrow’s 
theoretical considerations regarding the ambiguous functions of this „power“ exerted on and in between 
those in power and those subordinated to this power might even be applicable to the GDR literary scene 
during the Ulbricht years even if the institutionalized historical science was under a much more direct 
influence of the SED than the more or less independently working writer. Sabrow views those participating 
in the discourses explicitly not only as powerless subordinates but also as individuals who obtain power 
themselves within their institutional and professional spheres. They thus give the regime a certain amount 
of additional stability and integrative power.
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and return, who “against all inner and external resistance and errors [reached] their new 
insights.”
193
 This was not least of all a question of choosing the right place and setting for 
a war novel, because it was a fact that 
the main decision of World War II was made on the so-called Eastern Front, that the thorough re-
education of German soldiers started almost too late, but eventually not too late in Soviet 
imprisonment, and since the fostering of friendly relations between the entire German people and 
the peoples of the Soviet Union [is] an existential task, we call upon our writers to deal more 
intensively with the fascist attack on the Soviet Union and to keep their focus on this main front of 
the military class struggle – including as background.
194
This orchestrated concentration on the war against the Soviet Union (and the battle of 
Stalingrad as the turning point, as we will see) partly explains why East German literature 
compared to the West appears to have started earlier and more intensively to deal with 
the Eastern Front war. In addition, the explicitly political understanding of literature 
shared by SED strategists and many writers, and the desire to utilize the past for the 
legitimization and implementation of present policies in the most effective possible way, 
have contributed to the focus on the history and consequences of the war against the 
Soviet Union in early GDR literature. Read before this background, the selection of texts 
from East Germany analyzed below represents the result of a literary process which was 
significantly steered and influenced by politics and ideology. Nonetheless, these literary 
texts served not necessarily and not exclusively the creation of politically opportune 
historical narratives, but always dealt with historical reality as well – albeit often tainted 
by a particular worldview. As the observant writer Günter de Bruyn (born 1926) 
retrospectively commented the ambivalent position of the literary artist: in the GDR 
193
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„writing about war and post-war times was only possible by leaving things out and by 
lying if one wanted to be printed during the 1950s and 1960s.”
195
The literary scene in the early FRG was quite different. Despite the pluralistic 
democratic system in place there, most intellectuals viewed themselves as “outcasts” 
during the Adenauer era – as “intellectuals in the offside.” It is commonly believed that 
the bitter realities of the Cold War made writers in the GDR to “henchmen of the 
communist regime,” and West German writers to “outsiders and powerless critics” of a 
reconstruction process they had not wanted the way it evolved.”
196
How inescapable this situation seemed to many West German intellectuals was well 
described by Thomas Mann in an article in the French journal L’Express in the fall of 
1954:
Because of a hapless and sinister world constellation ... we see a mankind whose moral status has been 
severely damaged by the wars of yesterday and before yesterday, torn apart in two camps. Over the 
terribly strained relationship [between these camps] daunts a catastrophe of such gravity that 
civilization would be finished. That the most important border between these camps runs through a 
country, the forlorn Germany, makes the intolerability of this complex situation even clearer.
197
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Hans-Werner Richter two years later described what this untenable situation meant for 
contemporary writers in West Germany. The author and founding member of the famous 
“Group 47” observed in March 1956 on the occasion of the creation of the “Grünwald 
Circle:”
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If you write here a book against war, they quickly see you as fellow traveler over there [drüben, i.e. 
in the GDR], and here occasionally as a man who “poisons” the young soldiers of Mister Blank
[Minister for Defense at the time]. If you write a book, however, about the misery of the expellees 
from the East, you are a henchman of the monopolists paid by the Americans over there, and here 
you are pushed into the corner of Radio Free Europe. For the German intellectuals this situation is 
undoubtably a unique, dangerous and unbearable situation. ... It makes it infinitely more difficult to 
stand up for the truth, for justice and for freedom and it paralyzes honest criticism almost until 
complete paralysis because the edge on which such criticism must wander is thin.
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The feeling of discomfort Richter expressed in these lines was shared by many of his 
young colleagues in the 1950s. He also provided an apt analysis of what many perceived 
as a paralyzed intellectual and cultural climate of those years overshadowed by the heated 
debates about the rearmament of West Germany. In retrospect it has often been noted that 
the contemporary literature of the 1950s was if not apolitical, then un-political, that it was 
a matter of “privacy” for “as an institution [it was] not integrated into the rapidly 
solidifying order” of the young FRG.
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entspringt einer objektiven Notwendigkeit, die solange übermächtig bleibt, als nicht das Bewusstsein sie in 
sich selbst aufnimmt und damit über sie hinausgeht. Die Welt ist aufgeteilt in unmäßige und übermächtige 
Kraftfelder. Der Geist sieht sich vor dem Zwang, entweder sich anzupassen, oder sich zur Isolierung, zur 
Ohnmacht, zur Donquichotterie verurteilt zu sehen.“ See Theodor W. Adorno, Kritik. Kleine Schriften zur 
Gesellschaft, (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1971), 20-33, quote on 29f.
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Nonetheless, the 1950s were years of literary new beginnings and productivity. 
Authors like Heinrich Böll, Günter Grass and Wolfgang Koeppen had their first 
successes.
201
 The literary “mastering” of the war differed greatly from the war literature 
produced by East German writers, it had different forms and emphases. Aside from the 
flood of cheap war novels and memoirs, a few important novels about the battles of 
Leningrad and Stalingrad dominated the literary market and are thus included in the 
following analysis. In general, though, it should be noted that the war on the Eastern 
Front served rather as background or occasional reference point than as central theme in 
West German high literature of the 1950s.
Despite the factual division of Germany there were still a few inner-German debates 
about how to deal with the legacy of the Eastern Front war in contemporary literature. 
One debate in particular stands out for its format and intensity, namely the controversy 
surrounding Gerd Ledig’s novel Stalin Organ – the title refers to a Soviet boxlike rocket 
launcher mounted on a gun carriage widely used by the Red Army in World War II. After 
its release in 1955, the book was reportedly praised as “the best novel about World War 
II” but then was long forgotten until its republication in 2000.
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 Ledig, himself a veteran 
of the Eastern Front, narrated without many flourishes and details but with gruesome 
precision the fighting, suffering and dying of a group of unnamed soldiers near Leningrad 
in 1942. Tenor of the novel is the senselessness of war in which fear and brutalization 
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were the order of the day, and in which a soldier did not fight and die heroically because 
of his commitment to a cause, but perished pitifully because he had no other choice. War 
was not the result of human action but a kind of catastrophe that had come over German 
and Soviet soldiers alike, a calamity dumped on to the shoulders of the common soldier 
by incompetent and ruthless generals.
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Ledig’s novel was praised enthusiastically by the West German press. The weekly 
intellectual paper Die Zeit lauded its “seeming cool style” behind which “the passion of a 
torn heart and the love for the German and Russian men”
204
 lay hidden. The author 
himself sought publication in the GDR. The editors of the book in West Germany, 
however, rejected the idea pointing to the very likely ideological instrumentalization of 
the work by SED-propagandists. Still, the manuscript circulated among East German 
writers, and Anna Seghers in person praised the realistic and deterring portrait of war 
during her speech to the Fourth Writers’ Congress in East Berlin in January of 1956. At 
the same time, a critical review of the novel in neue deutsche literature denounced the 
“nihilistic” undertone of the text and demurred that Ledig had failed to reach the “right” 
insights and conclusions in terms of the ever-and still-raging class struggle:
Gerd Ledig is concerned with war as such, with material war, for which to him the Stalin Organ was 
a symbol; he is less concerned with the fascist character of war, and not at all with its causes. ... To 
him the Russian soldiers are the same poor victims as the German, both not knowing what they are 
fighting for, both only chessmen on the chess board of the generals.
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 This is how Ledig later also explained his anti-war attitude: „Nachdem aber das Unglück des Krieges 
nun einmal über uns hereingebrochen war, konnte man wenigstens erwarten, daß dieser so geführt wurde, 
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 Günther Deicke, „Drei neue westdeutsche Kriegsromane“, neue deutsche literatur, vol. 3, no. 6 (1955), 
139.
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This partly justified criticism encapsulated the nucleus of the East German interpretation 
of the war against the Soviet Union and at the same time illuminates its ideological 
distortion. The review denounced the undifferentiated depiction of German and Russian 
soldiers which blurred the line between aggressors and defenders. The reviewer pointed 
to the need to illustrate that German soldiers had been misled and misused for the evil 
cause of fascism while Soviet soldiers fought for not only their own liberation, but for the 
liberation of the German nation and ultimately for the historical victory of communism as 
well. In the categorical words of Anna Seghers this amounted to the following 
conclusion:
In reality, the fear of life and the fear of death are never identical and [should not] be mixed up in 
the war between the Soviet Union and Hitler fascism. Just as the fight for bread and peace cannot be 
mixed up with the fight for power and profits.
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The Stalinorgel dispute exemplifies the main tendencies in the West and East German 
literature of the post-war years. The majority of West German authors of the so-called 
rubble-literature placed individual suffering in war at the center without subscribing to a 
new version of a collectivist world view. Most East German writers found their 
(collectivized) voice in the official history discourse by drastically and relatively 
authentically depicting the suffering inflicted on the Soviet lands by the German 
Wehrmacht and by idealizing and glorifying the heroes of Soviet and German communist 
resistance. 
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III. “Barbarossa” as Literary Stuff: Stalingrad and the War on the Eastern Front in 
Postwar German Literature, 1945-1960
The following analysis of fifteen novels and short stories from East and West 
German writers is based on a selection of literary texts which deal implicitly or explicitly 
with the history of the war against the Soviet Union.
207
 Thus, while a broad reading 
included works such as Günter Grass’ “Tin Drum,” my analysis makes no references to 
the world-famous novel because even though it is partly set “on” the Eastern Front, i.e. in 
Danzig, the actual war enters only from afar. Grass depicts his hero, the young man 
Oskar stuck in the body of a three-year old, rebelling against militarism, war, and death 
by excessively playing his drum as expression of his resistance against the (Nazi) world 
around him. Yet, he narrates the Eastern Front only selectively, most notably as the 
Germans’ flight/expulsion from their homes in the wake of the intrusion of Russian 
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soldiers (“the Ivans”) into the city. The observant reader notes, for example hints at the 
mass murder in the East when Grass describes how Germans raised their arms to 
surrender to machine-gun bearing Russian soldiers: “That adults raised their arms I 
thought was normal, one knew that from the Wochenschauen.” (376).
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In contrast to Grass’ “Tin Drum,” the works considered in the following analysis 
address the Eastern Front war directly in one way or another. They were written during 
the first postwar years, i.e. between the years 1945 until 1960. The battle most often 
described in German postwar literature, the battle of Stalingrad, was also the subject of 
several texts included here, but it is impossible to include all of them in this context.
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The authors of the texts represent a generation of Germans for whom the Second World 
War, or in some cases even both world wars, had a formative influence on their personal 
biographies. War and its aftermath was one, if not the central theme of most of their 
young and adult lives. 
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 Other scenes include more explicit references to the gassing of humans in Nazi extermination camps, 
see for example the scene in which Oskar is examined by a doctor who knew from his Treblinka experience 
how to handle „disinfecting substances.“ Jews are not mentioned explicitly, rather the text refers to 
hundreds of thousands of “poeple sent to shower.” (396f.)
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The selection of the texts was not primarily determined by the possibility to place them all in the category 
„war novel.“ Rather, I took a broad look at the contemporary book market in order to get a sense of the 
importance and meaning as well as ignorance and negation of the war on the Eastern Front in Germany’s 
postwar literature. All of the selected authors were adults in 1939, about a third had already experienced 
World War One. The majority of the authors had served as soldiers in the I. and/or II. World Wars, eight of 
them had fought on the Eastern Front resp. in Stalingrad.
430
In my analysis I refrain from retelling the plots of the books but instead select scenes 
which illustrate the various ways in which the authors used the war as literary stage, as a 
reference point for describing thoughts and emotions of their leading figures, and which 
exemplify the use of language to depict misery and crimes, victims and perpetrators. The 
reading of all the texts has inspired the following thematic structure of the analysis. A 
first section looks at the historical context in which the stories and literary figures are 
placed, i.e. it asks how the historical background “Eastern Front war” is utilized as 
literary material: is it portrayed as “hit of fate” (Schicksalsschlag), or as a sort of natural 
catastrophe, or as the result of human action; does the question of aggressive war and 
conspiracy to wage war come up at all and if so how is it addressed? Who is fighting for 
what reason? A second section is dedicated to the depiction of the individual soldier’s 
world, his thoughts and emotions. Under the headline “Conscience in Upheaval: Legends 
of Return,” this section deals with the soldier torn between discipline and resistance, thus 
with the issue of personal responsibility, of how to remain a human being responsible for 
one’s own actions when one is caught in the middle of a war of extermination. When 
does a soldier become a murderer? And what about those moments of (supposed) inner 
return, when the conscience is no longer clear and when defeat seems inevitable, 
especially after the “turn” at Stalingrad? How did literature deal with the cathartic 
experience after indoctrination and reformation, and was there something like an 
authentic transformative experience at all beyond the communist master narrative of the 
antifascist turn? Finally, the third sections “Scenarios of Horror: Of Crimes and 
Criminals” discusses how language is used to reconstruct historical horrors, i.e. crime 
scenes, victims’ fates and perpetrators’ actions and motivations. Was there indeed a 
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tendency to merely “reproduce the horrors naturalistically” as Kant and Wagner
criticized? Or could literature do more, could it provide a balanced, emphatic insight into 
the human sufferings during war when soldiers are not always just potential perpetrators 
but also potential victims. 
This set of questions serves as thematic guide. Obviously, many of the texts 
discussed are works of high complexity and textual density who deserve to be read as a 
whole. In this case and without intending to negate these features, I use them as historical 
source in order to examine in which way literature in the 1950s contributed to the 
memory of the war against the Soviet Union and whether these works of art provided 
alternative interpretations beyond the officially propagated narratives of Stalingrad and 
the Eastern Front. Did some of them offer alternative narratives which opened the 
readers’ hearts and minds, and thus the public conscience to a more “empathetic 
understanding of [historical] truth?”
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„WHAT DO THEY ACTUALLY WANT HERE?” – THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
„Death smelled different in Russia than in Africa“ – this is the first sentence of Erich 
Maria Remarque’s remarkable novel Time to Live and Time to Die about the soldier Ernst 
Graeber who witnesses both the war on the Eastern Front as soldier and the bombing of 
German cities at home (5).
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 When it comes to the clear stand about who was responsible 
for “Barbarossa,” this book is unique in the West German literary landscape of the 
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postwar years, maybe because Remarque never returned to Germany from his American 
exile after the war. Despite the fact that the first German editions appeared with 
significant alteration from the original manuscript, the novel represents one of the most 
candid reckonings with the Eastern Front war, and the complicity of the Wehrmacht in 
war crimes.
212
 Just as in All Quiet on the Western Front, Remarque masterfully describes 
the complexity of the manifold sufferings caused by war without equalizing victims’ and 
perpetrators’ fates. That the „meaning of this war“ was the „mass murder of the innocent“ 
alone (196),  was rarely formulated with such clarity and Remarque’s style, free from 
pathos and ideological undertones, stands out for the sober, carefully crafted descriptions 
of individual experiences in the many facets of modern war. The historical context is 
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clear, the reader is not thrown into a war theater somewhere out there on the Eastern 
Front as in most other novels written in West Germany at the time.
Hans-Hellmut Kirst bestselling book Zero-Eight-Fifteen in War, another much less 
sophisticated example, treats war as acting subject and not as an event caused by human 
action. At the very beginning, the reader literally falls into a “resting break” of one 
Patrolman Asch while the war in Russia is waging on:
The war is sleeping his winter sleep, and nobody seems to exist in this area who would be keen on 
disturbing it. But spring stood already at the door and it would also get into the war’s bones and help 
him back on his feet. This first Russian winter sleep was no permanent condition. (5)
For Asch, who embodies the disillusioned, occasionally brazen-ironical and mostly 
indifferent run-of-the-mill-soldier who fights without much qualms and thus is basically 
exchangeable, this war is an “inevitable evil” – like any 08/15-war – that he had not 
started, yet in which he nonetheless had to fight.
213
 This indifferent basic mood implies in 
passing that the Second World War was a war just like any other. To Asch’s relatively 
easy-going superior Wedelmann who entertains a relationship to a Russian “volunteer” 
interpreter, the question of “why” seems easy to answer as a benign dialogue between the 
two “lovers” demonstrates:
’Why must there be war?’ she asked.
‘Without the war we would never have met.’
‘How you say that!’ she responded angrily and withdrew her hand. ‘That is a comfortable excuse and a 
bad one in addition. We could have met at a great sports event, on a vacation trip, somewhere in a 
theatre, in a gallery. Does there always have to be war so that two people from different countries 
encounter?’
‘No, not that. But they wage it!’ (162f.)
213
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For Gerd Ledig’s nameless soldiers in the novel Stalin Organ the question of the 
cause for war never even arises. The novel praised so enthusiastically by contemporary 
critics for its detailed and realistic description of mutilations, injuries and death, deals 
with the suffering on both sides in an – again “senseless” – battle on “Height 308” just 
outside Leningrad during the Winter of 1941/42. The question what the German troops 
had actually brought there does only occur to one Soviet lieutenant, yet no answer is 
given. In view of the impeding doom of the German attack the man ponders over the 
motives of the invaders who rather died than surrendered:
Another such animal, the lieutenant thought. In a cage he behaves like a human, but when he has a 
gun he shoots at corpses. What does he actually want here? This beast with the sheep’s face. His 
home has plenty of heights like this one. I have seen them: green trees, rivers, clean villages. On 
their streets there is no rubble and no dirt. On their fields the ears of corn stand like soldiers. (170)
The most famous novel about the battle of Stalingrad, Theodor Plievier’s Stalingrad 
poses questions in a similar way and sticks to an accusatory tone throughout. This earliest 
and probably most widely-read Stalingrad novel carries a decided condemnation of the 
war on the Eastern Front. Above all, it denounces the generals as “corpse-deliverers” and 
“executioners of their own soldiers.” The limitless sufferings of both German and 
Russian soldiers are depicted en detail, and again, the ordinary soldiers seem to have no 
idea why and for what cause he is fighting. At least, the novel questions Hitler’s reasons 
for waging this war:
What are we dying for, General? Will our wives, our children dry their tears on the flags of victory 
or will they have to cry forever?  Was this war necessary, was this war forced upon us and is it about 
a great and sacred cause, is this war just and is it about Germany? Do we defend Germany at 
Njeschegol, on the Oskol, Don and Volga Rivers, General? (28)
In Heinrich Gerlach’s saga about the Betrayed Army in the “winter of horror 1942/43 
somewhere near Stalingrad“ the title already implies that the war was started by Hitler
and his henchmen, and that the Wehrmacht was merely misused as an instrument for 
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“saving the world from Bolshevism” (188). The hero of the novel, a rank and file soldier 
from a working class family, learns from one of his more honest superiors that this was 
however a “fairytale,” that war was a “business, nothing else. Big industry and big 
business did not fund the [Nazi] party for nothing; of course they finally want to see 
dividends” (188).
Most East German authors leave no doubt as to who had caused this war. Willi 
Bredel’s novel The Grandchildren from his family trilogy Relatives and Acquaintances
tells the story of the worker family Hardekopf in Hamburg from the Kaiserreich to 1945. 
Is set at the home and the Eastern Front simultaneously. On June 22, 1941, the beginning 
of “Barbarossa,” a friend runs into antifascist Walter Hardekopf’s house and breaks the 
news: “It’s war!... Hitler has attacked the Soviet Union!” (359) – implying in its way that 
the war had started only then. A few pages down the author describes how the „war of 
extermination [is spreading] like a giant wild fire over Russia” (378). Franz Fühmann’s 
remarkable short story Comrades
214
about the entanglement of a young soldier in a murder 
and its consequences has the three main characters Josef, Thomas and Karl discuss the 
official Nazi version of why this war was waged and thereby hints at the aggressive, 
offensive nature of the invasion of Russia:
‘Now we want to occupy Russia then,’ said a low voice, ‘Moscow, the Urals, as far as the Pacific.’ 
Weirdly, although the voice swung so low, it drowned all noises, and it made all mouths silent. The 
silence was an unbearable burden, laid on everyone. ‘What ...,’ said Josef, he spoke very hoarsely, 
‘what – of course we go against the Bolsheviks. It had to come like this.’ He suddenly started to 
shout: ‘It had to come like this, better today than tomorrow.’ ‘Better an end with horror…,’ said 
214
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Karl and laughed. ‘Now, everything will be alright, little fellow,’ said [Josef to Thomas], ‘with the 
three of us, with Germany and with the whole world.’ (32f.)
In most texts it is the soldiers who first realize that nothing would be alright – the 
men, boys, fathers and sons in uniform. Their sacrifice is not stylized as a heroic front 
experience like in the novels of Ernst Jünger after World War One.
215
 Rather, their being 
human is at the center of attention. Ledig describes most explicitly that fear is not 
cowardice and being attached to life is not high treason. The captain without a name, for 
example, “wanted to live, like they all wanted to live. He had come to the conclusion that 
it would be better to not become a hero and instead to stay alive.” (Stalinorgel, 9). For, 
„somewhere women wait for their men, children for their fathers“ (87). The nameless 
sergeant who prevents a nameless radio operator from running away during an attack, 
asks: „Are you afraid?“ “Yes,” the operator responds. The sergeant says calmly yet 
determined: “Me too, shoot!” (64) 
The youngest soldiers like this radio operator receive the most attention, those who 
had spent their summer vacations under the motto „We are born to die“ in Nazi youth 
camps during the 1930s. Wolfgang Borchert and Heinrich Böll, the young postwar 
writers who gave a voice to this “lost generation,” dedicated much of their early work to 
the suffering of soldiers, prisoners of war and returnees who after the end of the war were 
perceived as victimized, traumatized wanderers. With their works – eager to prevent that 
notions of a misunderstood heroism would ever again lead to a celebration of war – these 
young poets embodied the absence of a new “myth of the war experience,”  the 
215
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Thomas Nevin, Ernst Jünger and Germany.: Into the Abyss, 1914-1945 (Durham: Duke University Press, 
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impossibility of a new celebration of military values after World War II. Böll once 
reflected on war as the main theme underpinning his life and work; to him, the war would 
never be over “as long as there is one wound still bleeding from it.”
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In his short story On the Road, Wolfgang Borchert called this generation the 
“generation without fare-well” and he considered himself to be one of them: 
We are the generation without bond and without depth. Our depth is the abyss. We are the 
generation without luck, without home and without fare-well. Our sun is narrow, our love is cruel 
and our youth is without youth. And we are the generation without boundaries, without restraints 
and protection – expelled from the playpen of childhood. … (59)
The experience of war and imprisonment remains in the abstract historical 
background, the reader is to fathom its horrors. In his famous play The Man Outside,
Borchert apostrophized this experience with the phrase “1000 days of cold.”
217
 A young 
woman whose husband went missing at Stalingrad finds the returnee Beckmann on the 
shore of the Elbe River outside Hamburg after a failed suicide attempt. The martyrdom at 
Stalingrad evolves only in insinuations with the women mentioning one of her own loved 
ones missing since the battle: 
Girl (bitter, softly): Starved, frozen, left laying there – who knows. Since Stalingrad he is missing. 
That was three years ago.  
Beckmann (motionless): In Stalingrad? In Stalingrad, yes. Yes, in Stalingrad, not a few guys were 
left laying there. But a few return. And they then wear the clothes of those, who don’t return. (114)
Heinrich Böll’s short story about an Attack of the Red Army on the Western lines of 
the Eastern Front during the last days of war, limits the description of the war context to 
the melancholic illustration of the “indifferent stiffness of the grey creatures” who await 
the next round of slaughtering in some dirty hole: “Meager bushes behind them, a field of 
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sunflowers churned up by tanks, and a forest again, a bright, green forest; but it was so 
meaningless: soil was soil, and war was war” (32).
Yet, the focus on the soldier as victim of indoctrination and war nonetheless leads 
once again to his idealization, only this time he became the hero of suffering, an anti-
hero. The exemplary heroes of suffering were the Stalingrad fighters whose individual 
stories were reproduced uncounted times in German postwar literature. Plievier’s 
Stalingrad saga provides a representative characterization of the forlorn anti-hero of 
World War II: 
The Stalingrad soldier, his humbleness, his ability to adjust, tenacity, perseverance, quiet enduring 
of torments, his on-time obedience, his endurance and fighting will until the last – what greatness of 
un-pathetic and silent fighterdom [Kämpfertum]! And finally his faith as well, his unconditional 
faith which was his greatest [virtue] and became his greatest guilt! What a memorial do you intend 
to put up for him, my gentlemen, what inscription to chisel into his gravestone? (301)
„CONSCIENCE IN UPHEAVAL:” LEGENDS OF RETURN
The phrase „Conscience in Upheaval” stems from the title of the autobiography of 
one of those former Wehrmacht officers who had experienced an “antifascist turn” in 
Soviet imprisonment.
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 In GDR literature those figures dominated the scene for whom the 
war symbolized an experience of inner transformation. To Bodo Uhse, they were the true 
Patriots, a “new generation of strong, fearless human beings free from any worries” (10), 
exemplarily embodied by the Soviet man. Uhse’s novel about the struggle of German 
communists fighting the German armies before Moscow is the literary pendant to the 
SED’s master narrative of Germany’s liberation by the Red Army and a handful of 
decent, “good Germans, German communists” – the true patriots. For “to confess to a 
218
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certain cause in the hour of danger is not as hard as to stand by it in the hour of shame 
and humiliation” (12).
In reality, most soldiers did not join the resistance but fought as „Hitler’s soldiers” 
(42) until the bitter end of the „fascist Wehrmacht.“ After the war, the legacy of this army 
and its understanding of soldierdom was dealt with in differing ways in the two 
Germanys. In the literature under scrutiny here, the German soldier has many faces, many 
characters. Not rarely the conflict between discipline and conscience is discussed in one 
form or another, often to the effect that the “little man” in uniform was not the master of 
his own will, even stopped being a human being. He was more or less responsible himself 
for becoming a conspirator and perpetrator in the criminal war against the Soviet Union. 
Seldom the legend of the “clean Wehrmacht” is the central motif and constant theme of a 
novel or short story; rather, the authors introduce varying characters who each represent a 
certain type: the fanatic Nazi, the profiteer and career man, convinced anti-Nazi or 
transformed hanger-on. In the works of East German writers, the communist hero 
dominates the scene even though he is often contrasted with a particularly spiteful Nazi in 
uniform. 
 Harry Thürk’s intriguing novel The Hour of the Dead Eyes which stirred a heated 
debate in the GDR
219
 addresses the brutalization of the soldier and his role as an 
instrument of murder. Ultimately, the soldier here appears not to be responsible for his 
deeds as individual because he was to function, and indeed functioned well, as killing 
machine. The young, experienced soldier Thomas Bindig looks back on one year of 
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fighting on the Eastern Front in his company in 1944, and the reader is granted a look 
into his mind:
[He had] learned what it meant to be a soldier. It meant that you obtained a special, subordinated 
place within the human race; that you were not to think about your actions and neither about the 
future and the past. If you managed to do that, you lacked nothing. (16f.)
... Germany has bred faultless soldiers. They don’t even bite on their lips when they kill. Young and 
cold. They kill like butchers. (21)
According to this view, Nazi indoctrination had been immensely successful in 
turning the German youth into reliable henchmen and executioners of the regime. 
Another example is Fühmann’s faltering hero Josef who justifies his profession as 
“murderer” while reading Nietzsche’s Zarathustra and finds his peace of conscience in 
the words of the great philosophers:
He read into a world which was cold, frosty and empty, populated only by One, that was him; and 
there was something around this One, something swarming, undifferentiated, a mass, a throng of the 
living, deep down below him: people. ... Thus spoke Zarathustra: ‘You made a profession out of the 
danger, there is nothing to be said against that. Now your job is your ruin: for this I want to bury you 
with my hands.’ Thus spoke Zarathustra. Josef found his most secret thoughts confirmed. He 
thought: Zarathustra understands the myth of danger, the myth of death, Zarathustra understands the 
German soldier. To make a profession out of the danger, just for the sake of danger, that is great, 
that is German! The Nibelungen wandered into their certain doom and they knew it but they still 
went to the Huns’ lands; they perished, and their death was their fulfillment. And they also beheaded 
an innocent child and still, no, that is why they were heroes: It also needs heroism to behead 
innocent children! (34f.)
Being a soldier against one’s own will is also the central theme of Borchert’s novel 
The Man Outside whose tragic, tired returnee Beckmann realizes laconically that he had 
never actually been a soldier. Confronting his former superior with his feelings of guilt 
(about the death of eleven of his comrades) which deprive him of sleep after his return, 
the colonel warns him: “Na na na na! Don’t you talk such unmanly nonsense. You were a 
soldier, weren’t you?” Beckmann denies that and when he is asked „Why not? You are 
wearing a uniform,” Beckmann simply replies: “Yes, for six years. But I always thought 
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that when I’d wear the uniform of a mailman for ten years that would still not make a 
mailman out of me.”
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Yet, again and again also those soldiers are portrayed who immerse in their role as 
soldier, those alleged “perpetrators of conviction,” who had given up thinking 
independently and were willing to fight in any war. Kirst’s ironic and disillusioned
protagonist patrolman Asch not only mocks his superior but also despises some of his 
comrades because: “soldiers are not asked for their opinion. Some even like that. They 
prefer giving their blood rather than to start using their brains” (9f.). Yet, ultimately these 
were all “poor wretches. And you are a poor wretch yourself,” he ponders a few days 
later, “many poor wretches in the world!” (127)
SCENARIOS OF HORROR: OF CRIMES AND CRIMINALS
For a long time the suffering of „the others,” namely of civilians, Jews, Soviet POWs 
and „partisans” who were killed and tortured during the war on the Eastern Front did not 
receive the appropriate measure of empathetic attention in neither the political nor the 
literary discourses over the past. Yet, occasionally the suffering was verbalized in 
postwar German literature. The language used ranged from clinical to realistic, from 
nebulous insinuations to drastically depicted scenarios of violence, torture and death.
Johannes R. Becher’s drama Winter Battle tells the story of Johannes Hörder, the 
personification of the „unknown soldier of the Second World War.” Hörder is fighting in 
the battle of Moscow and the reader witnesses his experience of inner return and 
reformation. Only vaguely, as so often, the reasons for this transformation are hinted at: 
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the crimes of the Wehrmacht and SS in the occupied Eastern territories at and behind the 
front lines remain schematic and unclear. While on leave from the front, Johannes reports 
about his “long journey” through Poland and Russia:
I came through Poland. Hatred I saw, nothing but hatred. There I saw t h e hatred ... And in Russia I 
saw, there I saw ... Yes, I am exhausted from a long, far journey. It is exhausting, Anna, such a 
seeing. ... (123)
The insinuated witnessing of crimes committed on the Eastern Front is what also 
inspired the inner return of Stephan Hermlin’s young Lieutenant Yorck of Wartenburg, a 
fictional conspirator of the 20 July 1944 plot against Hitler.
221
 Shortly before his 
execution, the young man dreams of his liberation and a national uprising against Hitler 
in Germany. But in reality there was no uprising in Germany; instead: “Our SS-mobs 
shoot the children of Charkov; we must wade in blood up to our knees before we begin to 
think” (29). This is one rare concrete reference to a real crime in the history of the 
Eastern Front war.
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 The short drama ends with the programmatic observation that the 
historical failure of Germans to dispose of their tyrant can only be overcome by a 
complete break with the past, or rather by evading it, just as it was later realized in 
Hermlin’s socialist Germany:  “Escape and escape again – only that is the future: 
conversion and forgetting” (37).
Just like this example, many texts include scenes of horror, suffering of civilians, 
destruction and deprivation albeit as brief, scattered sequences; only rarely do they take 
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up more than one or two pages. Anna Segher’s The Dead stay Young contains 
descriptions of expulsion of Soviet civilians, of devastated villages and lynched persons 
on the road side (485, 469, 492); Plievier mentions twice the inhuman treatment of Soviet 
POWs by their German captors (30, 136). Fühmann’s Comrades witness the cold-
blooded execution of innocent Russians for the murder of the Captain’s daughter (for 
which the “comrades” themselves were responsible) (42-46). The individual 
entanglement of the soldier into the war of extermination, however, is nowhere described 
more vividly and compellingly as in Remarque’s first chapter in Time to Live, Time to 
Die. Ernst Graeber’s involvement in an execution of Russian “partisans” is one of the 
most realistic and complex literary scenes addressing the question of individual guilt, the
circle of violence in war and the group dynamics in a military unit: almost the entire 
specter of human action and emotion becomes tangible, maybe even comprehensible. The 
scene is worth being quoted at length for its exceptional intensity:
Day-light dawned. Steinbrenner spat: ‘Shooting – way to good for this mob! To waste ammunition for 
that! One should hang them!’ ‘Where,’ Sauer looked around, ‘do you see a tree anywhere? Or should 
we make a gallows ourselves? And from what?’ ‘There they are,’ said Graeber. Mücke appeared with 
the four Russians. The two soldiers walked before and behind them. The old Russian came first; the 
women followed after him, and then the two younger men. Without an order the four of them stood in 
a row before the ditch. The woman looked down before she turned around. She wore a red woolen 
skirt.
Lieutenant Müller from the first platoon emerged from the house of the company commander. He 
stood in for Rahe at the execution. It was ridiculous, but often they still stuck to the formalities. 
Everyone knew that the four Russians were perhaps partisans, and perhaps not – but they were 
interrogated and sentenced with all formalities. Without ever having had a real chance. What was to be 
investigated anyway? They allegedly had weapons. Now they were shot, with all formalities and in the 
presence of an officer. As if they would care. (18f.)
... The group of soldiers stood still. Graeber felt his rifle. He had taken of his gloves again. The steel 
stuck cold to his thumb and forefinger. Hirschmann stood next to him. He was all yellow, but he stood 
motionless. Graeber decided to shoot at the Russian to the far left. Initially he had always shot in the 
air when he was ordered to an execution but that was over. You didn’t do a favour to those who were 
to be shot. Others had thought the same way; and it happened that almost all shot to the side on 
purpose. The execution then had to be repeated. And the prisoners were executed twice. (21)
... ‘Fire!’ came the command. The Russian seemed to rise and move towards Graeber. He bent and fell 
back ... The other two fell were they had stood. The one without the boots had raised his arms in the 
last moment to protect his face. One hand hung on the tendons like a rag. None of the Russians had the 
hands tied up and the eyes blind-folded. It had been forgotten. The women had fallen ahead. She 
wasn’t dead. She pushed herself up with her hands, the face upright and looked at the group of soldiers. 
Steinbrenner had a satisfied look on his face. No one but him had shot at her. ... She didn’t seem to 
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realize that Mücke approached her sullenly from the side. She hissed and hissed and only in the last 
moment did she see the revolver. She turned her head suddenly and bit in Mücke’s hand. Mücke cursed 
and hit her on the lower jaw with his left hand. And when her teeth yielded, he shot her in the neck. 
(22f.)
The extraordinary situations in which Graeber finds himself in again and again in 
this war are rare literary examples for an early challenge of the “myth of the clean 
Wehrmacht.” Remarque’s novel is in fact the only example on my reading list that 
attempts to disentangle the web of options for action for a soldier in war. That these 
options oscillated between the brutalization of war, the relative (but not absolute) 
powerlessness of the individual, the will and courage to resist and the act of killing 
arbitrarily becomes vividly clear in the above-quoted scene. Someone like Graeber is 
indeed a tragic figure caught in the brutal dynamics of war. Yet, others in the group are 
credible examples of men who adapted willingly and energetically to the requirements of 
a “race war” and “war of world views” on the Eastern Front. Remarque’s novel begins 
with this scene and all subsequently described sufferings of the soldier Graeber at the 
front and in his bomb-stricken home town remain overshadowed by the crimes 
committed by German soldiers on the front. In most other works the protagonists are 
bystanders, witnesses of crimes, only rarely are they depicted as actively participating 
perpetrators– not even in those cases where the later “antifascist turn” promises to 
exonerate the soldier from his misdeeds. 
Even less common than the hint at the criminal conduct of Wehrmacht soldiers are 
explicit references to the Holocaust. The mass murder of six million Jews could not have 
been carried out without the war waged on the Soviet Union. Without the Wehrmacht 
occupying the Eastern territories it could not have been executed the way it was. 
Nonetheless, the Jewish fates, anti-Semitism and race-hatred play only a marginal role in 
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the works examined here. Bredel mentions the “concentration and extermination camps” 
in passing, in which “millions of people were gassed and burned without the smallest 
guilt, only because they were racially or politically undesirable” (The Grandchildren, 
587). Anna Seghers describes in one place a Jewish transport leaving Berlin towards 
Poland under the eyes of non-Jewish Berliners (The Dead Stay Young, 520, 525f.). And 
some of the most cut-out scenes in Remarque’s Time to Live and Time to Die depict the 
burning, gassing and shooting of Jews.
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Cooperation between Wehrmacht troops and SS/SD-execution commands was the 
order of the day in the war on the Eastern Front. In the numerous battle descriptions it is 
as good as non-existent. One exception is a compelling scene in Heinrich Gerlach’s The 
Betrayed Army: soldier Lakosch encounters a group of “foreign-looking, black 
creatures,” which is rounded up for execution by a German Landsers. Responding to 
Lakosch’s “stupid question” why they were shot, one of the men says: “Why? 
Supposedly they shot! – Besides, it’s all their fault” (183). Infected with the “bloodlust,” 
Lakosch wants to help with the execution although he had noticed just a moment earlier 
that he could not quite see the connection between those forlorn guys and the “Jewish 
conspirators on Wallstreet and in the Kremlin.” Only the decided intervention of an 
officer who demanded to see the order for execution prevented the Jews from being shot. 
Later Lakosch’s thoughts repeatedly wander back to this scene leaving his conscience in 
unrest:
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He saw the awful fear of death in the eyes of the Jewish men, saw the deep-down hatred of a people 
that for thousands of years were only trampled on and abused. ... And he saw himself, the gun in his 
hand - - And what remained was disgust and shame and the burning desire to be able to erase what had 
happened, or at least the memory thereof. No, thought Lakosch, this is no war anymore, this is … he 
found no words for what tortured him. (186f.)
Gerlach’s novel ends in a prisoner of war camp with the insight that delusion and 
indoctrination had turned soldiers into criminals. Ultimately, personal responsibility had 
its limits. Why men fight in war of which most knew that it was unjust and criminal is a 
main motif in most texts. The literary answer to the crimes committed and their mastering 
was thus none of negating these crimes but one of explanatory justification, namely that 
German soldiers had acted in the belief to serve a noble cause. Representative for this 
way of literary Vergangenheitsbewältigung is Gerlach’s version of the end of the war:
‘Comrades!’ said [the captain to his soldiers shortly before they surrendered to the Red Army]. ‘We 
are finished. And this end is hard. We all didn’t want this. But we were silent and obeyed in the 
belief to be serving a good cause. That the dress we are wearing today is no longer a dress of honor 
is not our fault. ... We were soldiers of the Führer … We want to learn to be human beings again!’ 
(556)
The knowledge of crimes, the parallelism of being a victimizer and a victim, and the 
only too human desire to mourn and to forget, were probably the decisive experiences 
and emotions at the end of this total war, and indeed not only for many former 
Wehrmacht soldiers but also for Germans on the “home front.” It was not only a question 
of existential stabilization in divided postwar Germany that all energies concentrated on 
the material reconstruction and the future but also an expression of the very human need 
to settle with the past, to somehow overcome it.
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This need is eloquently expressed by Remarque’s main character Ernst Graeber who 
is shot at the end of the war by a group of “partisans” he helped to liberate.
224
 During the 
war, at the end of one of his leaves from the front he visits his former school teacher 
Pohlmann – a regime-critic and religious man – and ultimately finds no answers to his 
questions: 
‘I want to know, in how far I was involved in the crimes of the last ten years,’ he says. ‘And I want to 
know what I shall do.’ ... I have read quite a bit,’ says Graeber. ‘And heard a lot. I also know that the 
war is lost. And I know that we only keep on fighting because the government, the party and the people 
who caused everything can stay in power a bit longer in order to cause even more harm.’ 
‘You know all that?’ asked [Pohlmann]. 
‘I know it now. I didn’t always know it.’
‘And you have to go back out?’
‘Yes.’
‘That’s terrible.’
‘It is even more terrible to have to go back out and to know it and perhaps to become an accomplice. 
Will I become one?’
Pohlmann said nothing. ‘What do you mean?’ he asked after a while, whispering. 
‘You know what I mean. ... In how far will I become an accomplice if I know that not only this war is 
lost but also that we have to lose it so that the slavery, the murder, concentration camps, SS and SD, 
mass extermination and inhumanity will stop – if I know that and go back out there again in two weeks 
to keep on fighting for this? ... When is it murder what we usually call heroism? If you don’t believe in 
its reasons anymore? Or in its purpose? Where is the boundary?’ (195-197)
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This reflective depth was rare. Yet, reflection itself was not the exception in the war 
literature in postwar East and West Germany. The high literature of those years offered 
those who sought it, fictitious space for individual pondering about one’s own history, 
about one’s own entanglements, feelings and inner conflicts. It thus stood in contrast to 
the official politics of overcoming the past, of drawing a final line under the dark Nazi 
years as advocated by the political elites in both Germany’s in different ways during the 
1950s. This conclusion is plausible if we realize that for Germans the memories of war 
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were an integral part of their personal lives and emotional worlds – in whatever form, 
kept alive or suppressed, communicated or evaded, selectively recaptured or comfortably 
distorted. These memories were present and demanded some form of settlement. 
Contemporary literature beyond the mass market of generals’ memoirs and Landserheften 
offered a multitude of explanatory narratives and literary heroes fit to provide 
identification or role models. Quite unseasonably, reading this literature demanded more 
often than not a differentiated and critical consideration of the nation’s and its citizens’ 
gruesome past. 
Before I turn to the transformations in the political memory of the Eastern Front 
during the 1960s to 1980s, the next chapter serves as a transition from the era of 
Adenauer’s politics of the past spanning the “long 1950s” (Norbert Frei) to the era of 
Détente. It widens the chronological view and shifts attention from the official narratives 
to the rituals of official commemoration between 1949 and 1989. It recaptures how the 
political elites in both Germanys wanted their citizens to remember, to mourn, to honor 
their “own” dead – as well as the “others” – in context of the Eastern Front memory. The 
way these commemoration ceremonies and themes changed over time, only slightly in 
East but swiftly in the West, reflects both the swayings of Cold War rivalry and the 
changing domestic needs for a ritualized memory of the Eastern Front.
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Chapter 9
Rites of June, Rites of November: The Politics of War Memory in 
Divided Germany, 1949-1989
“Thousands of tanks destroyed the land,
Behind them just death and misery,
Miles of Soviet territory burned,
Cities dismembered in rubble and debris.
Yet, above the hatred, all the gloom,
Rose the victorious Soviet Union.
Brotherly she offers her helping hands,
As well to our German lands.”
From a songbook of the Free German Youth (1952)
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I. Rites of June: June 22 as Official Memorial Day in East Germany
Political regimes generally assume that the regular and ritualized celebration of 
official memorial days increases their legitimacy and popular acceptance. In both 
democratic and dictatorial systems, memorial days function as collective events which 
are believed to endow society with a sense of identity and belonging. They are important 
elements of the respective political culture – reflecting it and shaping it at the same time.
1
Neither in East nor in West Germany was June 22 such a national holiday. The purpose 
of this chapter is, however, to demonstrate that in the case of the GDR it played a hitherto 
largely neglected role as a key “recallable date”
2
 in the SED’s official calendar of 
commemoration. None of the standard works on the official memorial and national 
holiday calendar in the GDR contains a reference to the annual, centrally and locally held 
1
 Dietmar Schiller, „Politische Gedenktage in Deutschland,“ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (APuZ) 
25/1993, 32-39. Rüdiger Voigt, „Mythen, Rituale und Symbole in der Politik,“ in idem, ed., Symbole der 
Politik, Politik der Symbole (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1989), 9-38. With a focus on the specific 
memorial cultures in the GDR and FRG, cf. Sabine Behrenbeck, „Rituale des Zwiespalts. Politische 
Feiertage in Ost und West,“ in Peter Bender et al., eds., Zeichen und Mythen in Ost und West (= Rostocker 
Philosophische Manuskripte, Neue Folge, 6 (1999)), 45-70. Jan-Holger Kirsch, „’Sichtbarer Beweis der 
bewältigten Vergangenheit?’ Deutsche Gedenktage als strategische Erzählungen vom 
Nationalsozialismus“, in Jahrbuch Zentrum für Niederlande-Studien, 12 (2001), 81-104. Ralf Rytlewski, 
Detlve Kraa, “Politische Rituale in der Sowjetunion und der DDR,” in APuZ 3 (1987), 33-48. On the 
emergence of official memorial culture(s) in Germany since the Weimar Republic see most recently Insa 
Eschebach, Öffentliches Gedenken. Deutsche Erinnerungskulturen seit der Weimarer Republik
(Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag, 2005). Eschebach contrasts the „acts of public commemoration which in 
West Germany have become a prevalent medium of collective self-communication [verbreiteten Medium 
kollektiver Selbstverständigung]” with the “state official, uniform memorial” in the GDR. Ibid., 9f. For a 
general introduction into the study of war and remembrance in the twentieth century see Jay Winter, 
Emmanuel Sivan, eds., War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century  (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), esp. 6-39. and Winter, ed., Remembering War: The Great War Between Memory
and History in the Twentieth Century (Yale Univ. Press, 2006).
2
 To borrow Edgar Wolfrum’s phrase „abrufbare Schlüsseldaten,” Cf. Edgar Wolfrum, Geschichtspolitik, 
24, fn. 9, see also below, fn. 8.
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rituals on June 22.
3
 The ritualized commemoration of June 22, 1941 was also essential to 
the party’s attempts to substitute the lack of popular support with a sense of collective 
identity.
4
 In West Germany, remembering “Barbarossa” was long a matter left to popular 
culture and the media, yet the general shift in the politics of memory in the 1960s 
gradually fostered a more balanced representation and interpretation of the Eastern Front 
war. The second part of this chapter discusses this shift in context of the speeches held on 
Volktrauertag (“National Day of Mourning”) every November in the Federal Republic.
This chapter traces the genesis of June 22 as memorial day back to the late 1940s and 
ventures well into the 1980s in order to detect the long-term changes and continuities in 
what I call the “Rites of June” in the GDR, and the “Rites of November” in the FRG. 
Both rites illustrate how, in the long run, the “politics of war memory and 
commemoration” shaped divided Germany’s political cultures, and vice versa.
5
 The 
ceremonies held to commemorate June 22 in East and West Germany were not only the 
result of an already existing set of historical views, political ideas, and ideologies. They 
3
 The ritualized commemoration included heavy media coverage, memorial services and silent 
demonstrations before monuments and on cemeteries, exhibits and discussions in Houses of German-Soviet 
Friendship, ect. See Monika Gibas, “’Auferstanden aus Ruinen und der Zukunft zugewandt.’ Politische 
Feier- und Gedenktage der DDR,“ in Sabine Behrenbeck, Alexander Nützenadel, eds., Inszenierungen des 
Nationalstaats. Politische Feiern in Italien und Deutschland seit 1860/71 (Köln: SH-Verlag, 2000), 191-
220. Ralf Rytlewski, Birgit Sauer, “Die Ritualisierung des Jahres. Zur Phänomenologie der Feste und 
Feiern in der DDR,” in Wolfgang Luthhardt, Arno Waschkuhn, eds., Politik und Representation: Beiträge 
zur Theorie und zum Wandel politischer und sozialer Institutionen (Marburg: SP-Verlag, 1988), 265-285. 
Vorsteher, ed., Parteiauftrag: Ein neues Deutschland. And Rytlewski, Kraa, “Politische Rituale in der 
Sowjetunion und der DDR.”
4
 Rytlewski and Kraa have aptly summarized these attempts: “The highly visible deficits of official 
ideologies force politics to break new ground: Bureaucratic rule seeks to implement socio-cultural policies. 
Forms of crisis management dominate, and, as integrating ideologies, are to generate limited consent, 
diffuse identification and to hinder conflict among the population… The ritualization of politics is one such 
form. It must be understood as both directed socialization and ideologization of the conscience.” 
Rytlewski/Kraa, “Politische Rituale in der Sowjetunion und der DDR,” 34. 
5
 Ashplant, ed., The Politics of War Memory, esp. the introduction.
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also influenced the respective modes of Vergangenheitsbewältigung. Memory is both a 
product of political culture, and a factor shaping it. Further, this expedition through four 
decades of East and West German memorial culture is intended to serve as a hinge 
connecting the thus far presented analysis of the political memory of the Eastern Front 
until the building of the wall, with the eras of Ostpolitik under Willy Brandt, and of “late 
socialism” under Erich Honecker. 
While in West Germany, the memory of Stalingrad and “Operation Barbarossa” was 
long popularized not by the political elites but by the mass media, the East German 
communists – believing to invoke the right lessons learned from history and to utilize 
them for their quest for political legitimacy – anticipated early on the ideological-political 
potential of these key events, and thus the importance of their appropriate 
commemoration. Over time, February 2, the day of the Sixth Army’s capitulation at 
Stalingrad, received only secondary attention. The central historical date was (next to VE 
Day) June 22, 1941, the day of the Wehrmacht’s attack on the Soviet Union. As the 
following analysis of the annual Rites of June, i.e. the ritualized and canonized 
commemoration of the beginning of “Operation Barbarossa,” shows, June 22 was a set 
date in the SED’s official memorial calendar. The DSF, too, took special care to establish 
the date as regular memorial-day.
6
 In addition to the three other World War II memorial 
6
 See, for example, a list of commemoration days attached to the 1953 “yearly perspective plan for 
activities in universities and institutions of higher education.” Next to the adaptation of  “scientific 
knowledge” from the Soviet Union and the “deepening of respect” for it, the “plan” included a list of 
memorial-days to be celebrated: among them Lenin’s death (January 21), founding of the Soviet Army 
(February 23), Marx’ birthday and death (May 5, March 14), VE Day and June 22, the 36
th
 anniversary of 
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days – May 8 (“International Fighting and Memorial Day of the Workers and 
Anniversary of the Liberation from Fascism”), September 1 (“Anniversary of the 
Beginning of the Hitler War”), and the second Sunday in September (“International 
Memorial Day for the Victims of Fascist Terror and Fighting Day against Fascism and 
Imperialist War”) – the commemoration of June 22 constituted a fourth, equally 
important memorial day. This quadrangle in the GDR’s official memorial calendar 
contained the key events of World War II as the SED saw them: the outbreak of the war 
on September 1, 1939, the invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, and the end of 
the war on May 8, 1945. The SED completed the calendar with the “Week of the 
Brotherhood in Arms,” starting annually on February 23, the anniversary of the founding 
of the Red Army, and the “Month of German-Soviet Friendship,” celebrated every 
November around the anniversary of the “Great Socialist October Revolution.”
7
 The SED 
elevated June 22 to the pantheon of “recallable key dates” in recent German history –
dates always available for recall in the collective memory of East Germany’s citizens.
8
Interestingly, the celebration of June 22 – albeit a set annual ritual in the USSR –
seemed not to have been the result of instructions from the Kremlin. Unlike the VE Day 
parades and ceremonies which were largely copied from the Soviet example, the 
the October Revolution (November 7) and Stalin’s birthday (December 21). See BA/SAPMO, DY 32/4941, 
14.  
7
 See the annual cycle described by Rytlewski/Sauer, “Die Ritualisierung des Jahres. Zur Phänomenologie 
der Feste und Feiern in der DDR,” esp. 281. May 8 was the only World War II Memorial Day that was also 
a national holiday; the two other holidays were May 1 (International Labor Day), and October 7 (Day of the 
Republic). See also Gibas, “’Auferstanden aus Ruinen und der Zukunft zugewandt.’“
8
 This borrows from Edgar Wolfrum who has pointed to several older „abrufbare Schlüsseldaten” which to 
Germans carried a set meaning and connotation and with the help of which certain political decisions were 
legitimized and explained. He cites recent World War I research, for example, according to which dates 
such as 1756, 1813 and 1870 have been found to have played a major role in emotionalizing and mobilizing 
Germans for going to war in 1914. Edgar Wolfrum, Geschichtspolitik, 24, fn.9.
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commemoration of June 22 in the GDR was directed autonomously by the SED.
9
Naturally, Ulbricht’s personal experiences on and memories of the antifascist struggle on 
the Eastern Front assured an “appropriate” commemoration of the events which was fully 
in accordance with Moscow’s master narrative of the Great Patriotic War. This personal 
factor is of great importance for the genesis of the June 22 memory as it emerged over the 
first two postwar decades. What became the established narrative under Ulbricht later 
remained largely unchanged under his successor Erich Honecker – a man with no veteran 
memories of the Eastern Front war. While the content of the Eastern Front memory did 
not change much over four and a half decades until 1989, the way the SED’s 
propagandists contextualized the historical events and related them to the present altered 
significantly. Furthermore, certain aspects of the story, e.g. the role of Stalin or the 
German High Command’s involvement in war crimes, were either downplayed or 
emphasized depending on the current state of affairs and on the propagandistic needs of 
the day. 
In general, seven recurring themes can be identified in the propaganda surrounding 
every fifth and tenth June 22 anniversary, all of which became fixed motifs in GDR’s 
Eastern Front memory. The war against the Soviet Union was the worst crime committed 
during World War II; it was based on the “greatest lie ever,” namely of a “Bolshevist 
threat in the East;” the Wehrmacht’s crusade was doomed from the start; the Eastern 
Front was the decisive front of the entire war; the Red Army’s victory equaled 
socialism’s victory over capitalism; it inspired and boosted anti-Hitler movements all 
9
 Jürgen Danyel, „Politische Rituale als Sowjetimporte,“ in Jarausch, Siegrist, eds., Amerikanisierung und 
Sowjetisierung, 67-86.
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over Europe; and its central lesson was “eternal” gratitude and friendship with the Soviet 
Union. It should be stressed that some of the themes “propagated” by the SED reflect 
historical reality; others were conclusions drawn from history based on ideology and 
political interest. For example, the war on the Eastern Front was the costliest and most 
crucial theater of World War II in Europe. The Red Army’s victory and ultimately 
Hitler’s defeat, however, were not the result of historical law but of the successful 
wartime alliance between the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain against 
Nazi Germany.
Three aspects underpinning these themes underwent considerable modifications over 
time. First, the SED’s official history accounts varied as to who had suffered the most 
(the Soviet peoples, both Germans and Soviets, the German nation). Second, as long as 
Ulbricht was in power, these accounts prominently discussed the role of the NKFD. 
Under Honecker it became comparatively marginal. Third, the space dedicated to past 
and present events varied significantly over time, sometimes the SED’s propagandists 
focused on the recollection of the historical events on the Eastern Front, at other times 
references to the present under the headline “current lessons of Barbarossa” dominated 
the commemorative agenda. 
The SED celebrated the Rites of June annually. It dedicated a lot of energy and 
dedication to every tenth anniversary, and gave less but also regular attention to every 
five- year- and yearly anniversary. Not only that the propaganda machine lavished the 
population with the key messages, but the SED organized central and local 
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demonstrations, held meetings in factories and schools, and gathered residents for 
memorial services on local cemeteries of fallen Soviet soldiers.
10
 The party’s “central 
organ,” Neues Deutschland, published many reports, memoir pieces and editorials 
addressing the history and legacies of “Barbarossa.” The entire SED leadership as well as 
leading government representatives and Soviet delegates gathered in Berlin-Treptow 
before the “Soviet Honorary Memorial” (Sowjetisches Ehrenmal), where they celebrated 
an official memorial service. Ulbricht, or Honecker, and their associates would lay down 
flowers and wraths while a military ensemble played Chopin’s Trauermarsch and the 
revolutionary elegy “Unsterbliche Opfer.”
11
Hundreds of “ordinary citizens,” neatly 
categorized by their affiliation with certain factories, labor unions and mass 
organizations, joined the procession. Usually, Neues Deutschland carried front-page-
filling photographs of the ceremony along with excerpts from speeches and statements 
the next day. 
10
 In 1952, for example, on the uneven 11
th
 anniversary of “Barbarossa,” the DSF registered a number of 
local activities: in Bitterfeld (Bezirk Halle), the local paper warned that “we know that the situation in the 
USA and in other imperialist countries is similar to the one here [in Germany ] in 1941” and that also the 
“peace-loving GDR shall be attacked;” in Reichenbach (Bezirk Dresden) “the blackest day in history” was 
commemorated by “exemplary” local factory brigades who committed to various community services on 
that day – all with the purpose to intensify German-Soviet friendship; the inhabitants of Potsdam were 
called to gather for a “powerful demonstration” and a wreath-ceremony on the Memorial for the Soviet 
Heroes and to prove with their participation their “determination to prevent a new June 22, as Adenauer
plans it;”  a similar mass meeting took place in Rudolstadt (Bezirk Gera), and at the central Soviet 
Memorial in Berlin-Treptow. See the collection of local newspaper articles in BA/SAPMO, DY 32/10286.
11
 „Unsterbliche Opfer/ihr sanket dahin/wir stehen und weinen/voll Schmerz, Herz und Sinn. Ihr kämpfet 
und starbet/um kommendes Recht/wir trauern, wir trauern/der Zukunft Geschlecht. Einst aber, wenn 
Freiheit den Menschen erstand/und all euer Sehnen Erfüllung fand/dann werden wir künden/wie ihr einst 
gelebt/zum Höchsten der Menschheit empor nur gestrebt!“ The lyrics were written by W.G. Archangelski, 
German by Hermann Scherchen. The song used to be sung at the graves of victims of the revolutionary 
fights in 1905 and 1917 in the Soviet Union. After 1918, it also became popular in the German workers 
movement. Lyrics printed in Leben, singen, kämpfen. Liederbuch der Freien Deutschen Jugend, ed. 
Lehrerkollektiv der Jugendhochschule am Bogensee (Berlin: Verlag Neues Leben 1952), 114-115. 
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In contrast to this full-scale commemoration program on June 22, the anniversaries 
of Stalingrad played a less central role throughout the years. Since Stalingrad contained 
the name Stalin, it became increasingly difficult after 1956 to continue the aesthetization 
of the battle for political and self-legitimating reasons.
12
 The “battle on the Volga River,” 
as it was referred to since the late 1950s, was less suited to describe a “Hegelian 
moment,” a mythical saga of trial and triumph. Therefore, SED propaganda diminished 
efforts to cultivate the memory of Stalingrad as the central metaphor for socialism’s 
historically logic victory arising from the ashes of the historic defeat at Stalingrad.
13
 The 
battle occasionally even lost its role as turning point of World War II, and it was 
substituted with the two other crucial military defeats of the Wehrmacht in Russia, the 
battles of Moscow and Kursk.
14
 Notably, Neues Deutschland carried a picture of the tank 
battle near Kursk instead of the embattled city of Stalingrad for the first time in June 
1971, the first major anniversary of “Barbarossa” commemorated under Honecker. This 
can be said to demonstrate symbolically the shift from the biographically inspired 
political memory of the Ulbricht era to the de-personalized, canonized political memory 
12
 In general, this seems not to have been the case in the Soviet Union. See, for example, the continuous use 
of the name “Stalingrad” in Soviet film, media and literature. Jahn, ed., Stalingrad erinnern, 118-165. Yet, 
in 1963, when the twentieth anniversary of Stalingrad was commemorated (two years after the city’s 
renaming into Volgograd) official coverage of the battle referred only to Volgograd; for the time being, the 
sculpture “fighter for life and death” was used as visual substitute for the name “Stalingrad” now officially 
banned from the official memory. Ibid., 140, 148. Soon later, after Khrushchev’s downfall in 1964, the 
historic name of the battle was again used. Had it not been for Khrushchev’s personal Stalingrad 
experience, it has been speculated, the battle might have lost its central function in the wake of de-
Stalinization. While this remains a speculative argument it seems save to claim that the temporal name 
purge probably boosted the “myth of Stalingrad.” See Wolfram von Scheliha, “’Stalingrad in der 
sowjetischen Erinnerung,” in Jahn, ed., Stalingrad erinnern, 24-32, esp. 25f.
13
Thus trend cannot be discerned in GDR historiography, Stalingrad remained a central battle of the war, 
even if in later years, Moscow and Kursk were evaluated as equally important. 
14
Neues Deutschland, June 22, 1971, 3. This is something I only detected in the coverage of Neues 
Deutschland, I didn’t come across archival evidence for this shift as a conscientious change in SED 
propaganda.
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of the Eastern Front war under Honecker. It could also be taken as a sign of subtle 
distancing from, if not disrespect for, Ulbricht’s legacy on the eve of his political career. 
The following detailed analysis of the genesis of the official memory of 
“Barbarossa” and Stalingrad rests on the joint reading of relevant Neues Deutschland 
issues and selected documents from the SED and DSF archives. As it spans the entire 
period of communist rule in East Germany, it will be possible to demonstrate the 
instrumental role the Eastern Front memory played for the SED in its incessant quest for 
legitimacy. The narrative of an organic, historically generated German-Soviet friendship 
not only complemented the GDR’s antifascist founding ideology but it represents the 
other founding narrative of the SED state.
15
 The following paragraphs also illustrate the 
nearly-perfect instrumentalization of history for political purposes by the communists. 
Moreover, the analysis of these well-thought-through appropriations and re-
appropriations of the past to and on the present reflect the turbulent history of Cold War 
relations between the Soviet Union and the two German states. For, in reality, the past 
was more than a rhetorical tool; it was the silent third party on every negotiation table, as 
Adenauer had observed after his return from Moscow in 1955. 
Keeping the memory of the war against the Soviet Union alive in East German 
society was for the SED a matter of legitimizing its political power and it thus had 
feasible, real-life consequences: for only this part of the history of World War II 
15
 Scholars of GDR history so far have ignored this fact or subsumed the narrative of German-Soviet 
friendship under the antifascist myth. Monika Gibas, for example, has hinted at it as “aspect of the East 
German founding myth.” Gibas, “’Auferstanden aus Ruinen,’” 207.
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contained the ideological ingredients for the establishment of the “other Germany.” The 
SED leading this “other Germany,” declared the project of German-Soviet friendship its 
raison d’être. Thus far, historians consider antifascism as the “founding myth” of the 
GDR.
16
 This study proposes to widen and deepen the perspective. If, as previously 
discussed, historians mean by “political myth” a narrative forged by the political elite in 
order to endow a community with a sense of belonging and identity, I suggest to consider 
the ideological-political assertion of an unbreakable friendship between the former arch-
enemies a second, equally central founding myth.
17
 The SED leaders deduced the master 
narrative of a quasi-organic German-Soviet friendship from a view of the past based on 
their own veteran experience, most notably Ulbricht’s, and on the political needs of the 
day. The in this sense opportunistic, calculated interpretation of the Eastern Front war 
was to result practically in the mobilization of the masses for friendship with the Soviet 
Union. Propagating German-Soviet friendship – and, of course, friendship to all other 
nations in the “peace camp” – was thus more than a mere tactical response of the East 
German communists to the ideological-political necessities of the Cold War. It was the 
quintessence of the lessons these men believed to have learned in World War II.
18
Already during the war, the KPD began to work on an opportune master narrative. 
Anton Ackermann has already been quoted with a list of policy principles for the KPD’s 
postwar agenda. Already in 1944 he had succinctly summarized the programmatic 
16
 See for example Danyel, „Die Opfer- und Verfolgtenperspektive als Gründungskonsens?.“ Meuschel, 
Legitimation und Parteiherrschaft, 29-122. Grunenberg, Antifaschismus. Münkler, “Antifaschismus und 
antifaschistischer Widerstand.“
17
 See my discussion in chapter 3.II.
18
 Epstein, Last Revolutionaries, raises this issue in a similar context, highlighting the impact individual 
KPD and war veterans had as a group on the course of East German postwar history.
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importance of history for the future of the communist project: “Mobilize all means, the 
past included!”
19
 Yet, the mobilization of history entailed more than its ideological 
instrumentalization. If the past could indeed be “mobilized” for the KPD’s project of 
peaceful German-Soviet relations then they expected this campaign to result in more than 
just pro-Soviet rhetoric. Rather, it was to serve a political cause, namely the 
establishment of Soviet-style (i.e. Stalinist) socialism in Germany with all its social 
consequences and human costs. As demonstrated earlier, with the NKFD founded shortly 
after the defeat in Stalingrad, the German communists in Soviet emigration had an 
effective organization at their disposal to propagate their truths about “Hitlergermany,” 
its possible salvation and likely doom. Millions of leaflets financed by the Kremlin and 
dropped over the German troops on the Eastern Front called for the collective desertion 
of the Wehrmacht to the Red Army and denounced Hitler as criminal adventurer and 
ruthless murderer of German soldiers. Already then, the battle of Stalingrad resumed a 
central role. Under the title “The Dead to the Living!” (“Die Toten an die Lebenden”), a 
NKFD leaflet of May/June 1943 had the dead of Stalingrad speak to their surviving 
comrades: 
We didn’t believe it when an inner voice whispered to us: ‘Only Hitler is to be blamed for the misery 
of this war. He wanted it, he wants your death!’... Stalingrad has shown who Hitler is: the slayer of 
Germany, a military amateur, an adventurer. He is responsible for our death. The inner voice tells you, 
too: Away with Hitler and the war is over! ...The dead are warning you, soldier; the shadows of 
Stalingrad are warning you!
20
19
 Anton Ackermann, „Deutschland und die Sowjetunion.“ Handwritten outline for a lecture in the KPD 
party school, October 15, 1944. Quoted in Wilke, Erler, eds., „Nach Hitler kommen wir,“ 237-240, quote 
on 240.
20
 Backside of the Leaflet entitled “The Death to the Living,“ May/June 1943, printed in Flugblätter des 
Nationalkomitees Freies Deutschland, 188. Fig. 2 in Chapter 2 shows the frontpage of this same leaflet.
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Yet, most German soldiers ignored this warning and refused to desert or surrender to 
the Red Army. The KPD/SED later confronted their fellow-citizens with the failure of 
organizing an effective, genuinely German anti-Hitler-movement which could have 
driven Hitler from power before a total defeat. To them, this collective failure served and 
sufficed to justify a future historic obligation towards the Soviet Union: restitution and 
unconditional solidarity. In its programmatic declaration of June 11, 1945, “Call to the 
German People,” the KPD prepared the ground for the appropriate and thereafter 
canonical interpretation of the events on the Eastern Front: 
The greatest and most fateful of Hitler’s war crimes was the perfidious, treacherous attack against the 
Soviet Union who never wanted war with Germany. ... The world is shocked and, at the same time, 
illed with deepest hatred against Germany in view of the unprecedented crimes, this gruesome mass-
murdering which was carried out systematically by Hitlergermany. ... 
[The Red Army and the Western Allies] have destroyed the Hitlerarmy, smashed the Hitlerstate and 
thus have brought peace and liberation from the chains of the Hitlerslavery also to you, working 
German people. The more the conscience and the shame must burn in every German, as the German 
nation bears an important part of the guilt and responsibility for the war and its consequences.
21
The DSF, too, propagated „Barbarossa” as the worst crime of the Hitler regime, and 
stressed that it was also the “most fateful blow against the vital interests of the German 
nation.”
22
 This interpretation anticipated later systematic claims in SED propaganda 
according to which enmity with the Soviet Union in fact harmed and even neglected 
Germany’s national interests. For with “Operation Barbarossa,” Hitler had not only 
sought to destroy the Soviet Union (and had failed), but he had brought the German 
nation to the brink of its existence. Later on, depending on how urgently the SED needed 
21
 „Aufruf des Zentralkomitees der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands an das deutsche Volk zum 
Aufbau eines antifaschistisch-demokratischen Deutschlands“ (June 11, 1945), printed in Ministerium für 
Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der DDR, ed., Um ein antifaschistisch-demokratisches Deutschland, 56-63, 
quote on 57.
22
 Günter Gorski, Alfred Anderle, Günter Rosenfeld, eds., Deutsch-sowjetische Freundschaft. Ein 
historischer Abriß von 1917 bis zur Gegenwart (Berlin: Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1975), 139.
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ideological reinforcement of the alliance between the GDR and the USSR, the 
commemorative texts in Neues Deutschland carried variations of the “equal suffering” 
theme: it was the two nations which had fought most energetically during World War II –
against each other – and if they afforded the same determination to the postwar world, 
peace would be secured.
23
Thus, soon after the war, June 22 emerged as the memorial-day for the 
commemoration of the Second World War. While the KPD/SED celebrated the 
“liberation” by the Red Army on May 8, and commemorated the outbreak of the war on 
September 1, neither of the two days was dedicated as exclusively to the events of World 
War II – or those events the SED deemed worth remembering – as June 22. With this 
focus on the attack against the Soviet Union the party subtly turned June 22 into the 
perceived outbreak of the entire war.
24
 Aside from the degree to which this interpretation 
was inspired by genuine personal belief and ideological outlook of the SED’s antifascist 
propagandists, the opportunistic nature of this memory was apparent from the beginning. 
While in 1946, Neues Deutschland stressed the gruesome details of the Wehrmacht’s 
invasion, by 1948 the paper used the anniversary to legitimize the Soviet occupation in 
East Germany. In 1946, page one of Neues Deutschland carried a description in words 
and photographs of the brutal reality in the Soviet territories occupied by German troops. 
23
 For example, „Regierungserklärung zur 10. Wiederkehr des Tages des Überfalls der Armeen 
Hitlerdeutschlands auf das friedliebende Sowjetvolk,“ Neues Deutschland, June 22, 1951, 1. See above 
Chapter 5.I., III.
24
See also Chapter 5. I. on the reduction of World War II to the years 1941-1945 in selected writings of 
Ulbricht, Abusch and Norden. The coverage in Neues Deutschland throughout the GDR’s existence, 
including on September 1 anniversaries, confirms this assumption. 
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The text elaborated on “June 22 and its consequences” for the Soviet and German 
peoples:
The consequences of June 22, 1941, the attack against Russia, are gruesome for the German people and 
without precedent in history. ... Immediately after the first day of the attack started the meticulously 
planned destruction of cities and villages, the obliteration of factories and collective farms, the robbery 
and devastation of museums, schools, hospitals, and churches, the mass deportation of Soviet citizens 
for slave labor to Germany and the bloody extermination of uncounted men, women and children of 
the Soviet Union.
25
Two years later, the anniversary occasioned protest against “anti-communism” in the 
Western zones culminating in a claimed continuity from Hitler to Schumacher. For the 
“major lesson of June 22, 1941” was that “anti-Soviet hate campaigns are campaigns for 
war,” as the front-page editorial titled: 
History since June 22, 1941, has taught that ‘one’ can wage war against the Soviet Union, but also that 
‘one’ will lose it. ...
[Today we are faced with] a new systematic anti-Soviet hate campaign in Germany. ... Anti-
communism and the anti-Soviet hate campaign are, just as under Hitler, preparations for a new 
aggressive war against the Soviet Union. War against the socialist land ..., however, ends with the 
defeat of the aggressor and with catastrophe for those people who first allowed the warmongers of their 
own country to suppress them and then to misuse them as slaughter-victims [Schlachtopfer]. That is 
one main lesson of June 22.
26
Notably, Neues Deutschland characterized German soldiers not as instigators of the 
slaughtering but as victims thereof. The motif of them having been sent to the slaughter-
bench was a recurring theme in subsequent announcements remembering the war on the 
Eastern Front. Similarly, the main message of this 1948 editorial – the West was 
preparing a new war against the Soviet Union – remained largely unchanged over the 
next four decades. The interpretation of “Barbarossa” as worst crime in history and worst 
threat in the future became a static motif in the SED’s anti-Western rhetorical inventory. 
Even when relations between the two sides smoothed somewhat in the wake of the 
25
Neues Deutschland, June 22, 1946, 1.
26
Neues Deutschland, June 22, 1948, 1. 
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“peaceful coexistence” period and of Détente, the SED untiringly invoked the alleged 
threat looming from the West against the East.
27
That the East German communists were to some extent successful in imbuing East 
Germans with this interpretation of “Barbarossa’s lessons” is aptly illustrated in the 
following song written by students of a school run by the SED’s youth organization Free 
German Youth (FDJ).
28
 The lyrics echoed the main motives of the SED’s memory of the 
Eastern Front and suggest that it was indeed possible to root it rather effectively in the 
political culture of the young GDR:
Thousands of tanks destroyed the land,
Behind them just death and misery,
Miles of Soviet territory burned,
Cities dismembered in rubble and debris.
[Chorus:] Yet, above the hatred, all the gloom,
Rose the victorious Soviet Union.
Brotherly she offers her helping hands,
As well to our German lands.
Free became the farmer on his own land,
Thanks to you, Soviet soldiers.
With the liberated workers aligned,
He works with plough and with spade.
… [Chorus]
Soviet tractors on our fields,
With men of progress behind the wheel.
Friendship with the Soviet nation we swear,
Nothing more cherished than peace.
… [Chorus].
When the GDR was founded in October 1949, the SED had established the war 
against the Soviet Union as central historical reference point, with the help of which it 
27
 Cf. Chapter 11. I.
28
 Lyrics and tunes printed in Leben, Singen, Kämpfen, 42ff. Here quoted from Gibas, „’Auferstanden aus 
Ruinen,’“ 206f.
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sought to diffuse the bitter reality of Soviet occupation and to silence resistance against 
the building of socialism in East Germany. Stalingrad and the war on the Eastern Front 
were primarily relevant and instructive because the SED could use these events to 
legitimize the unconditional liaison between the GDR and the Soviet Union. 
It is important to realize that the SED propagated its master narrative of recent 
German history, in which the Soviet Union in every respect played the leading part, not 
only in context of the Rites of June but also on several other ceremonial occasions. Most 
importantly, VE Day served to reiterate the Red Army’s decisive role in defeating 
“Hitlergermany;”
29
 East Germans were again and again confronted with the claim that it 
was the Soviet Union, its peoples and soldiers, who had suffered the most and contributed 
the most in the war against German fascism.
30
 In May 1950, for instance, the GDR 
celebrated VE Day for the first time as official memorial-day. People got the day off and 
the party leadership gathered for a memorial service at the “Sowjetische Ehrenmal” in 
Berlin-Treptow – VE Day would always be celebrated at the Treptow-Memorial. Prime 
Minister Grotewohl gave the key note address during the central ceremony in the opera 
house in Berlin. The stage from which Grotewohl delivered his speech was draped with a 
29
 Of secondary but equally crucial importance were the memorial-day commemoration the founding of the 
Red Army, 23 February, and the anniversaries of the “Great socialist October Revolution,” both of which 
were celebrated under the same motto, albeit on those occasions the SED usually stressed the military 
achievements and potential of the Soviet army. See, for example, the SED’s Agitation Division Information 
„30 Jahre Sowjetarmee“ (February 18, 1947), which set the tone for all subsequent commemorations of the 
Red Army’s founding. BA/SAPMO, DY 30 IV 2/9.02/161, fiche 1. And the 38 “Losungen des ZK der SED 
zum 34. Jahrestag der Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution und zum Monat der deutsch-sowjetischen 
Freundschaft,” October 28, 1951, printed in Dokumente der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei, vol. III, 618-
620. (One „slogan“ cited Thomas Mann’s dictum „anti-Bolshevism – the main folly of our epoch.” Mann 
had written an essay under that title for the SED’s theoretical organ “Einheit” in 1946, see Thomas Mann, 
“Der Antibolschewismus – die Grundtorheit unserer Epoche,” Einheit, 2, 1945, 105-107).
30
 Gibas, “’Auferstanden aus Ruinen,’” 206ff. 
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curtain bearing the slogan “The liberation of Germany from fascism is the achievement 
of the Soviet Army.”
Fig. 5. The Liberation of Germany from Fascism is the Soviet Union’s Achievement:
Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl speaking at the central commemoration ceremony in the Staatsoper Berlin on May 8, 1950.
31
Thus, not only the ritualized June 22 celebrations were intended to convey the SED’s 
master narrative of the Eastern Front but all other national memorial days as well.
32
Orchestrated like this, the memory of the war against the Soviet Union became the 
central historical event of World War II to be commemorated and collectively 
remembered in the GDR.
31
 BA/SAPMO, Bild Y1, 1132/79.
32
 On October 7, the “Day of the Republic,” the SED commemorated not primarily the war but the “help 
and friendship” which the Soviet Union had given and continued to give so generously in its aftermath to 
the German nation. The founding of the GDR, the “other Germany,” was owed to the Soviet willingness to 
forgive the people and determination to reconstruct the country of its former enemy. See Gibas, 
“’Auferstanden aus Ruinen,’” 212ff. 
467
Already in 1951, a number of local and central ceremonies and demonstrations took 
place in commemoration of the tenth anniversary of “Barbarossa.” Neues Deutschland 
carried a “government declaration” on its front page flanked by an editorial by Walter 
Ulbricht about the “Crime of June 22” and a photograph of Moscow, “the capital of the 
Soviet Union, the hoard of peace – undefeated and invincible.” Yet, beyond recalling the 
crimes of the fascist army – the perpetrators were identified as “SS-formations” and 
“German troops” – on Soviet territory, the text aimed at connecting the United States as 
closely as possible with the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union. In fact, the texts were 
designed to convey the impression that it was not only Hitler but also the U.S. and Great 
Britain who had wanted war in 1939. For, it allegedly had been their “real aim in World 
War II to eliminate the German competitor [Hitler], and to annihilate the Soviet Union.”
33
In this construction, following in the footsteps of Zhdanov’s 1947 “two-camps” speech, it 
seemed logical to the “GDR government” that the “American warmongers and world 
conquerors” remained unsatisfied with the outcome of the war and that they now 
intended to “use imperialist [West] Germany for realizing their criminal aims.” In 
essence, the story concluded, the US was seeking to transform West Germany into the 
“main basis for the war of conquest against the Soviet Union.” 
This aggressive instrumentalization of the Eastern Front memory for the SED’s anti-
Western campaign was a constant tool in the ideological cold war with the West, most 
notably during the 1950s, the decade dominated by the question of remilitarization and 
collective security in Europe. Two more pages were dedicated to this memory in the 
33
Neues Deutschland, June 22, 1951, 1.
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Neues Deutschland of June 22, 1951, and the main historical tractate on page three 
presented “evidence” for the “shared guilt of American imperialism for the Hitlerwar” 
and the attack of the “peace-loving” Soviet Union.
34
 The message of the day was 
underlined with pictures as well: a portrait of Stalin bearing the lines “We are for peace 
and we defend the cause of peace,” and a caricature depicting Truman sitting on a bomb 
and cracking a whip vis-à-vis a socialist worker carrying one of Stalin’s work in his 
hand.
35
As already demonstrated, in the decade to come, the SED connected major events in 
the history of the GDR with the “lessons of Barbarossa,” most importantly the June 
uprisings in 1953, and the building of the wall in 1961. In both instances, the memory of 
the Eastern Front fulfilled two functions which were usually subsumed with the phrase 
“admonition and warning” (Mahnung und Warnung). Both, in June 1953 and in June 
1961, the propaganda apparatus produced dozens of pamphlets and documentaries aimed 
at illustrating and emotionalizing the history of the war against the Soviet Union as the 
most gruesome, indeed singular, crime in German history. Albert Norden recalled in June 
1953, a few days after the popular uprisings had erupted the SED state, the “sinister 
cynicism” with which Hitler’s generals planned the “annihilation of the Soviet 
population” – only to illustrate the terrible consequences another “Day X” in 1953 would 
34
 Georg Krausz, “Zum 10. Jahrestag des Hitlerschen Überfalls auf die Sowjetunion am 22. Juni 1941. Die 
Mitschuld des amerikanischen Imperialismus am Hitlerkrieg,“ ibid, 3. Krausz was head of the Neues 
Deutschland’s very own propaganda division between 1951-56, and he later became the head of the 
Association of German Journalists in the GDR (1957-1967). Notably, after spending years in Nazi prisons, 
Krausz was arrested in June 1945 by the NKVD for unclear reasons, interned until 1948, and released and 
rehabilitated thereafter by the SED. Despite this personal experience with Stalinism, as well as the show 
trials and purges which he witnessed as correspondent in Eastern Europe in the early 1950s, he was and 
remained a faithful, partisan journalist. 
35
 Cf. Fig. 3, Chapter 5.I.
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have had, had not Soviet tanks stopped this “fascist coup.”
36
 Similarly, the events leading 
up to the erection of the wall in 1961 were accompanied by a series of “Barbarossa”-texts 
on the occasion of its twentieth anniversary.
37
 Yet, more instrumental than 
commemorating the suffering of Soviet civilians was to recall the outcome of Hitler’s
crusade against the Soviet Union: his total defeat. Thus, the SED cherished the Eastern 
Front memory because it also carried a message of “warning” to subsequent generations 
and to the “class enemy.” Anyone seeking to attack and invade the Soviet Union yet 
again, this message went, was doomed to fail.
38
 Just as in 1953, when Norden warned in 
the pages of Neues Deutschland that, much like in 1941-1945, “another ‘Day X’ was 
doomed to fail as well,”
39
 SED propaganda in 1961 threatened the alleged enemies with 
death, destruction and ultimate defeat. Recalling the horrors of Stalingrad, the warnings 
in 1961 culminated rhetorically in the prophecy that, this time around, “the birch crosses 
[on the graves] of new ‘Barbarossa’-adventurers would not stand in Stalingrad but in 
36
 See the details of this argument above in Chapter 5. I. Norden’s text “Warum das Potsdamer Abkommen 
für Adenauer ein Alpdruck ist. Lehren des 22. Juni 1941,“ in Neues Deutschland, June 21, 1953, 5.
37
 Again, the brutality of warfare was at the center of these articles. See for example, “Der Plan 
‘Barbarossa’ und sein Fiasko,” Neues Deutschland, June 17, 1961, 5.
38
 Most importantly a published Khrushchev speech: “Jeder neue Agressor würde Hitlers Schicksal teilen. 
Aus der Rede Nikita Chruschtschows auf der Moskauer Kundgebung zum 20. Jahrestag des faschistischen 
Überfalls auf die Sowjetunion,“ in Neues Deutschland, June 22, 1961, 3. See also, A.I. Jeremenko, 
“Denkzettel für Ostlandreiter,” Neues Deutschland, June 17, 1961, Beilage no. 24, 3. (Next to the piece, an 
excerpt from Ulbricht’s diary about the anitfascist resistance fight among German POWs was published 
under the remarkable title „Stimme und Gewissen der Nation,“ in ibid.). And, A.I. Jeremenko, „Weshalb 
die Wehrmacht besiegt wurde,“ in Neues Deutschland, June 21, 1961, 5f; and Günter Kertzscher, „Noch 
immer aktuelle Lehren des 22. Juni,“ Neues Deutschland, June 22, 1961, 4. 
39
 “Warum das Potsdamer Abkommen für Adenauer ein Alpdruck ist. Lehren des 22. Juni 1941,“ in Neues 




 Practically, they culminated in the sealing of the inner-German borders on 
August 13.
In 1961, SED and DSF stepped up the propaganda surrounding the twentieth 
anniversary of the invasion of the Soviet Union to an unprecedented degree. A
conference of GDR and Soviet historians in East Berlin discussed recent research on the 
“Aggression of German Imperialism against the USSR.”
41
Prominent historians such as 
Jürgen Kuscynski, Walter Bartel and Stefan Doernberg lent their voices to the SED’s 
orchestrated effort to connect the past with the present. DSF supported these efforts 
energetically. The organization staged a prominently attended one-day conference on 
June 21, 1961 in the DSF’s Central House in Berlin under the title “The Aggression of 
German Fascism Against the Soviet Union.” Among the guests were representatives of 
all bloc parties, relevant academic institutions and universities, the defense, interior and 
state security ministries, members of the AeO, several journalists from the print media 
and radio, a Soviet delegation and a number of personally invited persons such as Hanna 
Wolf, Luitpold Steidle, historians Leo Stern (1901-1982)
42
 and Ernst Engelberg (born 
1909).
43
 The DSF’s propaganda division had prepared the day by distributing carefully 
40
 “Was uns der 22. Juni 1941 lehrt. Eine historische Dokumentation zum 20. Jahrestag des faschistischen 
Überfalls auf die Sowjetunion,“ in Neues Deutschland, June 20, 1961, 3. On a detailed analysis of the SED 
propaganda around June 22, 1961, see above Chapter 5. III.  
41
 This was the title of the seventh meeting of the “Commission of GDR and USSR Historians” held at the 
Institute for History, Academy of the Sciences, in Berlin, June 19-25, 1961. See the protocol in 
BA/SAPMO DY30 IV 2/9.09/58. For a detailed discussion of the contributions see Chapter 10. III.
42
 Leo Stern (the brother of the AeO initiator and spiritus rector, Wolf Stern), a historian specialized in 
economic history and the history of the workers movement, 1953-1959 rector of the Martin-Luther-
University in Halle.
43
 See the entire list of participants in BA/SAPMO DY 32/6820. All historians present at the above-
described conference of GDR and USSR historians (June 19-25, 1961) were present that day, so it seems 
the two events were timely coordinated in order to assure a maximum reach, prominence, and participation.
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drafted instructions according to which June 22, 1961 was to clearly point out the 
historical “responsibilities” and “connections” deriving from June 22, 1941 and to 
denounce the alleged continuing threat posed by contemporary “German imperialism.” A 
number of “forums, papers and discussions” were organized whose “main content” was 
to be “the unmasking of West German militarism and neo-fascism.”
44
 The focus was as 
much on the present as on the past. The wording of these instructions neatly summarized 
the SED’s main message and ideological agenda on June 22, 1961:
The twentieth anniversary of the fascist attack against the Soviet Union must therefore be an occasion 
to create clarity about the historical connections, about the criminal character of the fascist attack and 
the complete forlornness of any aggressive adventures in the current epoch.
45
As demonstrated earlier, customized and adapted like this, the SED invoked the 
memory of the Eastern Front war to legitimize the building of the wall on August 13, 
1961. The recurring elements of warning and admonition, of fear and threat – namely, 
fear of another June 22, and threat against the potential attackers – fulfilled crucial 
political-ideological functions in the SED’s efforts to justify the creation of the 
“antifascist protection wall.”
44





Fig. 6. Honoring the Heroes of the Soviet Union, June 22, 1961: The SED leadership at the Soviet Honorary Memorial in 
Berlin-Treptow: SED-Politburo member Hermann Matern, Mayor of East Berlin Friedrich Ebert, head of the People’s 
Chamber Johannes Dieckmann, and SED ZK’s General Secretary Walter Ulbricht (first row, left to right), behind Ulbricht to 
the right, head of the Council of Ministers, Willi Stoph
46
In 1966, the last major “Barbarossa” anniversary was celebrated under Ulbricht. In 
the era of the “new economic policy” aimed at winning the economic race with the 
Western neighbor (“Einholen ohne Überholen” - “catching up without overtaking,” was 
Ulbricht’s program at the time), the commemoration of the German-Soviet war offered 
an opportunity to “prove” the superiority of socialism, and, in turn, capitalism’s doom. 
46
 BA/SAPMO, Bild Y1, 24229.
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DSF agitators received detailed instructions for the ceremonies and speeches to be held in 
the summer of 1966: while, in the identical wording of previous anniversaries, the attack 
on the Soviet Union represented “a perfidious, treacherous” act, the “most severe crime 
of German imperialism,” its outcome had confirmed that
from the very beginning, the aims of robbery and conquest of German imperialism stood in stark 
contrast to the historical laws as well as to [German imperialism’s] own political, economic and 
military capabilities, and with the attack against the Soviet Union [these aims] were doomed to total 
failure.
47
In a front-page editorial, Neues Deutschland’s stressed that June 22, 1941 was the 
“blackest day in a dark time of German history” and that the Soviet Union had only been 
able to defeat the “militarists blinded by anticommunism” because of the “moral power 
and unity of millions of Soviet citizens and the superiority of the socialist system.” Only 
now, it was the “land of Lenin” and not the “land of Stalin” anymore, whose historical 
achievements were to be commemorated. And in order to underline Ulbricht’s drive to 
“catch up” with the West, the editorial noted that “today, the Soviet Union supersedes 
West Germany in the major fields of industrial production by at least the triple.”
48
 Thus in 
1966, the SED once again skilfully appropriated the historical memory of the Eastern 
Front war – a war which indeed had cost over twenty million Soviet lives – to the 
necessities of the ideological and economic rivalry between the GDR and FRG. 
This is further manifested in the way the same commemoration texts refer to the 
climate of détente and the signals of cooperation coming from the outgoing Ludwig 
Erhard (CDU) administration and the incoming Grand coalition under Kurt-Georg 
47
 “Hinweise für Referenten anläßlich des 25. Jahrestages des Überfalls des Faschismus auf die 
Sowjetunion,“ BA/SAPMO DY 32/92, 1f.
48
 “Der 22. Juni 1941,” in Neues Deutschland, June 22, 1966, 1.
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Kiesinger (CDU) and Willy Brandt (SPD). Erhard was the first West German chancellor 
to issue a statement commemorating June 22, 1941 in the Federal Republic. The 
statement called for an “end to the postwar era” and demanded that it was time to remove 
the “remains of the war,” by which Erhard meant in particular German division.
49
Neues 
Deutschland distorted this statement by claiming that Erhard was in fact calling for an 
“attack against the socialist GDR:”
It is known that for Bonn ‘abolition of the German division’ means as much as ‘annexation of the 
GDR.’ Thus, one has the guts over there [in the West] to proclaim an attack against the socialist GDR 
on the anniversary day of the attack against the socialist Soviet Union.
50
The years to come under Honecker’s regime saw a continuation of this anti-Western 
threat-and-fear-campaign based on the exploitative use of the Eastern Front memory, but 
never again would the rhetoric become so audaciously explicit. 
As during the years since 1945, the communist narrative of the Eastern Front during 
the 1960s was enriched with voices from veteran antifascists. In 1966, the eye-witness 
and front veteran Walter Ulbricht was quoted, yet no longer in connection with his 
NKFD activities – whose twentieth anniversary he had celebrated in 1963
51
– but with a 
statement on the “fateful poison of anticommunism” which had brought “so much misery 
49
 Ludwig Ehrhard, “Der Zukunft ihr Recht geben! Überreste des Krieges wegräumen,“ printed in Bulletin 
des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung (Bonn: Deutscher Bundesverlag, 1950-1990), no. 




 See his speech “Sie kämpften mutig gegen den Nazismus,” July 12, 1963. Originally published in 
Mitteilungsblatt, no.8, August 1963. Reprinted in Ulbricht, Ausgewählte Reden und Aufsätze, 259-267. 
Ulbricht started his speech with the sentence „many of us went through the hell of two world wars,“ 
underscoring (and exaggerating) his own veteran experience. He further used this occasion to basically 
argue that while the NKFD bravely led the anti-Hitler-coalition, the Western powers “who had been 
attacked by Hitler, tried to redirect the offensive against the Soviet Union.” This reiterated his point of an 
immanent second strike against the USSR. Ibid., 259, 261. The speech triggered a number of angry press 
reactions in the West all of which were collected by Albert Norden and attached to a memo to Ulbricht, 
dated July 13, 1963. BA/SAPMO, DY 30 IV/A2/2.028/80, 9. (The press selection is not included in the 
file).
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to Germany and the Germans.” This is again a good example illustrating that it was a 
peculiar mix of biography, ideology and calculation which inspired the political memory 
of the Eastern Front the GDR. Not only that the Western political establishment was 
“hiding the truth and objective facts” about the Wehrmacht’s war against the Soviet 
Union,” Ulbricht contended, it also refused to acknowledge that only “under victorious 
socialism nations can erect a human and democratic order” while, at the same time, only 
then these nations could “progress in every respect faster and better than under the 
conditions of capitalism’s rule.”
52
 Ulbricht managed to connect the memory of the Eastern 
Front to the economic competition between the two Germanys in the 1960s. After the 
building of the wall, faced with the latent crisis of the planned economy and a growing 
consumer frustration, this memory again promised ideological self-assurance within the 
party and political legitimacy among the population. The SED needed historic prove of 
socialism’s ultimate triumph over capitalism regardless of the fact how remotely 
connected the history of the Eastern Front war was to the material conditions in the GDR 
of the mid-1960s.
53
Yet, whatever limited credibility and moral authority Ulbricht possessed as a result 
of his well-propagandized biographical background, this capital disappeared once he was 
removed from power and the younger Erich Honecker took over his position in 1971 –
coincidently in the year of “Barbarossa’s” thirtieth anniversary. Honecker, born in 1912, 
52
 Walter Ulbricht, “Unheilvolles Gift des Antikommunismus” (excerpt from his speech on the 8
th
 DSF 
congress), Neues Deutschland, June 22, 1966, 3. 
53
The most obvious connection between the Eastern Front war and East Germany’s economic state was not 
discussed by Ulbricht, of course: the reparations paid to the Soviet Union, the dismantling and and 
deportation of entire factories (and human expertise) from the Eastern zone to the USSR crippled the East 
German economy from the beginning.
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survived the Nazi years imprisoned in KZ Brandenburg for KPD underground activities 
between 1935 and 1945. After his liberation by the Red Army he quickly joined the 
leading communists around Ulbricht, played a key role in the merger of SPD and KPD, 
and was one of the founders of the SED’s youth organization “Free German Youth” 
(FDJ). As head of the ZK’s Division for Security Matters, Honecker directed and 
oversaw the building of the wall in 1961 – a fact either unknown or long forgotten in 
1971. 
Even lacking the front experience, Honecker became Moscow’s faithful ally at the 
top of the GDR. By the 1980s, Honecker’s state was one of the most prosperous but also 
most repressive countries in the communist bloc. This was also true with regards to 
Honecker’s politics of the past: what he lacked in personal memories and war record 
from the Eastern Front he compensated by relying heavily on the Soviet master narrative. 
Unlike Ulbricht, he travelled to Stalingrad (1975) and to the former NKFD school in 
Krasnogorsk (1985) to give speeches commemorating the historic battle and the 
antifascist fight of the German communists in the Soviet Union.
54
 The transition from 
Ulbricht to Honecker therefore entailed not an alteration of the fundamental messages 
and lessons accorded to June 22, 1941, but rather a shift in perspective as well as a 
variation in style and tone. 
Starting in 1971, when the Rites of June fell amidst the succession struggle between 
Ulbricht and Honecker (Ulbricht had already lost his post as leader of the SED, but 
remained chairman of the Council of the State until 1976), official commemoration of the 
54
 See further Chapter 11. I.
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Eastern Front war became a matter of course – a de-personalized, ritualized act of 
rhetorical submission to the Soviet Union.
55
 As under Ulbricht, retired Soviet generals 
contributed articles to Neues Deutschland vividly and proudly recalling the Red Army’s 
fighting and victory. Yet, the SED now paid much less attention to the German 
communist movement, particularly the NKFD, in official announcements, presumably 
because direct personal continuities as the Ulbricht-Khrushchev Christmas meeting in 
Stalingrad 1942/43 could no longer be exploited.
56
 Instead, with Honecker’s takeover, 
eternity entered the historical memory of the Eastern Front. The commemoration 
propaganda from now on stressed that “the lessons of the past have been drawn forever”
57
and that “the heroic fight of the Soviet soldiers [was] an eternal obligation”
58
 to their heirs 
in the GDR. As demonstrated above for the crucial years of 1953 and 1961, Ulbricht’s 
politics of memory included a direct and instant appropriation of the past to the present, a 
blatant and unswerving instrumentalization of history’s lessons to present political-
55
This fits into the general tendency under Honecker to (re-) confirm the Soviet Union’s leading role and to 
downplay everything “German” in – if there was any – the GDR’s socialist nationalism, particularly during 
the 1970s. See Stefan Wolle, Die heile Welt der Diktatur. Alltag und Herrschaft in der DDR (Bonn: 
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1999), 45. Wolle aptly summarizes the major themes of Honecker’s 
„double strategy” for ruling the country: on the one hand, further distancing from the imperialist enemy, 
seeking closer relations with the Soviet Union, increasing the “revolutionary alertness” and thereby further 
militarizing GDR society, enhancing role and capabilities of the state security system, and removing the 
last remnants of capitalism by expropriating the last private businesses in East Germany; one the other 
hand, Honecker showed leniency for a Westernizing youth culture, and advocated social benefit increases 
and consumer interest satisfaction (in order, of course, to be better prepared for the ideological-practical 
consequences of détente). Ibid.
56
See for example Neues Deutschland, January 30, 1963, 5, commemorating the twentieth anniversary of 
the battle of Stalingrad. The only way in which Honecker related his biography to the history of the Eastern 
Front war was by recalling the thoughts on and following June 22, 1941 in KZ Brandenburg. A passage 
from his memoirs was cited for that purpose on a rare occasion in 1981. He went not without mentioning 
his own years on the Soviet “front,” albeit it were the years before the Nazi-takeover in Germany 
(1930/31). See “Vom ersten Tage an…,” Neues Deutschland, June 22, 1981, 5.
57
 “Die Lehren der Vergangenheit wurden für immer gezogen,” Neues Deutschland, June 22, 1971, 1.
58
 “Heldenmütiger Kampf der Sowjetsoldaten ist uns ewig Verpflichtung,” Neues Deutschland, June 23, 
1971, 1.
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ideological necessities, e.g. the popular unrests in June 1953, and the building of the wall 
in 1961. For these purposes, party propaganda gave much attention to the gruesome 
details of the Wehrmacht’s war of annihilation, included the details of war crimes and 
occasionally named the perpetrators. During the Honecker era, the history of the Eastern 
Front was recaptured in a rather sober style, albeit not without the usual pathos. Yet, 
Neues Deutschland no longer printed photographs of destructed cities, hanged partisans 
or military cemeteries. Instead, the paper focussed on Soviet military might (tanks, armed 
soldiers, military production sights), and emphasized Soviet sufferings and sacrifices in 
general. Moreover, the GDR leadership not only confessed “gratitude and respect” but 
also “love” to the “Soviet heroes.”
59
Two main themes emerged from these depictions of the “lessons,” best captured in 
the coverage of the June 22 anniversary in 1981: one was that the “eternal heroic deeds of 
the Soviet people” had built the “fundament for the longest peace period in Europe,” the 
other one was that the socialist camp was to remain “alert and ready for combat” at all 
times as long as capitalism had not vanished from the face of the earth.
60
 In addition, 
pictures of memorial services held by leading party and state officials at the Soviet 
Honorary Memorial in Berlin-Treptow, alongside lengthy reports listing the names and 
titles of those participating in the ceremonies, underlined the increasingly ritualized 
character of the event.
59
 Otto Winzer, „30 Jahre nach dem faschistischen Überfall auf die Sowjetunion. Unser Bündnis mit der 
UdSSR – wichtigste Lehre des 22. Juni 1941,“ Neues Deutschland, June 22, 1971, 3. 
60
 „Unvergänglich sind die Heldentaten des Sowjetvolkes, das die Naziaggressoren vernichtete und das 
Fundament für die längste Friedensperiode in Europa legte. Die Sowjetarmee zerschlug alle Pläne der 
Faschisten,“ Neues Deutschland, June 20/21, 1981, 9. 
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With Brandt’s Ostpolitik, Détente entered West-German-Soviet relations and the 
SED felt prompted to react to the thaw by re-appropriating the memory of the Eastern 
Front war to it. Thus, in 1971, the year of the ratification of the treaties between the FRG, 
the USSR and Poland, an important part of “Barbarossa’s” legacy had been fulfilled. Otto 
Winzer (1902-1975), the GDR Foreign Minister at the time, authored the main piece 
about the “most important lessons of June 22, 1941” in Neues Deutschland, putting the 
war into the broader historical perspective and debating the prospects for bringing lasting 
peace and security to the European continent. Naturally, lasting peace was only to be 
achieved at the side of Soviet Union. Winzer summarized and contextualized the 
contemporary developments by granting that
the coming into effect of the treaties of the Soviet Union and Poland with the FRG would be of 
extraordinary importance for an easing of tensions in Europe. Their ratification would in many ways 
create a new political atmosphere in Europe and would significantly improve the preconditions for 
solving the most important European security problems. In view of June 22, 1941, the ratification of 
the treaty between the Soviet Union and the FRG is a political-moral obligation whose fulfilment 
concurs with the peaceful interest of the people [Volk] in the FRG.
61
Winzer’s analysis blamed the Cold War entirely on the Western allies. The Soviet Union, 
in contrast, stood for peace and reconciliation, and the German attack against its 
homeland in 1941 served to underscore this analysis. At the same time, it became 
increasingly difficult to keep up the fear-and-threat rhetoric amidst a not only global but 
also inner-German climate of détente. Particularly the Brandt administration’s new tone 
with regards to the German-Soviet past – examined in a following chapter – left little 
room for attacking Bonn’s alleged aggressive and imperialist intentions. Winzer chose to 
attack former Defense Minister Franz-Josef Strauss in 1971, although Strauss had been 
61
 Otto Winzer, „30 Jahre nach dem faschistischen Überfall auf die Sowjetunion. Unser Bündnis mit der 
UdSSR – wichtigste Lehre des 22. Juni 1941,“ Neues Deutschland, June 22, 1971, 3.
480
out of the defense ministry for almost ten years and out of power on the federal stage for 
over two years: „For Strauss, the Second World War has not yet ended. Starting from this 
anti-Soviet principle, he furthers and pursues the old politics of the German finance 
capital which seeks hegemony over Europe.”
62
It was not until ten years later, that the Rites of June were celebrated again with 
comparable ideological energy and ceremonial care. In 1976, the thirty-fifth anniversary, 
Neues Deutschland ignored the event altogether. The reasons remain unclear.
63
 Only DSF 
remained as active as ever. They published a brochure entitled “Anti-Communism and 
Anti-Sovietism – Crimes against Humanity” following the “International Conference of 
the Communist and Workers Parties of Europe” which took place in East Berlin in late 
June 1976.
64
 The text once again invoked Thomas Mann’s wartime remark that 
anticommunism was the “main folly of our epoch”
65
 and once more stressed that “in 1941 
the most dangerous, severest and most consequential imperialist crime” was committed 
against socialism with the “fascist attack” on the Soviet Union.
66
 The broshure listed 
Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba as examples for further such crimes in the postwar period. 
Citing not-specified West German press publications, it also argued that the imperialist 
62
Ibid. Most recently, Strauss had served as finance minister in the Kiesinger administration between 1966-
1969.
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 At the time, the SED was caught up in a discussion over party program and statute during its IX. Party 
Congress in May, and shortly thereafter a number of social policy decisions on the raise of wages and 
pensions were announced. Yet, these indeed cannot explain why there was no official interest in such a 
major anniversary.
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105-107. See the discussion in Chapter III. 2.
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camp saw “the communist” as “anti-person” (“Gegenmensch”) and thus “modern 
anticommunism justifies the uninhibited nuclear armament, the neutron bomb, the 
preparation of total nuclear war.” Worse, “the annihilation of life on earth lies within its 
imagination.”
67
This revival of what I have earlier called a fear-and-threat campaign, stretched 
well into the 1980s. Indeed, the stationing of Soviet SS 20 missiles in 1979, and of U.S. 
Pershing II missiles in 1984, had stirred opposition from a vibrant anti-nuclear movement 
in several European countries and renewed fears of nuclear war.
68
 In June 1981, the 
commemoration campaign contained once again assertions that Hitler’s criminal 
strategists had found their “heirs” among the current leading Western politicians and 
NATO commanders.
69
 Less than ever before the coverage dealt with the reality of the 
Eastern Front war or the legacy of the Nazi occupation. Instead, it focussed on Soviet 
military capabilities (then and now), on the war production effort and even carried a chart 
comparing Soviet and German “military powers and means” during World War II. As in 
earlier years, the coverage in Neues Deutschland put emphasis on the necessity to “be 




 Particularly on the West German debates see Jeffrey Herf, War by other Means. Soviet Power, West 
German Resistance, and the Battle of the Euromissiles (New York: Free Press, 1991).
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Fundament für die längste Friedensperiode in Europa legte. Die Sowjetarmee zerschlug alle Pläne der 
Faschisten,“ Neues Deutschland, June 20/21, 1981, 9. Similarly, see Olaf Groehler, „22. Juni 1941 –
Anfang vom Ende der Naziaggressoren,“ Neues Deutschland, June 22, 1981, 5.
482
these efforts also meant in the SED’s view “to heed one of the most important lessons of 
June 22, 1941.”
70
By 1986, the last important June 22 anniversary to be celebrated by the SED before 
the regime collapsed in 1989, the threat to be mastered was nothing less than to “save 
humankind before a nuclear inferno.” Neues Deutschland carried this statement made by 
a leading official of the USSR embassy in East Berlin, and reported that a Stalingrad 
veteran spoke on the occasion before the film “Brotherhood in Arms” was screened at the 
embassy.
71
 Unlike in previous years, the statement included a reference to the military 
contribution of the Western Allies to Nazi Germany’s defeat, and the anti-Hitler coalition 
was mentioned explicitly – something unimaginable throughout most of the previous 
decades. A day later, on the fourty-fifth anniversary of the beginning of “Operation 
Barbarossa,” Neues Deutschland dedicated the entire upper front-page to the “ceremonial 
memorial service for the fallen Soviet heroes” and carried a large photograph depicting 
Honecker, Willi Stoph (1914-1999), head of the Council of Ministers, and a number of 
high-ranking ZK members along with the Soviet ambassador Vjacheslav Kochemasov
and Petr G. Lushev, the commander-in-chief of the Soviet forces in the GDR. 
70
 Ibid. See also the editorial „Die aktuellen des 22. Juni 1941,“ in Neues Deutschland, June 22, 1981, 2. 
See further Chapter 11.I.
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 „Pressekonferenz in der Botschaft der UdSSR,“ Neues Deutschland, June 21/22, 1986, 2. 
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Fig. 7. Commemorating the Soviet Heroes, June 22, 1986: The SED leadership pays tribute to the “fallen Soviet heroes” at the 
Soviet Honorary Memorial in Berlin-Treptow (Neues Deutschland, June 23, 1986, 1). The text lists participants and their 
positions.
Earlier, only the “round” anniversaries of 1951, 1961, and 1971 had prompted the 
paper to reserve this prominent spot on the front-page for the commemoration of the 
Eastern Front war. But unlike in 1951 and 1961, in particular, the coverage in 1986 was 
limited to reports on the ceremony. Not a single extra article addressed the historical 
events following the Wehrmacht attack. Neither memoir pieces nor illustrated 
documentaries recalling the criminal legacies of the Eastern Front war were added as had 
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been routinely the case before. All the reader was left with were a number of matter-of-
fact reports about the central and local ceremonies dedicated to the event.
72
This interesting change underscores one of the main features of the politics of 
memory in the Honecker era, namely the inclination to strip the past off its historical 
contents by obscuring differences between past and present. Metaphorically speaking, the 
SED invoked merely history’s mantle which in turn was to descend on the present much 
like a veil, imbuing it with the spell of history. Far from instrumentalizing the memory of 
the Eastern Front for concrete policy steps, Honecker’s ritualized memory was to 
“consolidate the present with the past.”
73
 He no longer even saw the SED fulfilling a 
historical mission in the sense that the “socialist revolution” which had been steeled in 
the fighting on the Eastern Front during World War II, was to triumph over capitalism 
one day. Rather, in the late GDR the “legacies of the [fallen] heroes”
74
 were being 
administered in the day-to-day struggle to “improve” socialism. As GDR society has 
often been said to have come to a standstill in course of the 1980s – with a wide-spread 
sense of lethargy and disillusion, and a growing retreat into private niches – the Rites of 
June illustrate the regime’s ideological solidification as it withdrew to hollow ritual and 
historical symbolism.
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 This is not to say, that the official memorial culture under Ulbricht
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Two articles described the memorial services at the „Memorial of Liberation Seelower Höhen,“ (where in 
the spring of 1945 more than 30,000 Soviet soldiers perished during the final battles of the war) and at the 
Soviet memorial in West-Berlin’s Tiergarten. Neues Deutschland, June 23, 1986, 2.
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 Cf. Münkler, “ Antifaschismus und antifaschistischer Widerstand,“ 28f.
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lacked these elements. Yet, the primary function of invoking the German-Soviet war well 
into the 1960s was to mobilize and energize the population for the project of German-
Soviet friendship with all its practical consequences, i.e. the building of socialism in 
1952, the crushing of “reactionary tendencies” in 1953, the creation of a “National 
People’s Army” in order to prevent the “imperialists” from waging “another” Eastern 
war, and the building of the “antifascist protection wall” in 1961. The fear-and-threat 
campaign had clear and concrete purposes during the Ulbricht era, whereas since the 
early 1970s – with the international climate improving in the wake of détente – the 
memory of the Eastern Front war severed primarily to reinforce and re-emphasis the need 
to stick with the Soviets and to properly administer the “socialist achievements” in the 
GDR. The farther remote the real events of the Eastern Front war grew, the easier it was 
for the SED to disassociate its “messages” and “lessons” from the historical content. Not 
only the antifascist rhetoric justifying the second dictatorship on German soil became 
“formulaic,”
76
 so too did the official memory of the Eastern Front. Thus, although the 
GDR claimed routinely to have (better) mastered the Nazi past, the actual historical facts, 
at least in the official memory propaganda, became increasingly irrelevant.  
THE OFFICIAL STALINGRAD MEMORY IN EAST GERMANY
One might assume that a historical event so powerfully connotated and emotionally 
laden as the battle of Stalingrad was – once established as a key metaphor in the SED’s 
postwar official memorial culture – there to stay. Yet, regardless of the fact that 
76
 Charles S. Maier, Dissolution. The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1997), 55.
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“Stalingrad” became a lieu de mémoire in the collective memory of both Germanys,
77
 the 
SED’s official reference to the battle, its aftermath and meaning, changed significantly 
over time. The East German communists remembered and appropriated one of the most 
cataclysmic events on the Eastern Front to their ideological-political needs only for so 
long as it promised to endow the East German socialist experiment with additional moral-
historical legitimacy. This was the case under Ulbricht, who shared with a number of 
influential postwar politicians a personal memory of Stalingrad that would naturally fade 
as these veterans retired from the political arena. Former Wehrmacht leaders such as 
Wilhelm Adam, Vincenz Müller, Heinrich Homann, Luitpold Steidle and Otto Korfes
stood with their personal stories and authority on the propaganda front during the 
founding years of the GDR. Their tales of the “reflection and return” experience in 
Stalingrad were to inspire und sustain the illusion of a collectively shared antifascism the 
SED prescribed to the whole of the East German population. 
The official memory of the battle of Stalingrad was the essence of the Eastern Front 
memory propagated by the SED throughout the years: Stalingrad both embodied and 
acuminated the horrors of the war in the East. The battle had claimed tremendous losses 
on either side, it signalled the turning point of the war, it saw the emergence of the 
antifascist alliance between German communists and the Red Army, indeed of a 
“people’s movement against Hitler,”
78
 and its outcome confirmed the ultimate triumph of 
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 Ulrich, “Stalingrad,” 332-348. 
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 “Volksbewegung gegen Hitler. Zu einem Buch von Erich Weinert über das Nationalkomitee ‚Freies 




 Moreover, by focussing the memory of the Eastern Front war on Stalingrad it 
was possible to address all important military issues, including the question of occupation 
policies, manpower and soldierly mass death. At the same time, however, one could 
comfortably exclude the Holocaust. The sufferings on each side were limited to “Soviet” 
and “German” soldiers; occasionally their sacrifices were even equated, only that the 
Wehrmacht’s losses had ultimately been “senseless.”
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Literature and films dealing with Stalingrad had reached a wide audience in East 
Germany even before the KPD/SED had put the concerted pro-Soviet propaganda in 
place. Theodor Plievier’s 1945 Stalingrad novel was one of the first and most popular 
literary works depicting and denouncing the seemingly senseless fighting on the Eastern 
Front.
81
 In 1950, the Soviet film “The Battle of Stalingrad” was screened in East German 
movie theatres, initially establishing “Stalingrad” as hallmark of the Eastern Front 
memory in the GDR.
82
 The date remembered in the GDR was February 3, 1943 – the day 
of the Sixth Army’s capitulation. In contrast, Western media coverage focussed in 
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 See for example, Otto Korfes, „Zum 15. Jahrestag des Sieges der Sowjetarmee bei Stalingrad. Die 
unvermeidbare Niederlage des deutschen Imperialismus,“ Neues Deutschland, 2 February 1958, 2. „Wie 
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 A two-part, semi-documentary movie (the Soviets called it “künstlerisch-dokumentarischer Film”) 
illustrating Stalin’s role as “genius and victorious” commander-in-chief during the battle and World War II 
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addition on November 22, 1942 – the day the cauldron closed around the Sixth Army. 
Thus, while Stalingrad symbolized the beginning of victory in East Germany, it was 
remembered as the beginning of the end in West Germany.
83
Fig. 8. Film Poster “The Battle of Stalingrad” (1949): Poster advertising a Soviet film production depicted the motif of the 
Soviet Honorary Memorial in Berlin-Treptow. A Soviet soldier carries a child (salvaged Germany); under his feet crushed 
German tanks.
What made the memory of Stalingrad so instrumental to the SED’s quest for 
legitimacy during the 1940s and 1950s was its symbolic power: the Wehrmacht’s defeat 
inaugurated the defeat of fascism, thus of imperialism, and therefore promised the 
ultimate triumph of socialism. The reconstruction of the city of Stalingrad, later 
83
 See also Sabine Behrenbeck, „Über die Lesarten eines Menetekels. Kommentar zum Beitrag von Helmut 
Lethen über das Geschichtszeichen ‚Stalingrad,’“ in Kittsteiner, ed., Geschichtszeichen, 181-198. 
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Volgograd, exemplified the resurrection and further expansion of socialism across the 
postwar world. In 1963, Neues Deutschland even commemorated the thirtieth anniversary 
of Hitler’s ascendancy to power in 1933 in conjunction with the twentieth anniversary of 
Stalingrad as the “beginning” and “end” of National Socialism: “it began with fires” in 
1933 – referring to the Reichstag fire – and “the battle on the Volga” was the “end of the 
arsonists – the turn towards victory of the nations.”
84
In the wake of de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union, Stalingrad was renamed 
Volgograd in 1961, and this might be one reason why the SED (already under Ulbricht) 
no longer propagated the Stalingrad narrative as the central event of the Eastern Front 
war. In 1963, twenty years after, it was the “battle on the Volga” or the “drama on the 
Volga” which had broken the “spell of Hitler’s invincibility” (which – arguably – had 
already been broken before Moscow and Leningrad). The text included none of the usual 
pictures of house-to-house fighting in the embattled city. In 1968 and 1978, the 
anniversary was not mentioned at all. In contrast, the fifteenth anniversary in 1958 had 
been prominently commemorated as “admonition and warning,” enriched with pictures of 
the “victorious Red Army taking the heart of the city in a storm” and a page-one 




 „Wie vor 30 Jahre die Nacht des Faschismus hereinbrach und wie sie endete,“ Neues Deutschland, 
January 30, 1963, 5. The article claimed rather falsely that „from now (1943) on the end of the Hitlerarmy 
and of the Hitlerstate were certain.”
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490
On a lower key, the tale of Stalingrad as the city rebuilt from the ruins of war 
remained a prominent theme in SED propaganda. Its paramilitary youth organization 
“Society for Sports and Technology” (GST) published a borschure in 1973 on the 
occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the battle. It encapsulates the key elements of the 
SED’s Stalingrad memory as it pervaded East German political culture until 1989. Its 
quintessential message read as follows:
The red flag ... wove over Stalingrad on February 2, 1943. It signalled: the battle in this city ... ended 
with a historic victory of the Red Army. ... The formerly strongest war machinery of world reaction 
was destroyed by the heroic defenders of Stalingrad. ... Stalingrad thereby becomes a symbol: no 
power on earth can annihilate socialism. ... He who raises his sword against socialism, will die by the 
sword. 
[Today] the traces of war and destruction are ... completely removed. [People] are proud of their city. 
They are happy and optimistic. They contribute to the fact that socialism keeps having the stronger 
battalions, that the socialist countries are alert and ready for combat and protect peace reliably. Thus 
they fulfill the legacy of the fighters and victors of Stalingrad.
86
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Günter Specht, Stalingrad 1943 - Wolgograd 1972, ed. Gesellschaft für Sport und Technik, 
Hauptabteilung Patriotische Erziehung (Berlin (Ost): Militärverlag der DDR, 1972), quote on backcover.
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Fig. 9. The Legacy of Stalingrad Fulfilled: Broshure published by the “Society for Sports and Technology” (GST), 1973.
DSF invoked the same “legacy” again in 1983, when the organization kicked of an 
entire campaign to “honor the historic victory of the Soviet army in the battle of 
Stalingrad” forty years after: films screenings, veteran talks, discussion groups, exhibits 
and illustrated wall newspapers were to be prepared by every local DSF branch in the 
entire republic. The main theme of the campaign was “Bonded with the Victors of 
History.”
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 A detailed set of instructions from the DSF executive committee advised the 
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 „Maßnahmen zur Würdigung des historischen Sieges der Sowjetarmee in der Stalingrader Schlacht,“ 
BA/SAPMO, DY 32/10743, 1-3. 1983 was also a „Karl-Marx-Year“ (100
th
 anniversary of his death), and a 
special focus lay on the city partnership Volgograd – Karl-Marx-Stadt, the latter of which hosted a number 
of “propagandistic events on the topic ’40 years after – Friendly relations Volgograd – Karl-Marx-Stadt,” 
ibid., 2. Further, a “representative photo-exhibit was displayed in the Central House of DSF in Berlin and in 
the House of DSF in Karl-Marx-Stadt (entitled “Stalingrad”); the films suggested to be screened in 
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agitators to “emphasize the current lessons of the battle of Stalingrad such as the 
invincibility of socialism and its armies, as well as the historically logic defeat of fascist 
Germany.”
88
Both, the official memory of the Eastern Front war and the battle of Stalingrad were 
crucial ingredients of the SED’s quest for legitimacy throughout the forty years of its 
rule. Stalingrad has even been elevated into the pantheon of the GDR’s “founding 
myths.”
89
 Yet, while the commemorative rituals and ceremonies largely remained 
unchanged over time, their content was changed, indeed thinned out by party agitators. 
What remained “useful” and thus worth preserving were the general historic “lessons” the 
SED drew from the war, especially the themes of socialism’s invincibility and 
fascism/capitalism’s doom. Rarely was there a genuine interest in the actual events on the 
Eastern Front. If at all it was under Ulbricht that Wehrmacht crimes against “Soviet 
citizens,” “soldiers” and “partisan fighters” – notably not the Holocaust – were recalled 
and vividly described as long as the party felt that such an emotionalized memory of the 
Eastern Front war contributed to a current policy decision or ideological campaign. 
Indeed, the Rites of June can be said to have been a major instrument in marginalizing 
addition, included “films provided by the USSR embassy” as well as “Heißer Schnee,” “Man wird nicht als 
Soldat geboren,” “Sie kämpften für die Heimat,” and “Sterben bevor das Leben beginnt,” ibid.
Curiously, the SED left this fourtieth anniversary campaign largely to the DSF, there was no nation-wide 
coverage of the event in Neues Deutschland. The paper just carried a brief, very general review of the 
central event commemorating the battle in Volgograd. It noted that the “Red Army had contributed one
decisive part [no longer the decisive part] to the liberation of Europe from the fascist tyranny.” Neues 




 Behrenbeck, “Lesarten eines Menetekels,” 192. According to Behrenbeck, Stalingrad belonged  „als 
staatlicher Gründungsmythos zum Kernbestand eines Selbstbildes als das bessere Deutschland gehört.“ 
Ibid. See also Kumpfmüller, Stalingrad.
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the Holocaust throughout GDR history.
90
 Further, the constant fear-and-threat rhetoric in 
the name of “peace” was to win and mobilize the population for the SED’s main foreign 
and domestic policy project, German-Soviet friendship. That the SED in fact created no 
more than a “myth” or an “invented friendship” has been discussed more detailed 
elsewhere.
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 For my purposes it is important to stress the central role the SED assigned to 
the historical events “war on the Eastern Front” and “Stalingrad” in these campaigns. 
And to consider, that the SED’s quest for legitimacy was inextricably connected to the 
quest for a popular friendship movement – as it turned out a hopeless undertaking whose 
failure not only latently undermined the SED’s ideological stand but also, in the long run, 
contributed the regime’s collapse in 1989.
II. Rites of November: The “National Day of Mourning” in West Germany
While in the GDR, June 22 became an official day of remembrance, the same date 
was neglected by the political elite and largely absent from the public consciousness in 
West Germany until at least the 1960s.
92
 It was not until 1966, that a West German 
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chancellor, Ludwig Erhard of the CDU, acknowledged the twenty-fifth anniversary of 
“Barbarossa” with an official statement calling to “remove the remains of the war,” by 
which he meant most of all German division.
93
 Yet, neither thereafter was June 22 a set 
date in the official commemoration calendar. Much depended on the personal historical 
conscience and sensitivity of the men in power. The two most important memorial days 
dedicated to the memory of World War II were May 8, until President Richard von 
Weizsäcker’s famous 1985 speech mostly remembered as the day of national defeat, and 
July 20, commemorating the failed assassination attempt against Hitler. In addition, June 
17, the “Day of German Unity,” ever since the East German uprising in 1953 served to 
commemorate one of the most severe consequences of the war – Germany’s division.
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particular, Wigbert Benz, „Stalingrad im deutschen Schulbuch und Unterricht,“ in Wette, Ueberschär, eds., 
Stalingrad, 240-246. 
A similar trend was observed in West German historiography, see Rolf-Dieter Müller, Gerd R. Überschär, 
“Die deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen und das Unternehmen ‘Barbarossa’ 1941 im Spiegel der 
Geschichtsschreibung. Eine kommentierte Auswahlbibliographie,“ in Ueberschär, Wette, ed., 
„Unternehmen Barbarossa,“ 267-291 (which provides a comparative, yet quite dated overview of 
scholarship in FRG, GDR and USSR until 1984). More recently see Rolf-Dieter Müller, Gerd R. 
Ueberschär, eds., Hitlers Krieg im Osten 1941-1945. Ein Forschungsbericht (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 2000) and the commented overview by Wigbert Benz, “Die Bewältigung des 
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Geschichtsunterrichts (Frankfurt/Main: Haag & Herchen, 1988), esp. 112ff.
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memory under Adenauer lead to a growing concern with the history and memory of the Holocaust. See 
Herf, Divided Memory, 334-362.
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Over decades, none of these three official memorial days addressed explicitly the 
sufferings Nazi Germany had brought upon its neighbors and the world. Accordingly, 
they rather circled around German civilian and military victims.
95
 The same was initially 
also true for the speeches and ceremonies held on the “National Day of Mourning.” This 
memorial day was celebrated every November between All Souls Day and Totensonntag
96
(two religious memorial days dedicated to the deceased). Of all occasions, one could 
expect this one to at least have included a reference to the other losses, particularly to the 
millions of Jewish and non-Jewish civilian victims on the Eastern Front in Poland, the 
Baltic States and the Soviet Union. Yet, until the 1970s, the Rites of November were 
mainly dedicated to the German dead buried in over fifty countries around the globe: 
soldiers, POWs, civilian “bomb victims,” refugees, expellees, and those persecuted for 
their “political or religious beliefs.”
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 Usually the song “The Good Comrade”
98
 was played 




 On VE Day in West Germany see Kirsch, “Wir haben aus der Geschichte gelernt,“ on the July 20, and 
June 17 commemorations see the literature cited above in fn. 91.
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„Sunday of the Dead:“ second last Sunday before First Advent commemorating the dead.
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 For a good analysis of the Volkstrauertag ceremonies and speeches, see Meinhold Lurz, 
Kriegerdenkmäler in Deutschland (Heidelberg: Esprint, 1987), 509ff. Lurz analysis is limited to speeches 
by presidents of the Volksbund für Kriegsgräberfürsorge. 
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The lyrics of “Der gute Kamerad” were written by Ludwig Uhland in 1809 in Tübingen, the music 
composed by Friedrich Silcher. The song soon became the national mourning song for a war-torn Germany 
after the Napoleonic wars. See Kurt Oesterle, “Die heimliche deutsche Hymne,” Schwäbisches Tageblatt, 
November 15, 1997. The lyrics are:
Ich hatt’ einen Kameraden,/Einen besseren find’st du nit./Die Trommel schlug zum Streite,/Er ging an 
meiner Seite/In gleichem Schritt und Tritt. 
Eine Kugel kam geflogen,/Gilt’s mir oder gilt es dir? Ihn hat es weggerissen,/Er liegt mir vor den 
Füßen,/Als wär’s ein Stück von mir.
Will mir die Hand noch reichen,/Derweil ich eben lad./Kann dir die Hand nicht geben,/Bleib du im ew’gen 
Leben/Mein guter Kamerad!
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 Heinrich Lübke interpreted the lyrics with the following words: „This good comrade is the one whom we 
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the bunker, in the camp, in the prison or on the streets of expulsion, a fate which might as well could have 
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speeches on Volkstrauertag were mostly dedicated to trying to make sense of these 
“sacrifices.” Most commonly, the varying speakers saw this “sense” manifested in the 
present-day dedication and duty to keep the peace; thereby the “legacy” of the millions of 
dead would be fulfilled.
100
 The Holocaust was mostly circumscribed with phrases such as 
“people murdered by race hate”
101
 or “those who died dreadfully in the extermination 
camps” as a result of “national hatred and racial paranoia.”
102
 In November of 1986, 
Alfred Dregger (1920-2002), head of the CDU/CSU faction in the Bundestag, for the first 
time appropriately acknowledged the Jewish genocide by referring to the “exterminating 
murderers” (Ausrottungsmorde) at the very beginning of his speech.
103
 Yet, the (German) 
victims in the “East”, not those of the East, were only in so far a point of concern as 
officials had to accept that it remained impossible to visit the graves of the “uncounted 
dead in the width of the East.”
104
caught us.” Heinrich Lübke, “Im Geiste der Wahrhaftigkeit,” printed in BPI, no. 215, November 18, 1960, 
2074.
100
A good example is President Heinrich Lübke’s speech in November 1960, “Im Geiste der 
Wahrhaftigkeit,” printed in BPI, no. 215, November 18, 1960, 2073-2074. To him the question of the 
„sense of the gruesome events … must find its answer in the conclusion we draw from [them] for the 
present and the future:” Never again, Lübke warned, must people be instrumentalized as “tools of power,” 
never again must a dictatorship rise on German soil, and the “worth of freedom” must be grasped and 
cherished once and for all. In 1961, without reflecting on the twentieth anniversary but mindful of August 
13, the message was similar: “Keep the peace!” was the “call that sounded from the graves of our war 
dead.” See Walter Trepte, “Volkstrauertag 1961. Für die Erhaltung des Friedens – Die Opfer der Toten 
rufen uns zu tätiger Bewährung,” printed in BPI, no. 217, November 18, 1961, 2025.
101
 See President Heinrich Lübke’s speech in November 1960, “Im Geiste der Wahrhaftigkeit,” printed in 
BPI, no. 215, November 18, 1960, 2074.
102
 In German „Völkerhass“ and „Rassenwahn.“ See speech by Vice Chancellor and Minister of Interior, 
Gerhard Schröder, “Stätten des Gedenkens – Mahnmale zum Frieden,” printed in BPI, no. 214, November 
17, 1959, 2186.
103
 Alfred Dregger, „Der Friede ist das Werk der Gerechtigkeit,“ printed in BPI, no. 140, November 18, 
1986, 1169. On the emergence of the democratic Holocaust-memory in the FRG see Herf, Divided 
Memory, 201-362.
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 Such were the words of Vice Chancellor and Minister of Interior, Gerhard Schröder, on November 15, 
1955, “Dem Gedenken der Toten,” printed in BPI, no. 215, November 15, 1955, 1805.
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For the first time in 1960, a speech by a major politician, President Heinrich Lübke
(1894-1972, CDU), explicitly acknowledged the sufferings of other nations, recalling that
over 50 million died in World War II and including “soldiers of all nations,” “women, 
men, children and the elderly of all nations,” “the POWs and deported (Verschleppten) of 
all nations,” “people of all nations who became victims of the nationalist hatred in their 
homes or during flight and expulsion” and “all people murdered by racial hatred” in the 
memorial ceremony.
105
 Yet, it took more than a decade until the Soviet Union’s fate 
during World War II was specifically remembered in context of the Volkstrauertag. 
While Ludwig Erhard in 1966 – for the first time at all addressing the anniversary of 
“Barbarossa” in a government statement – declared that the “German attack against the 
Soviet Union … had brought misery and suffering over both nations” alike, it was only in 
1971 that Helmut Schmidt, then Minister of Defense in the Brandt administration, 
questioned the Germans’ postwar self-conciliatory longing for making sense. Schmidt 
used the occasion of Volkstrauertag to stress that World War II had been a senseless war, 
that Hitler’s “unprovoked war of aggression” had not been “a good cause” for which it 
had been worth dying.
106
 This was at the time a daring statement questioning the sense of 
105
 Heinrich Lübke, “Im Geiste der Wahrhaftigkeit,” printed in BPI, no. 215, November 18, 1960, 2074. As 
Reichel has pointed out, Lübke, nonetheless, was eager to reduce the circle of German perpetrators to the 
lowest possible number and to stress the victimization of Germans; in 1965, in a speech in Bergen-Belsen 
twenty years after its liberation, Lübke weighed that the number of “henchmen” had been much smaller
that the number of “German victims.” He also compassionately defended the German soldiers against 
accusations of having participated in mass murder – it was the “perfidiousness of the national socialist 
regime” to “attack them from behind.” Lübke (CDU), president between 1959 and 1969, had been 
temporarily imprisoned by the Nazis, but later had been working for a firm that also built KZ complexes. 
For this involvement with Nazi crimes he was repeatedly attacked towards the end of this second term. See 
Reichel, Politik mit der Erinnerung, 130f.
106
 Nonetheless, Schmidt also maintained that it was no shame to have been fighting dutifully in a “wrong 
war.” Cf. Chapter 11.II. – Chancellor Willy Brandt himself just offered some introductory remarks on the 
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the German sacrifices in the war, and distinguishing them from Nazi Germany’s other 
victims. The German dead belonged in a “different historical category” than those 
nationals who had died as a consequence of the war. Schmidt concluded, the death of 
those “Frenchmen, Poles, and Russians, Dutch and Yugoslavs,” had not been “senseless” 
for they died “defending the freedom of their countries.”
107
 This was the first major speech 
on that occasion to challenge the notion that even dying for Hitler had been a sacrifice 
worth giving. Schmidt’s distinguished statement might also be explained with the fact 
that he was the first and only West German chancellor to have fought on the Eastern 
Front.
108
The first time June 22 was directly addressed during the annual Rites of November 
was in 1981. Vice president of the Bundestag, Annemarie Renger (born 1919, SPD), 
addressed the fourtieth anniversary of “Barbarossa” in a long speech on November 15, 
1981. Renger praised the work of the Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge
(People’s Association for German War Graves Care, VDK) on hundreds of soldiers’ 
cemeteries across Europe and underscored its “humane meaning” as it offered 
compassion to all those who have lost loved ones in war. However, she also clarified that 
occasion, praising the reconciliatory work of the Volksbund für Kriegsgräberfürsorge. See BPI, no. 168, 
November 16, 1971, 1773f.
In June 1971, the 30
th
 anniversary of “Barbarossa,” Brandt did not address the occasion with a public 
announcement as Erhard had done five years earlier in 1966. That the date was far from omnipresent in the 
official memorial calendar is illustrated by the fact that Justice Minister Gerhard Jahn delivered a speech to 
newly sworn-in soldiers on June 19, 1971, without once reflecting on this historic date. See his speech “Der 
Auftrag des Soldaten” printed in BPI, no. 93, June 22, 1971, 977f.
107
 Helmut Schmidt, „Gedenken an die Opfer von Krieg und Gewaltherrschaft,“ printed in BPI, no. 168, 
November 16, 1971, 1774.
108
 Schmidt had served as Lieutenant in a tank division, and had taken part in “Operation Barbrossa” from 
the beginning until 1942. He had fought in the battle for Moscow and had also partaken in the siege of 
Leningrad. In 1942 he was ordered back to the Reich to work in Göring’s Reich Air-Force Ministry as 
recruits training advisor. See further below, Chapter 11.II.
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“World War II was incited in the name of the German people as naked war of aggression 
and conquest, and that the willingness to give one’s life was demanded by a regime that 
was in its nature criminal.”
109
 She further stressed that on this day, the commemoration 
included the victims of war in all nations, soldiers and civilians alike. Supporting the 
VDK’s ongoing efforts to get access to German soldiers’ cemeteries in Eastern Europe, 
Renger sought to promote reconciliation by directly acknowledging the Soviet Union’s 
losses:
We know which unspeakable blood toll [Blutzoll] the peoples of the East had to pay and how bitter 
memories are which are resurfacing in light of the fourtieth anniversary of the attack against the Soviet 
Union. And still we join in the VDK’s pledge that even there, one should not reject the humanitarian 
intentions of the war grave care.
110
While the official memory of the Eastern Front, thus, grew more nuanced over the 
decades and in the wake of Ostpolitik came closer to acknowledging the historical facts 
beyond the mere appropriation of the war’s memory on current political necessities, the 
memory of Stalingrad as the perceivably worst outgrowth of the brutalization of warfare 
on the Eastern Front remained a matter of semi-official and personal, yet still collective 
commemoration. Especially the media communicated the Stalingrad picture in West 
Germany over the years, while politicians offered little public reflection.
111
 Rather than 
remembering the battle of Stalingrad in ritualized public announcements, leading 
politicians referred to the event in passing, not without exploiting the powerful 
collectively cherished emotions the memory of this traumatic event continued to invoke 
109




 A good print media analysis has been provided by Behrenbeck, „Über die Lesarten eines Menetekels, 
181-198. Behrenbeck’s analysis includes quality newspapers such as Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Zeit, Bayrische Staatszeitung, Welt, and Rheinischer Merkur. For 
comparison, she read the East German magazines Vorwärts, and Einheit. 
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throughout the postwar decades. For example, in his nationally televised speech 
commemorating the centenary of the founding of the German Reich in 1971 (notably also 
the thirtieth anniversary of “Barbarossa”), President Gustav Heinemann (SPD) recalled 
the disastrous road Bismarck’s Reich had taken in history: 
One hundred years of German Reich – this not just means once Versailles, but twice Versailles, 1871 
and 1919, and this also means Auschwitz, Stalingrad and unconditional surrender in 1945.
112
By recalling these key-dates and places of recent German history in one thought, 
Heinemann echoed the collective memory of Stalingrad in West German society: the 
battle was ingrained in the collective mind just as deeply as other decisive events. Most 
notably, in this line of argument, the “lieux de mémoire” Auschwitz and Stalingrad 
appeared to be of equal relevance to German memory. These two names embodied the 
two poles of West German World War II memory: the first representing German guilt, 
the latter German suffering. In both Germanys, in general, the connection between 
Auschwitz and Stalingrad was neglected for most of the Cold War period.
This points to the meaning most Germans accorded to Stalingrad. The battle was the
central metaphor for the sufferings and sacrifices of German soldiers (and Germans) in 
World War II, a war that often appeared to have been waged by Hitler not only against 
Europe and the world, but first and foremost against Germans themselves.
113
 As others 
have demonstrated, the West German print and electronic media reinforced and sustained 
112
Quoted in Wolfrum, Geschichtspolitik, 260. Heinemann (originally CDU, had left the party in protest of
Adenauer’s policy of remilitarization in 1952; since 1957 SPD, President 1969-1974) earned himself a 
storm of public protest for putting the Bismarck Reich into the larger context of twentieth century German 
history and for practically placing Hitler’s Third Reich at the end of the history of the Second Reich, i.e. for 
arguing the Sonderweg thesis. In particular, his famous dictum of “the difficult fatherland Germany” and 
the bloody legacy of German nationalism and militarism stirred the controversy. As Wolfrum points out, 
“such a lesson in history the German had never been given before.” Ibid., 260f.
113
 Frei, „Der totale Krieg und die Deutschen,“ 290.
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this “image” of Stalingrad.
114
 Similarly, organized veterans cultivated their personal 
experiences as sagas of heroic self-sacrifice in the line of duty.
115
 The war on the Eastern 
Front as a whole received less but similarly whitewashing attention in the media, 
particularly in the popular, widely-read and richly illustrated “Barbarossa” books and 
treaties of Paul Carell (1911-1997), a former Nazi propagandist turned publicist.
116
These collectively communicated memories found two ways of expression and thus 
had a two-fold effect on West German society: on the one hand, the Stalingrad memory 
was a political memory in so far as it served to paint the war experience in a certain light 
– one which tended to marginalize the Wehrmacht’s criminal legacy and thus helped to 
sustain the “myth of a clean Wehrmacht.” It also gave a meaning to the fighting. It 
therefore enabled veterans to make sense of their past and to integrate into a receptive 
peace-time society. On the other hand, Stalingrad inspired what might be called a 
humanitarian-religiously informed memory which can best be illustrated with the story of 
114
 See most recently the excellent, richly illustrated exhibition catalogue Stalingrad erinnern, ed. Jahn. The 
exhibition was reviewed by von Wrochem, “Stalingrad erinnern.” A good summary is Norbert Frei, 
„Mythos Stalingrad. Die ‚Kriegswende’ in der Wahrnehmung der Deutschen,“ in idem, 1945 und wir. Das 
Dritte Reich im Bewußtsein der Deutschen (München: Beck, 2005), 97-106. See further very detailed 
Kumpfmüller, Die Schlacht von Stalingrad, and on the literary and popular reception see Baron, 
„Stalingrad als Thema der deutschsprachigen Literatur,“ and Renner, „Hirn und Herz.“
115
 See Detlev Vogel, “Die deutschen und österreichischen Stalingradbünde. Schritte vom Mythos zur 
Realität,“ in Wette, Ueberschär, eds., Stalingrad, 247-253. For a most recent example of this function see 
an interview of the current president of the Bund ehemaliger Stalingradkämpfer Horst Zank in the right-
wing weekly paper Junge Freiheit, January 31, 2003.
116
 On Carell cf. Wigbert Benz, Paul Carell. Ribbentrops Pressechef Paul Karl Schmidt vor und nach 1945
(Berlin: Wissenschaftliche Verlagsgesellschaft, 2005). Carell alias Paul Karl Schmidt was as Ribbentrop’s 
press chief responsible for translating NS policy, including the “Final Solution,” into “Sprachregelungen” 
for foreign correspondents. His postwar works on the war against “Russia” appeared in multiple editions. 
See further Chapter 10. II.
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the famous drawing “Madonna of  Stalingrad.”
117
 The drawing was created by Lieutenant 
Kurt Reuber, a staff physician and Protestant pastor caught in the battle of Stalingrad 
during the winter of 1942/43. Reportedly, his comrades were deeply moved when they 
saw it for the first time. It undoubtedly offered some sense of consolation and hope to 
men in a desperate situation.
Fig. 10. The “Madonna of Stalingrad” (1942).
117
The Madonna hitherto has been „ignored by historians,“ Perry points out. Joseph Perry, „The Madonna 
of Stalingrad: The (Christmas) Past and West German National Identity after World War II,” Radical 
History Review, 83 (Spring 2002), 6-27, quote on 9.
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While Reuber did not survive the war (he died in Soviet captivity), the drawing is 
said to have been flown out of Stalingrad with the last plane to leave the embattled city. 
His widow donated it to a returnees organization in the 1950s. It was displayed in various 
exhibitions throughout the republic and soon became a fixed image in West German 
memorial culture. In a ceremony in 1983, fifty years after the defeat at Stalingrad, the 
drawing was given to the Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church in (West) Berlin – the 
prominent historic remains symbolizing the damage done to Berlin by Allied bombings. 
Ever since then it is being displayed there as a “symbol of peace and security, and the 
links between Stalingrad, German victimhood, and the tragedy of world war forged in 
their rhetoric” still resonates with most visitors.
118
Over the course of the years since the 1950s, the Stalingrad-Madonna became a 
powerful emotional symbol not only for the most (in)famous Christmas during World 
War II (Kriegsweihnachten), but also of West German society’s longing for a sense of 
common identity, and for (“finally”) coming to terms with the past. Eventually, this 
codified peculiar Stalingrad memory offered a path towards finding closure and 
reconciliation – not with Germany’s victims but with oneself. Referring to Stalingrad in 
the context of family gatherings on Christmas – regardless whether a dead or living 
member of the family was a Stalingrad veteran – the memories and emotions invoked by 




shared suffering.” It allowed West Germans to evade the question of personal 
responsibility for Nazism and its crimes.
119
In its published version, the drawing came along with an explicit and a meta-
narrative, a “narrative of suffering and forgiveness.”
120
 Printed on the front of a little 
booklet, it circled within families during Christmas time, and parents could read the 
inside text and a prayer on the back cover to their children.
121
 Of special interest and 
significance is the inside cover text
122
 because it splendidly exemplifies the questionable 
effects the Stalingrad memory had on the general (popular) reception of the Eastern Front 
war in West Germany. Neglecting the grandiose tragedy of the others which constituted 
the context of the battle – the war of extermination – the Stalingrad-Madonna became an 
uplifting symbol for “light, life, love:”
Russia, Stalingrad, winter of 1942.
Thousands of soldiers are encircled, awaiting breakdown and death.
The doctor Kurt Reuber draws on the backside of a Russian map
A picture, and surprises on Christmas Eve
His friends with this drawing. 
...
What calm and protectiveness emerges from this Madonna of Stalingrad;
What power and security from him who embraces both – of God!
...
The picture has probably the strangest frame ever given to a picture.
On the left edge is written:
‘1942 Christmas in the cauldron.’
On the right edge we read the words:
‘Light, life, love.’
On the one side the hint
of downfall and death.
On the other side the message
119
Ibid., 8. In Germany, the drawing was therefore mostly seen as a „document of reconciliation,“ see 
Martin Kruse, ed., Die Stalingrad-Madonna: Das Werk Kurt Reubers als Dokument der Versöhnung




I thank Hedwig Richter for providing me with a copy of the booklet.
122
Both, inside cover text and prayer were – as far as I was able to determine – added to the drawing after 
the war by pastor Theo Schmidkonz.
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Of rescue and salvation.
What faith did this man have
Who in the face of death was able to say and draw such words.
L i g h t! Not night then
Will eventually prevail, but:
‘The shine of the Lord gleams around them.’
L i f e! Not death then
Will triumph forever, but:
‘Today your savior is born.’
L o v e! Not hate then
Has the last word, but:
‘A child in the cradle – peace on earth.’
In the hell of Stalingrad
A piece of heaven opens up: Light, life, love!
123
123
The prayer on the back reads: Jesus Christ,/you are always with us,/surrounds us from all sides. /In 
darkness and night/give us – your light. /In fear and death/give us – your life. /In coldness and 
loneliness/give us – your love./ Lord/in your hand/we are secure, at home,/You, our savior and friend.
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Chapter 10
The Crimes of the Eastern Front in the Limelight: History, Memory 
and Justice in the 1960s
“To record and interpret the diversity of historical reality, to describe ‘how it really was’ (Ranke), often 
even remains an annoying side-product for the scientist of the Eastern bloc. History is less contemplatio ... 
but first of all agitatio, a sharp weapon of the mind, mercilessly and brutally employed, an instrument of 
hate and irreconcilable enmity which forces the Soviet-communist historian to relegate himself to a highly-
paid henchmen of communism.”
Andreas Hillgruber, West German Historian (1961)
“We have to write the Marxist history of World War II long awaited of us. We must turn it into a heavy and 
sharply burnished weapon against all falsifiers and defamers, agitators and instigators who subjectively or 
objectively [and] in the service of American and German imperialism pursue the ideological preparation of 
a third world war.”
Leo Stern, East German Historian (1959)
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I. On Trial: The Judicial Confrontation of the Crimes on the Eastern Front in both 
Germanys
This chapter shifts focus again to the political aspects of the memory of the war 
against the Soviet Union. It traces the changing East and West German perceptions of the 
war on the Eastern Front in the 1960s by focussing especially on the judicial and 
historiographical confrontation of Nazi and war crimes committed on the Eastern Front 
between 1941 and 1944. Increasingly, remembering the Eastern Front meant not just 
“remembering war” in terms of “finding a legitimate narrative,”
1
 but confronting and 
judging the perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity. These crimes 
included the systematic killing of about four million European Jews in the extermination 
camps of the Generalgovernment and the mass execution of about two million Jews 
behind the Eastern Front lines, as well as those crimes committed against Soviet non-
Jewish civilians, partisans and soldiers in the wake of the Wehrmacht’s invasion of the 
Soviet Union. In the SBZ/GDR, the crimes of the Eastern Front – on a depersonalized 
and formulaic level – had played a prominent role in the official memory ever since the 
communist takeover. In the Federal Republic it was only during the 1960s that the Nazi 
crimes against Jews, Poles, Russians and others received growing public, judicial and 
scholarly attention and that the apologetic discourse of German suffering turned 
gradually into a discourse of mutual sufferings. The triangle of history, memory and 
justice attained new meaning during those years as the democratic left’s call for “daring 
more democracy” (Willy Brandt) included addressing the burdens of the past with a focus 
1
 Bourke, “Introduction ‘Remembering War’,” 480.
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on justice and respect for the victims instead of primarily “integrating” the guilty and 
accomplices as during the Adenauer years.
2
The judicial and scholarly efforts to confront these legacies became particularly 
closely intertwined in both Germanys during the 1960s, as the following analysis shows. 
With the contrary political system and resulting political cultures in mind, it recaptures 
how these various efforts contributed to the transformation of the official Eastern Front 
memories as concrete historical events and facts gradually became common academic 
and thus at least semi-public knowledge. In how far this knowledge disseminated among 
the public would require a separate study. Yet since the historical events on the Eastern 
Front, and especially the crimes of SS and Wehrmacht, became indispensable material in 
the ideological Cold War between East and West Germany these events gradually and 
inevitably entered public debates in the FRG, while they continuously dominated much 
of the SED’s official commemoration and propaganda agenda in the GDR. 
The years after the building of the wall marked a turning point in the genesis of the 
Eastern Front memory in two different ways: the SED intensified its efforts to present the 
“antifascist” GDR as the “better Germany” to the world, and to imbue its citizens at home 
– now finally unhindered and undisturbed by direct influences from the West – with a 
socialist identity based to a considerable degree on the recourse to history and the 
constant invocation of the “right lessons” learned. In the West, a changing political 
2
 Herf, Divided Memory, 267. Herf weighs this shift with the following words: “Even in the classic era of 
silence and of democratization through integration [during the Adenauer years], the crimes of the Nazis 
found a place in early West German political narratives, though not a prominent or ubiquitous one. That 
place nonetheless became larger and more prominent until eventually in the 1960s the connection between 
memory and democracy was reversed: daring more democracy eventually came to entail more, not less, 
national political discussion of the Holocaust and other crimes of the Nazi past.” Ibid., 268.
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culture during the post-Adenauer years fostered a new interest in the Nazi past which 
entailed a more differentiating and probing approach to the question of German guilt in 
general, and the crimes of the Eastern Front in particular.
3
There are only few areas in which the inner-German Cold War was fought as fiercely 
and relentlessly as in the area of facing the Nazi past and its legacies. By its very nature, 
the factually and ideologically divided Germany was caught up in a unique historical 
situation, namely to come to terms with a shared past under squarely opposing political 
circumstances in the present. Especially the East German dictatorship was able – due to 
the authoritarian nature of its political power – to narrate history according to the leading 
party’s ideological objectives, the most important of which was to put the past into the 
service of the present. The SED’s politics of memory involved a number of political and 
ideological aims all of which it sought to achieve by engaging in a constant propaganda 
war with the FRG about the “right lessons of the past.” 
When in 1961, the wall manifested the – then perceived – final division of Germany 
into two separate states, the SED also intensified the ideological campaigns aimed at 
presenting the GDR as the “better Germany” and the FRG as the breeding ground of 
German neo-fascist imperialism. The Nazi past was the decisive instrument in this battle: 
already between 1957 and 1960, SED chief agitator Albert Norden had “released” 
evidence incriminating West German judges for their “bloody” record of prosecuting 
every thinkable “enemy of the Volksgemeinschaft” during the Nazi era. Every six months, 
3
 On the second Vergangenheitsbewältigung during the 1960s in general, see Detlef Siegfried, 
„Aufarbeitung der NS-Vergangenheit,“ in Axel Schildt, ed., Dynamische Zeiten. Die 60er Jahre in den 
beiden deutschen Gesellschaften (Hamburg: Hans Christians, 2000), 77-113. See also the essays in the 
more recent book by Gassert, Steinweis, eds., Coping with the Nazi past.
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Norden held an “international press conference” to denounce “Hitler’s Blood Judges in 
the Service of the Adenauer-Regime,” overall about 200 West German lawyers, judges 
and state prosecutors on the basis of archival evidence.
4
 This propagandistic and 
calculated gambling with (largely) authentic historical evidence earned the SED not the 
attention many of these cases might well have deserved. Rather, the way they were 
presented and exploited for day-to-day political purposes undermined the declared 
intention to contribute to the mastering of the Nazi past in the Western part of Germany. 
Yet, indirectly, Norden’s strategic goal to permanently damage the FRG’s reputation 
abroad was successful. The British public and parliament, in particular, became 
increasingly annoyed with Adenauer’s refusal to rid his administration of severely
burdened former Nazis such as the Director of the Chancellery Hans Globke (1898-
1973), and the Minister of Displaced Persons, Refugees and Victims of War, Theodor 
Oberländer (1905-1998, CDU). It is thus incorrect to judge Norden’s agitation 
exclusively as mere “disinformation campaigns” (Weinke), because campaigns aimed at 
unmasking former Nazis and other accomplices could only work for so long as there 
actually were influential persons to be unmasked and deserved to be held accountable.
5
4
 Weinke, Die Verfolgung von NS-Tätern im geteilten Deutschland, 78-82. Weinke provides a thorough 
overview of the campaigns between 1957 and 1960, but focuses exclusively on the propagandistic side of 
the activities thus rendering them meaningless Cold War manoeuvers. She wholly ignores the pieces of 
historical truth that lay at the heart of many of these denouncement campaigns.
5
 On the degree of NS continuities in the West German judiciary system see Marc von Miquel, “Juristen: 
Richter in eigener Sache,” in Frei, ed., Karrieren im Zwielicht, 165-214.
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Fig. 11. Unmasking West German Neo-Fascism: Albert Norden, SED’s chief propagandist at one of his “international press 
conferences,” holding up a file containing information about the Nazi past of West German Minister Theodor Oberländer, 
October 1959.
6
The campaigns of Albert Norden are a prime example for the political, ideological
and all-German dimension of the war crimes issue. The judicial reckoning with the 
crimes of the Eastern Front war was more than any other part of the Nazi legacy 
predetermined to become entangled in the politics of memory. Thus, history, memory and 
justice remained irreconcilable during the 1960s for different reasons in both parts of 
Germany: in the West, the public memory of the Eastern Front as the most sacrificial 
front of the German soldier accounted for the widespread leniency in prosecuting and 
6
 BA/SAPMO, Bild Y1, 15641.
512
judging crimes committed there, especially crimes against Soviet POWs, partisans and 
(non-Jewish) civilians. In the East, the SED’s preoccupation with gaining political and 
legitimating capital from the prominent and canonized memory of the Wehrmacht’s war 
against the Soviet Union led in fact not to a more balanced judicial reckoning with 
Wehrmacht crimes, but merely to a politically-motivated bias towards Soviet victims.
The officially crafted and communicated memories of the Eastern Front war in East 
and West Germany – encapsulated in the previously described “Rites of June” in the 
GDR and the “Rites of November” in the FRG – undeniably exerted significant influence 
on the judicial reckoning with Nazi crimes and crimes of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern 
Front. One might expect that the strong official focus on the Eastern Front war in the 
GDR entailed an increased interest in the prosecution of crimes committed there, 
especially on Soviet territory. Yet, that was, generally speaking, not the case. Although 
recent research has qualified claims that the East German prosecution of Nazi crimes was 
only ideologically driven and predominantly misused to silence political opponents,
7
when it came to the prosecution of crimes committed by members of the Wehrmacht on 
the Eastern Front, East and West German courts proved equally disinterested – with one 
exception: in the SED state those trial proceedings pertaining Wehrmacht crimes 
involved much more often Soviet victims, particularly POWs, partisans and Soviet 
7
 See the report by Michael Greve summarizing recent findings in connection with the systematic 
cataloguing and publication of East German NS trials and how these compare to the history of the 
prosecution of Nazi crimes in West Germany, „Eine Fachtagung zu den ostdeutschen Strafverfahren wegen 
NS-Tötungsverbrechen am 25.10.2002 in Berlin,“ online available at http://www.michael-
greve.de/forschung.htm#fo [Sept. 2006].
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civilians (including Soviet Jews), than respective trials in the FRG, thus resonating the 
political bias of the official Eastern Front memory.
8
Views of the Eastern Front war as they emerged and were publicly communicated in 
postwar Germany found entrance – very concretely – into judicial proceedings pertaining 
crimes committed there by members of the Wehrmacht. They shaped legal discussions 
about guilt and responsibility as well as court-room debates over the degree of “cruelty” 
characterizing a deed or “inescapable circumstances” which might have had led to certain 
crimes. Thus far, the East German Nazi and Wehrmacht trials have only been registered 
and catalogued; the court records themselves have not yet been the subject of historical 
study.
9
 The history of West Germany’s prosecution of Nazi crimes, however, has already 
been written. Ruth Bettina Birn has closely examined West German court-room records 
and concluded that the judiciary proceedings were strongly influenced by “societal 
prejudices” and by “interpretations of historical facts” which mostly can be said to result 
from “a collective, retrospective deformation of the past.”
10
 The “continuing 
identification with the values of the war years” led in practice to a lenient, tendentious 
and often apologetic treatment of Wehrmacht crimes in West German trials. 
8
With regards to the difficulty of comparing the judicial proceedings and their legacy in East and West 
Germany, Weinke has recently noted that it might be impossible to come to a „methodologically clean“ 
conclusion. Cf. Annette Weinke, „’Alliierter Angriff auf die nationale Souveränität?’ Die Strafverfolgung 
von Kriegs- und NS-Verbrechen in der Bundesrepublik, der DDR und Österreich,“ in Norbert Frei, ed., 
Transnationale Vergangenheitspolitik. Der Umgang mit deutschen Kriegsverbrechern in Europa nach dem 
Zweiten Weltkrieg (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2006), 37-93, quote on 49, fn. 47.
9
 A selection of East German court documents (including inditements and verdicts) is published at 
http://www1.jur.uva.nl/junsv/Lesen.htm [Oct. 2006].
10
 Ruth Bettina Birn, “Wehrmacht und Wehrmachtangehörige in den deutschen Nachkriegsprozessen,“ in 
Müller, Volkmann, Die Wehrmacht, 1081-1099, quote on 1083. See for the societal context and 
contemporary reactions, Marc von Mique “Explanation, Dissociation, Apologia: The Debate over the 
Criminal Prosecution of Nazi Crimes in the 1960s,” in Gassert, Steinweis, eds., Coping with the Nazi past, 
88-113.
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One scandalous but not exceptional example can be found in the files of the district 
court in Düsseldorf which in 1964 deliberated a case against Wehrmacht soldiers accused 
of having executed the Jewish population of a village in southern Russia. Routinely, war 
crimes committed in connection with the “partisan” warfare on the Eastern Front were 
justified with the hint that the “Russians” fought in a “bestial way” against the 
Wehrmacht. The Düsseldorf court applied this reasoning to the case at hand and 
concluded that the defendant had not acted “cruelly” by rounding up the Jews of the 
village, letting them stand on a truck under a plane over night and having them shot the 
next morning. The qualification of a deed as “cruel” was a precondition for declaring an 
act of killing murder; otherwise it was classified as manslaughter which by 1964 was 
already statue-barred and would therefore have rendered no punishment.
11
 The jury –
itself mostly made up of “active war participants” – accepted the explanation of the 
defendant about the “war in the East which had been fought with ruthless cruelty on the 
Russian side.”
12
 No one questioned the validity of this claim even though the victims in 
this case had evidently been old men, women and children and none of the defendant’s 
subordinates had noted any “partisan activities.” In its decision, the court pondered that it 
was thinkable that “children functioned as informers for partisans” and believed that the 
11
 On the difficult subject of determining the nature of a crime as well as on the problem of statute of 
limitations, see also Michael Greve, „Täter oder Gehilfen? Zum strafrechtlichen Umgang mit NS-
Gewaltverbrechern in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” in Ulrike Weckel, Edgar Wolfrum, eds., 
„Bestien“ und „Befehlsempfänger.“ Frauen und Männer in NS-Prozessen nach 1945 (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003), 194-221. Greve comes to a similar conclusion with regards to the 
overwhelming classification of NS-perpetrators as „subsidiaries” by West German courts: this lax attitude 
rested not only on “normative criteria” but also on “personal value systems and political attitudes of judges 
and jurors.” They all too often showed an „apologetic understanding for the perpetrators” and created an 
image of NS criminals which is irreconcilable with the historical facts. Ibid., 221. 
12
 Birn, „Wehrmacht und Wehrmachtangehörige,“ 1096-1097. 
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defendant’s deeds had been inspired not by “race hatred” but by the desire to protect his 
troops. It was one thing that the accused thought his victims were Jews, but the court 
found that this was no proof that they actually were Jews.
13
 Birn aptly concludes that the 
verdict – the proceedings against the corporal in question were closed – reflected a 
“perversion of soldierly values.” The man was declared a “comradely superior” who, in 
the words of the verdict, had not withdrawn his “personal participation” from “unpleasant 
tasks.”
14
 Thus, the active personal participation in an execution was interpreted to the 
defendant’s advantage.
15
This case exemplifies how the official and popular Eastern Front memory in West 
Germany could pervade crucial areas of civil society, in this instance the justice system. 
The one-sided image of the war against the Soviet Union as the most brutal and 
sacrificial front German soldiers had to fight during World War II, left little room for 
acknowledgment of and sympathy with the sufferings of Soviet (Jewish and non-Jewish) 
war victims. Not the Wehrmacht was viewed as having kicked off an unprecedented 
military campaign aimed at the annihilation of the Soviet state and the Jewish “race,” but 
the “Russians” were said to have caused the brutalization of warfare by fighting – not 
defending themselves against an attacker – in a “bestial way.” The legacy of the 
inadequate West German judicial reckoning with Nazi and war crimes is indeed sobering 
13




 See also the case examples for the extraordinary mild judgement of perpetrators of mass executions 
presented in Greve, „Täter oder Gehilfen?,“ 218.
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given that the Federal Republic’s democratic consensus rested to a significant degree on 
the public acknowledgement of German guilt.
16
In the GDR, a system of political justice heavily tainted the prosecution of Nazi war 
crimes from the beginning, and the mantle of official antifascism served as disguise for 
the purge of real and suspected enemies of the socialist project. Throughout the early 
postwar years, SED and Soviet occupation authorities routinely used the denazification 
campaign to incarcerate opponents and those believed to be hostile to the socialist 
reconstruction effort. In the Waldheim trials of 1950, the SED proved its determination to 
crush real and believed opposition with political terror and arbitrary justice.
17
 Often a 
defendant’s guilt was determined on the basis of his or her membership in one of the 
former Nazi organizations; evidence for individual responsibility for actual crimes was 
rarely presented. At the same time, the trials were used to declare an official end to the 
16
 This has been unequivocally emphasised by a number of historians, among them Birn, “Wehrmacht und 
Wehrmachtangehörige,” Greve, “Täter oder Gehilfen?,” Weinke, Die Verfolgung von NS-Tätern im 
geteilten Deutschland, and Miquel, “Juristen: Richter in eigener Sache,” as well as by former prosecutors 
such as Adalbert Rückerl, NS-Verbrechen vor Gericht (Heidelberg: C. E, Müller, 1984), idem, Die 
Strafverfolgung von NS-Verbrechen, 1945-1978. Eine Dokumentation (Heidelberg: C. E, Müller, 1979). 
And Alfred Streim, „Saubere Wehrmacht? Die Verfolgung von Kriegs- und NS Verbrechern in der 
Bundesrepublik und der DDR,“ in Heer, Naumann, eds., Vernichtungskrieg, 569-597. Rückerl and Streim 
were heads of the Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufklärung nationalsozialistischer 
Verbrechen.
17
 In the 3,385 Waldheim trials against 3,442 internees of Soviet “special camps” in the SBZ (Buchenwald, 
Sachsenhausen and Bautzen), 3,308 persons were convicted for alleged Nazi crimes. See Helge Grabitz, 
“Die Verfolgung von NS-Verbrechen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in der DDR,” in Claudia 
Kuretsidis-Haider, ed., Keine „Abrechnung:“ NS-Verbrechen, Justiz und Gesellschaft in Europa nach 1945 
(Leipzig: Akademie, 1998), 163. Of the convicted, 49 were executed, 160 received life sentences and 2,914 
persons received sentences longer than 10 years. Herf, Divided Memory, 73. With the ten show trials held 
between June 20-29, 1950 in the Waldheim townhall, the SED ended symbolically the prosecution of Nazi 
war crimes and sought to “draw a final line under the Nazi past” in the GDR. Unlike in the secret trials 
before, the defendants were granted a reliable defense lawyer who in the tradition of Stalinist show trials 
was to propagate the “right political messages” to the audience. Weinke, Die Verfolgung von NS-Tätern im 
geteilten Deutschland, 70f.
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denazification process and prosecution of Nazi war crimes in East Germany. Moreover, 
as Justice Minister Max Fechner (1892-1973, SED) claimed in a press commentary of the 
time, with the Waldheim proceedings the GDR had proven itself the only German state to 
have drawn “the right lessons from history.”
18
Recent research has shown, however, that the prosecution of Nazi crimes in the GDR 
since 1950 was not only opportunistic and not just driven by political-ideological 
interests.
19
 Most verdicts spoken by GDR courts after Waldheim were declared valid in 
post-1989 appeal trials, even if GDR judges were found to have routinely handed down 
the harshest possible punishments.
20
 As discussed earlier, the question of individual guilt 
was secondary in SED propaganda and practice. If official historical narratives dealt with 
the issue at all, it was impersonal “fascist hordes” who committed crimes. The fighting 
working class soldier was by definition excluded from the Wehrmacht’s criminal warfare, 
and former members of the Nazi party and soldiers could redeem themselves by 




 This was recently restated by Henry Leide, NS-Verbrecher und Staatssicherheit. Die geheime 
Vergangenheitspolitik der DDR (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005), who argues that the SED’s 
investigative version of antifascism was basically a „Tschekist practice aimed primarily not at prosecuting 
crimes but at fighting the contemporary chief enemy, the Federal Republic” (418). Although the MfS had 
systematically gathered a wealth of incriminating material about suspected Nazi war criminals, these cases 
were only selectively put on trial. 
20
 Greve, „Eine Fachtagung zu den ostdeutschen Strafverfahren.“ Greve also provided the following 
detailed comparison: 
                 West  East
Death penalty 0,7 %   6 %
Life in prison    8 %   8 %
Prison  45 % 67 %
< 1 year 4.5 % 4.2 %
1-5 years 61.8 % 57.6 %
5-10 years 24 % 15 %
> 10 years   9 % 23 %
No punishment 46 % 19 %
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paralleled by a judicial process which in spite of repeated official claims did not render a 
more thorough reckoning with the Nazi past than in the alleged “reactionary” West. True, 
compared to the FRG, the GDR tried twice as many persons per 100,000 inhabitants for 
Nazi crimes; by 1960, 87% of all NS-cases were already closed (55% in the West), 
punishments were usually harsher, and East German courts acquitted only half as many 
persons as courts in the West. Further differences arose from the kinds of crimes 
prosecuted: during the 1950s, the GDR prosecuted mainly denunciation crimes (57% 
compared to 10% in the FRG), while West German courts focussed on the so-called 
final-phase-crimes (Endphase-Verbrechen) (49%, 16% East).
21
 Yet overall, the 
prosecution of crimes committed by members of the Wehrmacht was strikingly similar 
with one exception: the largest victim group in East German Wehrmacht-trials were 
Soviet soldiers and civilians (48%, compared to 15% in the West) which confirms the 
dominance of the Eastern Front memory in the official memory of World War II in the 
GDR.
22
 It also can be insinuated that there was a political agenda behind many trials – or 
at least behind the decision to actually put a certain case on trial
23
– which paid tribute to 
21
 Ibid. This means that until 1960, 46% of the perpetrators tried in the East were civilians (compared to 7 
% in the West).
22
 Rüter’s claim that the GDR prosecuted “many more Wehrmacht crimes” than courts in the FRG seems 
exaggerated given that – so far – he provided no further evidence or statistics to support this assertion. See 
Greve, “Eine Fachtagung zu den ostdeutschen Strafverfahren,” 4. 
23
 Until 1968, criminal police and MfS jointly signed responsible for the investigation of NS crimes, after 
1968 the MfS alone decided who would be investigated, which case would be put on trial and which not. 
On the MfS and the prosecution of Nazi criminals see Leide, NS-Verbrecher und Staatssicherheit. Leide 
shows the extent to which the prosecution of Nazi crimes was the result of political opportunism rather than 
of a genuine interest in mastering the past. A good example was the “Aktion Licht” to identify “brown 
stains” in the FRG during the 1960s by unearthing relevant, i.e. incriminating, materials in archives of 
industrial businesses and banks. The MfS also microfilmed and utilized records deposited in other Eastern 
bloc countries. Much of the gathered materials were kept in order to blackmail persons when needed, many 
cases were not tried because their outcome, the Stasi feared, “could contradict the social conditions” (374) 
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the Soviet Unions prescribed role as Nazi Germany’s prime victim.
24
 Thus, only in so far 
as East German courts focussed on crimes committed against “Soviet citizens,” war 
crimes were addressed more intensively in the GDR since this victim group was mostly 
victimized by Wehrmacht units.
25
 Yet, a special and comprehensive reckoning with the 
Wehrmacht’s war of extermination on the Eastern Front, as one might have expected in 
view of the importance of the Eastern Front in the SED’s history propaganda, did not take 
as the SED wished to describe them in the GDR: a fully denazified, antifascist country that has moved 
beyond a dubious past.
24
 This confers with the conclusions of Helge Grabitz, “Die Verfolgung von NS-Verbrechen,“ 161.
25
 Categorized by victim group, the numbers are as follows: 
                                                         West   East
Prisoners of War
Proceedings until 1960   6.8 %     8 %
Proceedings since 1960 11.9 % 22.5 %
Resistance fighters/partisans
Proceedings until 1960  2.8 %   4.2 %
Proceedings since 1960     4 %    27 %
Civilians 
Proceedings until 1960 32.7 % 49.1 %
Proceedings since 1960    19 %    73 %
In tendency, thus, most crime complexes (categorized by crime location, victims’ nationality, ect.) were 
prosecuted surprisingly evenly in East and West Germany. It also seems that the GDR treated Jewish 
victims not with significantly less judicial attention as one might have believed having in mind the 
marginalization of the Holocaust in official GDR memory. The following statistics, also taken from the 




Proceedings until 1960 19 % 19 %
Proceedings since 1960 79 % 83 %
Foreign  victims
Proceedings until 1960 32 % 30 %
Proceedings since 1960 84 % 74 %
Jewish victims West East
Proceedings until 1960 21 % 18 %
Proceedings since 1960 72 % 65 %
Crimes of mass extermination
Proceedings until 1960   8 %   5 %
Proceedings since 1960 56 % 52 %
“Schreibtischverbrechen”
Proceedings until 1960   1 % 0.6 %
Proceedings since 1960   4 %    1 %
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place in East Germany’s court rooms. This, after all, would have entailed to prosecute 
those ordinary soldiers who mostly originated in the German working class and whom 
the SED had collectively exonerated during the founding years of the GDR. 
A comparative look at the trial proceedings pertaining homicidal crimes committed 
in the name of National Socialism in divided Germany between 1945 and 1989/90 
underlines that both German states inadequately prosecuted Nazi and war crimes after the 
wave of trials held under Allied auspices during the Nuremberg Interregnum had ended 
in 1949. Overall, between 1945 and 1989, 105,000 persons were formally investigated for 
Nazi and war crimes on the territory of West Germany, out of which 6,488 received a 
final verdict (12 death sentences, 163 life sentences, 6,198 prison terms, 114 fines); 
proceedings were closed against 91,466 persons or ended with acquittal; as of 1993, 
8,100 proceedings were still pending. The majority of the Nazi trials in West Germany 
had been held before the founding of the FRG in 1949; only 912 trials involving 1,875 
defendants took place between 1949 and 1990.
26
 In East Germany, 12,881 persons 
received a final verdict for war crimes and crimes against humanity (127 death sentences, 
271 life in prison, 3,191 longer than ten years in prison).
27
 Out of these 12,881 verdicts, 
8,055 had been handed down before December 1949, 3,308 originated in the Waldheim 
trials of 1950, and only 734 were handed down between 1951 and 1989. In addition, 
26
 See below, fn. 29.
27
 Günther Wieland, “Ahndung von NS-Verbrechen in Ostdeutschland 1945 bis 1990,” in Neue Justiz, 2 
(1991), 49-53.
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17,175 person had been convicted by Soviet military tribunals in the Soviet zone between 
1945 and 1949.
28
Thus, the record is strikingly even: while 933 trials dealt with NS-crimes in the GDR 
between 1949 and 1989, 912 trials took place in the FRG during the period of dual 
statehood.
29
With regards to Wehrmacht crimes committed on the Eastern Front, 
however, the statistics diverge, respectively reflecting the political memory agenda of 
either side. Out of 933 trial proceedings involving 1,637 defendants accused of homicidal 
crimes during the Nazi era in the GDR, 86 cases dealt with Wehrmacht crimes (9%). Of 
these 86 cases, 41 (48%) involved Soviet victims, including seven cases of Jewish 
victims.
30
 In the FRG, the numbers are similar: out of 912 trials involving 1,875 
defendants, 91 cases dealt with crimes committed by members of the Wehrmacht (10%). 




 The following information are taking from the online database “Justiz und NS-Verbrechen” at 
http://www1.jur.uva.nl/junsv/. [Oct. 2006] It is based on a project directed by law professors Christiaan 
Frederik Rüter’s and Dick W. de Mildt’s of the University of Amsterdam’s Law School: the multi-volume 
edition of all postwar German Nazi trials. See Christiaan Frederik Rüter, ed., DDR-Justiz und NS-
Verbrechen. Sammlung ostdeutscher Strafurteile wegen nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen
(Amsterdam, München: Saur,  2002 ff). The West German trials have already been published: Fritz Bauer, 
Karl-Dietrich Bracher, eds., Justiz und NS-Verbrechen. Sammlung deutscher Strafurteile wegen 
nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen 1945 - 1999, 35 vols. (Amsterdam: APA Holland University 
Press, 1968ff.).
30
 Crimes included: war crimes, other NS-crimes, endphase crimes, mass extermination, NS-crimes in 
prisons. Crime locations: USSR and German Reich, esp. POW camps.






Life in prison 11
Death penalty 5
522
cases of Jewish victims).
31
 These legal statistics suggest that the official memory of the 
Eastern Front in the two Germanys might well have prejudiced the respective priorities of 
the criminal proceedings against suspected war criminals. They speak to the West 
German tendency to turn a blind eye on the Soviet victims of “Operation Barbarossa,” 
and they also reflect the East German orchestrated focus on the Soviet Union’s 
victimization by the Wehrmacht.
32
Yet, a final thought should be given to the reasons for putting a certain case on trial 
or not in either Germany. While in the West at least until the early 1960s, NS trials more 
often came to materialize as the result of “accidental findings” than of systematic 
investigation, in the GDR political opportunism determined the judicial agenda – or 
rather, as we now know, called for cover-up and judicial inactivity. Henry Leide has 
recently shown that in several cases the MfS had obtained written evidence and testimony 
sufficient to put severe Nazi perpetrators on trail. Yet, the fear of either exposing 
“hidden” Nazis in the GDR thus undermining the country’s propagated image as the 
master of denazification, or of loosing potential informers for employment in the West, 
31
 The other Wehrmacht cases involved, among others, German Jews (11 cases), German civilians and 
soldiers, few Italian civilians and Dutch POWs. On the whole, 140 trials of all 912 NS trials in the FRG 
dealt with crimes against Soviet citizens (out of which 12 cases involved defendants who had been 
members of the Wehrmacht), two additional trials dealt with crimes against Estonian and Lithuanian 
victims; other mostly dealt with crimes committed by SS, SD, Einsatzkommandos, Waffen-SS, police forces 
and civil occupation authorities. 
The verdicts in the 14 cases (involving Soviet victims, including the Estonian and Lithuanian case; all cases 




10-20 years 1 
Life in prison 3
32
Yet, one also should keep in mind that in practical terms it was easier for East German courts to obtain 
evidence on crimes against Soviet citizens than for their West German counterpart. Also here, the Cold War 
context should not be forgotten.
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prompted the MfS to close numerous cases involving potential war criminals. One of the 
most notorious cases was Erwin Rogalsky-Wedekind, a SS-Oberstammführer who 
admittedly oversaw, if not participated in, the execution of “three or ten Poles” (in his 
words) after the Wehrmacht’s invasion of Poland and who was also suspected to have 
participated in massacres of Soviet civilians in Belarus. In exchange for year-long 
cooperation with the MfS as informer, Rogalsky-Wedekind was spared a trial in the 
GDR.
33
 Or take the case of Heinrich Groth, one of the “ordinary men” who served in a 
police batallion during the Eastern campaign in Lithuania and admittedly participated in 
the “hunting down” of Jews, escaped Soviet POWs and partisans. Groth also admitted to 
have participated in “ten to twelve mass executions of Soviet citizens” and having killed 
50 persons himself. Despite his earlier conviction for war crimes by a Soviet court, the 
MfS hired him as informer. As many other Stasi-informers with a (known) criminal 
record, Groth was to spy on former Nazi comrades in the West and to provide the MfS 
with evidence for the “neo-fascist” infiltration of Adenauer’s Germany. Yet to the MfS’ 
disappointment, it was this part of the assignment which he and most others failed to 
deliver.
34
This “secret politics of the past,” to use Leide’s phrase, was one outrageous outcome 
of the SED’s policy towards Nazi perpetrators, sympathizers and bystanders offering 
each citizen of the GDR exculpation in exchange for loyalty to the new system. The 
officially proclaimed sympathy for the Soviet Union as Hitler’s main victim rendered no 
judicial consequences even in cases where war crimes and crimes against humanity 
33




committed on Soviet territory could have been easily put on trial and judged. Still, this 
scandal was nonetheless explainable within the logic of the East German communists’ 
world view which allowed the “antifascist” ideals to be compromised if it was only in 
service of the continuous “antifascist” fight against the West. The politics of memory and 
justice in the GDR were not only inspired by a highly selective interpretation of history 
and its opportunistic application to the present, but also legitimized with a calculated, 
ostentatious empathy for the victims of Nazi crimes which made the unthinkable 
possible: the close cooperation of the state security apparatus with Nazi war criminals in 
the name of “antifascism.” 
The problematic political nexus between history, memory and justice can also be 
examined by focussing more closely on the relationship between the judicial 
confrontation of the Nazi past and the historical scholarship these proceedings initiated 
and fostered – again within very different political and academic systems in the two 
Germanys. After addressing the judicial confrontation of Nazi and war crimes on the 
Eastern Front in general, I will now turn to the historiography that some of the most 
prominent Nazi trials (e.g. the Einsatzgruppen-trial, the trials against the former head of 
the “Jewish Affairs” Department in the Reich Security Office, Adolf Eichmann (1906-
1962), against the FRG’s Minister of Displaced Persons, Refugees and Victims of War 
Theodor Oberländer, and the Frankfurt Trial against the Auschwitz staff) triggered in 
East and West Germany. The public reception and reflection of this scholarship by the 
political elites – a theme the following paragraphs discuss only briefly and pointedly –
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will then be the focus of the final chapter which returns to the political memory of the 
Eastern Front war. 
II. The “Unknown War:” The Eastern Front in West German Historiography
In November 1980, shortly before the fortieth anniversary of the attack against the 
Soviet Union, the historian Jürgen Förster, researcher at the Militärgeschichtliches 
Forschungsamt in Freiburg, harshly criticized the unwillingness of West German society 
to realize the “special character of the Eastern war.” His eloquent analysis captured the 
problematic relationship between the history of the Eastern Front, its historiography and 
memory in the Federal Republic:
Despite the fact that German historical research has long since exposed the racial-ideological core of 
Hitler’s Eastern war conception, has often described the close link between the military war against the 
Soviet Union and the struggle of world views against the Jews, the broader public in the Federal 
Republic still tends to neatly disassociate the operations against the Red Army from the simultaneous 
mass murder of Jews, communists and prisoners of war. ... It is a distorted view of reality that only the 
Einsatzgruppen, security police and SD liquidated Jews and communist functionaries. The Wehrmacht, 
too, participated in the extermination of ‘Jewish Bolshevism.’ The special character of the Eastern war, 
in particular the close connection between the ‘fight for living space’ and the ‘final solution of the 
Jewish question’ is still being repressed by parts of the population in the Federal Republic.
35
This was an important, courageous essay: a young West German historian 
confronted the political elite as well as society at large with their reluctance to face 
historical reality and with their ignorance towards historical research. Moreover, even 
among many his colleagues, Förster’s two central historical conclusions – the genocidal 
character of the war against “Jewish Bolshevism” and the complicity of the Wehrmacht 
in this war of extermination – were not yet commonly accepted at the time. Moreover, 
aware of the fact how “painful” the “confrontation with this part of the German past” 
35
 Jürgen Förster, „Zur Rolle der Wehrmacht im Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion,“ APuZ, 45 (1980), 3-15, 
quote on 3. Förster lists the works of Jäckel, Hillgruber, and Broszat to support his view. 
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was, especially for the elder generation, Förster wrote that the historian’s task was to 
“strive for enlightenment.” Quoting from a contemporary essay by the renowned 
historian Thomas Nipperdey in Die Zeit,
36
 he reminded those who had lived through the 
war that
’[h]istory breaks through the shells [Gehäuse] we always build around ourselves by putting the past in 
front of our eyes impartially and undistorted.’ History as enlightenment is still necessary, because for 
many soldiers and contemporaries, the memories of the summer of 1941, of this kind of warfare, have 
been deformed by National Socialist propaganda, and covered up with the crimes of the Red Army, 
particularly during their incursion into Germany, and with the sufferings [of German soldiers] in Soviet 
POW camps.
37
This observant and sensitive analysis of West German memories of the Eastern Front 
and the discourse of victimization they continued to inspire, encapsulated the challenging 
complexity which any effort to confront the legacies of the Eastern Front war entailed. 
Yet, the identification of such “Deckerinnerungen,” as Naumann has later coined this 
covering up of Nazi crimes with memories of Soviet crimes, invasion and occupation,
38
was for Förster no reason to release Germans from their responsibility to acknowledge 
historical truth. Rather, he called for an end to the selective remembrance of the Eastern 
Front resulting from the Manichaean Cold War paradigm. For the Cold War “has not 
only hindered the correction of the Feindbild of an aggressive communism built by the 
Nazis, but at the same time has offered the opportunity to retrospectively justify the 
attack on June 22, 1941.”
39
Just how accurately Förster’s observations described the public memory of the 
Eastern Front in the Federal Republic was confirmed a year later by the reactions to the 
36
 Thomas Nipperdey, „Geschichte als Aufklärung,“ Die Zeit, no. 9, February 22, 1980, 16.
37
 Förster, „Zur Rolle der Wehrmacht im Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion,“ 3.
38




15-part TV-series “The Unknown War”, a US-Soviet co-production about the war on the 
Eastern Front.
40
 On September, 14, 1981, the West German public TV-station WDR aired 
the first part of the series under the curiously translated title “Der unvergessene Krieg” 
(The Unforgotten War). This linguistic detail betrays a deeper truth about West German 
memories of the Eastern Front: it was perceived as the most costly battlefield of World 
War II, and because of what was known (and repressed), it was indeed unforgotten. 
40
 Produced with Soviet cooperation after the release of the US production “The World at War” (a 
documentary mini-series covering the history of World War II from the causes in the 1920s to the Cold 
War) which the Soviet government criticized for downplaying the Soviet Union’s role in the war. Released 
in 1978, “The Unknown War,” based on Soviet footage, was more sympathetic to the Soviet struggle 
against Nazi Germany. Each episode is about 52 minutes, similar in format to The World at War. The 
footage was taken from over 3.5 million feet of film taken by Soviet camera crews between June 22, 1941 
and May 1945. The US version was narrated by Burt Lancaster. The parts included: 1. June 22, 1941; 2. 
The Battle for Moscow; 3. The Siege of Leningrad; 4. To the East; 5. The Defense of Stalingrad; 6. 
Survival at Stalingrad; 7. The World's Greatest Tank Battle-Kursk; 8. War in the Arctic; 9. War in the Air; 
10. Partisans: The Guerrilla War; 11. Battle of the Seas; 12. Battle of the Caucasus; 13. Liberation of 
Ukraine; 14. Liberation of Byelorussia; 15. From the Balkans to Vienna; 16. The Liberation of Poland; 17. 
The Allies; 18. The Battle of Berlin; 19. The Last Battle of the Unknown War; 20. A Soldier of the 
Unknown War. The WDR aired only 15 of the 20 parts, leaving out those dealing with the Pacific War and 
the celebrations of victory in Moscow and the like after the war. 
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Fig. 12. The Unforgotten War: Cover of a book accompanying a TV-series aired by WDR in September of 1981.
For its screening in the GDR, the series’  English title was translated as “The 
Decisive War” (Der entscheidende Krieg). As the title and the euphoric reactions to the 
film in the official media indicated, in East Germany its message strongly resonated the 
party’s established narrative of the Eastern Front.
41
 The reactions ordinary West Germans 
expressed in a flood of letters to the WDR (about 700 after each part) ranged from open 
and hostile rejection of the film’s depiction of the Red Army’s struggle and the 
conditions in the German occupied territories, to “shock” and “the wish to know more.”
42
41
 Michael Eickhoff, Wilhelm Pagels, Willy Reschl, Der unvergessene Krieg. Hitler-Deutschland gegen die 
Sowjetunion, 1941-1945 (Köln: VGS, 1981), 11.
42
 Heinz Werner Hübner, „Der unvergessene Krieg,“ in Ueberschär, Wette, ed., „Unternehmen 
Barbarossa,“ 43-47, quote on 46. 
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On the whole, the series shattered widely-held notions that the Eastern Front war had 
been a necessary, even justified war.
43
The longing to retrospectively legitimate “Operation Barbarossa,” described so aptly 
by Förster, had long been a persisting aspect of West German historiography and public 
discourse on the Eastern Front war. While during the 1950s, relatively little research was 
done on the subject, the tide of interest shifted towards the end of the 1950s. In 1958, the 
Einsatzgruppen trial in Ulm against nine former members of the Einsatzgruppe A and 
their commander, police chief of the Memel area, Bernhard Fischer-Schweder, accused of 
jointly murdering 4,000 Lithuanian Jews, demonstrated not only the gravity of the crimes 
committed on the Eastern Front but also the scandalous shortcomings of their judicial 
confrontation thus far. In the same year, the Justice Ministers of the Länder agreed to 
establish a central institution for the investigation of Nazi war crimes, the Zentrale Stelle 
der Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufklärung nationalsozialistischer Verbrechen in 
Ludwigsburg.
44
 In 1959, a series of anti-Semitic attacks on cemeteries and the synagogue 
of Cologne triggered the first Bundestag debate about the state of West German 
democracy in view of the to a large extent still un-mastered Nazi past.
45
 Last but not least, 
the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem (1961) and the Auschwitz trial in Frankfurt/Main (1963-
43
 The message of the series was also publicized in an illustrated companion book by New York Times
reporter (and author of a moving book on the Leningrad Siege, 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad (New 
York: Harper, 1969)), Harrison E. Salisbury, Die Ostfront. Der unvergessene Krieg 1941-45 (Wien: 
Molden, 1981). Other accompanying publications included Michael Eickhoff et.al., Der unvergessene 
Krieg, and Michael Bartsch et. al., eds., Der Krieg im Osten 1941-1945. Historische Einführung, 
Kommentare und Dokumente (Köln: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1981).
44
 For a brief summary, see Alfred Streim, “Zur Gründung, Tätigkeit und Zukunft der Zentralen Stelle der 
Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufklärung von NS-Verbrechen,“ in Kuretsidis-Haider, ed., Keine 
„Abrechnung,” 130-143.
45
 The debate is summarized in Dubiel, Niemand ist frei von der Geschichte, 81-91.
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65) contributed significantly to the renewed interest in the criminal legacies of the Nazi 
regime in both Germanys.
46
Both latter trials not only further fuelled public debate on the deficiency of 
Adenauer’s “politics of the past,”
47
 but they also inspired further historical research on 
Nazi and Wehrmacht crimes committed against non-Germans all over Europe. This body 
of scholarship in East and West Germany differs greatly as to who initiated it to which 
ends.
48
 While the SED in East Germany literally ordered the historical investigation of 
Wehrmacht crimes on the Eastern Front in order to denounce the Bundeswehr as its direct 
heir, Western historiography widened its agenda in reaction to the public debates 
surrounding the above-mentioned trials, and thus reflected a general desire to approach 
the Nazi past in a more balanced, differentiated and nuanced way.
49
In the 1950s, West German historians had occasionally addressed aspects of the 
history of the Eastern Front war. In contrast to the apologetic scholarship and memoir 
literature of the time,
50
 the Institut für Zeitgeschichte, founded in 1953, published several 
46
 Among others Reichel, Vergangenheitsbewältigung, 151f., 158f. Reichel stresses that while the 
Auschwitz trial in particular was not a „political trial” it was certainly a “political event.” (171) On the 
discussion of the Eichmann trial in the West German press see Peter Krause, Der Eichmann-Prozeß in der 
deutschen Presse (Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 2002). Krause also provides a brief discussion of the reactions 
in the GDR press, see ibd., 208-243. On the Auschwitz trial see Fritz Bauer Institut, ed., “Gerichtstag 
halten über uns selbst…” Geschichte und Wirkung des ersten Auschwitz-Prozesses (Frankfurt/Main: 
Campus, 2001).
47
 Cf. Frei, Vergangenheitspolitik. 
48
 An excellent starting point for this historiographical discussion was the review essay by Rolf-Dieter 
Müller and Gerd R. Ueberschär, „Die deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen.” For a general overview of the 
historiographical confrontation of the Nazi past in East and West Germany see Mary Fulbrook, “The Past 
which refuses to become history,” in idem, German National Identity after the Holocaust (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1999), 103-141.
49
 For an overview of the public reactions to these trials see Peter Steinbach, Nationalsozialistische 
Gewaltverbrechen. Die Diskussion in der deutschen Öffentlichkeit nach 1945 (Berlin: Colloquium, 1981).
50
 Good examples for apologetic scholarship on the Eastern Front are the occupation studies published by 
the Institut für Besatzungsfragen in Tübingen. These studies were partly written by former participants of 
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studies on Hitler, the Wehrmacht leadership, and the timing and planning of “Operation 
Barbarossa” as a war of aggression in its journal Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte.
51
The exceptional character of the war against the Soviet Union could no longer be in 
question – at least among experts – after several documentations appeared in the same 
journal pertaining Nazi policies towards the Eastern occupied territories.
52
 An important 
study of Hitler’s world-view demonstrated the ideological and practical consistency that 
led from “Mein Kampf” to the attack against Soviet Russia in 1941.
53
 On the whole, 
however, the victimization of Soviet soldiers and civilians by the Wehrmacht during 
World War II was a marginal subject of historical research during the 1950s,
54
 not least 
because West German historians worked in an extraordinarily complicated professional 
the occupation in Eastern Europe, most prominently by Otto Bräutigam, diplomat and head of 
Grundsatzfragen divison in Alfred Rosenberg’s Ministry for Eastern Occupied Territories. See his 
Überblick über die besetzten Ostgebiete während des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Tübingen: Institut für
Besatzungsfragen, 1954). Further, the memoir literature by former Wehrmacht generals belongs to this 
category. See for example, Franz Halder, Hitler als Feldherr: Der ehemalige Chef des Generalstabs 
berichtet die Wahrheit (München: Münchener Dom-Verlag, 1949), Heinz Guderian, Erinnerungen eines 
Soldaten (Heidelberg: Vowinckel, 1951), and Manstein, Verlorene Siege. Simultaneously, a number of 
occupation studies appeared in the US and Britain, mostly written by Russian emigrants. Despite the fact 
that these studies explored the experience of the Wehrmacht’s occupation in Eastern Europe in part to 
utilize this Nazi expertise in the “political warfare” in the Cold War, important standard works were among 
them, for example the meticulously research volume by Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941-
1945 (London: Macmillan, 1957). Dallin focussed on the Rosenberg Ministry and its occupation policies 
and not on Wehrmacht cooperation and complicity in war crimes.
51
 This scholarship established firm evidence against the preventive war theory (which was nonetheless 
revived by other historians and publicists thereafter). Gerhard Weinberg, “Der deutsche Entschluß zum 
Angriff auf die Sowjetunion,“ Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte (VfZ), 1(1953), 301-318. Hans Günter 
Serphim, Andreas Hillgruber, “Hitlers Entschluß zum Angriff auf Rußland. (Eine Entgegnung); mit 
Schlußwort von G.L.Weinberg,“ VfZ, 2 (1954), 240-254. 
52
 Helmut Krausnick, „Zu Hitlers Ostpolitik im Sommer 1943,“ VfZ, 2 (1954), 305-312. Idem, „Denkschrift 
Himmlers über die Behandlung der Fremdvölkischen im Osten (Mai 1940),“ VfZ, 5 (1957), 194-198. And 
Helmut Heiber, „Der Generalplan Ost (Dokumentation)“, VfZ, 6 (1958), 281-325, addendum in VfZ, 8 
(1960), 119.
53
 Hugh R. Trevor-Roper, „Hitlers Kriegsziele,“ in VfZ, 8 (1960), 121-133.
54
 A rare exception was the early two-volume study of the military resistance against Hitler and Wehrmacht 
responsibility Vollmacht des Gewissens. The first volume was published in 1955 with a favorable 
introduction by Theodor Heuss. The second volume (1965) contained a discussion of the criminal orders 
and the crimes against Soviet commissars and POWs. See Heinrich Uhlig, “Der verbrecherische Befehl,” in 
Vollmacht des Gewissens, vol. 2, ed. Helmut Krausnick (Frankfurt/Main: Metzner, 1965), 287-410.
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and political environment: the source base was thin since most Nazi records were still in 
Allied hands, and East German and Soviet historians’ claims that the “West” was 
planning another “Barbarossa,” made it difficult, indeed undesirable, to address Soviet 
victims while at the same time being constantly accused of helping the plotter of such a 
campaign.
55
In the wake of the Eichmann and Auschwitz trials, public and academic interest in 
Nazi crimes rose significantly in the Federal Republic. In particular, the expertises 
prepared by historians Hans Buchheim, Martin Broszat, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and 
Helmut Krausnick for use in the Auschwitz trial encouraged a number of follow-up 
studies.
56
 In their contributions, Martin Broszat and his colleagues focused (in accordance 
with the court’s request) on the organisation of the SS, the police and concentration camp 
system, as well as on Nazi policies towards Poland and the Jews. In their preface to the 
first edition of their expertises in 1965, the authors contemplated the relationship between 
historical knowledge and memory. The similarity to Förster’s analysis in 1980 is striking 
55
 Since Stalin’s Über den Großen Vaterländischen Krieg der Sowjetunion (Moskau: Verlag für 
fremdsprachige Literatur, 1945) communist historiography repeated this supposed threat. See for example 
the introductory remarks in S. Golikow, Die Sowjetarmee im Großen Vaterländischen Krieg (Berlin (Ost): 
Verlag Kultur und Fortschritt, 1954), Gerhard Förster et.al., „Der Barbarossa-Plan in Politik und 
Kriegführung Hitler-Deutschlands 1940/41,“ Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft (Berlin (Ost), (ZfG), 7, 
no. 3 (1959), 529-552, or Albert Norden, Zwischen Berlin und Moskau. Zur Geschichte der deutsch-
sowjetischen Beziehungen (Berlin: Dietz, 1954). In Norden’s most explicit words „those rule in two-thirds 
of our fatherland who have plunged our nation into three wars against the Soviet power seeking to again 
wake feelings of hatred and enmity against the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics in order to prepare a 
new carnage. Thus, here history will not be written for history’s sake but this book wants to be a weapon 
for those who resist national suicide, namely aggressive anti-Sovietism.” (6).  
56
 They appeared under the title Anatomie des SS-Staates. Vol. 1: “Die SS, das Herrschaftsinstrument. 
Befehl und Gehorsam,” ed. by Hans Buchheim (Olten: Walter, 1965). Interestingly, the collection of all 
historical expertises produced by the Institut für Zeitgeschichte (IfZ) between 1958 and 1966 contains no 
account of the persecution of Soviet Jews under the section “Persecution of Jews in Foreign Countries.” 
Gutachten des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte, 2 vols. (Stuttgart: dva, 1966). On the context and genesis of the 
expertises see Irmtrud Wojak, “Die Verschmelzung von Geschichte und Kriminologie. Historische 
Gutachten im ersten Frankfurter Auschwitz-Prozeß,” in Frei, ed., Geschichte vor Gericht, 29-45.
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as they, too, lament Germans’ “lack of insight into the reality of the Hitler regime” and 
their blindness for the “connection between the political system and the ideological mass 
crimes.” Even if Broszat and his colleagues did not emphasize at that time the nexus 
between the Eastern Front war and the “Final Solution,” they pointed to the fact that “the 
crimes in the concentration camps and the mass murder of the Jews were specific 
elements of National Socialist rule.”
57
Two specific expertises systematically addressed crimes committed on Soviet 
territory in the wake of “Operation Barbarossa,” the Holocaust and the killing of Soviet 
POWs on the basis of the infamous “commissar order.”
58
 Jacobsen already then correctly 
estimated that about 3.3 million Soviet POWs were killed between 1941 and 1945, and 
his analysis also provided irrefutable evidence for the deep involvement of the 
Wehrmacht.
59
 Krausnick’s contribution detailed the execution of the “Final Solution” on 
Soviet territory stressing that with the decision to attack the Soviet Union, Hitler also 
decided to have the “Jews in his sphere of influence exterminated.”
60
Based on these historical facts, the Auschwitz trial contributed to a rising public 
awareness in the Federal Republic for the victimization of Soviet POWs by SS and 
Wehrmacht. This side of the Soviet war experience had not been discussed in public 
since the Nuremberg trials. The verdict, predominantly dealing with the organization and 
execution of the Jewish mass murder, included a few paragraphs on the selection and 
57
 Buchheim et. al., eds., Anatomie des SS-Staates, vol. 1, 5.
58
 See in particular, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, „Komissarbefehl und Massenexekutionen sowjetischer 
Kriegsgefangener,“ and Helmut Krausnick, „Judenverfolgung,“ in Martin Broszat, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, 
Helmut Krausnick, eds., Anatomie des SS-Staates, vol. 2: “Konzentrationslager, Komissarbefehl, 
Judenverfolgung,” (Olten: Walter, 1965), 163-279, 283-448.
59
 Jacobsen, „Kommissarbefehl,“ 197. His estimate was later confirmed by Streit, Keine Kameraden.
60
 Krausnick, „Judenverfolgung,“ 361.
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killing of Soviet POWs and “political commissars.” It stressed that these measures had 
been taken in accordance with the OKW’s “commissar order:”
Based on this order, political commissars selected from POW camps and other suspected POWs were 
‘liquidated’ also in Auschwitz by the Einsatzkommandos of Sipo and SD. Upon their arrival the 
prisoners were neither ... registered nor added to the list of camp inmates. They brought their identity 
tags and file cards with them. After the executions the identity tags were broken in half. On the file 
cards it was merely noted: ‘liquidated according to OKW-order.’ The shootings of the POWs took 
place either in the entrance hall of the small old crematorium or at the black wall by shot in the neck. 
Some of the POWs were also gassed in bloc 11 or in the small crematorium. A few of the political 
commissars were killed with phenol injections. ... How many Russian POWs were shot, gassed or 
otherwise killed on the basis of the OKW-order ... in the Auschwitz concentration camp could not be 
determined.
61
Overall however and due to the fact that the Auschwitz trial was about the mass 
killing of the Jews (including Soviet Jews) in Auschwitz and other extermination camps, 
the Soviet victimization on the whole remained a minor aspect. Yet in terms of 
confronting the historical reality of the Eastern Front, the expertises prepared for the 
Auschwitz trial marked a cornerstone not only with regards to the exceptionality of the 
war against the Soviet Union but also to the complicity of the Wehrmacht in crimes 
against Soviet citizens, military and civilian. Heinz Höhne’s landmark study of the SS 
pointed repeatedly to the murderous collaboration between SS and Wehrmacht troops on 
the Eastern Front.
62
 And Hans-Adolf Jacobsen’s analysis drew attention to the treatment 
61
 Quoted in Gerhard Werle, Thomas Wandres, Auschwitz vor Gericht. Völkermord und bundesdeutsche 
Strafjustiz. Mit Einer Dokumentation des Auschwitz-Urteils (München: Beck, 1995), 116f. The GDR 
dispatched its own prosecutor, Friedrich Karl Kaul, to the Auschwitz trial in order to represent East 
Berlin’s interests in the trial. One was, according to a SED Politburo decision of November 19, 1963, to 
turn the trial into a “tribunal against the I.G. Farben company” (for having enslaved and killed KZ 
inmates), the other was to bring attention to fate of those Soviet POWs and “commissars” murdered in 
Auschwitz. While the first objective was obviously not achieved, the second found entrance into the trial 
proceedings: an expertise prepared by Soviet historian Nicolaj S. Alexejew and researchers at the Potsdam 
Institute for Military history was heard by the court and the presented documentary evidence was admitted 
and considered in the verdict. Alexejew’s testimony on October 30, and November 5, 1964 is described in 
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 Published separatley as Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf. Die Geschichte der SS (Gütersloh: Mohn, 
1967).
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of Soviet POWs by the Wehrmacht.
63
 Still, it remains a subject of further historical 
inquiry whether this knowledge in fact disseminated among the West German public 
during the 1960s, as it took another thirty years or so to severely shatter the “myth of the 
clean Wehrmacht.” Consider in addition that the fate of Soviet POWs was marginalized 
as long as West Germans remained preoccupied with the fate of German POWs and 
returnees from the Soviet Union, that is at least until the 1970s.
64
Yet, the general climate of Détente since the mid-1960s facilitated historiographical 
balance and nuance. A cornerstone was Ernst Nolte’s work on the French, Italian and 
German variants of fascism which concluded on the remark that the war against the 
Soviet Union constituted the “most monstrous war of conquest, enslavement and 
annihilation known in modern history.”
65
 Andreas Hillgruber made a similar point when 
he demonstrated in his Habilitation about Hitler’s Strategy, that with the attack against 
the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany extended the European war into a global war, and that 
the racial war against “Jewish Bolshevism” distinguished “Operation Barbarossa” from 
any previous military conflict.
66
 Agreeing with Nolte’s above-quoted dictum, Hillgruber 
qualified, however, that despite this insight
the elementary importance of this fact for the character, the history and the for Germany and most parts 
of Europe catastrophic outcome of World War II with the manifold legacies and consequences of this 
event for the present are not being stressed with the necessary clarity in most historical accounts, leave 
63
 In Broszat et. al., eds., Anatomie des SS-Staates, vol. 2, 163-279.
64
 See most recently, Christiane Winkler, “The ‘Betrayed Generation“ – Heimkehrer in West German 
Public Discourse,” Paper at the Conference “Germany 1930-1990” (March 22–23, 2007), German 
Historical Institute, London. Just in 1966, Erich Maschke’s multi-volume history of German POWs during 
and after World War II appeared. See in particular Kurt W. Böhme, Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in 
sowjetischer Hand (Bielefeld: Gieseking, 1966f) (= vol. 7 of Zur Geschichte der deutschen 
Kriegsgefangenen des Zweiten Weltkrieges, ed. Erich Maschke, Bielefeld: Gieseking, 1962ff.)
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 In original: “der ungeheuerlichste Eroberungs-, Versklavungs- und Vernichtungskrieg, den die moderne 
Geschichte kennt.” Ernst Nolte, Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche, 436.
66
 Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie.
536
alone has it entered the conscience of the wider public in West Germany. This results from the fact 
that, then as now, Hitler’s Eastern war has been misunderstood and misinterpreted in three ways: (1.) 
as ‘crusade’ against Stalinist Bolshevism whose barbaric excesses during the 1930s caused world-wide 
terror and disgust ... (2.) as purely power political event which evolved from the necessities of the 
European war under way since 1939 (3.) as ‘national emancipation’ of the European peoples between 
Black Sea and Finland under Germany’s leadership threatened by the culturally inferior but in terms of 
numbers superior ‘half-Asiatic’ Russians in 1939/40. ...
Most soldiers of the Eastern armies and even most leading German militaries had not clearly grasped 
the total difference of this war with regards to its origins and principles vis-à-vis the wars on the 
Western Front, [which] ... on the whole were carried out as ‘normal European war;’ they partly didn’t 
want to see the consequences although they knew better or could have known better.
67
Placing “Operation Barbarossa” within the long-term programmatic thinking of Hitler
since World War I, Hillgruber concluded that Hitler had developed and realized a 
“program” in order to not only reorder the European continent according to racial 
principles, but to gain “world dominance.” This “program’s” centrepiece was Germany’s 
expansion to the East and the destruction of the Soviet Union as state. It included the 
realization of the in Hillgruber’s view notoriously underestimated “essence of the 
National Socialist program:” the physical extermination of the Jewish-Bolshevist leaders 
of Russia and their alleged “biological basis” – the Jews of Eastern and Continental 
Europe.
68
 It was this program of world dominance and physical extermination which 
made the Eastern war an unprecedented, indeed “new” kind of war. Towards the end of 
his study, Hillgruber returned to the present. Somewhat contradicting his own postulate 
of Hitler’s singular program and practice of racial warfare against the Soviet Union, he 
noted that 
The unprecedented level of violence that this war of total destruction unleashed, first on the Soviet and 
then the German side, led to a bitter struggle of nearly four years in which millions perished. It ended 
only with Germany’s unconditional surrender in 1945. As both sides, for different motives but with 
similar effect, struggled to annihilate each other, the Eastern war became by a nearly inconceivable 
degree, the bloodiest in history. The nature of the struggle precluded an armistice of the kind that might 
67




end a “normal” European war. It ended instead with a German capitulation whose historical 
consequences extend far beyond the military event.
69
Hillgruber also explicitely recalled the crimes committed by the Red Army in Eastern 
Germany. With a view on the current state of German-Soviet relations, concluded that 
because of its singular character, the Eastern Front war had not yet fully “become a thing 
of the past.” Rather, the legacies and consequences of this to-date severest event in 
German-Soviet history dominated the European present, but above all and more than all 
other political and ideological “fronts” of the post war era, the relationship between 
Germany and the Soviet Union.
70
In the long run, Hillgruber’s seminal study altered the way historian’s viewed 
Hitler’s political and military strategy, yet at first it did not inspire further investigation of 
the peculiarities of this new kind of war now also in the West labelled “war of 
extermination” – GDR historiography ever since 1945 referred to the Eastern Front war 
as “war of conquest and extermination” (Raub-und Vernichtungskrieg). Hitler continued
to be viewed as the chief architect of war and genocide and mainstream Western 
69
 This quote is taken from an English edition of Hillgruber essays since Hitler’s Strategie has never been 
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historiography agreed that the Eastern Front campaign was not a preventive but a purely 
aggressive war.
71
The first major work to address the connection between Nazi war crimes and the 
Wehrmacht appeared in 1969. Manfred Messerschmidt’s Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat: 
Zeit der Indoktrination described the National Socialist infiltration of the Wehrmacht as 
part of the Nazis’ attempted “inner conquest of the state.”
72
 He stressed the degree to 
which this attempt at ideological indoctrination succeeded among Wehrmacht officers 
and generals not without – on the whole – downplaying their accountability and 
complicity: “National Socialism was rather ‘experienced’ then realized,”
73
 the National 
Socialist world view was – towards the end of the war – reduced to a few “key messages” 
aimed at securing the “spiritual unity” of the army which by then “could only be believed
– and had to be believed.”
74
Yet, this important study established beyond doubt that most 
Wehrmacht leaders more or less whole-heartedly supported National Socialism because 
they shared with it a number of military and foreign policy objectives: reconstitution of 
Germany’s armed forces, restoration of Germany’s role as central power, thus its 
“liberation” from the “shackles of Versailles,” territorial expansionism (Eastwards), anti-
71
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 Messerschmidt’s treatment of the 
Wehrmacht’s role on the Eastern Front focused largely on the propagandistic realization 
of Hitler’s “war of world views” and on the educational measures taken to mobilize the 
troops for the historic “struggle of fate.”  The author stressed that in Russia, unlike in the 
wars against France and Poland, “the self-fabricated Popanz of the arch enemy of the 
Aryan man was to be destroyed, even ‘exterminated,’” and thus Wehrmacht soldiers were 
to be endowed with a “special inner approach,” with a new morale “beyond good and evil 
in the conventional sense.”
76
 The fight of the “master-race” against the “Untermensch” 
required a new kind of warfare and thus a new kind of military-political training. In 
essence, Messerschmidt concluded, “the ‘inner leadership’ of the Wehrmacht [the 
concept of military education introduced under Blomberg] was a leadership aimed at 
gaining agreement with the principles of National Socialism and, moreover, with a policy 
aimed at realizing these principles.”
77
This body of critical scholarship on the Eastern Front war competed with a number 
of popular histories on “Operation Barbarossa” of which the bestsellers by Paul Karl 
Schmidt published under the synonym Paul Carell became most famous. Carell published 
a number of accounts of the Eastern Front war in the Federal Republic glorifying the 
sacrificial fight of the German soldiers without ever once questioning the criminal nature 
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of the invasion and the Wehrmacht’s warfare.
78
 Carell’s pre-1945 activities as 
Ribbentrop’s press chief did not hinder him from making a remarkable career as publicist 
and writer after 1945. His works gave voice to those millions of readers in and even more 
so outside the veteran community who longed for a meaningful memory of the Eastern 
Front as more than “just” a failure and incriminated “war of aggression.”
79
 Nostalgia, 
even regret dominated the narratives – regret over missed opportunities and lost victories. 
Moreover, “Operation Barbarossa” appeared as a preventive war against an immanent 
Bolshevist attack. In the very first chapter of his first volume on Operation Barbarosssa 
with the revealing title “The Surprise Succeeds (Die Überraschung gelingt), Carell has 
Ribbentrop pondering in his office: “The Fuhrer has word that Stalin is mobilizing 
against us in order to attack us at a convenient moment in time. And … the Fuhrer has 
always been right so far.”
80
 Instead of citing more from his apologetic narrative, one of 
Carell’s own reflections on the writing of the the history of “Operation Barbarossa” best 
captures his problematic view of the Eastern Front war which found much resonance in 
the West German audience.  In a note of gratitude placed at the end of “Unternehmen 
Barbarossa,” Carell reflected: 
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 Carell was as Ribbentrop’s press chief responsible for translating NS policy, including the “Final 
Solution,” into “Sprachregelungen” for foreign correspondents. Among the works are the two-volume 
Unternehmen Barbarossa (Frankfurt/Main: Ullstein, 1963) which appeared in multiple editions, the most 
recent 9th edition in 1998; Der Rußlandkrieg (Berlin: Ullstein, 1967), and Verbrannte Erde (Berlin: 
Ullstein, 1966); further Unternehmen Barbarossa im Bild: der Rußlandkrieg fotografiert von Soldaten
(Berlin: Ullstein, 1978); and Stalingrad: Sieg und Untergang der 6. Armee (Frankfurt/Main: Ullstein, 1993) 
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 Cf. Chapter 7. I. and II.
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To depict the battles of a war which was lost and inscribed in history as criminal act of aggression 
constitutes a difficult undertaking, almost too difficult for the chronicler of this decade. Great is the 
temptation to correct the decisions on the battlefield with the pen or to rage [wüten] in the jungle of 
senselessness and guilt. The author wanted neither. He wanted to report about the military events of 
‘Operation Barbarossa,’ Hitler’s war of conquest, which ended at Stalingrad.
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Thus, free of having to address the “jungle of senselessness and guilt,” Carell offered an 
account of the war on the Eastern Front which focussed on the dutifully fighting German 
soldiers in a struggle against the Bolshevist threat (a threat that was perceived as still 
existing in 1963), and on Hitler’s failures as commander-in-chief. In effect he left the 
reader with the impression that “without the dilettante Hitler at the top, [“Operation 
Barbarossa”] actually should have worked out.”
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In 1967, Carell published a collection of photographs mostly taken by German 
soldiers between 1941 and 1944 on the Eastern Front. Formally, this book represents one 
early attempt to use images as documentary “evidence;” in a strange sense it thus 
antedated the approach taken by the initiators of the Wehrmacht exhibit in the 1990s. 
Intended to be consulted by the reader as a supplement to Carell’s historical accounts, the 
photo collection was to “deepen” the narrative in order for the reader to gain a better 
imagination of the detailed events. The volume contains not a single picture that would 
suggest German soldiers were involved in criminal warfare; rather, it was them who 
suffered and perished. Occasionally, photos of the indigenous population serve to 
illustrate that war “turns homes into the front”
83
 without ever reflecting the real extent of 
human suffering under German occupation. Carell’s introduction underlines this by 
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 Carell, Unternehmen Barbarossa, vol. 2I: “4000 Kilometer Front,” 550.
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equalling the suffering of soldiers, German and Soviet alike, with the sufferings that war 
in general inflicts on human beings:
One motif runs from the first to the last page [of the photo collection]: the image of the soldier! The 
German and the Russian. Not only his face changes with the years of war. Everything about him 
changes: the eyes, the posture, the uniform  ... The German victor turns into the loser, the defeated Red 
Army soldiers over the years becomes the hard conqueror. But beyond all changes, the image brings 
out with terrifying intensity how similar the faces of the soldiers were. 
This becomes especially clear when one considers the simple fact that in war there is not only 
shooting, driving, winning, dying and losing. [Soldiers] eat and drink, knit and nail, care for the 
wounded, heal and bury, ... repair and exercise. In every stage it was bureaucratized, loved, hated, good 
and evil were done. ... And one more thing: The country, in which war was fought, was battlefield only 
partially and temporarily. Humans lived there, and the soldier lived with them in the houses and 
cottages. Dealt and exchanged on their markets and crouched with them on their ovens during winter 
time.
84
Carell’s widely popularized illustrated narrative of the Eastern Front war portrayed the 
conflict as conventional war in which the military sphere remained separated from the 
civilian. Carell’s account made no mention of the excessive plunder, destruction, 
humiliations and mass killings committed by German SS and Wehrmacht forces on 
Soviet territory. It was similarly ignorant of the actual causes and real objectives of 
“Operation Barbarossa” despite the fact that at this point the criminal nature and intent of 
this war was a well established fact and accepted truth among historians. Carell’s work 
helped to sustain the “myth of a clean Wehrmacht” – a “myth” first and foremost 
referring to “Operation Barbarossa” as having been a conventional, rather innocuous 
military undertaking. This “myth” dominated much of the West German Eastern Front 





Even though historiography during the 1970s and 1980s to some extent contributed 
to the erosion of these popular perceptions,
85
 historical knowledge about the “special 
character” of the Eastern Front war had not even reached the public mind in 1980, almost 
forty years after the attack – despite a growing official acknowledgment and 
communication of this historiographical consensus on the part of government 
representatives and leading politicians.
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 Förster’s essay quoted at the outset of this 
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section speaks to this phenomenon. In 1987, publicist Ralph Giordano’s powerful 
extended essay on the “Second Guilt” argued that Germans were not only guilty of Nazi 
and war crimes committed between 1933 and 1945, but that their collective refusal to 
address reality and dimension of these crimes – particularly in the Eastern war and 
particularly regarding the Wehrmacht’s genocidal warfare – after 1945, constituted their 
second historic guilt.
87
 And even as late as 1989, the prominent German sociologist 
Rainer M. Lepsius observed that there was still a wide-spread refusal among the West 
German public to acknowledging the sufferings inflicted on the Soviet population by 
Germans during World War II.
88
Aside from the contrary historiographical approaches and differing collective 
memories of the Eastern Front war in East and West Germany, both sides referred 
constantly – explicitly or implicitly – to each other’s views and conclusions about this 
part of recent German history. Throughout the four decades of German partition, German 
historians for example relied on edited document collections published in the other part 
of the country.
89
 In terms of dealing with scholarly arguments made in the other half of 
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263.
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Germany, historians in the GDR routinely confronted, debated and usually refuted and 
denounced the positions of their “bourgeois” colleagues, who had “learned nothing from 
history.”
90
Western historiography either rejected East German research results as 
“Berliner smearings” of “Gesinnungslumpen”
91
on the basis of their explicit bias and 
political function – or ignored them altogether.
92
 Only in the wake of de-Stalinization 
which also entailed a reassessment of Stalin’s role as military commander in World War 
II, hopes arose among West German scholars that an open dialogue about the historical 
Militärverlag, 1980) which also was published in the FRG under the title Deutsche Besatzungspolitik in der 
UdSSR, 1941-1944. Dokumente (Köln: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1980). And on the participation of the Wehrmacht 
in the deportation of Soviet citizens to forced labor camps in Germany see Dietrich Eichholtz, “Der 
‘Generalplan Ost.’ Über eine Ausgeburt imperialistischer Denkart und Politik (mit Dokumenten),” in 
Jahrbuch für Geschichte, 26 (1982), 217-274.
Important West German editions inlcude Walter Hubatsch, ed., Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegführung.
Dokumente des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Frankfurt/Main: Bernard & Graefe, 1962).  Percy Ernst 
Schramm, ed., Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht 1940-1945 (Frankfurt/Main: Bernard 
& Graefe, 1963). Henry Picker, ed., Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier (München: Goldmann, 1979).  
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113-130. 
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assessment of the Eastern Front war might become possible.
93
 A number of memoirs by 
Soviet generals increasingly uncritical of Stalin’s role were read with great interest 
among Western historians.
94
 After a timid attempt to initiate an inner-German dialogue 
among historians of fascism and National Socialism was harshly suppressed by the head 
of the SED Politburo’s Ideological Commission Kurt Hager in 1964, GDR historians 
were “hermetically separated” from their Western colleagues and contacts remained 
limited to international conferences and “reliable cadres” who could occasionally travel 
across the border well into the 1980s.
95
 Following Hager’s historiographical crack-down, 
Ulbricht instead initiated the party-official project to write a canonical multi-volume 
“History of the German Workers Movement” in 1965, the fifth volume of which 
established the SED’s master narrative once and for all.
96
Nonetheless, historians in East and West took notice of the research activities and 
writings produced on the other side. In a rare case, this interest even led to the publication 
and genuine discussion of a standard Soviet history of World War II by two leading West 
German historians, Andreas Hillgruber and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen. In 1961, they edited 
and commented a German translation of Boris Telpuchowksi’s The History of the Great 
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 For example the memoirs of the most important former Soviet commander and later defense minister, 
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Patriotic War 1941-1945, a standard work reflecting the Soviet view of the Eastern 
Front.
97
 In their introduction to Telpuchowksi’s work, Hillgruber and Jacobsen made 
some important observations about the nature of Marxist-Leninist historiography as it 
was practiced by their Soviet and East German colleagues. While they focussed on Soviet 
scholarship on the subject, their conclusions clearly aimed also at GDR historians who, in 
the eyes of Hillgruber and Jacobsen, duly submitted their own research agendas to the 
Soviet master narrative:
For a Soviet historian it basically doesn’t matter whether his conclusion is true or false at the moment; 
all that matters is its usefulness, and that it is being believed. Behind that stands the conviction that this 
“belief” makes invincible. Is the asserted conclusion useful to the communist party and therefore to the 
realization of the constantly promised historical end-stage then it is not only justified morally but true 
in a ‘higher, dialectical sense,’ that means it reflects ‘historical law and socialist Being’ and ‘correctly’ 
assumes that the victory of the proletariat ... creates the societal and historical precondition for the 
realization of the ‘entire truth.’ To record and interpret the diversity of historical reality, to describe 
‘how it really was’ (Ranke), often even remains an annoying side-product for the scientist of the 
Eastern bloc. History is less contemplatio ... but first of all agitatio, a sharp weapon of the mind, 
mercilessly and brutally employed, an instrument of hate and irreconcilable enmity which forces the 
Soviet-communist historian to relegate himself to a highly-paid henchmen of communism.
98
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 Telpuchowski, Die sowjetische Geschichte des Großen Vaterländischen Krieges 1941-1945. In their 
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Spiegel der sowjetkommunistischen Geschichtsschreibung,” in Telpuchowksi, Die sowjetische Geschichte 




This harsh verdict about the nature of communist historiography indeed captured the 
main features of East German and Soviet historical research and writing. Communist, 
declaredly “Marxist-Leninst” historians viewed history as weapon and tool of politics in 
general, and of the anti-imperialist/antifascist class-struggle in particular. However, the 
scholarship on the Eastern Front war – despite its political bias, direction and 
instrumentalization – has produced a number of historical studies which, based on 
authentic documentary evidence, contributed to the reconstruction of events happening 
on the Eastern Front that Western historians decided to ignore for a long time.
99
Specifically, and resulting directly from the materialist Marxist-Leninist view of history, 
this body of scholarship focussed on the economic aspects of the war against the Soviet 
Union: its planned and executed exploitation, and the enslavement and resultant killing of 
millions of people. As the following section demonstrates, these were the “truths” East 
German historians as “the guardians of the moral flame”
100
 of antifascism in the GDR 
were instructed and willing to describe, while others, such as the mass murder of the 
Jews, or the Western front, or the non-Communist resistance, were – at least until the 
1970s – relegated to the status of footnotes in World War II history.
99
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III. The “Decisive War:” The Eastern Front in East German Historiography
For most of the 1950s the events of the Eastern Front remained a subject more of 
SED propaganda than of historical research.
101
 Contemporary events such as the June 
uprising in 1953, West German remilitarization and bloc integration, as well as the flood 
of apologetic generals’ memoirs prompted the SED to narrate the history of the Eastern 
Front primarily in terms of its political functionality and alleged deterring potential. This 
propaganda, a good example of which is Albert Norden’s 1954 book Between Berlin and 
Moscow, was not limited to presenting the population with a coherently tailored version 
of the Eastern Front war.
102
 It also aimed at denouncing Adenauer’s Germany and the 
West, above all the United States, for plotting another attack against the Soviet Union 
with Hitler’s former generals and the usual suspects among the monopoly capitalists. 
Texts like these remembered history not in order to remember a brutal conflict happening 
in the past but to describe and embroider a conflict of the present.
The year 1959, the twentieth anniversary of the outbreak of World War II, was a 
turning point in the history of the inner-German conflict over the war’s official 
commemoration and historiographical confrontation. From the East German point of 
view, the 1950s had confirmed that the Federal Republic had become an aggressive, 
“neo-Fascist” state: its leaders, the “henchmen of US American imperialism” had 
101
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remilitarized it, and Adenauer’s alleged unwillingness to root out fascism and its material 
basis both nurtured and reflected a persisting reactionary agenda – the worst outgrowths 
of which seemed to materialize in a series of anti-Semitic hate crimes in 1959/60 and the 
ongoing anti-communist campaign. In Ulbricht’s words, it was the “breeding ground” of 
Adenauer’s “militaristic-clerical regime” on which “fascist restoration and anti-Semitism 
pullulated.”
103
 It was Albert Norden again who exploited the issue most effectively in a 
pamphlet which accused the Adenauer administration of “nurturing Anti-Semitism” and 
thus instigating the “hunt against the Jews.”
104
 “The SED “countered” this 
“Refaschisierung”
105
with an ideological offensive aimed not only at denouncing West 
Germany as breeding ground of neo-fascism – the Norden campaign against “Hitler’s 
blood judges in the service of the Adenauer-regime” has already been mentioned – but 
also at ridiculing and undermining those West German politicians, intellectuals and 
publicists who most explicitly criticized these developments.
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from the reactionary domestic and foreign policy course.” Thus, the “war ministry” initiated the anti-
Semitic campaign. But “this wave proved to be a boomerang. West Germany was unmasked yet again as 
breeding ground and carrier of anti-Semitism and revanchism.” Ibid., 30.
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Aside from the Norden campaigns, and the GDR’s official attempts to 
instrumentalize the Eichmann and Auschwitz trials, the SED Politburo founded the 
“Ideological Commission” in 1960 to intensify and professionalize the ideologically and 
politically useful appropriation of history to the present. Placed under Kurt Hager, who 
also headed the SED Central Committee’s “Sciences Division,” one of the first projects 
of the commission was to react to the critical West German debate about the “un-
mastered past” (unbewältigte Vergangenheit). This debate was particularly challenging to 
the SED since it seemed to finally address those issues which the SED had long claimed 
had been left untouched by West German Vergangenheitsbewältigung – the personal, 
institutional and structural continuities between Nazi Germany and the Federal Republic. 
Yet, instead of greeting this genuine interest in a more critical and intensive dealing with 
the legacies of the “Third Reich,” the East German communists responded with a 
campaign aimed at exposing the debate as a hoax: in truth, they claimed, it was launched 
to “trivialize the Refaschisierung of West Germany,” to “distort the causes of fascism’s 
revival in West Germany,” and thus to “prevent  the fight against neo-fascism and its 
with the “thesis of the unmastered past” led by historian Lothar Berthold was Walter Dirks’ essay 
„Unbewältigte Vergangenheit – demokratische Zukunft,“ (Frankfurter Hefte, 3 (1960), 153-158), which 
called for a radically new approach in confronting the Nazi past: Germans should “secularize” the catholic 
practice of confession (invocation of the Holy Spirit, search of conscience, regret, confession, pledge and 
reparation). Implicitly, this was a critique of the Adenauer’s Vergangenheitspolitik and its negative 
consequences for West German democracy. See “Vorlage an die Ideologische Kommission betrifft 
Auseinandersetzung mit der These von der unbewältigten Vergangenheit,“ December 1, 1960. 
BA/SAPMO, DY 30/IV 2/9.01/5, 32. Theodor W. Adorno had given his famous talk on “Was bedeutet: 
Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit?” in 1959; it was first printed in Bericht über die Erzieherkonferenz am 6. 
und 7. November 1959 in Wiesbaden, ed. Deutscher Koordinierungsrat der Gesellschaft für Christlich-
Jüdische Zusammenarbeit (Frankfurt/Main, 1960), 12-23. It was not mentioned in the commissioners 
memo. For a brief summary of the critical debate about the “unbewältigte Vergangenheit” in the Federal 




 This was a fake debate intended to “appease the masses and the international 
public” who were shocked about the anti-Semitic crime series of 1959. The true motive 
behind this “feigned critique of fascism” was rather the “rehabilitation of its imperialist 
backers, the current leaders in the Bonn state, and of the fascist generals,” so that they, 
along with the USA, “can now employ [the masses] against the socialist states.”
108
 Yet 
again, it all came down to uncovering the threat of another “Barbarossa.” Hanna Wolf
(1908-1999), who as head of the party academy “Karl Marx” was closely involved in the 
internal strategic discussions, pointedly summarized the principle goal of the campaign 
against the “thesis of the un-mastered past:” it was to “prove the anti-Soviet tendencies in 
all works on the ‘un-mastered past.’”
109
Precisely at the time when the West German public started to take a more 
differentiated and critical interest in the history of National Socialism and its crimes, the 
SED waged a new propaganda war on two fronts, an ideological and an academic front: 
on the one hand, it further intensified the campaign against the “reactionary” and “neo-
fascist” tendencies in the West plotting a new attack against the Soviet Union and the 
socialist camp. On the other hand, the party initiated historical research on Nazi and war 
crimes based on documentary evidence – the results of which would eventually have to 
serve the same goal. Propaganda and historiography were thus as closely linked in the 
GDR as historiography and politics. Writing the history of the Eastern Front always 
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meant – and was intended – to confirm and reflect the SED’s official narrative, and to 
support the propagandistic efforts to popularize it both inside the GDR and across the 
wall.
On the second, the academic front, the SED’s party academy “Karl Marx” kicked off 
a series of conferences which focussed as much on the history of World War II as on the 
“falsifications” produced by Western “bourgeois” historiography. In May 1959, the “II. 
Scientific Meeting of the Historians’ Commission of the GDR and the USSR” dedicated 
to the topic “German Imperialism and the Second World War” took place at the academy 
in Berlin.
110
 The assembled Soviet and East German historians reconstructed the history 
of the war by focussing exclusively on the Eastern Front and the communist resistance 
and thus duly fulfilling a detailed agenda agreed on upfront. The “scientific tasks and 
goals of the conference” were the following:
1) To uncover the role of German imperialism in preparing and launching World War II.
2) To unmask German imperialism’s methods with regards to the economic, military, political and 
ideological war preparation.
3) To unmask the predatory methods of warfare used by German imperialism in order to enslave the 
peoples and to gain world dominance.
4) To demonstrate the historical lawfulness of the defeat of German imperialism in World War II, the 
decisive role of the Soviet Union in destroying fascist Germany as well as the role of the masses in the 
European countries in the victorious fight against fascism.
5) To demonstrate the historical importance of the defeat of German imperialism in World War II in 
light of the profound change in the balance of power between capitalism and socialism.
6) To unmask the revival of militarism and imperialism in West Germany in the post-war period and 
the role of the USA and the other Western powers therein.
111
This agenda for writing an “unmasking history” of World War II was exemplarily for a 
number of successor conferences hosted by the SED during the following years. The 
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second point of its agenda directly reflects the priorities a Marxist-Leninist 
historiography on the causes of World War II was to set. 
Accordingly, communist historiography on the Second World War stressed the 
economic and military aspects the most, while the political and ideological motives, 
which would have required a discussion of Hitler’s popular support for his political 
program and racial theory, remained of minor interest. The third agenda point, to 
“unmask the predatory methods of warfare” employed to enslave the population in the 
occupied territories indicates not a historical, or a moral but a calculated interest in Nazi 
and war crimes committed against non-Germans all over Europe. Indeed, the same 
directive included a detailed list of issues to discuss in a conference section on “the 
occupation policies of German imperialism and the antifascist resistance movement in 
Germany and the occupied territories:” the “plunder of the occupied countries and the 
Soviet Union by German fascism,” the exploitation of “foreign forced laborers, KZ-
inmates, and POWs as slaves by the German monopoly capital,” and the “fascist 
extermination policy in the occupied and satellite states,” which refers to the Holocaust in 
the usual euphemistic wording.
112
The published result, however, contained not a single article dedicated to either of 
these three crime complexes. The book emerging from this conference was entitled “The 
Second World War 1939-1945. Reality and Falsification.”
113
 The included ten essays on 
the military history of World War II offered a mix of historical argumentation and 
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political confrontation. All authors narrated the official (Soviet) history of the war – in 
fact reduced to the “Great Patriotic War” – while at the same time constantly repudiating 
Western “revisionist” historiography.
114
 Of the seven essays dealing with the military 
history, six focussed on the Eastern Front war, e.g. on the various aspects of the battle of 
Stalingrad and the “decisive role of the Soviet Union.”
115
The general direction of all essays might be best exemplified by Leo Stern’s
contribution to the volume. Stern was one of the most important and influential GDR 
historians in the 1950s. Himself an Eastern Front veteran, Stern was one of Ulbricht’s 
most reliable allies in the process of establishing a Marxist-Leninist historiography in the 
GDR. He was professor at the University of Halle between 1950 and 1966, became its 
rector in 1953 (until 1959) and was co-founder and co-editor of the most important East 
German historical periodical Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft (established in 1952). 
An expert on the history of the workers movement, Stern argued in his contribution to the 
conference volume that his Western colleagues were out to rewrite World War II history 
in order to justify another “crusade” against “Marxism, Leninism, and Bolshevism.” He 
noted that amidst the flood of publications by “former statesmen, diplomats, politicians, 
military writers, professional and amateur historians, and publicists,” the “actual 
wirepuller of the Third Reich” kept silent about the terror against German workers, the 
fascist mass murders in the concentration camps, the wars of plunder against Europe – as 
114
 The best example is Leo Stern’s essay „Revanchistische Einstellungen der Geschichte des zweiten 
Weltkrieges,“ in ibid., 1-29.
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 Three leading Soviet historians present Moscow’s official view of the Great Patriotic War: P. A. Shilin,
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did the “profit hyenas who benefited economically from the criminal war of 
extermination against the Jews, Poles, Czechs, Yugoslavs and other peoples.”
116
 Stern 
concluded that just as under Wilhelm II. and Hitler, these individuals “pull the wires in 
the background,” the only difference being that “today the West German politicians and 
ideologues have to serve two masters – the German and the American monopoly 
capital.”
117
 With a cynicism and disgust rarely to be found even among the most 
committed GDR historians, Stern attackd the intellectual and political elites of the 
Federal Republic as revanchist wolves in a democratic sheep’s pelt:
The most dedicated Nazis of yesterday, the most fanatic militarists, revanchists, and imperialists of 
today  now pose as the deeply moral democrats, as miraculously refined Europeans since the 
experience of 1945, as eager fighters for morality, freedom and justice, as burning admirer of 
occidental culture, as steadfast contender for the cause of God, the church and Christianity , as faithful 
guardian of the ‘unity of Western civilization,’ as crusaders against Marxism, Leninism, and 
Bolshevism equipped with all soldierly virtues ... Yet all of this only under the precondition that this 
Europe is being led by a Germany armed with the most modern weapons, nuclear arms and rockets. All 
war historians, memoir writers, Nazi generals and political commentators thereby more or less openly 
express the thought that the strategic spearhead of the ‘united Europe’ led militarily by West Germany 
will be directed against the Soviet Union, the socialist world system, especially against the GDR, 
Czechoslovakia, and Poland.
The open or concealed tendencies in the reactionary historiography on World War II are thus nothing 
else than the Christian-occidentally, European-liberally, democratic-progressively souped-up and only 
well-too-known old tendencies of German imperialism, militarism and revanchism, of the brutal 
reaction, of military aggression and Cold War.
118
By placing West German historiography at the center of this crude conspiracy theory – in 
which paradoxically the FRG was both the “servant of two masters” and the leader of an 
impeding attack – Stern dragged the history of World War II onto the purely ideological 
battlefield. The concrete “falsifications” he then identified constitute those historical 
topoi with which GDR historians of World War II – despite a feasible differentiation and 
116
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professionalization of the field since the 1970s
119
– would continue to operate over the 
coming decades in their quest to confirm that only their country had learned the “right 
lessons of the past.” Stern listed ten “portions” of World War II history in which 
“reactionary falsifications” occurred and then focused on the first three, in his view the 
“most important ones:” 
1. The pre-history of the World War II, 
2. The fascist attack against the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, 
3. The so-called turning points of the World War II, 
4. The role of the Soviet Army in the World War II, 
5. The German resistance movement and the myth of July 20, [1944],
6. The policy of the Western powers during the World War II,
7. The antifascist fight of the peoples suppressed by Hitler fascism,
8. The collapse of Hitlergermany and the Nuremberg war crimes trials,
9. The so-called Hitler-image and the role of the SS and other Nazi-formations in World War II,
10. The so-called integration of Europe as ideological brace [Klammer] of the aggressive NATO-
pact.
120
Elaborating his first point, Stern countered the “tendency to declare Hitler as the only 
responsible and guilty person in order to rehabilitate those circles who brought him to 
power and whose interests he represented.”
121
 He further criticized his Western colleagues 
for failing to establish that with their “policy of appeasement” the Western powers 
deserved to be held accountable as well. Worse, with regards to the Nazi-Soviet-Non-
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 Ibid. Stern supports his claims with extensive references to Western works.
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Aggression-Pact, “there are orgies of falsifications and defamations” inspired by anti-
Soviet hatred which only seek to put the blame for the “starting shot” of World War II on 
the Soviet Union, and to “put a political equal sign between Hitlergermany and the Soviet 
Union.”
122
 Clearly referring to the arguments of Western proponents of the totalitarianism 
model, Stern reasoned that this pact instead served the “self-preservation” of the Soviet 
state, it was forced upon it by a year-long policy of isolation of England and France 
against the Soviet Union, and its main “historical objective” had been to “break up the 
global imperialist conspiracy against the Soviet Union, and to secure the Soviet people, if 
only for a limited time, an important military breathing space.”
123
 This version, of course, 
denied that Stalin welcomed the opportunity to wipe out the Polish state, and made no 
mention of the extensive military, logistic and economic assistance given by the Soviets 
to Nazi Germany between 1939 and 1941. This, after all, would have meant to admit that 
the pact and its secret protocol were – in the balanced words of a leading Western World 
War II historian – “part of a mistaken and adventurous policy by Stalin which helped 
bring on a war which cost their people the most terrible losses and for which the country 
had not been properly prepared.”
124
Stern’s second point dealt critically with the thesis of a “preventive war” and 
repudiated claims of a planned Soviet attack against Nazi Germany and the West. Rather, 
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sought to “direct Hitler’s aggression onto the right track” – namely against the Soviet 
Union.
125
  Finally, by denying that the battles of Moscow and Stalingrad were the decisive 
turning-points of the war, Western historiography neglected the Soviet Unions crucial 
role in the fight against Nazi Germany, and thus refused to accept that the Eastern Front 
was the “decisive front of World War II.” Although this was a conclusion Western 
historians came to share over time, Stern’s critique was inspired by what such a neglect 
implied in his own days: the refusal to acknowledge what the Communist world saw as 
its historically proven triumph after 1945. If,  according to the laws of history, World 
War I had been the “cradle of the Soviet Revolution,” World War II was its baptism of 
fire for it “planted its flags in the very heart of Europe.”
126
 This outcome seemed to have 
manifested once and for all the historical supremacy of socialism over capitalism – and 
Stern wanted history to be written accordingly. 
In order to codify and popularize this interpretation of World War II, Stern thus 
pushed East German historians to concentrate more on writing its proper history, an area, 
he claimed, “we have all-too-long neglected.”
127
 Indeed, despite a few articles on selected 
aspects of the Eastern war, such as the place of the “Plan Barbarossa” in the overall 
scheme of Hitler’s policy
128
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aside from the first illustrated history of the battle of Stalingrad appearing in 1960,
130
 little 
original research had been done thus far. In Stern’s view, only a strong focus on World 
War II history would enable the East German historical profession to turn an “ideological 
and political explosive against us into an explosive for us.”
131
 His concluding sentences 
can be read as programmatic statement inaugurating a new era of historical research on 
World War II in the GDR. It not only set the tone for the stories to be written, but also 
determined the direction in which historians were to take their research:
Our most urgent task is to explore the objective historical truth about various problems of World War 
II. We have to write the Marxist history of World War II long awaited of us. We must turn it into a 
heavy and sharply burnished weapon against all falsifiers and defamers, agitators and instigators who 
subjectively or objectively [and] in the service of American and German imperialism pursue the 
ideological preparation of a third world war.
We can do it – we have to do it.
132
The twentieth anniversary of the German attack against the Soviet Union in 1961 
offered the opportunity to set this program into action. In the midst of the rising Cold 
War tensions over the Berlin question and faced with the continuous flight of hundreds of 
thousands of East Germans to the West, the SED orchestrated the official 
commemoration of “Operation Barbarossa” to directly relate to these current events. As 
already discussed in chapter 6, the SED stretched the commemoration campaign in the 
summer of 1961 from late June into early August, deliberately creating the impression 
that the building of the wall on August 13, 1961 was justified and necessary in order to 
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defend the GDR (and the Eastern bloc) against Western imperialism and thus to prevent 
another “Barbarossa.”
In June 1961, the SED gathered once again the “Commission of the Historians of the 
GDR and the USSR” for a conference in Berlin, this time to present and discuss recent 
research on the “Aggression of German Imperialism against the USSR.”
133
 Many 
professional historians shared Ulbricht’s understanding of history as “weapon.” They also 
seemed to agree with his ludicrous dictum that historians of his time were “dealing too 
much with questions of the past.” Ulbricht had made this statement („unsere 
Geschichtsprofessoren befassen sich zu sehr mit Fragen der Vergangenheit“) in 1955, the 
year in which the SED Politburo decreed a „reform“ of the historical sciences in the 
GDR.
134
The Politburo decree „The Improvement of Research and Teaching in the 
Historical Science of the German Democratic Republic” (dated July 5, 1955) declared 
historiography „a sharp ideological weapon“ and saw one of its main tasks in confronting 
the „reactionary falsification” of the German and Soviet pasts. The Politburo felt that 
Western accounts failed to acknowledge the historical role and achievements of the 
Soviet Union and the antifascist legacy of German communism. It decreed that GDR 
historians ought to fight the continuation of Nazi “Ostforschung” in the West. On the 
whole, the SED Politburo wanted historians to overcome the description and 
conceptualization of German history merely in terms of its failures (“deutsche Geschichte 
133
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als einzige Misere”). Moreover, they should “educate the masses to hatred against 
reactionary views,” and in turn should contribute to the destruction of any remnants of 
the hate campaign (“Hetze”) against the Soviet Union.
135
The agenda of the selected circle of German and Soviet historians gathered in June 
1961, among Jürgen Kuczynski, Leo Stern, Hanna Wolf (1908-1999)
136
, Walter Bartel 
(1904-1992)
137
, Alfred Anderle (born 1925)
138
, and historian Stefan Doernberg (born 
1924), the later director of the German Institute for Contemporary History (1962-1971), 
reflected the SED’s desire to properly connect the past with the present not only 
rhetorically but also scientifically. The participation of invited media representatives 
assured the appropriate public resonance. Among the themes discussed at the meeting 
were “The Great Patriotic war of the Soviet Union against German fascism – a just 
peoples’ war for the defense of the socialist state and the cause of humanity” (presented 
by Soviet historian Evgenij A. Boltin), “The preparation of the aggressive plans by OKW 
and OKH” (AeO-head Otto Korfes), and “On the participation of German antifascists in 
the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union” (historian Stefan Doernberg). The final 
135
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protocol noted that several conference contributions would be published in journals such 
as Einheit and Militärwesen in the GDR, and that a book would be put out as well.
139
The resultant conference volume entitled “June 1941: On the History of the 
Hitlerfascist Attack against the Soviet Union” appeared the same year and the articles 
included focused on the Soviet Union’s role as Hitler’s prime victim and victor. They 
were “dedicated to the memory”
140
 of the veterans of the antifascist struggle on the 
Eastern Front and in all of Europe. But the quality of the essays varied: for example, 
Alfred Anderle’s piece on the “Road to June 22, 1941” was the routine finger pointing 
against an Anti-Soviet conspiracy started in 1917, drawing a direct line from the Western 
rejection of the Soviet experiment to the “anti-Soviet war plans of German monopolists 
and Junkers” to Hitler’s war of extermination. One more original contribution dealt with 
the “Criminal Role of IG Farben during the Fascist Aggression against the Soviet 
Union.”
141
 As the title indicates, this text was neither free of polemics nor un-biased, yet it 
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Territorium der UdSSR (1941-1944) (Moskau: Verlag für Fremdsprachliche Literatur, 1963).
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gegen die Sowjetunion,“ in Anderle, ed., Juni 1941, 157-187. In 1967, Dietrich Eichholtz voluminous 
„History of the German War economy“ appeared as a first comprehensive Marxist-Leninist analysis of the 
relationship between the German industry and the Nazi regime. See Dietrich Eichholtz, Geschichte der 
deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1939 - 1945, 3 vols. (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1967ff.), particularly volume 
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was based on a number of incriminating documents from the company archives as well as 
on records from the Nuremberg Tribunal. The core result of this research – that the IG 
Farben company was deeply involved in and profited from the Nazi system of economic 
exploitation and physical extermination – was later confirmed by studies of Western 
historians.
142
Historical research on the war on the Eastern Front intensified not only in the wake 
of the conference in 1961, but also as a result of an orchestrated effort to instrumentalize 
the judicial proceedings against Nazi war criminals both outside the GDR, as in the case 
of the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem, and the Auschwitz trial in Frankfurt/Main, and inside 
the GDR as in the case of the show trial (in absence) against Theodor Oberländer, the 
West German Minister for Expellees and Refugees Affairs. Oberländer, who during the 
Nazi years contributed as “Ostforscher” to Hitler’s “Eastern policies” of Germanization, 
and to the “solution” of the “Jewish question” in Eastern Europe, was (in absence) 
sentenced to life in prison by the GDR Supreme Court in 1960. The verdict found that 
Oberländer had “in speech, writing and action propagated and supported the radical 
‘Germanization’ of the Eastern European countries … and the ‘extinction of the Jews.’ 
The court further declared him guilty of having personally participated in war crimes 
against Polish (Lemberg massacre, 1941) and Soviet civilians and POWs, communists, 
West German military historians, including Manfred Messerschmidt who furthered the critical scholarship 
on the Wehrmacht as director of the Militärgeschichtliche Forschungsamt in Freiburg. See also the review 
of the third edition of Eichholtz’s book by Rolf-Dieter Müller in Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift, 2 (1986), 
181-186. 
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review of the West German literature on the subject; the same review also included a critique of more 
recent IG Farben historiography in the GDR which, according to Hayes, was filled with “myths” and 
“misinterpretations.” Peter Hayes, “Zur umstrittenen Geschichte der I.G. Farbenindustrie AG,” in 




 Adenauer, under domestic public pressure, released the minister 
from his post in May of 1960, only weeks after the East German verdict. A West German 
court later found no sufficient evidence for his participation in war crimes, and a new trial 
in 1993 rescinded the 1960 verdict arguing that it was based on fraud documentary 
evidence.
144
Whereas the evidence for crimes on the Eastern Front were largely fabricated in the 
Oberländer case, the GDR used the Eichmann and Auschwitz trials to place authentic 
historical evidence deposited in East German or Soviet archives in the best possible light 
not in order to contribute to the search for historical truth and justice but to “prove” a 
personal and structural continuity between Nazism and the Federal Republic. It was 
Norden again who initiated and oversaw these activities.
145
 The trial of one of the 
masterminds of the “Final Solution,” Adolf Eichmann, was the first NS case in which the 
Ministry for State Security was closely involved, and the SED leadership sought to 
instrumentalize the trial for purely propagandistic reasons – in Norden’s words to 
“maximally acuminate the Eichmann case against the Bonn regime.”
146
 The GDR’s 
efforts to be admitted to the trial as joint plaintiff failed miserably and the Jerusalem 
court was repelled by the limpid maneuvers of the East German legal representative Dr. 
Friedrich Karl Kaul (1906-1981) geared only towards gaining propagandistic capital from 
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 The verdict is published in Die Haltung der beiden deutschen Staaten zu den Nazi- und 
Kriegsverbrechen. Eine Dokumentation, ed. Generalstaatsanwalt der DDR, Ministerium für Justiz (Berlin 
(Ost): Staatsverlag, 1965), 74f.
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Geschichte (Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 1999).
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 The SED’s Agitation Division declared the trial an absolute priority in the 
spring of 1960, and instructions given to the media reflected the true motives behind the 
GDR’s “support” of the trial:
It is not only about Eichmann, but [the media] must demonstrate that Eichmann is [sic] the instrument 
of German imperialism, of fascism, which aimed at the extermination of entire nations, not only the 
Jewish people.
Today in Bonn, Eichmann’s backers are sitting again in the key positions of the state, are leading the 
armed forces as generals, are, as Globke, the right hand of the Chancellor, are sitting in the justice 
system as blood judges – partly in higher positions than before –, in the foreign ministry, ect.
One must demonstrate the basic differences of politics in Germany: In the GDR, the economic and 
political roots of imperialism have been rooted out, and therefore anti-Semitism, too. ... 
In Bonn, however, where the murderers of the Jews are back in post and dignity [in Amt und Würde], 
antifascists and all those opposing the repetition of the same policy of Eichmann, Globke, Heusinger, 
ect., are again being jailed. He who hinders the mastering of the past, cannot be the representative of 
the nation.
148
This reading not only contains the official East German position on the Holocaust as one 
crime among others – and on anti-Semitism as an obsolete issue – but they also illustrate 
the regime’s unrelenting  effort to connect the past with the present for opportunistic 
reasons. The goal was yet again to use the opportunity to  present the GDR as the better 
“master” of the Nazi past and to increase its international standing as the “better 
Germany.” These efforts culminated in the publication of the „Brown Book” on „War 
and Nazi Criminals in the Federal Republic” in 1965, again a pamphlet produced under 
Albert Norden’s supervision. It included (mostly authentic
149




 „Argumentationshinweise Nr. 22“ of the „Commission of Argumentation“ in the SED’s Agitation 
Division, BA/SAPMO, DY30 IV 2/9.03/10, fiche 1, 53f.
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 Commenting the third edition of the Braunbuch in 2002, Götz Aly to a large extent rehabilitated this 
pamphlet from its reputation as one of the worst examples of East German “political pornography” 
produced during the Cold War: “In der alten Bundesrepublik galt der Band lange als politische 
Pornographie. Natürlich handelte es sich dabei um Propaganda, in wenigen Ausnahmefällen sogar um 
Fälschungen, aber ein gedankenloses Machwerk war das Braunbuch nicht. Vielmehr erwiesen sich seine 
empirischen Grundlagen als äußerst beständig, die Irrtumsquote lag deutlich unter einem Prozent. … [Der 
Band] dokumentiert eine Phase des binnendeutschen Kalten Krieges, gibt einen extrem parteiischen, aber in 
der Sache nicht falschen Einblick in die Nazikontinuitäten der alten Bundesrepublik und verschweigt jeden 
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past of fifteen federal ministers and state secretaries, one hundred generals and admirals 
of the Bundeswehr, about a thousand judges, lawyers, and prosecutors, 245 employees of 
the foreign ministry as well as about 300 members of the police and the Federal 
Republic’s Secret Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND).
150
The attacks and “unmasking” campaigns against potentially burdened West German 
individuals called indeed for an “unmasking” historiography which East German 
historians were eager to provide. This nexus became again clear during the Auschwitz 
trial. This time, the GDR was admitted as joint plaintiff and the SED made every effort to 
learn from the failures of the Eichmann trial. On November 19, 1963, four weeks before 
the start of the trial, the Politburo decreed the founding of an “Auschwitz commission” 
which was to gather evidence for the involvement of the then largest German chemical 
company, IG Farben, in the process of killing in Auschwitz, and thus to turn the trial into 
a “tribunal against the IG Farben company.”
151
 Based on this decree, the SED’s Security 
Division widened the agenda in February of 1964, when the trial proceedings also 
touched on the Wehrmacht’s participation in the mass murder. A memo to the National 
Defense Ministry’s Political Division, which oversaw the Institute for Military History in 
Potsdam, detailed why the focus on Wehrmacht crimes was important and what concrete 
research tasks were to be fulfilled:
Hinweis auf vergleichbare Kontinuitäten in der einstigen „DDR.” Götz Aly, „Lob des antifaschistischen 
Rentners: Reprint des Braunbuchs,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, August 9, 2002.
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Braunbuch: Kriegs- und Naziverbrecher in der Bundesrepublik. Staat, Wirtschaft, Armee, Verwaltung, 
Justiz, Wissenschaft, ed. Nationalrat der Nationalen Front des Demokratischen Deutschland, 
Dokumentationszentrum der Staatlichen Archivverwaltung der DDR (Berlin (Ost): Staatsverlag der DDR, 
1965).
151
 Quoted in Weinke, Die Verfolgung von NS-Tätern im geteilten Deutschland, 239.
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The question of the participation of the fascist Wehrmacht in the mass extermination in the 
concentration camps plays now an important role as well. In order to generate the relevant evidence on 
this matter it is necessary to thoroughly work through the records of the IMT successor trial against the 
OKW (Case 12) which are deposited in the German Central Archive [in Potsdam] and possibly in the 
Institute for Military History.
What matters most is to prove that the fascist Wehrmacht helped admitting POWs in concentration 
camps (Commissar Order, Commando Order, ect.), that these orders were drafted in the OKW/OKH 
by the militarists who play a role in the Federal Republic today, that the executioners of these 
murderous orders are active today in the Bundeswehr, Federal Border Guard, etc.”
152
The Institute for Military History in Potsdam was assigned with this “extremely 
important and urgent matter” and judging from what was published in the following 
years, the historians there fulfilled their assignment splendidly. Since the Wehrmacht was
involved in various ways in the mass murder on the Eastern Front and in the 
Generalgovernment, and since much relevant documentary evidence was deposited in the 
GDR and the USSR, a number of well-documented studies on the nature of warfare, the 
occupation regime, and the complicity of the Wehrmacht, came out since the mid-1960s. 
Particularly noteworthy is Norbert Müller’s work on the legacies of the Wehrmacht 
invasion and occupation of Eastern Europe
153
 and Leon Herzog’s study of the “criminal 
activity of the Wehrmacht” in Poland between 1939 and 1945.
154
 Both studies contained 
the essential facts about the nature of warfare on the Eastern Front and correctly placed 
the Wehrmacht campaigns and its role in the occupation of the Eastern territories at the 
heart of the National Socialist “living space” conception. Yet again, the authors largely 
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focused on the complicit “profiteers” in German big business, and failed to even consider 
the complexity and concreteness of individual guilt, or the diversity of the victims’ fates.





 aimed at canonizing and popularizing the official history of 
World War II, its causes and main battlefield – the Eastern Front – among East Germans 
were published at the same time. The widely-read, illustrated “The Second World War. A 
Chronology in Pictures” by Heinz Bergschicker (first published in 1963)
157
 presented the 
war against the Soviet Union as a brutal class war against the “home of socialism:” 
“German fascism did the decisive step towards catastrophe with the attack against the 
Soviet Union. As the extreme embodiment of an obsolete epoch, it [fascism] challenged a 
future-orientated social system of whose political-moral superiority he had no 
imagination.”
158
 The attack was doomed from the beginning, “Menetekel Moscow” and 
“turning point Stalingrad” figured as milestones on the predetermined path towards 
victory. Excerpts from documents underlined the criminal energy with which Wehrmacht 
155
Der deutsche Imperialismus und der zweite Weltkrieg. Materialien der wissenschaftlichen Konferenz 
der Kommission der Historiker der DDR und der UdSSR zum Thema „Der deutsche Imperialismus und der 
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and SS executed the “class war.”
159
 And Bergschicker pointedly described the ideological 
fundament of German “fascism” as twofold: one was the irrational “master race theory” 
in which the “dark-threatening creature of the ‘eternal Jew’” figured as the “necessary 
opponent” – necessary to fabricate the “conspiracy of world Jewry” which by itself was 
no more than a “useful lie” to cover up the enmity against “bourgeois democracy, class 
struggle and social revolution alike.” The second ideological pillar was fascism’s true 
fundament: “reality-based,” thus rational, anti-communism and its materialization in the 
attack against the Soviet Union.
160
 The “absolute nihilation of societal progress” 
constituted the “actual content of fascism.”
161
 It was within this explanatory framework, 
that Marxist-Leninist historiography interpreted the war against the Soviet Union as 
Hitler’s worst crime.  
Bergschicker’s books became bestselling encyclopedias of the SED’s official World 
War II narrative. The interested reader could further consult his illustrated histories of the 
siege of Leningrad and the battle of Stalingrad which also highlighted the Soviet Union’s 
tragically pivotal role as Hitler’s prime victim and conqueror.
162
 It is noteworthy, that the 
Stalingrad volume contained textual and visual evidence for the crimes of the Sixth Army 
159
 See for example the pages on the preparation and execution of the war for the „new order of Europe,“ 
ibd., 316ff., 362ff. Next to Nazi documents, the pages always included documents on the economic 
exploitation, and on the communist and Social Democratic resistance fight. 
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else away within a few years.” Ibid., 56f.
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on the Eastern Front, depicting for example soldiers hanging civilians and horrified 
Soviet women who had to witness the execution of their husbands. The narrative 
concludes addressing the imaginary German soldiers: “you fought for this, that is why 
you lost.”
163
 Contrasted with the illustrated history of the Eastern Front war published a 
few years later by Carell in the West, Bergschicker’s volume came much closer to the 
historical truth. 
It was not until the mid-1970s, that a six-volume history on “Germany in World War 
II” presented its causes, events, agents and contexts in a more nuanced way. The six 
volumes published under the direction of Gerhart Hass by the Central Institute for 
History in the Academy of Sciences provided the informed reader with an in-depth 
analysis of the war from a Marxist perspective.
164
 While the narrative neither challenged 
the ruling explanatory paradigm nor the official canon of focal points, it offered glimpses 
into areas of German society which had thus far been ignored by GDR historians. For 
example, in the first volume which reconstructs Hitler’s rule until June 22, 1941 (not, as 
one would expect, until the actual outbreak of the war on September 1, 1939), the authors 
briefly hint at the extent to which (younger) German workers were influenced by fascist 




 Bergschicker, Stalingrad, 28-30. The same pages include Reichenau’s notorious order on the „Behavior 
of the Troops in the East“ (December 10, 1941). 
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relatively sober and rather differentiated multi-volume study became a standard work on 
the Second World War in the GDR, and it even found respect among Western 
historians.
166
Routinely, the series presented the Eastern Front war as the “war of extermination” 
against the Soviet Union. It failed to grasp the synthesis of Hitler’s racial, political-
ideological and military aims and thus offered yet another one-dimensional narrative of 
“Operation Barbarossa” as imperialism’s crusade against the “home of socialism.” It also 
ignored existing (including East German) research on the singular character of the 
planned mass murder of the Jews, as well as on the intricate connection between the 
military campaign against the Soviet Union and the culmination of the anti-Jewish 
policies in genocide. As Jeffrey Herf has demonstrated with regards to the SED’s official 
narrative of antifascism in which the mass murder of the European Jews was marginal, if 
not absent,
167
 the party was well into the 1980s not only dogmatic in its refusal to 
acknowledge the Holocaust, but it also fell well behind the historical research and 
knowledge accumulated by its very own historians. 
The Auschwitz trial of 1963/65, for example, had inspired the publication of the first 
document collection dedicated exclusively to the “crimes of Hitler fascism” against the 
soldiers (not without pointing to the OKW’s “criminal orders”) against civilians, POWs, and partisans. The 
section contains no reference to actions specifically targeted against Jews. Ibid., 70f. A later section on 
“terror and mass murder” is equally unspecific, it mentions „mass executions of humans“ or „terror against 
the civilian population” (even in the case of the massacres in Lemberg, Charkov, Kiew and Babi Jar). 
Cynically, Jews find explicit mention mostly in the enclosed Nazi documents. The “war of extermination” 
was, according to this narrative, directed against the Soviet Union and its citizens. Ibid., 109-134. 
166
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Jews of Germany and Europe.
168
The gruesomely illustrated volume addressed “one of the 
most terrible crimes in human history: the intentional and planned extermination of the 
German and European Jews by the Nazi rulers.” While the authors put the main focus 
(and blame) on the “ruling classes” and saw the Nazi leadership as the real anti-Semitic 
fanatics, the narrative also recalled that the German people was “forced under a mass 
psychosis” by the Nazis – which, however, “in no way minimized the guilt and 
responsibility of every single citizen, who – voluntarily, or under pressure – participated 
in the crimes of the fascists, accepted them or took notice of them without joining the 
front against the Nazi barbarians.”
169
 This is a rare example of a reckoning with Nazism’s 
popular support in the GDR; moreover, the narrative even stressed that the Jewish mass 
murder was beyond the imperialist goals of the German monopoly capital: “In this case, 
murder had the primate over exploitation.”
170
 Curiously, the military history of World War 
II, and even the historical place of the war on the Eastern Front, remained marginal in this 




 Helmut Eschwege, ed., Kennzeichen J. Bilder, Dokumente, Berichte zur Geschichte der Verbrechen des 
Hitlerfaschismus an den deutschen Juden 1933-1945 (with a preface by Arnold Zweig). (Berlin (Ost): 
Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1966).
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Since the mid-1970s, German historians in general started to deal more intensely 
with the nature of fascism and the role of anti-Semitism in Nazi ideology. In the GDR, 
Kurt Pätzold’s important works on the treatment of Jews in the Third Reich 
acknowledged, on the one hand, the singularity of the Jewish fate, but on the other hand 
declared Hitler’s anti-Semitic program a tool of “strategy and tactics of fascist German 
imperialism.”
172
 His “analysis of the structure and history of fascist racial anti-Semitism” 
concluded that the “Nazi leaders employed their theory of an ‘Aryan master race’ and the 
‘Jewish Untermenschentum’ primarily in the political fights in Germany.” For Pätzold, 
whose books represented the first attempts to write a modern Marxist-Leninist history of 
anti-Semitism and of the Nazis’ anti-Jewish measures and crimes between 1933 and 
1945, the “racial doctrine was a fighting instrument” not against the Jews but “against the 
German working class.”
173
An important aspect which remained largely untouched by GDR historiography was 
the question of mass support for National Socialism and the degree of complacency and 
complicity of ordinary Germans, civilians within the Third Reich as well as soldiers at 
the fronts of World War II.
174
 Probing these questions would have meant to cross the 
officially set boundaries for historical discourse in the GDR. Since the SED based its 
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legitimacy on the claim to be the leader of the German “working class,” it had no interest 
to confront the significant support Hitler had received from this section of German 
society. Equally, it was of no use to identify the thousands and thousands of ordinary 
soldiers who participated in war crimes committed in the course of Hitler’s war of 
extermination in the Soviet Union. Thus, despite its prominent place in the SED’s overall 
scheme of recent history, the history of the Eastern Front as it was reconstructed and 
remembered in the GDR – officially and in historical works – remained nebulous. Instead 
of taking a sincere interest in the events of the past, which would require freedom of 
speech and thought, as well as the willingness to confront causes, agents and 
consequences of these events, the official politics of history and memory in the GDR 
took an ideology-driven and thus highly selective interest in the past. Rather than 
inquiring the past for what it was, the SED was concerned with exploiting it for what it is
– or for what it could potentially be in the every-day Cold War against “German 
imperialism.” Thus, the “administered past” (Martin Sabrow) was “frozen” (Forzen Judt) 
in an official narrative and appropriated to the present as legitimizing “warning” and “ 
historical lesson,” as emotionalizing “admonition” or mobilizing “legacy.” Well into the 
1960s, East German historians systematically explored and exploited the war against the 
Soviet Union as a “weapon” and directed it against their West German colleagues and the 
Federal Republic with the declared goal to “prevent” history from being repeated. 
As my analysis of East German historiography on World War II has demonstrated, in 
many areas professional historians resonated and reinforced the SED’s official narratives. 
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The historical profession and the SED’s politics of memory operated in the same gear. 
Both agreed that history was a “sharp ideological weapon”
175
 (Ulbricht), and that politics 
and historiography are “inseparably bound to each other.”
176
 Yet, since the 1970s, 
historical research on the Nazi past became increasingly diverse and less regulated, 
gaining intellectual space and analytical depth. Especially, research on the nexus between 
the anti-Jewish policies and the Nazi plans to exploit and enslave Eastern Europe, as well 
as internationally acknowledged studies of the economic aspects of Hitler’s Eastern 
campaign for “living space” and studies of the occupation regimes eroded the one-
dimensional, Hegelian view of the Nazi era and World War II as the mere background for 
a “Great Patriotic War” of the Soviet Union forging the triumph of liberating socialism.
Ulbricht, Honecker and other leading SED officials, however, largely ignored these 
politically and ideologically inconvenient results of the research they themselves had 
initiated by decree. As the last chapter will demonstrate, the SED’s official Eastern Front 
memory remained formulaic and faithful to the master narrative crafted by the East 
German communists around Ulbricht – the historian-politician and as Eastern Front 
veteran both witness and writer of history – upon their return to defeated Germany. In the 
Federal Republic, chancellors Erhard, Brandt, Schmidt and Kohl, increasingly forced to 
confront their (private and) public reflections on the Eastern Front war with the emerging 
critical historical scholarship, communicated a more differentiating memory of the 
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German-Soviet war. Given the diversity of their biographical backgrounds, the narratives 
these chancellors forged contributed from varying perspectives to a more “empathic 
understanding of historical truth,”
177
 namely by gradually including Germany’s many 
“other” victims in the official discourse about the Nazi past. 
177
 This is Dirk van Laak’s aptly phrased summary of the transformations in the “public use of history” and 
the changing views of the non-German victims of Nazism. since the 1960s. The realization of the necessity 
to „speak the historical truth“ was according to him a crucial precondition for „forgiveness and social 
peace“ emerging in FRG society since the 1970s. See his „Widerstand gegen die Geschichtsgewalt. Zur 




The Past Revisited: The Eastern Front Memory in the Era of Détente 
and “Late Socialism”
“The most important lesson of World War II is to prevent a new war, 
to fight against it before the weapons speak.”
Erich Honecker (1985)
“I always had a good personal relationship to Brezhnev ...; it probably rested on the fact that we both had 
experienced the war directly as soldiers. One knew each other’s war experiences because we had talked 
about them; we knew from each other that we both hated the war, and not just I feared a new war, but 
Brezhnev too. Brezhnev was no enemy but a respected opponent whom I understood on a human level.”
Helmut Schmidt (1996)
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I. The Politics of Memory from Ulbricht to Honecker
June 22, 1941, a key date in World War II history, was also a date which left its mark 
on individual biographies. The protagonists of this chapter – the political leaders in East 
and West Germany during the last two Cold War decades –remembered the invasion of 
the Soviet Union both as turning point in world history and as an unforgettable moment 
in their own personal histories. In their writings and speeches one can find differing 
recollections of that day, some of which recorded in the immediate aftermath of the war 
and thus laden with the vehemence of an eye-witness account, and some of which written 
many years later and thus clearly infused with political calculation and references to 
contemporary concerns. Walter Ulbricht (1893-1973), the later Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt (born 1918) and Federal Presidents Walter Scheel (born 1919) and Richard von 
Weizsäcker (born 1920) personally experienced the war against the Soviet Union: 
Ulbricht, back then already in his fifties, as antifascist front agitator on the Soviet side, 
Schmidt, Scheel and von Weizsäcker as Wehrmacht soldiers in their early twenties. The 
young communist youth leader Erich Honecker (1912-1994) spent most of the Nazi years 
in a prison in Brandenburg-Görden outside Berlin, while later Chancellor Kurt-Georg 
Kiesinger (1904-1988), a member of the Nazi Party between 1933 and 1945, served in 
the radio division in Ribbentrop’s Foreign Ministry. Willy Brandt (1913-1992), the first 
social democratic chancellor of the FRG, fled Germany in 1933 as young historian and 
journalist, was expatriated in 1938, and fought in the Norwegian resistance movement. 
Federal President Gustav Heinemann (1899-1976) had joined a domestic anti-Nazi 
movement, the Bekennende Kirche in the 1930s, and remained a critical pacifist 
protestant throughout his political career. Finally, Chancellor Helmut Kohl (born 1930) 
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owed his biography to what he called the “mercy of late birth.” He was the first West 
German leader to be born late enough to evade becoming a possible accomplice of the 
Nazi regime or having to fight a war in the name of National Socialism. 
This last chapter returns to the political memory of the Eastern Front war and to the 
public speeches, statements and announcements which communicated a largely 
unchanging view in the GDR and a gradually changing official (and popular) memory in 
the Federal Republic. It is important to keep in mind that these political memories did not 
only represent official rhetoric or mere calculated invocations of a politically and 
ideologically tailored past but to varying degrees they were also texts inspired by and 
reflecting on diverse individual biographies. Yet, political memory is political because it 
relates the past to the present, drawing certain historical “lessons” and applying them on 
the political needs of the day. Further, it is shaped not only by the past events it recollects 
but by the present as well. As the previous chapter illustrated, the 1960s constituted a 
decade of transition and even erosion of the Eastern Front memory in the West, while in 
the GDR this decade saw the beginning of Ulbricht’s end and the rise of “real existing 
socialism” under Erich Honecker. However, the intensified judicial as well as scholarly 
reckonings with the criminal legacies of the Eastern Front on neither side prompted a 
swift correction of official references to the realties of the war against the Soviet Union. 
Rather the process of “internalizing” (Lepsius)  the Nazi past in the West took another 
two decades or so, while Honecker’s politics of memory reinforced the master narrative 
of the Ulbricht years – albeit with significantly less enthusiasm and care for historical 
details such as the sufferings of the Soviet population or the activities of the NKFD. 
Eventually, just as the SED’s ideology of antifascism, the official memory of the war 
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against the Soviet Union under Honecker became formulaic and, as the following 
paragraphs illustrate, creating no more than a petty caricature of the unprecedented 
historical event it claimed to represent.
Ulbricht was a veteran of the Eastern Front war, Honecker was not. One should not 
overstate these biographical facts but this difference undoubtedly shaped either man’s 
way of looking at the history of this war. Ulbricht presented himself not only as veteran 
of the antifascist resistance, as fighter on the victor’s side but committed much time and 
energy to preserving this part of his biography as lasting contribution to the historical 
triumph of socialism over fascism. During the last decade of his regime, Ulbricht 
elaborately commemorated the twentieth anniversary of the battle of Stalingrad and the 
founding of the NKFD in 1943, arguably the one and only meaningful anti-Hitler
organization rooting in the German-Soviet antifascist cooperation in the East. Further, he 
personally chaired and coordinated a group of historians and leading party comrades 
writing an eight-volume history of the German workers movement in 1965. The detailed 
minutes of these meetings will be briefly discussed below for they represent a superb 
source for the reconstruction of Ulbricht’s personal view of the war against the Soviet 
Union. In 1966, he once again assured that the twenty-fifth anniversary of the beginning 
of “Operation Barbarossa” was remembered properly in the GDR. In 1971, Honecker’s 
takeover inaugurated a new era of the official Eastern Front memory, one much less 
inspired and influenced by personal attachment to the events. Unlike Ulbricht who had 
long utilized the memory of the war against the Soviet Union to propagate an impending 
repetition of “Barbarossa,” Honecker generalized the “lessons” to be drawn from the past 
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and never directly invoked the historical analogy of June 22, 1941. In his time, the 
socialist camp was threatened by (nuclear-armed) imperialism at present, and the war in 
general came to serve as a warning never to repeat history.
Ulbricht was in Moscow on June 22, 1941 which lent him the authority of the eye-
witness and the aura of an antifascist of the first hour. He could thus later be hailed as the 
“voice and conscience of the nation.”
1
 According to his personal diary he had learned the 
“terrible news that Hitler’s armies have started the attack against the Soviet Union” in the 
early morning hours of that day. His first thoughts went out to the “German working class 
who had proven incapable of thwarting Hitler fascism’s war preparations and [incapable] 
of preventing the invasion of the land of socialism. That was the worst part.”
2
 This failure 
troubled him throughout the remainder of the war. In one of his autobiographical texts, he 
recalled talking to newly captured German POWs in Stalingrad in late 1942, asking them 
What are you as a worker doing here in the steppe of Stalingrad? Why are you fighting against the 
socialist Soviet Union? Why are you killing Russian workers and peasants ... Goebbels has promised 
you the set lunch table. You are looking for the set table here on the Volga River. Don’t you realize 
that Hitler has baited you against the Soviet people so you won’t realize who is exploiting you and who 
is abusing you?
3
Already then the exculpatory depiction of the deluded German working class was an 
integral part of the communist explanation for Hitler’s rise to power and ability to wage 
global war. In a radio address four days after the invasion had started, Ulbricht reiterated 
1
Neues Deutschland, June 17, 1961, Beilage 24, 3.
2
 Quoted under the catchy title „Voice and Conscience of the Nation“ in Neues Deutschland, June 17, 1961, 
Beilage 24, 3. See also Ulbricht’s autobiographical notes which were the basis of the quote in Neues 
Deutschland. Ulbricht, Zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung 1933-1945. Aus Reden und 
Aufsätzen, vol. 2: 1933-1946, 258ff. The section on „World War II, 1939-1941“ begins directly with the 
attack on June 22, 1939. He described here also how shocked he was to speak to German soldiers fully 
convinced of the success of “Operation Barbarossa,” and fully indoctrinated with National Socialist slogans 
about the inferiority of the Slavs.
3
 Ulbricht, „Voice and Conscience of the Nation“ in Neues Deutschland, June 17, 1961, Beilage 24, 3.
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that it were “Hitler and [industrialist Alfried] Krupp, Göring and [industrialist Friedrich] 
Flick” who had “driven the German people into a shameful war against the Soviet Union, 
against the Soviet people who always felt connected to the working people of Germany 
through friendship.” And, wholeheartedly neglecting National Socialism’s popular 
support basis, he claimed that Hitler was chasing German soldiers into this war “without 
ever having asked one worker or one farmer.”
4
 Victimized and blinded like that, Ulbricht 
agreed with Khrushchev with whom he had spent Christmas 1942 in Stalingrad, that 
Germans would give up only after they were defeated and imprisoned.
5
 It was Stalingrad 
which signaled this turning point because the catastrophe inspired the founding of the 
NKFD among imprisoned German officers and soldiers in 1943. Ulbricht played a key-
role in organizing this movement. In 1963 he praised the “German anti-Hitler-coalition” 
as an “important national and international event in the history of World War II. “They,” 
including himself, “fought courageously against Nazism,” Ulbricht summarized the 
ultimately futile attempts to turn the majority of the German people against Hitler. 
Drawing a direct line from the united-front efforts of German wartime-communism to the 
“antifascist” SED-regime in the GDR, he once again used the opportunity to claim that in 
one half of Germany “imperialism has been rooted out.”
6
 To Ulbricht, the NKFD was so 
4
 Walter Ulbricht, „Was lehrt das Verhältnis zwischen Deutschland und der Sowjetunion in den letzten 24 
Jahren. Rundfunkansprache [Moscow-based German radio], 26. Juni 1941,“ printed in Ulbricht, 
Ausgewählte Reden und Aufsätze, 72-75, quote on 72.
5
 Ulbricht, „Voice and Conscience of the Nation“ in Neues Deutschland, June 17, 1961, Beilage 24, 3. 
6
 Walter Ulbricht, „Sie kämpften mutig gegen den Nazismus. Aus der Rede zum 20. Jahrestag der 
Gründung des Nationalkomitees ‚Freies Deutschland,’ 12. Juli 1963,“ printed in Ulbricht, Ausgewählte 
Reden und Aufsätze, 259-267, quote on 267. The speech also appeared in Mitteilungsblatt der 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft ehemaliger Offiziere, 8, 1963.
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central that its founding amidst the ashes of Stalingrad could be presented as the “end of 
the night of fascism.”
7
The prominent role of the NKFD in Ulbricht’s Eastern Front memory faded under 
Honecker, most obviously because the latter could not draw any personal authority from 
it. Ulbricht’s conception of remembering history, moreover, included writing it. To him 
“historical truth” was a “weapon” wisely and efficiently to be used in the ongoing class 
struggle.
8
 In 1965, he therefore chaired an “authors collective” to write an eight-volume 
history of the German workers movement, the fifth volume of which dealt with the Nazi 
years and World War II. This series was published as part of a concerted effort to raise 
the historical, socialist and national consciousness among GDR citizens, an effort from 
which the SED-regime hoped to (re-)gain stability after the series of crises that had 
culminated in the building of the wall in 1961.
9
 Next to prominent historians such as 
Albert Schreiner (1892-1979, emeritus of Leipzig University and former leading historian 
at the National Museum for German History) and Lothar Berthold (born 1926, head of 
the division “History of the German Workers Movement” at the ZK’s Institute for 
Marxism-Leninism), Ulbricht gathered party comrades such as Kurt Hager, head of the 
Politburo’s Ideological Commission, and the long-time mayor of East Berlin and former 
president of the DSF, Friedrich Ebert, around him. The former chair of the by then 
prohibited West German KPD, Max Reimann, was also a member of the “authors 
7
 „Wie vor 30 Jahren die Nacht des Faschismus hereinbrach und wie sie endete. Es begann mit 
Feuerbränden [the fire of the Reichstag 1933]. Das Ende der Brandstifter vor 20 Jahren: Schlacht an der 
Wolga – Wende zum Sieg der Wolga,“ in Neues Deutschland, January 30, 1963, 5.
8
 Thoms, Walter Ulbricht, 295f. See also my discussion of his activities as “historian” in Chapter 5. I.
9
 Werner Tschannerl, “Die SED-Führung und der ‘Grundriß der Geschichte des deutsche Volkes,’“ in 
Martin Sabrow, Peter Th, Walter, eds., Historische Forschung und sozialistische Diktatur. Beiträge zur 
Geschichtswissenschaft der DDR (Leipzig: Universitätsverlag, 1995), 110-118.
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collective.” The minutes of these meetings are revealing in several respects not least 
because they allow a glimpse into the making of the communist master narrative in East 
Germany. More than just for the purpose of political propaganda, this commission 
literally set down to negotiate how history was to be recorded – what stories to tell, what 
parts to ignore – and in which way it was to be presented to the East German public. 
A good example of Ulbricht mingling his personal memories with the writing of 
official history was his reference to the indoctrination of the Wehrmacht in the course of 
these historical negotiations in the Politburo. During a debate the commission had about a 
passage in the draft dealing with the National Socialist influence on the military after 
1933, and in particular the Röhm putsch in 1934, Ulbricht intervened 
Walter U l b r i c h t: ‘It is too complicated to explain the issue with Röhm and the Reichswehr 
comprehensively. I will say quite openly that it played an important role altogether because the 
leadership of the Reichswehr capitulated and succumbed themselves [selber kapitulierte und sich 
gleichschaltete], so that they stood on the ground of the Hitlerite imperialist policy. There were still 
significant differences with the leadership of the Reichswehr.’
(Albert Schreiner: ‘But not between Hitler and the Reichswehr!’)
[Ulbricht:] ‘We shouldn’t stress that so much. That is not true. I have talked to Paulus and asked him 
how German generals could run after such maniacs. He said: They gave us the most modern weapons 
that we needed, they gave us a military goal [Kriegsziel] and such great influence on the masses the 
military had never had before. That’s why we agreed.’
(Friedrich Ebert: ‘But Röhm was against it.’)
[Ulbricht:] ‘We would say Röhm was a sectarian. ... So let’s leave it as it is.’
10
In the then following discussion about the ideological outlook of the Nazi regime, 
Ulbricht’s and Hager’s considerations illustrate how the focus on the Soviet Union (and 
Hitler’s war against it) shaped their overall analysis of Nazi ideology. The in their view 
10
 Lothar Berthold, „Stenographische Niederschrift der Beratung der Arbeitsgruppe zur Ausarbeitung der 
dreibändigen [sic] Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung im Hause des ZK, Sitzungssaal Politbüro, 
am Donnerstag, dem 4.2.1965, Beginn: 10 Uhr,“ BA/SAPMO, DY30 IV A2/2.024/59, fiche 1,  43f. The 
title somewhat misleadingly refers to the fact that in this particular session three volumes of the eight were 
discussed. – Ulbricht had know Paulus as POW and had met with him before his release in 1953.
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ultimate outcome of the regime’s “living space” program – the invasion and conquest of 
the Soviet Union – determined the interpretation of the ideological path leading up to it:
U l b r i c h t: ‘I want to begin with page 76, the second paragraph which reads: “One of the decisive 
elements of the fascist ideology was the barbarian race theory ...” This account runs until page 77. That 
is too schematic here. The overall [Nazi] conception is not being explained consistently on these two 
pages. For that reason the “people without space” [“Volk ohne Raum”] is mentioned only on page 77. 
But the second paragraph on page 76 has to begin with the call for living-space. That was the starting 
point. With that they deceived some of the unemployed. There one must demonstrate the identity of the 
standpoint of the monopoly capital’s interests with the broad masses who thought that only more 
living-space would secure better living conditions. Then the demagogy was effective. The racial hate 
campaign is only the next step. It [the narrative] has thus to start with living-space, with “people 
without space” and so on, with the concurrence of the interests of the expansionist monopoly capital 
and the Hitler administration, how they deceived the masses with it. Then only comes the race story 
[Rassengeschichte]. 
H a g e r: ‘... Living-space was also connected with an incredible national demagogy. The old 
propaganda against the Treaty of Versailles was continued, then [followed] the propaganda of 
“German greatness.”’
U l b r i c h t: ‘Here it must also be said that the race hatred also served the purpose of diverting the 
attention of the masses away from the fight against the plutocrats. Earlier they formulated the fight 
against the plutocrats and they have now turned to the Jews. One must mention the two sides.’
11
According to this interpretation, anti-Sovietism had inspired the “living space” program 
and was the gist of Nazi ideology, not racial anti-Semitism. The view of Hitler’s anti-
Jewish propaganda (and ultimately policies, too) as mere tools of the fascist crusade 
against socialism was concurrently elaborated and sustained in the mainstream 
historiography on the subject in the GDR.
12
 Thus, “Operation Barbarossa” was the most 
monstrous crime in human history, not the Holocaust carried out under the guise of this 
“Operation.” The discussion then interestingly turned to the degree of popular support for 
the Nazi regime right before the invasion of the Soviet Union. Hager cautioned that the 
relatively prominently discussed antifascist fight within Germany overstated the case and 
brushed over the fact that there was “quite broad approval” of the attack against the 




Most importantly in the works of Kurt Pätzold, cf. chapter 10. III.
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Hager stated, the “ideology the Nazis had successfully disseminated among the 
population.” Kurt Hager (1912-1998) was an experienced KPD veteran and antifascist 
fighter (he was among the activists who interrupted Hitler’s first radio speech in 1933) 
who had been repeatedly incarcerated during the Nazi period before he was able to 
escape to England. He, just as Ulbricht, based his comments on his very personal 
memories and observations. He criticized that the draft text made no mention of the fact 
that “a not insignificant part of the population supported the acts against the Jews. That is 
not in here. Here they only talk about unease, acts of help, ect.” To Hager, this “didn’t 
reflect the actual situation.” So,
[only if] we get these problems straight, then we can answer the question what kind of situation we 
really had when the war broke out, and in particular when the attack against the Soviet Union started 
and how great parts of the population have behaved in it. ... Later, no one wanted to have known about 
it but, of course, everyone knew.
13
The actual war against the Soviet Union was most controversial with regards to its 
outbreak and Stalin’s role in it. It was Hager who raised the question whether “one should 
mention the many warnings which were given in advance and which were ignored by the 
statesmen.” Ulbricht responded: “That is a difficult question. The fact is that the Soviet 
government had received information a) from its secret service, b) during the night of the 
attack from deserters. That is mentioned on page 66.” He then continued in a rather 
sloppy tone: “The joke is that Stalin didn’t react,” and added “this must not happen 
again.” Obviously aware of the delicacy of the subject, Ulbricht suggested to simply copy 






 In a similar way, the disputants discussed how to correctly evaluate the battle of 
Stalingrad as historical turning point. Historian Schreiner cautioned that one might write 
that “it wasn’t the turn of the war, but that the ideology of invincibility had taken a heavy 
blow.” Yet to Ulbricht, “this wasn’t enough.” He suggested once again to “take the 
wording from that [Soviet] book about the Great Patriotic War” to which someone in the 
round responded, “the discussed passage [already] comes from there.”
15
 With that the 
“dispute” was settled.
Little dispute arose with regards to the few pages dedicated to the realities of 
Wehrmacht warfare on the Eastern Front, the mass murder, enslavement and torture of 
“Soviet citizens,” Jews included. As so often, writing the history of the Eastern Front was 
first and foremost a matter of recalling the antifascist fight alongside the heroic Red 
Army; life and death under German occupation remained a secondary issue, the 
Holocaust played a marginal role and the question of individual responsibility for war 
crimes was left out altogether.
16




 Ibid., 75f. The book they were referring to was a contemporary Soviet standard on the subject: 
Geschichte des Großen Vaterländischen Krieges der Sowjetunion, ed. Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus 
beim Zentralkomitee der Kommunistischen Partei der Sowjetunion; German edition by Hans Gossens, 
Walter Bartel, et. al., 6 vols (Berlin (Ost): Militärverlag, 1962-1968), here especially vols. 2-4 (covering the 
war in the Soviet Union). Curisously, the German edition of this master narrative was significantly altered; 
the SED was particularly unsatisfied with the “sections on the German antifascist fight,” the “analysis of 
the role of the monopoly capital” and also wished to correct or add some details on “the preparation and 
execution of the fascist aggression.” An “authors collective” in the GDR’s Ministry of Defense (among 
them Professor Walter Bartel of Humboldt University and the later famous Bismarck-biographer Ernst 
Engelberg) worked in revisions and additions, so that the first volume could appear in 1962, occasioning 
the 45
th
 anniversary of the “Great Socialist October Revolution.” Remarkably, the commission’s official 
report to the SED-Politburo (Hager) complained that „often imprecise and partly wrong information in the 
Soviet edition” complicated and slowed down the editorial work. See the memo to Kurt Hager, “Bericht 
über die Arbeit am ersten Band der ‘Geschichte des Großen Vaterländischen Krieges der Sowjetunion, 
1941-1945’” [unsigned, undated, ca. 1963]. BA/SAPMO, DY 30 IV A2/2.024/4, fiche 1, 64-66.
16
 For a detailed discussion of these sections of the book see Chapter 5.I.
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communist escaped Nazi internment in 1941 and emigrated to the US, made a general, 
unusually bold remark addressing this issue. He felt that the description of the 
“exploitation of POWs and prisoners in the concentration camps” was very “pale” 
(“blaß”). He “somewhat missed the partisanship of language” warning that if the “writer 
is not outraged himself about [the crimes], then he also cannot convey this to a reader 
who reads something like that today.” Schreiner criticized that the narrative was far from 
purveying a sense of “indictment of the barbarism in Nazi warfare.” In the course of his 
intervention, Schreiner got carried away and added with vehemence:
There are only dry numbers here. In my view, this is where the passion of language would be in place. 
In any case, the barbarism of German warfare also outside the camps is not treated sufficiently. The 
entire policy of extermination, German imperialism’s planned policy of extermination namely in 
Poland and the Soviet Union, is described here very unsatisfactory or not at all.
17
Schreiner hastened to add to this radical critique a sentence on the necessity to further 
detail the antifascist struggle in the camps as if to attenuate his comments. And Ulbricht
who was next to speak, picked up only this last sentence – “that is very right,” – before 
hastily moving on “to another question.”
18
 Rendering no further discussion, it is unlikely 
that Schreiner’s critique significantly altered the tone and content of the original draft.
The above-cited passages from the discussions in the “authors collective” chaired by 
Ulbricht may suffice to illustrate that under his leadership the SED’s politics of memory 
included more than propaganda, mass agitation, media campaigns and academic agenda-
setting. The Eastern Front war assumed its central role in the official memory of World 
War II because Ulbricht had a personal stake in it: he perceived himself as witness, 
17
 Lothar Berthold, „Stenographische Niederschrift der Beratung der Arbeitsgruppe zur Ausarbeitung der 





veteran and historian of this war. Yet, even though he remained completely faithful to the 
Soviet-centered memory of the Second World War, his policies of economic reform and 
experimentation regarding the German question during the last decade of his rule, 
alienated Ulbricht from Moscow and furthered the ascend of his successor Erich 
Honecker.
19
 Upon taking office, this young, efficient and experienced party bureaucrat 
(re-)assured Leonid Brezhnev of the GDR’s sense of alliance with the “motherland of 
socialism.” Moreover, he also fully succumbed his personal memories as well as his 
officially communicated view of recent German history to the Soviet master narrative.  
To young Erich Honecker, June 22, 1941 was not a day of concern about the horrors 
to come in the war of ideologies waged by Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union but –
at least according to his published memoirs – a moment of truth and resolve. By then 
serving his sixth year in a Nazi concentration camp, Honecker soberly recalled his 
thoughts upon receiving the news of the invasion in KZ Brandenburg-Görden:
The treacherous attack of Hitlergermany against the first socialist state of the world on June 22, 1941 
and the advance of the Wehrmacht to the gates of Moscow and Leningrad greatly agitated us. During 
long conversations we sought to make out the reasons. One thing was clear to me from the very first 
day: The socialist Soviet power would smash the audacious fascist German imperialism. I was deeply 
convinced that the Soviet people would never succumb to the aggressor. In 1930/31, [during a stay] in 
Moscow and Magnitogorsk, I had gotten to know their enthusiasm, their creative energy and their 
unruly will to cope with everything, even with the greatest difficulties. This and the grandiose 
industrial potential of the USSR reassured me that the Soviet people would also pass the acid test of 
war and would drive the fascists out of their country.
20
19
 Cf. Monika Kaiser, Machtwechsel von Ulbricht zu Honecker: Funktionsmechanismen der SED-Diktatur 
in Konfliktsituationen 1962 bis 1972 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1997) and idem, „Reforming Socialism? 
The Changing of the Guard from Ulbricht to Honecker during the 1960s,“ in Konrad Jarausch, ed., 
Dictatorship as Experience. Towards a Socio-Cultural History of the GDR (New York: Berghahn, 1999), 
325-339.
20
 Erich Honecker, Aus meinem Leben (Berlin (Ost): Dietz, 1980), 100.
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The reference to his one-year-long stay at a Comintern school in Moscow and 
Magnitogorsk in 1930/31
21
 is the only piece in his biography which connected Honecker
personally and historically to the Soviet Union and he used it here to underline his 
farsighted confidence in socialism’s ultimate triumph over fascism at the outset of 
“Operation Barbarossa.” Further references to events on the Eastern Front are scarce in 
his memoirs and serve to illustrate the inevitably victorious cause of the Red Army 
(“prison guards returning from the Eastern Front reported how much the partisans 
troubled the fascists in the occupied territories”
22
). Neither the Holocaust nor the mass 
murder and enslavement of the Soviet population were part of his personal memory of 
these years. Rather he recalled the perils of torture and forced labor as Nazi prisoner, the 
destructive force of Allied air raids and awaiting news of the Red Army’s liberating 
advance into Eastern Germany.
23
Accordingly, Honecker’s ex officio announcements commemorating the war 
against the Soviet Union focused almost exclusively on its victorious outcome while 
leaving the realities of this war largely unmentioned. More than under Ulbricht, 
Honecker’s Eastern Front memory was cherished much more for its message than for it’s 
content. “The lessons of the past were drawn forever” was the title of Honecker’s first 
21
 In an rhapsodizing tone rather not typical of the stiff SED-chief, he recalled his fascination with the “land 
of Lenin:” „To me the land of Lenin was my fatherland, his party my party, his youth organization my 
youth organization. In the Red Army soldiers […], albeit total strangers to me personally, I saw my 
brothers and comrades. I wanted to hug them and to kiss them like it is Russian custom because they 
represented the land of the workers and farmers, because they wore the red star on their hats which was also 
the emblem of the KPD. This star I had dearly cherished already as a child. It gleamed into the future.” 
Ibid., 36. While attending classes at the Comintern school, Honecker shared a room with Anton 
Ackermann, during the war a member of the Group Ulbricht in Moscow, and later candidate of the SED 






statement on the June 22, 1941 anniversary in 1971 shortly after he had succeeded 
Ulbricht as first secretary of the SED’s ZK.
24
 Assuring the Soviet leadership of the SED’s 
“firm and unbreakable friendship,” the new leader declared that with the “brutal attempt 
to destroy the socialist system in the USSR and to erect a fascist order in Europe, German 
imperialism and militarism [had] committed the severest crime against humanity.” Yet, 
eventually this crusade offered the Soviet Union with the possibility to “demonstrate 
convincingly” it’s “decisive role in the defeat of Hitler fascism;” the Great Patriotic war 
was a “glowing example for the antifascist liberation fight of the nations:”
Under great sacrifices, bearing the main burden of the struggle against Hitler fascism, the peoples of 
the Soviet Union achieved a historical victory which led to a fundamental turn in the history of Europe 
and to a decisive shift in the global power relations. The destruction of Hitler fascism offered the 
historical chance to create truly democratic conditions on German soil as well. With the foundation of 
the German Democratic Republic this chance was used. Once and for all, the historical lessons of the 
disastrous past were drawn ....
25
This was the quintessence of the still valid master narrative of the Eastern Front war 
as the crucible of the socialist revolution in East Germany. Germany’s defeat in World 
War II was transformed into a victory of the international working class, and the socialist 
GDR was the material embodiment of the historical lessons learned. Yet, unlike Ulbricht, 
Honecker’s Eastern Front memory served not as vehicle for bold historical analogies 
intended to explain and justify certain political decisions, it became rather an ever more 
general part of the World War II memory in the 1970s and 1980s. The historical 
propaganda under Honecker used the Eastern Front as one theme among others to 
24
 „Die Lehren der Vergangenheit wurde für immer gezogen,“ Neues Deutschland, June 22, 1971, 1. The 
statement was signed by Honecker, Ulbricht – who formally remained in power as head of the GDR’s state 




reaffirm the alliance with the Soviet Union. In 1971, in the wake of Willy Brandt’s 
Ostpolitik which resulted in a series of treaties between West Germany, Poland, the 
USSR and the GDR, invoking the past for present political purposes was thus a much less 
concrete undertaking. It was no longer about actually preventing “another Barbarossa” or 
preparing for another “Day X.” Rather, in the words of GDR Foreign Minister Otto 
Winzer, it was about confessing that the “alliance with the USSR as the liberator of the 
German people” was the “most important lesson of June 22, 1941.”
26
 To learn from it 
meant “not to underestimate the revanchism and militarism” of the West German kind 
and “to prevent the tragedy from happening again” by securing “a lasting peace.” His 
colleague, Defense Minister Heinz Hoffmann, warned that “highest alertness” was still 
necessary for the “scars of war [were] still visible.” He claimed that the “same forces that 
had attacked the Soviet Union 30 years ago … have grown once again to a looming 
danger in the Bonn state.” Thus the “lessons of the fascist attack are still highly 
relevant.”
27
 Straightly contradicting the still upheld claim that the capitalist FRG 
represented a threat to peace, Winzer nonetheless praised the Ostverträge as contribution 
to “an easing of tensions in Europe” and claimed that “from the perspective of June 22, 
1941 their ratification [was] a political-moral obligation whose fulfillment concurs with 
the peaceful interests of the people in the FRG.”
28
26
 Otto Winzer, „Unser Bündnis mit der UdSSR – wichtigste Lehre des 22. Juni 1941“, Neues Deutschland, 
June 22, 1971, 3. 
27
 Heinz Hoffmann, „Höchste Wachsamkeit ist geboten,“ Neues Deutschland, June 22, 1971, 3.
28
 Otto Winzer, „Unser Bündnis mit der UdSSR – wichtigste Lehre des 22. Juni 1941“, Neues Deutschland, 
June 22, 1971, 3.
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The insubstantiality of these invocations can also be discerned with regards to the 
way specific events of the Eastern Front war were recalled. Official statements paid little 
to no attention to the fate of the civilian population, to the Wehrmacht’s warfare, to the 
systematic killing of Jews, “partisans”, Soviet POWs, and commissars. A 
commemorative article in June 1981 contained a table listing “forces and means 
employed during the war” by the Soviet and German military forces including “humans,” 
without naming casualty numbers – not even military casualties. In contrast to East 
German historiography which by then had produced a number of well-documented works 
on the realities of warfare on the Eastern Front, official memory focused on Hitler’s lie of 
fighting a “preventive war,” on “Blitzkrieg-dreams” shattered by heroic resistance of the 
Red Army, and on the communist antifascist movement – only the latter was illustrated 
with a bizarre remark on casualties numbers: “three million Soviet communists died in 
the war against fascism. Five million new party members took their place.”
29
 In 1981, for 
the first time, SED propaganda left it to literature, to a little-known poet, to hint at the 
unprecedented brutality of warfare with a clumsy verse:
June 22, 1941 – ‘Barbarossa’
Blinded by the graven image, by the racial delusion of the ‘master-race-world,’
They took off, they wanted to ride ‘towards Eastland’ to conquer foreign land,
Like once the knights with the cross sign on the chest;
But not with sword and epee:
The black cross on tanks and fighting machines
Was the sign with which they fire-spittingly attacked the Soviet land, 
And brought misery, and murder, and death to the peoples of this land,
Which was creating a new world promising peace to all human beings on this earth.
29
 „Unvergänglich sind die Heldentaten des Sowjetvolkes, das die Naziaggressoren vernichtete und das 
Fundament für die längste Friedensperiode in Europe legte,“ Neues Deutschland, June 21-22, 1981, 9. The 
main „historical“ article (including the mentioned table as well as three photographs depicting Red Army 
soldiers, partisan units and a munitions factory under the headline “victory was forged at the front and in 
the rear”) was contributed by the prominent military historian Gerhard Förster. 
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An abundance of victims: 20 million, are they comprehensible?
Certainly as numbers, but each number was a human, was a life
Which had hope, strove forward, towards the beautiful for the people too, for life.
The hell which had been ignited in this country, sparked by humans of my nation.
Can one call them humans, they who acted inhumanly?
Where was the human in the nation who gave the world the geniuses of the classic era,
The masterly works of classical music,
The philosophers of world-changing ideas?
He had escaped the brown marshes, the hot wind of hell
to the world where he could breathe freely. –
The world heard the calls during the night in the Reich of darkness,
But their callers came into the dungeons, into the death camps,
The voices were to fall silent on the scaffold,
So that they never, never again could proclaim the truth to the nation.
But again and ever, ever their call was being heard
In the world, by the enemy and by the friends.
When the Soviet peoples then had gathered their forces,
Their retaliation, the great turn came,
They drove back the hellish creatures with the black cross
Until the point from which they had departed for the great raid without precedent.
On this long, sacrificial path Soviet troops reach the city of Weimar.
Their commander ordered the guardsmen to salute at Goethe’s grave
In the name of his nation.
He knew: that this other, true Germany lived and would live
In good relations with his nation too.
As soon as the waft of mist of the dark worlds were dispelled
And the sun would shine again on our nations.
30
This example of political poetry is interesting in so far as these verses translated the main 
motifs of the political memory of the Eastern Front into a kitschy elegy about the Soviet 
people’s sufferings and triumphs. “They,” the “humans of my nation” who rode 
eastwards to “conquer foreign land,” are never called by what they were; the bizarre hint 
at Christian crusaders belittled, to say the least, the unprecedented nature of the German 
attack. German perpetrators – “hellish creatures” from the “dark worlds” – remained 
obscure beings sent by an evil empire, just as SED-politicians never referred to ordinary 
30
 Olaf Barutzki, „22. Juni 1941 – ‚Barbarossa,’“ Neues Deutschland, June 21-22, 1981, 9. The author was 
a veteran antifascist who was sentenced to death by the Nazis in 1943, then “pardoned” to life in prison and 
liberated by the Soviets in KZ Brandenburg – the same prison Honecker was in. If this is one reason why 
the poem mentioned the tortured “callers” in the dark night of fascism remains unclear. Honecker made no 
mention of Barutzki in his memoirs. 
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Germans, or German soldiers when talking about Nazi crimes committed against and in 
the Soviet Union. Finally, the Soviet Union’s “retaliation” is presented as a tale of 
humanity culminating in the search for the good German in Weimar. The Soviet Army 
made the “sun shine again” over the “other, true Germany.” There, history came to a 
happy end. 
The ludicrous way in which this poem commemorated the misery of war on the
Eastern Front highlights once again how little sincere reckoning with the Nazi attack 
against the Soviet Union the SED’s official, Soviet-oriented antifascist paradigm 
rendered in practise. Far from communicating a genuine concern with the complex events 
taking place in the Soviet Union between 1941 and 1945, SED leaders – and the works of 
art they inspired – created a hollow, ritualized, and in this sense politically and 
ideologically “usable,” Eastern Front memory. Yet, despite the prominence of the subject 
in the SED’s overall “history propaganda,” Honecker himself never gave a major speech 
commemorating the Nazi war against the Soviet Union itself. However, a plethora of 
documents from the relevant propaganda divisions within the SED’s Central Committee 
– instructions, guidelines, memoranda circulated in preparation of historical anniversaries 
– testify to the centrality of the Soviet story in all history-related announcements and 
events.
31
 In accordance with this general line, Honecker routinely included references to 
31
 See for example the instructions prepared by the SED’s ZK Agitation Division, “Über den 30. Jahrestag 
des Sieges über den Faschismus,” [undated, Spring 1975], a canonical 24-pages text on the Soviet Union’s 
leading role not only in World War II, but in the history of the antifascist, liberating class struggle of 
humankind against reactionary forces. In the appendix see the practical instructions, “Vorschlag für
Maßnahmen zur Begehung des 30. Jahrestages der Befreiung,“ as well as the detailed schedule of „Zentrale 
Veranstaltungen zum 30. Jahrestag der Befreiung vom Hitlerfaschismus durch die Sowjetunion“ (the title, 
programmatically, refers only to the Soviets as the liberators). BA/SAPMO, DY 30 vorl. SED/18298. And 
a concurring memorandum from the same divison, “Zu Grundlinien der gegnerischen Propaganda im 
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the Eastern Front in his memorial speeches in the former KZ Brandenburg-Görden where 
he regularly celebrated VE Day.
32
 These references remained mostly very general. He 
granted the Soviet Union with having played the leading role in defeating Hitler. 
Therefore, the GDR had become its eternal friend. But Honecker, curiously, didn’t refer 
specifically to the war against the Soviet Union in a prominent speech until 1985.
33
 The 
Hinblick auf den 30. Jahrestag der Befreiung,“ February 20, 1975, which analyzed the Western attempts at 
„reducing historical truth“ by increasingly questioning the Soviet Union’s decisive contribution to the 
defeat of Hitler, and proposed to enhance the positive propaganda about the USSR in response. 
BA/SAPMO, DY 30 IV 2/2.035/21, fiche 2, 129ff. Similarly, for 1985 see the material deposited in 
BA/SAPMO, DY 30 vorl. SED/35685, including another canonical text codifying the central role of the 
Soviet Union’s contribution to the fight against Nazi Germany, “Aufruf zum 40. Jahrestag des Sieges über 
den Hitlerfaschismus und der Befreiung des deutschen Volkes.” The text upfront mentioned the other 
members of the anti-Hitler-coalition, but stressed “that the Soviet people and its heroic army bore the main 
burden of the fight.” Interesting also a list of TV-programs to be screened around VE Day in 1985: aside 
from several Soviet production and GDR-productions about the antifascist struggle, the list also contained a 
series on the destruction of German cities and the beginning of the occupation period, as well as on the 
“bourgeois resistance.” In 1985, the East German DEFA film studios also screened the documentary “Das 
Jahr 1945,” a depiction of the last weeks of war in 1944/45 based on footage never seen by GDR citizens: 
Allied troops arriving in West Germany (suggesting that it wasn’t only Red Army troops who liberated 
Germany), and the extent of destruction postwar Germany (leaving room for the notion of not only being 
“liberated” but also “defeated” – until then a taboo in East Germany. The film reached a wide audience; in 
the city of Erfurt alone (around 200,000 inhabitants), 60,000 saw it in movie theaters. For details and a list 
of contemporary reviews see http://www.cine-holocaust.de/cgi-bin/gdq?dfw00fbw001722.gd [March 
2007]. On VE Day as political memorial deay in general Kirsch, “Wir haben aus der Geschichte gelernt,” 
esp. 60-70. 
32
 In one instance, Honecker included a reference to the fourtieth anniversary of the beginning of 
“Operation Barbarossa” in an “election speech” in Karl-Marx-City. On June 10, 1981, he spoke about the 
voters’ duty to participate in the Volkskammer elections of that year (starting with the remarkable 
statement: “we all know that this is not a formal election as in a bourgeois society where promises are being 
made upfront only to be broken afterwards. In fact, there one doesn’t need elections if afterwards others 
determine what has to happen anyway, or where the representatives don’t remember their promises”). 
Towards the end of his speech praising the socialist accomplishments of the SED in recent years, Honecker 
reminded his listeners that “the wealth and fortune of nations can grow only in peace.” Invoking the 
fourtieth anniversary of the “day on which Hitlergermany attacked the Soviet Union predatorily,” he vowed 
that “we will never forget what the heroes of the Great Patriotic War have achieved and sacrificed for the 
freedom of the nations. They fought so that such destruction and annihilation may never come again, that 
peace may and always will be.” Erich Honecker, Reden und Aufsätze, vol. 8 (Berlin (Ost): Dietz, 1983), 
202-208, quotes on 202, 206.
33
 I have consulted Honecker’s VE Day speeches and writings between 1965 and 1989 with a focus on 
“Barbarossa” anniversaries in 1966, 1971, 1976, 1981, 1986. Among the texts are “Zum 20. Jahrestag der 
Befreiung vom Hitlerfaschismus,” in Die Arbeit, March 26, 1965. BA/SAPMO, DY 30/2324, fiche 1, 16ff. 
„8. Mai 1945 – historische Wende im Leben der Völker,“ manuscript for Probleme des Friedens und 
Sozialismus, April 1970. BA/SAPMO, DY 30/2324, fiche 1, 77ff. „Für immer mit der Sowjetunion 
verbunden,“ manuscript für Pravda, April 1975. BA/SAPMO, DY 30/2325, fiche 1, 21ff. „DDR fest auf 
598
following three examples thus represent rather lengthy version’s of Honecker’s publicly 
communicated Eastern Front memory and still suffice to illustrate the degree of 
disinterest in the real historical events. Commemorating VE Day in 1985, Honecker 
wrote an article for the SED’s theoretical journal Einheit in which he spent for the first 
time more than one sentence on the history of the Eastern Front. In accompanying 
speeches at KZ Brandenburg-Görden and Torgau (where American and Soviet troops had 
met in the spring of 1945), Honecker also started to stress the contribution of other 
nations to the Anti-Hitler-Coalition, notably the United States.
34
 This must be viewed as 
part of his timely efforts to gain diplomatic recognition by Washington; Honecker is said 
of always having dreamt of an official invitation to the U.S. The concurrent gradual 
inclusion of the Holocaust in the SED’s official memory – the clearest manifestation of 
which was the decision to rebuilt the Synagogue in Berlin on Oranienburger Strasse in 
1988 – was also part of this effort.
35
The year 1985 was a turning point in West German memory of World War II 
inaugurated by Richard von Weizsäcker’s seminal VE Day speech to the Bundestag in 
May 1985. It also marked a shift in the SED’s official memory: it returned to history, it 
started recalling specific facts and events especially with regards to the Eastern Front. In 
dem Weg des Sozialismus. Rede auf der Festveranstaltung zum 30. Jahrestag der Befreiung, 7. Mai 1975,“ 
in Erich Honecker, Reden und Ausätze, vol. 3 (Berlin (Ost): Dietz, 1976), 416-428. Speech manuscript at 
KZ Brandenburg-Görden, April 26, 1980. BA/SAPMO, DY 30/2325, fiche 1, 91ff. „Eine welthistorische 
Tat, die auch das deutsche Volk befreite,“ manuscript for Die Einheit, March 1985. BA/SAPMO, DY 
30/2326, fiche 1, 1ff.
34
 Cf. for example, “Die DDR verkörpert die Ideale des antifaschistischen Kampfes. Rede auf der 
Großkundgebung in Brandenburg anläßlich des 40. Jahrestages der Befreiung,” April 27, 1985. In 
Honecker, Reden und Aufsätze, vol. 10 (Berlin (Ost): Dietz, 1986), 593-597.
35
 Herf, Divided Memory, 363. And Angelika Timm, Hammer, Zirkel, Davidstern: das gestörte Verhältnis 
der DDR zu Zionismus und Staat Israel (Bonn: Bouvier, 1997), 296ff.
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his 1985 VE Day article for Die Einheit, Honecker embedded the attack against the 
Soviet Union into the chronology of World War II, calling it for the first time by its Nazi 
name “Operation Barbarossa” – a “crusade like no other.” After the “brutal conquest” of 
Austria and Czechoslovakia, Hitler started the “criminal attack against Poland and 
enslaved most other European countries.” Finally, in 1941 followed the “realization of 
‘plan Barbarossa,’ the attack against the Soviet Union, a crusade of torched earth like no 
other, aimed at removing the bastion of socialism, the vanguard of human progress.”
36
Yet, like in all official announcements of this kind, the Wehrmacht’s warfare, the 
Holocaust, the mass murder and exploitation of millions of civilians remained 
unspecified. Instead, Honecker pointed out that fascism “fizzled [schmählich scheitern] at 
the power and strength of the Soviet land whose people rose like one man in an 
unprecedented act of heroism.”
37
 It was the victorious historical outcome which counted, 
this remained the main motif in Honecker’s memorial speeches.
Only once before, in May 1980, Honecker in a singular instance paid more detailed 
attention to victim numbers and fates:
The Second World War, which the rapacious German imperialism had launched, was the greatest 
known to human memory. Between 1939 and 1945, 72 states were at war, overall 110 million citizens 
served in armed forces. Four fifths of the world population suffered under the events of war. Had 
World War I cost only ten million people their lives, fifty million died during World War II. Ninety 
million were wounded. The Soviet people alone lost more than twenty million of its sons and daughters 
in this fight which determined humanity’s fate. They perished on the battlefields, were murdered in 
Nazi Germany’s concentration camps or by fascist special commands.
38
36
 „Eine welthistorische Tat, die auch das deutsche Volk befreite,“ manuscript for Die Einheit, March 1985. 




 Erich Honecker, „Wir haben die historische Chance genutzt,“ manuscript for Die Einheit, April 1980. 
BA/SAPMO, DY 30/2325, fiche 1, 109.
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This is the most concrete reference to German war crimes in the Soviet Union in all of 
Honecker’s speeches commemorating World War II. Even in texts addressing a Soviet 
audience he remained rather unspecific as to the kind and scale of sacrifices given by the 
Soviet people during the Great Patriotic War. In an article for Pravda on the occasion of 
VE Day 1985, Honecker duly paid respect to the Soviet Union’s “unparalleled, eternal” 
achievements in the antifascist struggle, this time underscoring the ideological, anti-
Soviet fervor of “Hitler fascism:”
Hitler fascism, the most reactionary and aggressive spawn of German imperialism and militarism, 
started World War II because it longed for world domination. With its attack against the Soviet Union 
it wanted to usurp her raw materials and material resources. With the help of chauvinism, pan-
Germanism, the ideology of the ‘master race’ and the ‘inferior races,’ it kicked of an unparalleled 
project of destruction aimed at removing the Soviet Union as bastion of socialism and peace. This was, 
at the same time, the beginning of its end.
39
Again, this was the only reference to the Eastern Front in the article – a historical 
place on which indeed unparalleled crimes were committed. Yet, during the 1970s and 
1980s, the SED’s official rhetoric never moved beyond the above-quoted statements. 
Similarly, as demonstrated earlier, the propagandistic coverage of “Barbarossa” 
anniversaries in Neues Deutschland became increasingly focused on ritually recalling the 
“lessons of the past” as they fit into the present-day needs of the SED. The past itself 
became ever more remote. 
With regards to Stalingrad and the NKFD, however, two key motifs in Ulbricht’s 
Eastern Front narrative, Honecker was eager to avoid the impression of being remote 
from this crucial past. The antifascist founding narrative of the GDR rested on the 
memory of the communists’ struggle alongside the Red Army, and Honecker too sought 
39
 „Der welthistorische Sieg für den Frieden und eine glückliche Zukunft der Menschheit,“ in Pravda, May 
7, 1985. Printed in Honecker, Reden und Aufsätze, vol. 10, 614-626, quote on 615.
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to cultivate the historical-ideological underpinning of his regime by invoking this legacy. 
Yet, unlike Ulbricht, Honecker was not a veteran of the Eastern Front war; unlike 
Ulbricht, he had not been a witness to the battle of Stalingrad, and had played no part in 
organizing the NKFD behind Eastern Front lines. However, Honecker visited 
Stalingrad/Volgograd twice after the war, once in 1947 as leader of the SED’s youth 
organization FDJ, and again as head of state in 1975 after signing a renewed “treaty of 
friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance” with the USSR in Moscow. On his second 
visit, Honecker gave a speech to workers in the tractor factory “Felix Dzerzhinsky.” Here 
he invoked the “heroic fighters of Stalingrad” as a “shining symbol for the unparalleled 
heroism of the Soviet people.” It was the victory at Stalingrad which “inaugurated a 
fundamental turn in World War II.” The fighters of Stalingrad “had given the highest a 
human being possesses, [one’s] life, for the triumph of humanity over fascist barbarism, 
for the triumph of communism.”
40
40
 „Neue große Perspektiven für unseren Freundschaftsbund. Rede auf einem Meeting [sic!] im 
Wolgograder Traktorenwerk ‚Feliks Dzierzynski,’“ October 13, 1975. In Reden und Aufsätze. Vol. 4, 61-
65, quote on 61. The speech was also published in Neues Deutschland, October 14, 1975. 
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Fig. 13. Commemorating the Heroic Fighters of Stalingrad: Erich Honecker with a delegation of SED and CPSU comrades on 
the Mamai Heights in front of a sculpture “Standing until Death,” October 1975.
41
Honecker thus kept the story of Stalingrad alive: already in 1972, a widely 
disseminated brochure illustrated the extraordinary transformation of the embattled city 
of Stalingrad into Volgograd,
42
 and a decade later the fourtieth anniversary of the battle
prompted a series of official acts of commemoration orchestrated by the DSF.
43
 After all, 
it was the defeat of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad which had enabled German communists 
to recruit captured German soldiers and officers for a formal antifascist organization, the 
41
 BA/SAPMO, Bild Y1, 18-D-2.20.
42
Specht, Stalingrad 1943 - Wolgograd 1972. See Fig. 9.
43
 See the decree „Maßnahmen zur Würdigung des historischen Sieges der Sowjetarmee in der Stalingrader 
Schlacht“ by the DSF chairing committee, December 15, 1982. BA/SAPMO DY32/10743, 1-3. The 
„measures“ proposed – among other things a central commemorative ceremony on January 18, 1943 in the 
DSF’s central house in Berlin and a number of papers on the “meaning and current lessons of Stalingrad” –
were presented as the DSF’s contribution to the Karl-Marx-Year which the SED celebrated throughout the 
GDR in 1983 (honoring the 100
th
 anniversary of Marx’ death).
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NKFD. In 1985, Honecker paid tribute to the legacy of the NKFD by visiting the former 
POW camp in Krasnogorsk just outside Moscow, the historic place at which the 
organization was founded in July of 1943. This visit also took place within the context of 
the commemoration of the fourtieth anniversary of the end of World War II. In May of 
1985, a “Memorial Museum of the German Antifascists” was inaugurated at the site of 
the NKFD’s former school with Soviet and GDR officials, and West German KPD 
representatives present.
44
 Honecker was among the prominent speakers at the ceremony. 
Curiously, SED propaganda experts were aware of the fact that ever since Ulbricht had 
resigned, they had ignored the historical role of the NKFD. Already in 1982, a 
memorandum on the propagandistic “handling of 50 years of antifascist action” from the 
SED ZK’s Agitation Division warned that “it should be clarified early on” how to address 
the upcoming fourtieth anniversary of the NKFD’s founding in 1983, “since we haven’t 
written much on this in recent years.”
45
 This admission notwithstanding, Honecker in his 
speech at the memorial ceremony in Krasnogorsk claimed wholeheartedly the historic 
44
 According to Neues Deutschland, the Museum had been founded at the initiative of the SED and the 
CPSU, cf. Neues Deutschland, May 6, 1985, 1f.
45
 „Bemerkungen über die Behandlung 50 Jahre antifaschistische Aktion in unseren Medien und über die 
Aktivitäten des Gegners zu 50 Jahre Machtergreifung des Faschismus sowie einige eventuelle 
Schlußfogerungen,“ August 13, 1982. The memo began with the remark that „our history propaganda 
[Geschichtspropaganda] in connection with these events can not satisfy at this moment.” In odd 
contradiction to my findings on the rather unspecific commemoration of the Eastern Front, the memo 
continued: “Sure, there are a plenty of historical documentaries in Neues Deutschland, Junge Welt, Berliner 
Zeitung, the local papers as well as on radio (unfortunately television has not yet done much in this area 
[something that changed dramatically in 1985 with the commemoration of the fourtieth anniversary of the 
end of World War II]). Most contributions, however, are not more that reconstructions of historical facts 
and events. Some of them I consider very routine-like and not tailored according to the historical and 
current importance (war or peace) of the events of fifty years ago.” See BA/SAPMO DY 30 vorl. 
SED/30106, 1. In a way then, this confirms my earlier point about the decreasing direct instrumentalization 
of the Eastern Front for political and propagandistic purposes under Honecker. This analysis certainly 
described the late 1970s and early 1980s – notably a time during which the CSCE-process first inspired 
hopes for a lasting ease of tensions in Europe, and which then saw the reawakening of fears of war in the 
wake of the euro-missile crisis 1979/1983 – but not the 1950s and early 1960s when Ulbricht capitalized on 
“lessons of the Eastern Front” in every conceivable way.
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legacy of the NKFD by declaring that the “the unity of the antifascists lives on” in the 
GDR.
46
 While “Hitler fascism’s terrible crimes” had “besmirched the name of the German 
nation with dirt,” the “honor of our nations was saved by the German antifascists.”
47
 His 
list of antifascists – the true “patriots” as he stressed – naturally included not only the 
communist Eastern Front veterans, but also those – like himself – who had fought inside 
Germany, even while incarcertated by the Nazis in concentration camps and prisons cells. 
Fig. 14. A Museum for the Antifascist Patriots in Krasnogorsk, May 5, 1985: Erich Honecker during the opening ceremony for 
the “Memorial Museum of the German Antifascists,” to his right Herbert Mies, head of the West German KPD ; to his left 
Viktor Grishin, head of the CPSU in Moscow.
48
All of Honecker speeches, essays and declarations dealing with the legacy of the war 
against the Soviet Union were extremely vague in content, rather lofty in tone and 
instructing in style. He mostly lectured the lessons of the past in very general terms 
routinely referring to present-day political developments. Most of his announcements 
46




 BA/SAPMO, Bild Y1, 20-D-2.20.
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addressing questions of war and peace since the 1970s have to be read in conjunction 
with the ups and downs of the so-called Helsinki-process which since 1973 had led 
gradually to the creation of a collective security system (CSCE) including both West and 
Eastern bloc countries. For, the lesson of World War II was peace. In Honecker’s 
wording, the crucial message of history was that “after all the sufferings and devastations 
that the Second World War ignited by Hitler fascism inflicted on nations, there is nothing 
more important than to keep the peace and the preserve it permanently.”
49
 Depending on
the current state of affairs with regards to the Helsinki-process, Honecker would use 
historical speeches to underline variably the GDR’s avant-garde position as the first 
socialist state on German soil from which “never again a war will be launched,”
50
 the 
Soviet Union’s leading role in securing and preserving peace since World War II, or to 
point to the continuing threat posed by anti-communism and/or anti-Sovietism and thus 
the ever looming danger of history being repeated. Unlike during the Ulbricht era, the 
year 1941, or the date June 22, was no longer used as a metaphor for a possible future 
attack from the imperialist West on another “Day X.” The war against the Soviet Union 
had moved from being the focal point of the SED’s official memory and the rallying 
point of party propaganda and mass mobilization, to being one – albeit still the most 
important – battlefield of World War II. The lessons drawn from the war were no longer 
limited to the war against the Soviet Union. 
Back in 1949 when the Cold War inaugurated a new era of enmity between the 
Western powers and the Soviet Union, the SED Politburo had decreed that the key 
49




message from World War II was “never again war against the Soviet Union.”
51
 In the 
1980s, after the period of Détente had ended and a new Cold War dawned since the late 
1970s, this formula was used in a more generalized way. In Honecker’s words, “the most 
important lesson of World War II [was] to prevent a new war, to fight against it before 
the weapons speak”
52
– because it better suited the propagandistic needs of the day. 
Moreover, the past war naturally grew more remote, and the established postwar Soviet 
empire had become a global player, self-confident and seemingly unshakable. During the 
commemoration of the fourtieth anniversary of the end of World War II in the GDR, this 
shift became particularly evident. Aside from stressing the need to secure peace, i.e. by 
stopping the renewed arms-race, a key message of the commemorative speeches and acts 
delivered in May of 1985 was that “1985 [was] not 1939 and not 1941.” For by 1985, 
“the forces of peace and of social progress are incomparably stronger than half a century 
ago” and the Soviet Union had become the “strongest peace state.”
53
 1939 and 1941 were 
recalled as two equally important key dates in World War II history with the latter no 
longer rhetorically overshadowing the former. 
Despite this subtle relegation of the Eastern Front war resulting in its further 
obfuscation as historical event, the Soviet Union remained both Hitler’s prime victim and 
51
 Protocol no. 38 of the Politburo meeting on August 16, 1949, 2. BA/SAPMO DY 30/IV/2/2/38. DSF had 
suggested to declare February 2 as “Stalingrad Day” in honor of German POWs returning from Soviet 
captivity. The Politburo criticized this dedication and instead decreed the motto “never again war against 
the Soviet Union.” 
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 Erich Honecker, “Die DDR verkörpert die Ideale des antifaschistischen Kampfes.“ Speech at the central 
ceremony in Brandenburg on the occasion of the fourtieth anniversary of the liberation of KZ Brandenburg-
Görden, April 27, 1985. Printed in Honecker, Reden und Aufsätze, vol. 10, 595.
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conqueror. In 1985, a plethora of televised documentaries, movies and features – for the 
first time in GDR media history – was to transport the main messages of the official 
commemorative campaign by underscoring the Soviet Union’s dominant role in the past 
as well as in the present. For example, DDR II, one of the two state-controlled national 
TV channels, aired a 15-part Soviet production entitled “Strategy of Victory” between 
March and May 1985.
54
 The editors of DDR II were instructed to schedule the series for 8 
pm on Tuesdays and Fridays “for political reasons,” i.e. to reach the widest possible 
audience. Millions would indeed tune in. SED agitators now used prime time television 
to effectively spread Geschichtspropaganda. Other evening features aired in the spring of 
1985 included films on “Soviet Troops Reaching Berlin,” “We Must Remember Or It 
Will Happen Again” (on the liberation of KZ Sachsenhausen), “Bombs on Berlin,” and 
“German Antifascists in the Resistance.”
55
On the other side of the wall, national public television offered viewers in the West 
(and many secret viewers in the East) a number of documentaries on World War II as 
well. For example, ARD aired a six-part documentary on “The Germans in World War 
II” in April and May of 1985 (Sundays and Thursdays, 8:15 pm), a series focussing on 
the social history of Nazi Germany. It also showed a report drawing a positive balance for 
the “Federal Republic of Germany After 30 Years of NATO-Alliance.” While, thus, the 
West German public was still remembering VE Day in terms of German suffering and 
total defeat –Weizsäcker’s famous 1985 speech marked only the beginning of a 
54
 See the compendium “Sendungen des Fernsehens der DDR zum 40. Jahrestag des Sieges über den 
Faschismus und der Befreiung des deutschen Volkes von der Nazibarberei,“ in BA/SAPMO, DY 30/vorl. 




reorientation of this date towards its liberating aspect – the SED flooded its citizens with 
messages and materials still aimed at engraving the Soviet Union’s leading role in East 
German public memory of World War II. The Soviet victory in 1945 – not the preceding 
war between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union – was the decisive event in recent 
German history and according to the key document of the SED’s commemoration of VE 
Day in 1985, its significance resulted from a number of canonical facts: 
it proved the historical superiority of socialism;
it shaped the further course of world history forging a new balance of power, transforming socialism 
into a global system by inspiring liberation movements around the world;
it signalled the “triumph of humanism, freedom and human dignity over the forces of the ‘master race,’ 
racism, anti-Semitism,” their “petrifying places of destruction, prisons and concentration camps with 
their guillotines, gas chambers and crematoria;” 
it was the result of the sacrificial work of Soviet people thus carrying the main burden of war;
it was a victory of the indestructible idea of socialism, a victory of the teachings of Marx, Engels and 
Lenin;
German antifascists were among the front of victors and later assured that in the GDR the lessons of 
1945 were remembered and realized;
and the main lesson of war was to secure peace.
56
Within this context the actual events between 1941 and 1945 on the Eastern Front, were 
of little to no relevance at all. Much more than in earlier decades, historical details were 
missing from this image of the past, even more so concise statements on causes and 
consequences, perpetrators and victims, places and people. True, television series like 
“Strategy of Victory” included scenes depicting Soviet (and German) sufferings on the 
Eastern Front but even in this case the question of who committed the crimes for what 
reasons remained unanswered. The officially propagated memory of the Eastern Front 
war was little more than routine lip-service paid to the Soviets. As a result of the 
56
 These were the main points of the „Aufruf zum 40. Jahrestag des Sieges über den Hitlerfaschismus und 
der Befreiung des deutschen Volkes,“ signed by the SED’s ZK, GDR State Council, GDR Council of 
Ministers and the GDR’s „National Council of the National Front.“ BA/SAPMO, DY 30/vorl. SED/35685, 
3-9. The „Aufruf“ was published on the frontpage of Neues Deutschland, January 11, 1985.
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obfuscating contextualization of the Eastern Front war into the overall history of the 
Second World War, the last major anniversary remembered under the SED-regime, the 
25
th
 anniversary of the attack in 1986, was worth only a one-page statement by the SED 
Politburo on the formal ceremonial agenda to be observed on June 22, 1986
57
– this time 
not a single sentence was dedicated to elaborating the “political meaning” of the 
anniversary – and a brief report in Neues Deutschland on the various wrath-laying 
ceremonies. Below a front-page photograph of the SED leadership “solemnly honoring
the fallen Soviet heroes,” a lengthy article listed the names and organisations who 
participated in the ceremonies concluding that those present “once again vowed to honor 
and fulfil the legacy of the heroes with their deeds for all times.”
58
 Else the reader 
received no historical background information on the event which was at the center of 
these ceremonies.
59
II. From Ostpolitik to “Conservative Turn:” Revisiting the Eastern Front
It is often claimed that the end of the Adenauer era inaugurated a new phase in West 
German Vergangenheitsbewältigung. After a transitional phase under chancellors Ludwig 
Erhard and Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, historians have pointed to Willy Brandt’s 
chancellorship and the legacy of the 1968 movement as turning points in the political 
57
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vom 9.6.1986,“ BA/SAPMO, DY30 J IV 2/2R, 116, 99-100.
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quote on 2.
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culture of the Bonn republic.
60
 With that change in political culture, scholars have also 
noted transformations in the “public use of history.”
61
 By publicly communicating a more 
“empathic understanding of historical truth” which opened West German memorial 
culture to the sufferings of non-German victims of Nazism, the new generation of 
politicians ascending with Brandt created a crucial precondition for “forgiveness and 
social peace.”
62
 It was a milestone on the road towards the full “normative 
internalization” of the Nazi past into West German memory. In the long run, National 
Socialism was “overcome” because it was the historical event of reference 
(“Bezugsereignis”) which had kept the “greatest relevance for the self-reflection of the 
political system.”
63
While these observations hold true for the memory of the Holocaust, they certainly 
need qualification with regards to the Eastern Front war, its legacy and political memory. 
The context of the Cold War constituted the principal foil on which this memory 
emerged. It was the perception of the Soviet Union as ongoing threat in the East 
alongside the concurring “militant anti-communism” (Helmut Dubiel) which long 
hindered an empathetic and historically truthful understanding of the history of the 
Eastern Front. Yet, on the upside, the anticommunist stand of the early Federal Republic 
60
 See most recently Konrad Jarausch, „Critical Memory and Civil Society: The Impact of the 1960's on 
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Nazi past, 19-87.
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und NS-Diktatur in öffentlichen Geschichtsbildern der ‚alten’ Bundesrepublik“, in Cornelißen, 
Klinkhammer, Schwentker, eds., Erinnerungskulturen, 183-197. Lepsius, „Das Erbe des 
Nationalsozialismus.“ 
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helped initially to forge the anti-totalitarian, in essence democratic, consensus of the 
young democracy, and thus constituted one of its founding principles. It was an important 
element in the formation of a West German collective identity, and dominated the 
political culture during and even beyond the Adenauer years. On the downside, however, 
the continuous inability of the West German political establishment to self-critically 
reflect the fact that for years a „militant anticommunism“ in the West – much as the 
dogmatic antifascism of the SED in the East – had hindered an “effective moral 
confrontation with the Nazi legacy,” was “the moral drama of the postwar period.”
64
 This 
was (West) Germany’s “second guilt.”
65
The “Feindbild” of the Soviets drew heavily on 
the ideological and emotional residues of Nazi propaganda against “Jewish Bolshevism” 
and therefore long hampered a sincere reckoning with the legacy of the Nazi attack 
against the Soviet Union.
66
 Anyone expressing sympathy for Soviet victims during World 
War II, thus acknowledging the unprecedented suffering Nazi Germany had inflicted on 
peoples in the Soviet Union, and therefore also to some extent acknowledging 
understanding for its present security concerns, potentially risked being denounced as 
communist henchman. 
64
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Yet, with Détente and the ascend of “Neue Ostpolitik” this context changed 
significantly, making it now politically desirable to work towards understanding and 
cooperation with the Soviet Union.
67
 During the later 1960s the public perception of the 
legacies of “Operation Barbarossa” changed significantly albeit not yet fundamentally.
68
Memory increasingly mattered in the political arena; it was a prerequisite for the 
transformation of diplomatic relations with Germany’s Eastern neighbors: “Memory of a 
terrible past was indispensable for serving West German policy in the present.”
69
It was one of the core principles of Brandt’s Ostpolitik to acknowledge the fact that 
the solution of the German question was only possible in cooperation with the Soviet 
Union, not without or against her will.
70
 This fundamental shift in West German foreign 
policy also entailed a different approach towards the burdens of the troubled German-
Soviet past. However, the discourse over the Eastern Front legacy did not change over 
night. It rather took another two decades to firmly root the acknowledgment of German 
crimes on Soviet soil in West German political memory.
71
 Although tone and content of 
67
 On „Neue Ostpolitik“ see most importantly Peter Bender, Die “Neue Ostpolitik” und ihre Folgen. Vom 
Mauerbau bis zur Vereinigung (München: dtv, 1995), and William E. Griffith, The Ostpolitik of the 
Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978). See also Dennis L. Bark, David R. Gress, A 
History of West Germany, vol. 2: “Democracy and its Discontents, 1963-1991” (Cambridge: Blackwell, 
1992), 166-223.
68
Wolfrum, „Die Suche nach dem ‚Ende der Nachkriegszeit,’ 183-197, esp. 188f.
69
 Herf, Divided Memory, 346. See further on the question of memory and foreign policy Berger, „The 
power of memory and the memories of power.“
70
 Cf. Egon Bahr’s famous speech on July 15, 1963 in Tutzing entitled “Wandlung durch Annäherung,” 
printed in Deutschland Archiv 6 (1978), No. 8, 862-865, esp. 862. 
71
 As late as 1989, the sociologist Lepsius noted that “the recognition of the war crimes committed against 
Russian [sic] POWs and against the civilian population in the East progresses only slowly.” The process of 
their “normative incorporation” into German memory had just started then. Lepsius, “Das Erbe des 
Nationalsozialismus,” 263. In 1987, the prominent military historian Wolfram Wette published an essay in 
the weekly paper Die Zeit under the programmatic title “The oppressed burden of 1941:” Wolfram Wette,
“Erobern, zerstören, auslöschen. Die verdrängte Last von 1941: Der Rußland Feldzug war ein Raub - und
613
statements regarding the German invasion altered even before Brandt – it was under 
Ludwig Erhard that the Federal Republic officially commemorated the attack against the 
Soviet Union for the first time in 1966 – this was a change in degree, not in kind. The 
historical facts, contexts and consequences of the Eastern Front war still remained largely 
unaddressed, politicians still avoided referring to concrete events and facts such as 
occupation policies or Wehrmacht crimes. At most they came around to acknowledging 
that the horrific crimes were still alive in Soviet memory and occasionally spoke about 
unhealed wounds and unfading scarves. 
It should be clarified upfront that the purpose of this excursus into West German 
political culture is not to accuse the political establishment of ahistorical short-
sightedness and moral failure while keeping silent about the Soviets’ undemocratic 
policies, totalitarian aspirations and violent practices pursued within the fortified borders 
of its empire. The territory of the GDR was kept under communist rule against popular 
will, and the resulting division of Germany remained the chief grievance of the German 
nation since the end of World War II. Keeping these political facts in mind, the objective 
here is instead to analyse from the standpoint of one of Nazi Germany’s successor states 
the way the political elite addressed – and evaded – the realities and consequences of 
Hitler’s “war of annihilation” against the Soviet Union, and the way they connected this 
burdened history to the political concerns of the day.
Vernichtungskrieg von Anfang an,” Die Zeit, November 20, 1987, 49-51. The most powerful case was 
made by Giordano in his Zweite Schuld, esp. 169-214.
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In a remarkable 1965 article for Foreign Affairs, Erhard’s able Foreign Minister 
Gerhard Schröder (CDU) eloquently reasoned why an opening towards Eastern Europe 
and especially the Soviet Union was both necessary and possible twenty years after the 
end of World War II. Recalling that ever since the Hungarian uprising in 1956, the 
Eastern bloc could no longer be perceived as a monolith under total Soviet control, 
Schröder argued that Germany’s Ostpolitik stood before a grandiose task: to bridge the 
“intellectual and political gap” which World War II had left “in [the] relations between 
divided Germany and the countries to the East.”
72
 He was the first foreign minister to 
stress explicitly that the present difficulties were linked to the past: “National Socialist 
megalomania [had] raged with particular brutality in Eastern Europe.”
73
 Schröder knew 
that the goal of a peaceful German unification could not be reached without 
acknowledging the legacy of the Eastern Front war because its emotional and ideological 
aftermath continued to dominate mutual perceptions and relations: 
It is not surprising, therefore, that we frequently find an outdated image of Germany in Eastern Europe 
– one which may also have existed in the West 15 or 20 years ago. That image is characterized by 
mistrust and fear, based on recollections of the era when the National Socialist megalomania raged 
with particular brutality in Eastern Europe. Moreover, the countries of this area tend to make the same 
error that the Germans themselves frequently made and of which they have been cured by two 
catastrophes – namely, the mistake of overestimating Germany's resources. Ignorance of the changes 
that have taken place in Germany since 1945 has so far prevented this distorted image from being 
corrected. It is hard to know how deeply mistrust and fear of Germany are rooted in the minds of the 




Gerhard Schröder, „Germany looks at Eastern Europe,“ Foreign Affairs, Oct. 1965, 15-25, quote on 18. 
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In this statement, a West German foreign minister for the first time acknowledged the 
role of Eastern Front memory by – if only implicitly – accepting the roots of the historical 
fear of a strong Germany in Eastern Europe. In the same breath, Schröder explicitly 
disconnected his country from this history by stressing that past mistakes would not be 
repeated since West Germany had been “cured.” He realistically evaluated the 
historically rooted fear as “considerable political factor,” the very existence of which the 
political leaders in Bonn hitherto had denied, ignored or dismissed. It should be recalled 
that Schröder’s statement came exactly ten years after Adenauer had boldly shrugged off 
the fear of Germany among Eastern Europeans as “psychosis of war” during his visit to 
Moscow in 1955.
75
Schröder’s article appeared in context of the commemoration of the twentieth 




 personally had endowed that 
anniversary with a peculiar mix of seeking closure and raising hopes: ending the 
“postwar period” (Nachkriegszeit) and securing Germany’s role among the peace-loving 
nations for the future were the main themes of his brief chancellorship. Under the Erhard 
administration (1963-1966), Bonn slowly moved away from a mere policy of distrust 
against the Soviet Union towards a policy of forging trust in order to create a spirit of 
75
 One should indeed recall Adenauer’s awkward remarks on the “war thing”, the Soviets’ “psychosis of 
war” and the need for a “psychological cleansing” before starting a new era of diplomatic relations which 
outraged Khrushchev during their meeting in Moscow in September of 1955. Cf. Chapter 5.II.
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cooperation. This was now viewed as the most crucial precondition for achieving a 
solution of the German question. “While earlier, it was only spoken of what the Russians, 
the Poles and the Czechs had done to the Germans [invasion, rapes, robbery, expulsion], 
it was now also considered what the Germans had perpetrated under Hitler in Eastern 
Europe.”
78
One of the first results of this development was the “Peace Note” offered by the 
Erhard administration to all nations (except the GDR) in the spring of 1966, followed by 
the first official announcement commemorating the beginning of “Operation Barbarossa” 
in June of the same year. Both documents rendered no immediate changes in the FRG’s 
diplomatic policies but it reflected the West German government’s “frustration with its 
policy towards the East and its concern to strengthen its own credibility as a responsible 
power.”
79
 They also aptly illustrate Erhard’s problematic ambition to move beyond the 
“postwar period,” in fact to end it. Implicitly, the chancellor acknowledged the historical 
legacy of Nazi Germany’s war in Eastern Europe, but simultaneously he argued explicitly 
– very much reminiscent of Adenauer’s rhetoric – for a final line to be drawn.  
In context of the worldwide ceremonies commemorating the end of the Second 
World War in 1965 and confronted with increasing domestic and international criticism 
of the meager legacy of Adenauer’s Vergangenheitspolitik, Erhard’s focus was on 
presenting his country in the best possible light. While the Bundestag heatedly debated 
78
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the extension of the statute of limitations for Nazi crimes in 1965
80
, and while the 
Auschwitz trial 1963/65 for the first time had placed the Holocaust into the spotlight of 
public attention, the chancellor sought to shift focus on the republic’s positive 
accomplishments. He stressed the stunning economic successes of the young Federal 
Republic which in his view had grown into a mature democracy (he spoke of the 
“formierte Gesellschaft” or “matured society”).
81
 He believed that German reunification 
was the precondition for an easing of East-West tensions – unlike Brandt, who believed 
the opposite – and he felt that the Soviets’ refusal to end Germany’s division was the 
“wound which leaves Europe restless” – not Hitler and World War II which had caused 
it.
82
 Erhard also wanted West Germany to become a respected, influential and “normal” 
member of the international community: “we are someone again,” was his motto.
83
 One 
step in this direction was the full diplomatic recognition of Israel in 1965 overshadowed 
80
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by a heated controversy over secret arms transfers and followed by the immediate break-
up of diplomatic relations with the FRG on the side of most Arab countries.
84
With his “Peace Note” of March 25, 1966, Erhard practically if not formally 
annulled the Hallstein-Doctrine. It assured all governments in the world, including 
Eastern European countries but excluding the GDR, of the peaceful intentions of the 
Federal Republic, its commitment to arms-control and its determination to prevent the 
outbreak of another war: “The German nation wants to live in peace and freedom. It sees 
its greatest national mission in overcoming the division under which it has been suffering 
for many years.”
85
 The emphasis was once again on the need to end the postwar period 
which in Erhard’s view was kept alive only by the Soviets’ refusal to permit Germany’s 
reunification. At that time, one should recall, it was still Bonn’s official position that a 
united Germany would exist within the borders of 1937 unless a “freely elected all-
German government recognizes different borders.”
86
 This was a rhetorical figure which 
continued to overshadow Bonn’s relations with Moscow, and especially Warsaw. The 
past, and the war on the Eastern Front in particular, remained of little relevance in these 
84
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statements. Erhard’s stance towards the Soviet Union – in stark contrast to his foreign 
minister’s position – was not informed by a genuine awareness of the war’s legacy. 
In his already-mentioned important government statement in 1965, Erhard had 
admonished the Soviet Union that it stood in the way of a peaceful solution of the Cold 
War. Stressing that almost half of all West Germans had no personal memories of the 
years between 1933 and 1945, Erhard talked about the need to move beyond 
remembering the “crimes committed in the name of Germany” during those years: the 
war and the postwar period “must no longer be reference points of this administration’s 
policies.”
87
 At no point did he connect the division of Germany to the pre-1945 period. 
Instead, he accused the Soviet Union of prolonging the war by other means: “The Soviet 
Union hitherto has not wanted German reunification in freedom and still does not want 
it.”
88
 Yet, implicitly Erhard recognized the severity of the historical trauma caused by the 
German attack in 1941:
The Soviet government erroneously insists that a divided Germany served better the interests of the 
Soviet Union than a unified one. But they should know instead – and we have declared this as well: 
The German people and every all-German government will be ready to guarantee that the reunification 
of Germany will neither threaten Russia nor our Eastern neighbors.
89
Five years later, Brandt would become the first chancellor to explicitly refer to the 
horrors of the Eastern Front war in context of a possible solution of the German question. 
Even the little-known fact that Erhard issued the first official declaration on the occasion 
of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Nazi attack against the Soviet Union in 1966, 
confirms the conclusion that Erhard moved only half-heartedly towards a better 
87






understanding with Eastern Europe, towards a new Ostpolitik based on the presumptuous 
idea of “détente through reunification.”
90
 The short declaration with the remarkable title 
“Giving the Future its Right! Removing the Residues of War,” was released by the 
Erhard government to the press on June 20, 1966. It started with the following words:
Twenty-five years ago, the German invasion of the Soviet Union began. It has brought suffering and 
misery over both peoples, cost millions of human lives and shook the political constitution of Europe. 
The blood toll which the German and the Soviet nation have paid is an obligation to prevent forever a 
repetition of June 22, 1941.
He who looks back on that fateful day and its consequences, misconceives today’s realities and gives 
away tomorrow’s chances.
91
Read closely, these sentences reveal a principal refusal to face historical facts and 
betray a troubling insensitivity for the painful legacy of the war against the Soviet Union 
in the Soviet Union. While the first sentence admitted Germany was the attacker, the very 
next thought blurred the line between attacker and victim by stressing that both nations 
suffered greatly. Moreover, the “blood toll” was firstly paid by the Germans, but both, 
Germany and the Soviet Union, were called upon to prevent a repetition of June 22, 1941. 
Worse, the statement’s historical part ended with a critique of all those who refused or 
proved incapable of forgetting this “fateful day and its consequences.” Assuming that 
“those” referred primarily to the people in the Soviet Union – and the political elite who 
kept referring to the war whether out of sincerity or political opportunity, or both – this 
statement testifies to the still prevalent tendency to speak as little and as detached as 
possible of German guilt, and as much and as empathic as possible of German suffering 
on the Eastern Front. It is questionable whether Erhard was aware of the fact that two 
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thirds of the more than 20 million Soviet victims during World War II were civilians. 
Nazi Germany’s many non-German, mostly non-military victims were still being brushed 
over, or simply ridiculed as a result of the crude equation of both sides’ sacrifices and 
losses. 
The second part of the declaration stressed that “it was time to remove the residues 
of the war, in particular the German division.” And with an implicit hint at the German-
Soviet Weltanschauungskrieg (war of world views), it warned that “hatred has brought 
the nations on the brink of extermination.” This alleged aggressive hatred on both sides 
negated once again who waged war, and who reacted. Finally, only the realization of the 
“vital necessities of the other will bring them peace and security.” Germany, the text 
concluded, was “ready to cooperate and to sacrifice.” 
With this unprecedented but half-hearted gesture, Bonn had acknowledged the 
importance of June 22, 1941 in Soviet history and memory, and its relevance for the 
diplomatic relations between the two nations. Yet it also used this self-created 
opportunity to throw the ball onto the Soviet side. The declaration was to demonstrate 
West Germany’s peaceful, cooperative intentions, and to expose Moscow’s continuing 
renitence to properly address the German question. Far from expressing an empathetic 
understanding of historical truth the first official Bonn document dealing with the Eastern 
Front war and its legacy can be viewed as a perfect example of the politics of memory in 
its democratic variant. Its purpose was to relate the past to the present not for the sake of 
remembering the past but for the sake of rallying support for a solution to the burning 
question of Germany’s dual statehood in the present and future.
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Behind the Iron Curtain, the SED’s interpretation of Bonn’s June 22 declaration was 
accordingly frosty. In the editorial on June 22, 1961, Neues Deutschland argued that it 
showed “how little German imperialism had learned from June 22, 1941.” Aiming in 
particular at Erhard’s call to “remove the residues of war,” the commentary reminded the 
reader that “it is known that for Bonn ‘ending the German division’ means as much as 
‘annexation of the GDR.’” The commentary intentionally and maliciously misread the 
declaration by complaining that “one has the guts over there to proclaim an attack on the 
socialist GDR on the anniversary of the attack against the socialist Soviet Union.” For 
Walter Ulbricht this resembled the anti-communism of the interwar years. Alluding to 
Erhard’s postulation of the “end of the postwar period,” the editorial quoted Ulbricht with 
a warning that “one must not allow that Bonn’s anti-communism leads into a new pre-
war period.”
92
East Berlin’s fierce propaganda against an allegedly aggressive West Germany 
routinely continued even though the signs for a lasting improvement of East-West 
relations congregated under the Kiesinger-Brandt administration (1966-1969). As Erhard, 
his successor Kurt-Georg Kiesinger (CDU) saw West German-Soviet relations not 
primarily “burdened” with the legacies of the Eastern Front war but with the “still 
unsolved problem of Germany’s reunification,” so he declared in his government 
statement upon taking office in December of 1966. Yet, at the same time Kiesinger and 
his Foreign Minister Willy Brandt (SPD) acknowledged that this was a distant goal that 
could only be achieved if the current political structure in Europe changed and the bloc 
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 Kiesinger dedicated a significant portion of his address to the 
relationship with the Soviet Union, recalling that already in 1955 he had strongly 
supported the establishment of diplomatic relations with Moscow. He also repeated what 
he had said eight years earlier in a Bundestag speech, namely that “the German nation 
harbors neither enmity nor hatred against the peoples of the Soviet Union; to the contrary, 
it seeks to live in good, peaceful neighborhood with them.”
94
 To Kiesinger in 1966, a 
solution of the German question from now on was considered possible only within the 
larger context of a European peace settlement. This principle was the nucleus of the 
“New Ostpolitik” and it eliminated once and for all the long-standing contradiction 
between Bonn’s Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpolitik.
95
 Remarkably, Kiesinger also avoided 
repeating the explicit claim to Germany’s borders of 1937. Instead he stressed that many 
Germans “desired a reconciliation with Poland, whose painful history we have not 
forgotten.” Addressing Prague, the chancellor “condemned Hitler’s policies which were 
aimed at destroying Czechoslovakian statehood” and expressed the hope for a better 
understanding in the future.
96
 Finally, Kiesinger also paid tribute to the fact that the 
conclusion of the Auschwitz-trial in Frankfurt just a year earlier had brought the 
Holocaust at the forefront of the public mind. No chancellor could ignore it any longer. 
He thus briefly and vaguely referred to the “gruesome crimes which have been 
committed against the Jewish people abusing the name of our nation” and acknowledged 
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that these crimes burdened relations to Israel. Nonetheless, he vowed to continue to work 
for improving relations.
97
Though Kiesinger is not on record for ever referring specifically to the historic 
events on the Eastern Front during his short term in office, his 1966 speech both in terms 
of content and style signalled the dawn of a more sensitive inclusion of history’s burdens 
into West German diplomacy and politics. With regards to the Eastern Front war, it was 
his successor Willy Brandt whose negotiated settlements with Moscow, Warsaw, Prague 
and East Berlin – the so-called Eastern treaties (Ostverträge) – entailed a reassessment of 
Germany’s historical relations with Eastern Europe, and in particular with Poland and the 
Soviet Union. Moreover, Brandt’s speeches, interviews, announcements and public 
commemorative acts such as his kneeling down in Warsaw in 1970 indeed reflected a 
more empathetic understanding of history. Yet, while Brandt’s famous “knee-fall” and 
his subsequent explanations contained a sincere willingness to accept German guilt for 
Poland’s sufferings and a sincere hope at reconciliation, his statements regarding the Nazi 
war against the Soviet Union remained rather sober and vague. After the pictures of him 
kneeling at the Warsaw Ghetto memorial had gone around the world, Brandt later 
reflected in his memoirs:
I went down on my knees before the memorial to those who died in the Warsaw Ghetto. Despite 
malicious comments in the Federal Republic, I was not ashamed to have done so. This gesture ... was 
not ‘planned.’ ... Oppressed by the memories of Germany’s recent history, I simply did what people do 
when words fail them. My thoughts dwelt not only on the millions who had been murdered but also on 
the fact that Auschwitz not withstanding, fanaticism and suppression of human rights persisted. My 






 Quoted in Bark, Gress, eds., Democracy and its Discontents, 187. Bahr recalls that Brandt and him didn’t 
talk much about the event, Brandt only once reflected that “I had the feeling a nod with the head was not 
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Repeatedly before and after, Brandt spoke movingly of the sufferings that Poles had had 
to endure at the hands of Germans. Yet, while his sympathy for Poland’s painful history 
is unquestionable, his postwar experience with the Soviet occupation of East Germany 
and parts of Berlin seem to have obviated an equally sincere commitment to 
reconciliation with the Soviet Union. At least in comparison with his statements on 
Poland, Brandt’s references to the Soviet Union’s war experience reveal a certain inner 
distance, even coldness. His closest advisor, Egon Bahr
99
 (born 1922), confirmed this 
impression in his memoirs, stating at one point that “Brandt saw Poland with an 
understanding and an affection which [he] did not cherish for the Soviet Union.”
100
Politically and publicly, this inner distance mattered a great deal. Brandt never 
expressed a word of apology for what Germans had done in the Soviet Union during 
World War II, as he would do with regards to German crimes committed in Poland. 
Unlike the Moscow Treaty, the treaty with Poland starts with an explicit reference to the 
outbreak of World War II “whose first victim was Poland.”
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 Unlike the Erhard
administration before him in 1966, and the Schmidt/Genscher administration after him in 
enough.” Quoted in Egon Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit (München: Karl Blessing, 1996), 341. On Brandt’s knee-
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1981, Brandt issued no special statement in June 1971, thirty years after the German 
attack against the Soviet Union. The anniversary was not even formally acknowledged.  
To illustrate this point one may refer to one of Brandt’s speeches during the debate over 
the ratification of the Eastern treaties in the Bundestag in 1972. The Eastern treaties with 
Moscow and Warsaw, Brandt argued, constituted the “responses to the bitter questions 
left to us by World War II.”
102
 As to the recent German-Polish history and the lost German 
territories, the chancellor stressed that 
we cannot and we do not want to turn injustice into justice, but we don’t want to add yet another link to 
the chain of injustice between the two nation. …Given the history of Germans and Poles alike there 
can be no indifferent existence next to each other. …This administration – and I may certainly add: this 
high house – wishes that both nations, and especially the young people amongst them, find each other 
across the rifts and graves of history.
103
He added to these remarks that “all this applies also to the peoples of the Soviet Union.”
104
Brandt then explain in his own words the reason for his wavering position: Poland was 
the tragic “loser among the victors of World War II,”
105
 but the Soviet Union in its wake 
had become a “world power:”
We know that we are dealing here with a world power, and with the interests of a world power. We 
know that we cannot face this world power without backup from our friends and allies. But we also 
know that there are millions of people in the Soviet Union to whom this contract is more than a legal 
act in the political power game. Applause from the coalition parties [SPD, FDP] There are too many 
wounds on both sides. This treaty means that we want to let old wounds heal, and to avoid inflicting 
new ones.
106
To Brandt, then, the historical burdens seemed diminished by the powerful position the 
Soviets had attained after World War II. Nonetheless he stressed the human dimension of 
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the Eastern Front war. Quoting himself with a statement he had made in Moscow after 
signing the treaty in 1970, Brandt paid tribute to the fact that the “catastrophe” – his 
synonym for the crimes of the Nazi regime – had cost the “peoples of the East, even more 
than in the West, indescribable sacrifices.”
107
Thus, publicly chancellor Brandt chose a nuanced rhetoric which signalled both, a 
willingness to acknowledge and reconcile the past, and a determination to keep a critical 
distance. He also carefully balanced the need to “keep the book of history” open with the 
desire to write “new pages in this book.” 
Reconciliation between the Federal Republic of Germany and the peoples of Eastern Europe can only 
be honestly achieved if the book of history will not be closed. But it must be added right away: on the 
new pages of this book, good news about the German fate can only be recorded if we reach out the 
hand to balance and to reconciliation, if we say yes to a good development in Europe which will not be 
possible without our own contribution.
108
On its downside, this balanced approach allowed it for Brandt to remain rather unspecific 
in his public comments on Nazi Germany’s crimes and especially on the question of 
criminal guilt and collective responsibility. Although he had himself written a short 
history of World War II shortly after the end of the war in which he had detailed the 
crimes committed by Germans in the Third Reich, his public statements as chancellor 
more than twenty years later lacked historical detail and depth.
109
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Norwegian resistance he had had knowledge of the Nazi mass killings in Poland, the 
Soviet Union and elsewhere, and he incorporated these first-hand information in his early 
post-war writings as journalist.
110
 However, despite this remarkable experience as World 
War II veteran and chronologist – two experiences he shared with Ulbricht – Brandt’s ex 
officio comments on the legacy of the Eastern Front war, the what he referred to as 
“Hitler’s crimes,” committed in the name of Germans by “a criminal clique” whose 
“national betrayal” had blemished Germany’s name,
111
 remained mostly vague. Following 
his credo that “the past must not hinder the future,”
112
 he used his historic trip to Moscow 
in August of 1970 to strike a balance between facing the past horrors and shifting focus 
on a new beginning. In an address on Moscow television shortly after the signing of the 
In 1946, Brandt also published a collection of essays on the Nuremberg Trials. The volume was written and 
published in Norwegian only. The title “Criminals and the other Germans” (Forbrytere og andre tyskere) 
nicely captured his main – and later unchanged – view on the criminal legacy of Nazi Germany. In his 
memoirs, Brandt summarized and commented its controversial essence: “What was guilt? What 
responsibility? When does a bystander become a perpetrator? The Nuremberg trials helped to clarify the 
terms. Guilty I called the Nazis, i.e.: their hard core – roughly a million; I wanted guilt to be individually 
determined. The Nazi-enemies I called not guilty, neither the great majority of the more or less indifferent. 
Yet there was no doubt that they all bore responsibility [which] they all had to carry into the future. […] I 
judged those raised in the Hitler youth with special mildness: The worst Nazis are not among those who 
‘grew into Nazism so to speak, but among those who had already been Nazis before they came to power.’ I 
generalized and stated: ‘It would be terrible if the Germans as such were criminals.’ Special circumstances 
had made them to tools – and victims – of Nazism. I made these observations during the months of the 
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caused awful confusion. It was the title of a book that defended the majority of Germans against the 
minority of criminals.” Even in 1989, when Brandt published his memoirs, he didn’t rethink his more than 
questionable assessment. Cf. Brandt, Erinnerungen, 144f.
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German-Soviet Treaty, Brandt explained to his “fellow-citizens” the historic and political 
meaning of the settlement:
The signing of the treaty between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany is an 
important moment in our postwar history. Twenty-five years after the capitulation of the German Reich 
that was destroyed by Hitler, and fifteen years after Konrad Adenauer, here in Moscow, had agreed the 
establishment of diplomatic relations, it is now time to reconstitute our relationship with the East, and 
what is more on the basis of the unconditional, reciprocal renunciation of force and taking as a starting-
point the existing political situation in Europe. ...
I know I am free from wishful thinking, as most of you are. This century marked by blood and tears 
and hard work, has taught us to exercise common sense. ... This treaty with the Soviet Union is a 
success of German postwar policy. It is a decisive step towards improving our relations with the Soviet 
Union and our Eastern neighbors – a quarter of a century after the catastrophe that claimed untold 
victims from the nations, in the East more than in the West. 
It accords with the interests of the entire German people to improve relations with the Soviet Union in 
particular. Not only is she one of the major World Powers; she also shares in the special responsibility 
for Germany as a whole and Berlin.
113
The statement contains a few remarkable lapses. The “Third Reich” was not destroyed by 
Hitler, but by the anti-Hitler-coalition. And while referring to the end of the war, Brandt
avoided mentioning the attack against the Soviet Union in 1941, undoubtedly the most 
decisive event in recent German-Soviet history looming over the heads of the negotiating 
partners.
114
 Instead he once again stressed Germany’s dependence on the Soviet Union as 
global player. And unlike his statements in and with regards to Poland, the chancellor did 
not take – symbolically – personal responsibility for the crimes committed in the name of 
Germans, and he did not ask for forgiveness. Earlier that day, August 12, 1970, the 
chancellor had visited the “Memorial for the Unknown Soldier” to lay down a wrath – his 
only, nonverbal, statement there.
115
 What Brandt did say though in his televised address 
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was that Eastern Europeans had suffered incomparably harder under the Nazi war and 
occupation than Germany’s other conquered countries in the West – a long ignored and 
then still unpopular fact. 
Upon his return to Bonn, Brandt declared that in a “metaphorical sense,” a “final line 
has been drawn under the war,” and that he hoped that “now also the war of words will 
come to an end.”
116
 Two years later, in a Bundestag debate, he also recalled his remarks 
made before having dinner with Soviet prime minister Alexei N. Kosygin (1904-1980) on 
the evening of August 12, 1970, the day of the signing of the treaty. Speaking semi-
publicly, Brandt was much more open and engaging on that occasion, elaborating his idea 
of drawing a “final line” (Schlußstrich) with some very personal thoughts:
Yesterday, for the first time in my life, I stepped on Soviet soil and in doing so I was aware of the 
memories and wounds which our states and not the least their peoples carry up until this very day. I 
know I am in a country in which there exists a special sense of history. A history that no one can undo 
and that no one must deny. He who forgets or seeks to forget will became sick in his soul.
117
Remarkably, Brandt chose not to quote this part in his Bundestag speech. He only 
repeated the more formal lines which then had followed in his Kremlin dinner speech:  
But it is equally true, that no nation can live permanently without pride and without the prospect of 
realizing its will peacefully. History must not become a grind stone [Mühlstein] which won’t ever 
release us from the past. In a certain sense, I understand this treaty as a final line and as a new 
beginning that allows our two states to look ahead into a better future. As a treaty which shall liberate 
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This public rhetoric of coming to terms with the past by “liberating” both sides from the 
“shadows and burdens” signalled a measured dose of empathy for the Soviet fate in the 
wake of Nazi Germany’s attack, but also an assertive determination to rehabilitate 
Germany, to restore its national “pride,” to move beyond a history of bloodshed whose 
causes, course and consequences nonetheless remained unspoken. 
The chancellor Willy Brandt thus spoke much about reconciliation and about 
remembering history without ever really stating what precisely needed to be reconciled 
and what needed to be remembered. He reiterated time and again that the “catastrophe,” 
the “bloody history” has endowed Germans with an everlasting responsibility but he 
avoided to make concrete references to German war crimes on the Eastern Front, their 
perpetrators and victims. Given how strongly Brandt had embedded his diplomatic turn 
towards Ostpolitik  into a rhetoric of revisiting the past – and of reassessing its 
ramifications for the present – it is noteworthy that his bringing about a fundamental shift 
in the political culture of West Germany was possible even though his public speeches 
contained so few references to concrete historical facts.
119
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 This holds true also for Brandt’s Holocaust memory. He made one of his more concrete statements on 
Auschwitz in an opening speech for the “Brotherhood Week” in Cologne, an meeting of young Christians, 
in March of 1971. Stressing that the agreement with Moscow would not interfere with Bonn’s good 
relations with third states, including and especially Israel, the chancellor warned that neither the fuming 
Arab-Israeli conflict would obfuscate the “special feature” German-Israeli relations: ”The fact that millions 
of Jews were murdered in Europe cannot be extinguished – and this is all the more horrible for us and for 
those born afterwards, because under the spirit of enlightenment the symbiosis of Jewish and German 
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tolerate – that hell on earth was possible. It was reality. 
The name, Auschwitz, will remain a nightmare for generations. Illusions are not [allowed]: the injuries 
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people of the perpetrators will not heal so quickly. For it was the image of man which was injured, of man 
whom we understand as the image of God. This experience – it is the real catastrophe of mankind, more 
than all wars and their terrors lie upon Jewry, not only in Israel; and it lies on us Germans.” Quoted from 
the at times odd English translation in Brandt, Peace, 82. Here in Cologne speaking semi-publicly before 
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The contrast evident in Brandt’s selective public recollection of his historic Kremlin 
dinner speech of August 12, 1970, can be highlighted further with the secret minutes and 
protocols of the chancellor’s closed meetings with the Soviet leaders, as well as from his 
personal autobiographic reflections.
120
 Recalling the August 1970 visit, Brandt later 
revealed in his memoirs, he had ambiguous encounters with the “traumatic” Soviet 
history – and had realized that “false and sincere” expressions of “war memories” could 
be very close to each other. Shortly after his arrival in Moscow, he recalled passing by a 
memorial that signalled the point at which German tanks were forced to turn around in 
1941. Yet, “the trauma of deadly threat had roots which reached even farther back,” he 
added. Kosygin, who accompanied Brandt on the car ride from the airport, had the driver 
stop at the Lenin Hills, where he led his guest to the spot from which Napoleon 
reportedly looked back on the burning city of Moscow for a last time. “This was a piece 
of history brought back to life.”
121
 In contrast, Brandt despised Brezhnev’s “reminiscences 
to June of 1941 which he dished up” later that day. Apparently, the CPSU’s general 
secretery Leonid I. Brezhnev (1906-1982) lamented how well economic relations had 
been between the two countries prior to 1941. He recalled the “positive attitude” of the 
Soviet peoples towards Germany. He explained the complete “ignorance” of the Soviet 
leadership on June 22 with the fact that the “honorable partner” was not expected to 
an audience of young Christians, Brandt might have found the words he did not find just a few weeks 
earlier in Warsaw while standing at the Warsaw Ghetto Memorial. Maybe this was even a consequence of 
that remarkable visit and the worldwide, very emotional and mostly positive reactions to it. For a more 
general contextualization see in addition Herf, Divided Memory, 344f.  
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commit such an act of “disloyalty.” Brezhnev then recounted “front memories [enriching 
them] with melodramatic appeals to the ‘comrades from the other side.’” Brandt was 
more “shocked than impressed by this way of mobilizing emotionalism 
(Rührseligkeit).”
122
When three years later Brezhnev visited Bonn in May of 1973, Brandt recalled 
another instance of them discussing the war – this time he felt that Brezhnev’s remarks 
were more sincere and authentic. His own comments might have contributed to that. 
During a dinner hosted by the Soviet delegation, the chancellor expressed appreciation 
for Soviet war memories “listening very carefully when [Brezhnev’s] thoughts wandered 
back to the war and to the victims he had claimed.” In his short speech, Brandt then 
quoted from a front letter of a young German soldier fighting on the Eastern Front:
In a letter a German soldier wrote to his parents after the invasion of the Soviet Union, there are the 
sentences: ‘I know that our armies will leave this country in a streak of misery. Nothing but suffering, 
destruction and maybe hatred will remain. And still, there is nothing I desire more than’ – the letter 
said – ‘to face the people one day in peace and as friend.’ That soldier never returned.
123
Brandt’s successor Helmut Schmidt was also present at that dinner, then still in his 
function as finance and economics minister. In a rare case of personal reflection about his 
wartime experience as young Wehrmacht officer in a semi-public situation, Schmidt 
remembered his thoughts at the end of the war: “he did not think it was possible that after 
this terrible war there could come a chance for a conversation between Germans and the 
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emotional toasts,” and that “there stood tears in the eyes of my Russian hosts.”
124
 It seems 
that over the years the Eastern Front memory eroded the long-lasting atmosphere of 
mistrust and hatred. 
The above-described cautious but eventually very sincere and pointed exchanges 
about the Eastern Front war testify to the fact that “memory was essential in allaying that 
mistrust and for any hope of securing Soviet agreement to end or moderate the division of 
Germany.”
125
 The intersection of politics and memory and the long shadow of history in 
politics may be pointedly summarized by a statement Brezhnev made at the end of 
Brandt’s second visit in September of 1971. Sitting next to each other in the car back to 
the airport, Brezhnev laid his hand on Brandt’s knees at one point and said: “I understand 
you, Willy Brandt, when it comes to Germany [the German division]. Yet, not us, but 
Hitler is responsible for that.”
126
Brandt surely was convinced that “public reflection” on the Nazi war of 
extermination in Eastern Europe was “necessary to rebuild trust and normalize West 
German relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.”
127
 In retrospective, his 
politics of memory fulfilled this self-imposed requirement. Naturally, this could not be 
achieved by Brandt alone; his foreign policy advisor Egon Bahr, his foreign minister 
Walter Scheel (FDP) as well as president Gustav Heinemann strengthened his public 
position and rallied support for Ostpolitik. Scheel, an air force veteran of the Eastern 
Front, contributed to a more empathetic understanding of history as foreign minister and 
124
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even more so during his term as federal president (1974-1979). He publicly argued that 
Germans must remember “all victims of the war with respect and reverence,” stressing 
particularly the million-fold murder of Jews and Eastern European civilians.
128
 As Brandt, 
he also met with Brezhnev on several occasions during which he expressed how 
important these encounters were “after all the mischief [Unheil] the Second World War 
has brought over our nations.”
129
 Federal president Heinemann, a long-time advocate of a 
demilitarized, peaceful, neutrally united Germany, pleaded for the historization of the 
Nazi past by stressing the negative political traditions that led Germany down a 
disastrous path. In the already mentioned controversial speech commemorating the 
centenary of the Bismarck Reich, Heinemann connected the fateful lieux de mémoire of 
Germany’s recent history: “One hundred years German Reich – this indeed does not 
mean once Versailles, but twice Versailles, 1871 and 1919, and it also means Auschwitz, 
Stalingrad, and unconditional surrender in 1945.”
130
 This speech illustrated why 
Heinemann had used the much-quoted phrase of Germany as the “difficult fatherland” in 
his inaugural speech in 1969. Now picking up the arguments of the Fischer controversy, 
he engaged the West German public in a “discourse of catastrophe.”
131
 The head of state 
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had given his countrymen not only an unprecedented “public lecture on history” that “hit 
the public like a bomb.”
132
 He was also the first prominent West German politician to 
connect the Eastern Front war with the Holocaust, even though he “merely” listed the two 
places symbolizing the mass murder of the Jews and the mass death on the Eastern Front 
– Auschwitz and Stalingrad – right next to each other, in one breath.
It was thus the Brandt era as a whole, and the political climate change it brought 
about, which generated a fundamental change in West German political culture. 
Domestically, Brandt, Bahr, Scheel, and Heinemann started a process of gradually 
opening public memory to the horrors of the Eastern Front and of reassessing the war’s 
end and outcome (namely to accept the status-quo, i.e. the permanent loss of German 
territories in the East). Brandt saw himself as the chancellor of the “other Germany,” a 
Germany that was “liberated” in 1945, not (just) defeated.
133
 His important 1970 speech 
commemorating VE Day introduced the idea the later president Richard von Weizsäcker
popularized fifteen years later: that May 8, 1945 was not only a day of total defeat but 
that it was also a day of liberation:
This, too, must be seen: what in those days – 25 years ago – was felt by countless Germans as national 
as well as personal affliction was, for other peoples, liberation from foreign rule, from terrorism and 
fear. And for the majority of the German people as well, there emerged the chance of beginning again, 
of creating a constitutional and democratic way of life.
134
Insofar Brandt, not von Weizsäcker, should receive credit for initiating the transformation 
of the public perception of the war’s end. On the diplomatic level, Brandt initiated a new 
era of relations with the East hoping to achieve “change through rapprochement” in the 
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long run. Just as Adenauer had opened up West Germany’s path towards a real 
integration into the Western world by formally acknowledging responsibility for the 
Holocaust in 1951, Brandt’s shift in tone and content with regards to the political 
memory of the Eastern Front war “was essential for diplomatic success in Eastern Europe 
and in Moscow.”
135
 The Nobel Prize committee awarded him the Nobel Peace Prize in 
1971 for this success and it aptly summarized the quintessence of his contribution to 
Germany’s postwar history: “In the name of the German people, Brandt has stretched out 
his hand to reconcile peoples who were enemies for a long time.”
136
Helmut Schmidt, chancellor from 1974 to 1982, initially continued Brandt’s 
Ostpolitik. He had been actively involved in its formulation during the late 1960s, had 
visited Moscow twice in 1966 and 1969 and had served as Brandt’s defense minister 
from 1969 to 1972. He was well-known for his expertise on defense and international 
security questions, and his sober judgment and unfailing sense for the politically 
necessary and possible won him popularity at home and esteem abroad.
137
 Schmidt 
understood himself most explicitly as member of the „war generation,” the generation 
who shared the existential experience of violence, fear and societal collapse.
138
 He claimed 
to have known that National Socialism was doomed on the day “they attacked the Soviet 
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 According to his personal experience and memory, he perceived of the 
Wehrmacht as the “only decent club” in the Third Reich because he mostly remembered 
it as a place free from Nazi ideological infiltration.
140
 He also described in his memoirs 
how he had “suppressed” war memories for more than thirty years until he met Brezhnev
in 1973 with whom he shared the front experience. It were indeed his encounters with the 
Soviet leader that seemed to have prompted him to start a deeper personal reckoning with 
the memories and legacies of the Eastern Front war:
I always had a good personal relationship to Brezhnev ...; it probably rested on the fact that we both 
had experienced the war directly as soldiers. One knew each other’s war experiences because we had 
talked about them; we knew from each other that we both hated the war, and not just I feared a new 
war, but Brezhnev too. Brezhnev was no enemy but a respected opponent whom I understood on a 
human level.
141
A decisive moment in this remarkable relationship – after all, the Brezhnev doctrine 
continued to overshadow Détente until the mid-1980s – was their conversation during the 
already mentioned dinner hosted by Willy Brandt for Brezhnev back in 1973. During that 
meeting, Schmidt suddenly recalled memories of the smell in a burning city, images of 
dead bodies scattered on the streets, images of Soviet POWs, and the horrifying screams 
139
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of a comrade dying next to him.
142
  He later recorded this first memorable encounter with 
Brezhnev and the ensuing conversation about their shared but by no means identical 
Eastern Front experience:
That was the beginning of a very special and personal relationship between an emotional “Great 
Russian” who was nonetheless capable of political calculation, and a cool North-German who was 
nonetheless not free from emotions. ... In the course of the evening, Brezhnev – whether calculated or 
inspired by his mood of the moment remained unclear to me – started a monologue about the 
sufferings of the peoples of the Soviet Union during World War II. Especially the people in the 
Ukraine, where he himself was a general major and political commissar of the Eighteenth Army, had 
suffered indescribably. Brezhnev’s speech escalated into a moved and moving depiction of ever more 
details of losses, the horrors of war, and also the criminal misdeeds of the Germans in violation of 
international law, whom he kept calling ‘fascist soldiers’ or the ‘fascist invaders.’
I had experienced the same war. I knew how right he was; I also knew how much it was his right to 
talk like that – even though he seemed to exaggerate in some instances. Willy Brandt and the other 
Germans present must have felt similarly because we all listened to Brezhnev for a very long time. It 
was important to him ... to make his hosts feel the great turn, the great self-conquest it had cost him 
and the Russians to decide to cooperate with the Federal Republic of Germany, to agree on the 
Moscow treaty and the Four-Power agreement on Berlin – and to visit Bonn, the former enemies.
143
Schmidt’s analysis underlines the relevance of an appropriate Eastern Front memory 
for the success of Ostpolitik. The described conversation between the leaders of two 
former enemy nations was a key moment in Schmidt’s personal memory of the Eastern 
Front. His response to Brezhnev’s monologue revealed his henceforth unchanged view of 
a collective guilt of Germans on the one hand, and – from his limited air-force 
perspective – of a Wehrmacht as the “decent club” of mostly innocent, patriotically 
fighting good Germans, on the other:
Brezhnev was right: the war was terrible, and we Germans had carried it into his country. Yet, he was 
also wrong in his one-sidedness; not only Germans but also Russian soldiers had committed heinous 
crimes against their former enemies. And he was wrong to see the former German soldiers as fascists. 
The great majority of Germans, their corporals, officers and generals were as much Nazis as the great 
majority of our former enemies were communists; on both sides one had believed to be obliged to 
serve and defend one’s fatherland. ... During the entire eight years in the Wehrmacht, in fact, I had not 
one single convinced Nazis as superior or commander. But I was indeed raised to be a patriot. I 
reminded Brezhnev of those officers who on the one hand fought as patriots against the enemy, and on 
the other against Hitler, ready to commit high treason, but not to betray their country. I spoke of the 
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dying in the bombed cities, of the miseries during flight and expulsion; ... while we condemned Hitler 
at night, we fulfilled out duty as soldiers during the day.
144
Here Schmidt not only perpetuated the “myth of a clean Wehrmacht” – endowing it with 
the weight of his personal integrity and authority as eyewitness – but also resonated the 
main themes of West Germany’s victims myth – Germans as victims of air raids, flight, 
expulsions.
145
 And he formulated the position he would restate twenty years later in 
reaction to the controversial Wehrmacht exhibit: that the Wehrmacht was mostly free of 
ideology, and thus mostly uninvolved in Hitler’s war of extermination.
146
 Even Brandt
vividly remembered the impact Schmidt’s remarks made on everyone in the room. After 
Schmidt had described the “ambivalent feelings of a young officer on the Eastern Front” 
who thought it impossible that after this “terrible war” Germans and Russians would be 
able to talk to each other ever again, Brezhnev responded by offering “strongly emotional 
toasts.”
147
Helmut Schmidt was the only West German chancellor with such an intense Eastern 
Front experience and thus he was particularly sensitive to the fact that “Hitler’s shadow 
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 Though he continued the basic line of Brandt’s Ostpolitik, his strong belief in 
military parity between the great powers, and his early insight into what would become 
the Euromissile Crisis (spanning the years from 1977 to 1983) forced him to take a more 
confronting stand vis á vis Moscow. In fact, being a “centrist to the core,” he lost his 
office over that dispute because his own party deserted him in 1982.
149
 Even during those 
years of a dawning second Cold War arms-race, Schmidt noted in one of his many 
autobiographic reflections that Brezhnev had a certain “understanding for my deep 
concern about the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles with which the Soviet Union 
threatened to exterminate all important cities and military targets on German soil.”
150
Schmidt, again, attributed this understanding to a shared war experience. 
His personal sense of history and sensitivity for the persistence of memories thus 
blended with the changes in West German political culture now fully under way as the 
ideals and ideas of the 1968 movement disseminated amongst many parts of society.
151
 He 
was the first chancellor to visit and speak at Auschwitz in 1977, finding exceptionally 
well-chosen words to express “West German atonement and remorse.”
152
 Equally unique 
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was his speech commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the anti-Jewish pogroms of 
November 9, 1938, because he began by actually detailing the brutal events he was about 
to commemorate.
153
  He also found strong words to expose most Germans’ passivity to 
and complicity in Nazi crimes.
154
These changes in the political memory of the Second World War were in part a 
distancing from and in part a reception of new trends in historiography. During the 1970s, 
many World War II historians turned increasingly to neo-Marxist concepts in order to 
explain National Socialism. Discussions of theories of fascism departed from and arrived 
at a critique of capitalism. They paid comparatively little attention to archival studies of 
actual events and its causes.
155
 At the same time, some professional historians picked up 
the theory of a preventive war obviously inspired by David Irving’s widely-read works 
on Hitler’s war and his generals.
156
 Moreover, some of these arguments, such as that the 
Eastern Front war was a missed opportunity for a war of liberation for Eastern Europe, 
and that heinous crimes were committed on both sides and thus could and should be 
weighed against each other, entered mainstream historiography. They reflected the wide-
spread, diffuse and persisting desire to retrospectively legitimate the crusade against the 
153
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Soviet Union and to confirm the validity of anti-Bolshevism.
157
 The still-prevalent idea 
that already prior to 1945, Germans had stood on the right side – alongside the Western 
allies against the Soviet threat – had been a popular “illusion” in the conservative 
political circles since the 1950s.
158
Unlike their East German colleagues, Western historians largely left the economic 
and military elites’ involvement in Nazi crimes on the Eastern Front untouched. 
Important exceptions were Hillgruber’s 1978 essay on the image of Russia among the 
Wehrmacht leadership, and Rolf-Dieter Müller’s work on the “role of the industry in 
Hitler’s Eastern Empire.”
159
 Schmidt most certainly noticed these exceptions – during the 
controversy over the already mentioned Wehrmacht exhibit in 1995, he passionately 
fought against a collective condemnation of the Wehrmacht but knew the crimes in 
question very well – not, as he claimed, from personal experience but from postwar 
historical accounts.
160
 It was only during the later 1970s, that West German historians 
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began to address the genocidal character of the crusade against “Jewish Bolshevism” and 
identified the ideological amalgamate of anti-Semitism and anti-Bolshevism as the 
“centerpiece of the racial-ideological program of National Socialism.”
161
 The attack 
against the Soviet Union was now viewed as the prelude to the “final solution.”
162
 Helmut 
Krausnick and Jürgen Förster shed “new light” on the Wehrmacht’s warfare on the 
Eastern Front by illustrating the effective execution of the criminal orders and by turning 
attention to the millions of Jewish and non-Jewish Soviet citizens who perished under 
these orders.
163
 During the early 1980s, a number of historians published meticulously 
researched accounts of the murderous treatment of Soviet POWs in German captivity.
164
Gradually, also West German historians began to address the economic, exploitative 
aspects of the Eastern Front war.
165
And lastly, in 1982, Raul Hilberg’s seminal work on 
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the “destruction of the European Jews” finally came out in a German translation –
twenty-one years after its original publication.
166
The most important official statements of the Schmidt administration concerning the 
war against the Soviet Union originate in those years. The year 1981, the fortieth 
anniversary of the attack against the Soviet Union, was a pivotal milestone in the official 
commemoration of the Eastern Front: the anniversary fell in the midst of the Euro-
Missiles conflict. Schmidt’s foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (born 1927, FDP)
167
published a statement commemorating the attack on June 21, 1981. Compared to 
Erhard’s brief 1966 declaration, this statement was more precise and clearer with regards 
to causes and consequences, perpetrators and victims. Yet, amidst the heated controversy 
about the NATO double-track decision, its title exclusively alluded to the present, thus 
constituting another example for the politics of memory regarding the Eastern Front war: 
“A Policy of Securing Peace and Rapprochement.” Once again, the attacker was named 
upfront but the text’s very brief historical part indiscriminatingly referred to “millions” of 
unnamed victims in Europe.
Forty years ago, Hitler-Germany attacked the Soviet Union. This war brought immeasurable sufferings 
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Genscher’s statement further presented the Federal Republic as the only responsible 
heir to the Third Reich, having “visibly broken with spirit, aims, and policies of the 
National Socialist Regime which led to the Second World War.” In working towards a 
peaceful Europe, it demonstrated its “determination to never again let war break out on 
German soil.” The statement assured the “peoples of the Soviet Union for whom the 
Second World War had brought so much misery” that “we Germans stand by the 
renunciation of violence (bekennen uns zum Gewaltverzicht).” Without directly 
criticizing the Soviet Union for its rearmament policies in central Europe and 
expansionism in Afghanistan, Genscher’s declaration stressed the need for all states to 
“cooperate” with each other instead of “confronting” each other, to prefer the “sober 
dialogue” to “polemics,” and to exercise “restraint and responsibility when dealing with 
each other instead of striving for domination.” The fortieth anniversary of the beginning 
of the invasion once again marked a welcome occasion to demonstrate Bonn’s dedication 
to a “calculable policy towards all nations in the world,” a policy “contributing to 
stabilization and the securing of peace.”
169
One day later, chancellor Schmidt published an editorial addressing the anniversary 
in one of the leading national papers, Süddeutsche Zeitung – thus far an unprecedented 
gesture in the commemoration of the Eastern Front. Schmidt’s commentary in essence 
repeated Genscher’s political conclusions, yet his historical remarks were more 
ambiguous: on the one hand, Schmidt acknowledged that the “German attack has covered 




country had to bemoan more dead than the Soviet Union – over twenty million people.” 
Yet, on the other hand, Schmidt spoke of “Hitler’s war,” “Hitler’s attack,” and “Hitler’s 
crimes,” uniting the “terrible losses” of the German nation with the other victims in the 
call “never to forget.” Drastically downplaying Nazi Germany’s plans in Eastern Europe, 
Schmidt equalized Soviet wartime and German postwar sufferings: “What the National 
Socialist regime in the German Reich wanted to impose on the Russians – the partition of 
the state, and expulsion of people – is what happened afterwards to our own nation.”
170
Thus, Germany’s division was to Schmidt a crime comparable to Hitler’s “Plan 
Barbarossa,” except that the latter had failed. It was this connection to the present which 
prompted Schmidt to stress how the “evil consequences of World War II” still burdened 
the two nations’ relations to that day. Distrust and fear prevailed on both sides. Yet, while 
the Soviet Union betrayed mutual agreements regarding arms control, Germany 
continued its cooperative policies because it “has learned from the war.” In conlusion, 
Schmidt, the Eastern Front veteran, put this legacy into a comforting formula most 
Germans at that time were all too willing to accept: “We Germans today bear no guilt for 
Hitler’s war. But we carry the main moral burden to assure that the right lessons will be 
learned from Hitler’s war.” This not only stripped a whole generation of veterans of the 
responsibility for Nazi Germany’s military adventures, but it also put Germans once 
again in a position of deciding what was “right,” and what was wrong. Moreover, with a 
nod to NATO’s controversial double-track decision, Schmidt stressed that “no one can 
ask us to jeopardize our own security and our own freedom. We certainly won’t do that –
170
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for this we have the alliance and the Bundeswehr.” But, what “Jews, Poles, Frenchmen 
and Russians, indeed everyone in the world can ask of Germany is that we will never 
forget Hitler’s crimes and Hitler’s war.”
171
 This ostentatious willingness “not to forget” 
contained in fact no real acceptance of responsibility for it disassociated the German 
people from Hitler’s war.
The fortieth anniversary of “Operation Barbarossa” was addressed once again in 
1981 in context of the memorial service on the National Day of Mourning. Just two 
months earlier, many West Germans had closely watched “The Unforgotten War,” the 
first documentary series on the Eastern Front war aired on West German television.
172
 The 
president of the Bundestag, Annemarie Renger (SPD), delivered a thoughtful speech 
dedicated to honouring the dead, but also to recalling that there was no good fighting in a 
wrong war – a notion Schmidt strongly disagreed with. World War II, Renger argued, 
was launched in the “name of the German people as naked war of aggression and 
conquest.” It should not be forgotten that the “willingness to give one’s life was 
demanded by a regime that was in its nature criminal.”
173
 This was a bitter truth for 
veterans to swallow in postwar Germany. Most politicians had long avoided this candor 
in context of the National Day of Mourning.
174
Schmidt too refused to fully acknowledge 
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he still saw himself obliged to fulfil “my military duties.”
175
 This sense of obligation he 
would never come to question in retrospective.  
Thus, even with the Eastern Front veteran Schmidt heading the Bonn government, 
the political memory of the Eastern Front war remained largely vague and inconspicuous. 
While it had attained a more prominent position in the official memorial calendar, the 
political leadership still avoided direct and detailed references to German war crimes in 
the Soviet Union. Schmidt’s semi-public ponderings over the Eastern Front face to face 
with Brezhnev are in so far relevant as they demonstrate how little of his personal lessons 
from history Schmidt was willing to relate to the public. With the transition to Helmut 
Kohl’s self-declared “turn” amidst a “spiritual-political crisis”
176
– a turn which included 
the goal to popularize a more affirmative, patriotic understanding of German history –
such in-depth references at first seemed even less likely.
177
 Yet, it was under Kohl and 
federal president Richard von Weizsäcker, that the controversial commemoration of the 
war’s end in 1985, the Historikerstreit and the further erosion of West Germany’s 
“victims myth” (Robert Moeller) would compel the political establishment to publicly 
acknowledge – and actually name – what had happened on the Eastern Front between 
1941 and 1945 to Nazi Germany’s other victims.
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Kohl’s “public use of history” had two main themes: he presented himself as a 
person blessed with the “grace of late birth,”
179
 and as the representative of a democratic 
Germany dedicated to proving that “we have learned from history.”
180
 He had grown up in 
a Catholic, anti-Nazi home, with his father prophesying at the kitchen table that “Hitler
means war.”
181
 As young teenager, Kohl helped clean away bodies and rubble after allied 
air raids on his home town Ludwigshafen. After his evacuation in 1944, the boy was 
hired to help remove precarious documents and records from the Nazi leadership’s 
private homes and offices in Berchtesgarden.
182
 As a student of law and history during the 
1950s, Kohl focussed on the contemporary challenges facing his country. His dissertation 
dealt with the re-emergence of the political parties in the Palatinate after 1945. As 
chancellor, he would develop a strong propensity for detecting and exploiting the 
historical moment – sometimes with much tact, as during a memorial service in Verdun 
with French president François Mitterand in 1984, and sometimes with surprisingly little 
sense for the appropriate as during his visit to a cemetery of American and German 
soldiers, including SS-men, in Bitburg with U.S. president Ronald Reagan on May 5, 
179
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 Herf has pointed out that the Bitburg visit was so controversial because it 
“displaced the realities of the Nazi era in a fog of manipulative sentimentalism.”
184
 If to 
Kohl and Reagan it was an act of expressing friendship between the US and West 
Germany to blurr the lines between the former enemies by honoring dead allied soldiers 
alongside Wehrmacht soldiers, members of the SS and Waffen SS, then doing the 
opposite, namely speaking of the war of extermination planned and executed by 
Wehrmacht, SS and Waffen SS, potentially implied anti-German sentiment. And because 
West Germany was since 1945 opposed to he Soviet Union alongside its former Western 
enemies, Kohl’s politics of memory in Bitburg “seemed to offer symbolic confirmation 
of an unbroken continuity between the Wehrmacht’s war against the Soviet Union and 
the Cold War that followed.”
185
 Germany had been on the “right side” all along. 
This was not Kohl’s view of German history, however, and another public 
commemoration ceremony just a few days before Bitburg gave him the opportunity to 
ameliorate the heated emotional debate which his plans to visit the soldiers ceremony had 
stirred. In Bergen-Belsen, Kohl gave a historic speech on the fortieth anniversary of the 
concentration camp’s liberation on April 21, 1945. It was historic because it was the first 
time, a West German chancellor spoke publicly and explicitly about the crimes 
committed against Soviet POWs on the Eastern Front and in concentration camps within 
the Reich such as Bergen-Belsen. Four years after the first major historical work on the 
German treatment of Soviet POWs had appeared (Christian Streit’s Keine Kameraden), 
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Kohl was the first political leader to appropriately resonate these findings in one of his 
historical speeches. Stressing the need to educate Germans about “the time of murder, 
indeed of genocide, the darkest, most painful chapter in German history” and to keep the 
“conscience alive for the scope, for the dimension of this historical experience and 
burden,” Kohl commemorated “most of all the persecution and murder of the Jews.”
186
 He 
asked “why so many people remained indifferent, didn’t listen, didn’t want to realize” 
what was about to unfold after 1933. After all, what the Nazis had in mind for the Jews 
became not just visible on November 8, 1938, “when 35,000 Jewish fellow-citizens were 
carried of to concentration camps.”
187
 But Kohl also referred to the many other victims of 
Nazism: Sinti and Roma, the mentally handicapped, Soviet POWs, the civilian population
in Eastern Europe. It is particularly noteworthy that he decided not just to mention these 
victims, but that he attempted to tell their stories, an approach to Germany’s other victims 
hitherto unknown in the political speech of the Bonn republic:
When the camp was erected at Bergen-Belsen, they at first brought Russian POWs here. The way they 
were housed and treated became a torture to the prisoners. Over 50,000 alone died here in the area 
around Bergen-Belsen. This too we must always remember: of the overall almost six million Soviet 
soldiers who were captured, less than half survived. And thus, at this hour, we also bethink the 
sufferings that were inflicted on the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe in the German name. We 
remember the war dead of the Soviet Union. And we remember the crimes against the Polish nation.
188
Even if Kohl, too, left the perpetrators in the dark, the details he did communicate were at 
that time only beginning to become public knowledge in West Germany. Moreover, he
respected the singularity of the crimes committed “in the German name” against Soviet 
186
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POWs by avoiding the routine reference to the many German soldiers and POWs who 
had perished in the Soviet Union (yet, he did mention the German expellees, the victims 
of “new injustice”). It is remarkable that on this occasion Kohl also anticipated the 
essence of Weizsäcker’s famous speech to be delivered on May 8, 1985: May 8, 1945, he 
contended, was “for the Germans a day of liberation,” not just for those directly 
victimized and occupied by the Nazis, but for all Germans. And he assured his audience, 
that Germans knew of their “responsibility before history,” a responsibility “that also 
finds expression in a shame never to become time-barred.”
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President Weizsäcker’s much-cited 1985 speech
190
 commemorating the fortieth 
anniversary of the end of the war did include a reference to the “peoples who have 
suffered in the war, most of all the inexpressibly many citizens of the Soviet Union and 
of Poland who have lost their lives.”
191
 He also discussed the Hitler-Stalin-pact criticizing 
the Soviet Union for exploiting other nations’ wars to profit with territorial gains. “Yet, 
the initiative of war came from Germany, not from the Soviet Union. It was Hitler who 
took up force. The beginning of the Second World War remains tied to the German 
name.”
192
 Weizsäcker named a few places which symbolized Nazi crimes – the Warsaw 
Ghetto, Lidice, Rotterdam. But it took another six years for a German head of state to 
refer specifically to crime scenes in the Soviet Union: Kohl, addressing the fiftieth 
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referred to the siege of Leningrad, one of the most horrendous chapters in the 
Wehrmacht’s war on the Eastern Front.
193
Yet, an important milestone in the public commemoration of the Eastern Front war 
was a speech given by president of the Bundestag Phillip Jenninger (born 1932, CDU) in 
November 1988 commemorating the 1938 anti-Jewish pogroms.
194
 The scandal his speech 
ensued was due to his attempt to explain the Germans’ “fascination” with Hitler, to 
reconstruct how the amalgamate of a century-old popular anti-Semitism and a racially 
inspired extremist nationalism could lead to organized industrial mass murder of the 
European Jews. The opposition charged Jenninger with succumbing to this “fascination” 
by slipping into the minds of ordinary Germans; about fifty deputies of the SPD and the 
Greens walked out during his speech and the spiral of negative reactions to his speech 
forced him to eventually resign from his post.
195
 The ostentatious lack of support amongst 
his own conservative ranks can be explained with the other controversial argument 
Jenninger’s speech put forward: that “the planning of the war in the East and the 
destruction of the Jews were inseparable from each other, that one without the other 
would not have been possible.”
196
 This was indeed the first time a leading West German 
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politician connected the war on the Eastern Front with the Holocaust, and thus also linked 
the Wehrmacht’s warfare with its execution. 
If the view is extended beyond the fall of the wall in 1989 and beyond the unification 
of Germany, Kohl can be said to have been the first German chancellor to begin to name 
the crimes committed in the war against the Soviet Union. In 1991, in the aftermath of 
German reunification and amidst the last days of the Soviet state, Kohl sent a formal 
letter to the Kremlin, addressing the CPSU ZK’s general secretary Michael Gorbachev
(born 1931) directly. He also gave a televised speech to the Soviet public more than 
twenty years after Brandt’s appearance on Soviet television after the signing of the 
Moscow treaty. In his television address Kohl said that “German troops” had attacked the 
Soviet Union” to carry out a “war launched by the Hitler dictatorship.” This war inflicted 
“inexpressible suffering on the peoples of the Soviet Union.” Yet “no numbers can 
measure this misery. Our grief extends on all innocent victims, the children, the women, 
the elderly. It extends on the millions of soldiers who suffered fear, misery, and death on 
the battlefields of this war.”
197
 And for the first time he referred to the “two cities in the 
Soviet Union whose names symbolize all the cruelty of the war the National Socialist 
leaders had planned as war of extermination: Leningrad and Stalingrad.” The siege of 
Leningrad, Kohl contended, symbolized the “inexpressible sufferings inflicted on the 
civilian population,” Stalingrad “stands for the inferno of total warfare.” Yet, Kohl made 
this statement on Soviet television; it was not a speech addressing a domestic audience 
197
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and maybe that is why he mentioned the siege of Leningrad and the “German hands” 
which had committed those and other crimes. 
Even though an unprecedented media attention at home placed the fiftieth 
anniversary of the attack at the center of public attention, the political leadership still only 
reluctantly spoke of the historical truth.
198
 Kohl’s remarks on Soviet television, however, 
were the most explicit reference to Nazi war crimes – and a hint at the Wehrmacht’s 
incriminating role – a German chancellor had ever made thus far. Speaking now as 
chancellor of a united Germany half a century after the beginning of “Operation 
Barbarossa,” Kohl vowed to honor the legacies left by the Eastern Front war: “In view of 
the crimes which were committed in the German name and by German hands, we 
solemnly swear: Never again dictatorship! Never again war!”
199
The changing political memory of the Eastern Front war was crucial for the easing of 
tensions between West Germany and the Soviet Union since the 1960s. Brandt, Bahr and 
Scheel would not have succeeded with Ostpolitik without convincing the Soviets of their 
genuine determination to revisit the Eastern Front war, its history and legacy. Even 
though Brandt and his successor Schmidt were far from fully acknowledging the criminal 
dimension of the Nazi war against the Soviet Union, their shift in content and tone of the 
Eastern Front memory signalled that West Germany was taking Soviet historical and 
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security concerns more seriously, sought to dispel them and supplant these concerns with 
trust. This shift was a crucial precondition for the rapprochement between the two former 
enemy nations. As the many historical, often private conversations initiated by Brezhnev
demonstrate, to Moscow, history was the third party at the table and the shadows of the 
past needed to be addressed before diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic could 
normalize. Remarkably, the Eastern Front memory continued to influence the diplomatic 
theater even after the conflict over Soviet missiles in central Europe, and the invasion of 
Afghanistan had worsened relations once again. Schmidt, in particular, clung on to the 
notion that the shared experience of the horrors of war obliged the leaders of the two 
nations to preserve peace at all costs. 
To the degree to which the West German memory of the Eastern Front became more 
balanced and nuanced, the East German reminiscences to the war against the Soviet 
Union faded from the political sphere. With Ostpolitik, the long-standing “two-camp 
theory” had become (almost) obsolete, and Honecker’s personal dedication to the alliance 
with the Soviet Union no longer required as much to exploit the Eastern Front memory as 
evidence for East Berlin’s unwavering, “eternal” loyalty. Nonetheless, Honecker 
appropriated the Eastern Front to his agenda of connecting the antifascist narrative with 
the achievements of “real existing socialism,” substituting the lack of war experience 
with an extra sense for historical locations and their celebration – his visits to Stalingrad 
and Krasnogorsk served this agenda well. Yet, under Honecker’s rule, the political 
memory of the Eastern Front became less detailed, less nuanced, even less historical. It 
seems that to the degree to which the legitimizing power of the antifascist “founding 
myth” faded away during the 1980s, it became also less relevant for the SED to keep the 
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Soviet Union and its role as Hitler’s prime victim and victor during World War II at the 
center of public attention.
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Conclusion
“The war is not over as long as there is one wound still bleeding from it.”
Heinrich Böll
660
Postwar German political culture cannot be properly understood without considering 
the impact the experience of war and its aftermath had on German society. Whereas 
historians thus far have focused on studying the memory of German suffering and the 
Holocaust, this study has demonstrated how central the Eastern Front memory was in 
German postwar political culture on both sides of the Iron Curtain.  The memory of the 
war against the Soviet Union was a politicum from the very beginnings. With the division 
of Germany in the wake of the Cold War, remembering the Eastern Front, especially 
German crimes commissioned in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe between 1941 and 
1945, posed an immense challenge to the emerging political elites. In the GDR, the 
SED’s monopoly over the interpretation of history secured the Eastern Front war the 
most prominent position in the political memory of the Second World War. In the FRG, 
in contrast, it took the political leadership decades to formulate a critical Eastern Front 
memory. My study suggests that with the emergence of the Holocaust memory since the 
1960s, it was possible to evade the other historic crime of Nazism – the “war of 
extermination” in the Soviet Union – until the 1980s. Thus, in as much as the “divided 
memory” (Jeffrey Herf) of the Holocaust marginalized the mass murder of the European 
Jews in East Germany – with the SED instead focusing on the Soviet Union as Hitler’s 
prime victim and conqueror – it in turn marginalized the Eastern Front as monstrous 
crime scene in West German memory with the political leaders since Kiesinger/Brandt
placing the Holocaust at the center of official narratives about Germany’s role in World 
War II. 
In both Germanys, the political elites perpetuated an artificial division of the criminal 
legacy of the Third Reich: they failed to connect the two most outrageous crimes planned 
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and executed by Nazi Germany, namely the crusade against “Jewish Bolshevism” in the 
Soviet Union and the extermination of the European Jews. However, this study has not 
neglected that politicians are not historians, and that they cannot and should not be 
expected to speak about historical events from a professional historian’s point of view. 
This is indeed not the measure a study of public memory should employ. Yet, my 
analysis has demonstrated how the propensity of politicians (and ideologues) to keep 
references to historical events largely ambiguous and vague instead of fleshing them out 
with specific details, contributed to the public misuse of history – of history’s bold 
instrumentalization in the East, and elusive avoidance in the West, and thus its all too 
frequent misrepresentation in both Germanys. In contrast, politicians like Brandt, 
Schmidt, Jenninger, or Kohl, who in rare cases paid attention to specific events, historic 
details, and overall context, came closest to portraying history in its full complexity and 
ever-prevalent ambiguity. 
With a long-term view and from a comparative perspective, my study has 
highlighted the fact that over the course of half a century, the experience of war and total 
defeat has had a decisive impact on German society and politics. The brutalization of 
warfare taking place on the Eastern Front between 1941 and 1945 in the course of which 
Germans not only experienced mass death but were first and foremost “those who did the 
killing,” was one source for the “stigma of violence”
1
 which left its mark on postwar 
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German political culture ever since the end of the Third Reich. This stigma explains the 
“difficulty of ending the war” on the Eastern Front in either Germany.
2
 Coming to terms 
with this legacy oscillating between the sufferings Germans have inflicted on others, and 
the losses incurred by Germans themselves, was a major political, intellectual and 
emotional challenge for Germany’s political elite. The master narrative forged by the 
Nazis since the beginning of “Operation Barbarossa” in 1941 declared the war a crusade 
against Jewish Bolshevism, a test of fate forced upon the German people to save their 
own existence and to save Europe from the Bolshevist menace. In reality, this was a war 
waged to put into practice the Nazis’ vision of a racially homogenous Aryan empire and 
of gaining “living space” at the expense of millions of Eastern Europeans. Under the 
pretext of fighting a Jewish-Bolshevist world conspiracy, Hitler launched his “essential 
war” (Jürgen Förster) against the Soviet Union and thus created the most important 
precondition for genocide: it was the Eastern Front war which enabled the Nazis to 
proceed with the extermination of the European Jewry on and behind the front lines, as 
well as in the vast territories occupied by the Wehrmacht. 
Most Germans perceived the Eastern Front as the worst war theater, and the losses 
incurred during battle of Stalingrad endowed the name Stalingrad with a metaphorical 
meaning: as a collective trauma, it came to embody German suffering during World War 
II. Yet, at the same time, the Nazi propaganda leading up to the war, as well as the 
collective hunch most Germans evidently had about the criminal dimension of 
“Operation Barbarossa,” burdened the narrative of ultimate suffering with the question of 
2
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guilt. Both these aspects, the traumatic experience of mass death among German soldiers 
and the concurrent commission of unprecedented crimes against non-Germans, constitute 
the “legacies of Stalingrad.” During the Nuremberg interregnum, this ambiguous legacy 
was part of the public discourse in all four zones of occupation. Several Allied war 
crimes trials addressed the criminal nature of the Wehrmacht’s war against the Soviet 
Union en detail, the media reported heavily and for a brief moment in postwar German 
history, the historical reality of the Eastern Front was subject of public discussion. The 
facts unearthed by Allied prosecutors, however, did not become part of the political 
memories of the Eastern Front war as they were forged by the political leaders in East 
and West Germany. 
For differing reasons and to varying degrees, crucial parts of the story were 
marginalized, acquiesced, or distorted. Seeking to forge “usable pasts” (Robert Moeller), 
the political elites put their interpretations of the war into the service of the present. The 
conceptual premise of this long-term study was to examine the relationship and 
intersections between memory and politics, historical narratives and political legitimacy, 
meaning and power. By focussing in this sense on the “public use of history” (Jürgen 
Habermas) in the political and diplomatic spheres, this kind of political-cultural history 
can indeed deepen our understanding of these intersections and the impact they can have 
on the political culture of postwar societies. In the GDR, the SED propagated the war 
against the Soviet Union as the centerpiece of its master narrative about World War II. 
The Red Army’s fight alongside German communists, transformed “Stalingraders,” and 
NKFD activists served as the historical starting point for the building of socialism in one 
half of postwar Germany. The postulate of a historically generated, quasi-organic 
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friendship between the former arch-enemies, Soviet Union and Germany, was one 
fundament on which the SED hoped to plant and cultivate its political legitimacy. It was 
not only the “antifascist myth” on which the East German communists founded their 
state, it was also the project of German-Soviet friendship with which they claimed to 
realize the right lessons learned from the past. The GDR’s raison d’être was in fact not 
based on one or the other, but on the combination of these two interdependent historical 
narratives. Yet, the calculated presence of the Eastern Front war in the GDR did not 
entail a nuanced and detailed confrontation of the historic crimes committed in its course. 
Rather, by blaming the attack on German imperialism, the SED exculpated the ordinary 
soldier by putting him in one line with Hitler’s other victims. Blinded and abused, the 
German working class had become the tool of German fascism, not its supporter, and nor 
its executor. As my analysis of the judicial reckoning with Eastern Front crimes has 
shown, the SED’s calculated focus on the war against the Soviet Union did not lead to a 
more thorough prosecution of war crimes committed by potential perpetrators residing in 
the GDR. It merely entailed a bias towards Soviet victims. Thus, the SED’s political 
memory of the Eastern Front war included remembering the crimes against Soviet 
civilians, Soviet POWs, and partisans – in contrast to what West German politicians 
communicated – yet, the concrete circumstances of their commission and execution, or 
even the identity of the main victim group, the Jews, remained obscure until the 1980s. 
The process of “internalizing” the Nazi past in West Germany lasted for decades. 
Memory shifted from the victims perspective dominant during the 1950s to a perpetrator 
perspective in the late 1960s. The most important result of this shift was the 
acknowledgment of the Holocaust as Germany’s historic crime and lasting liability. Yet, 
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even though the mass murder of the Jews almost exclusively took place on and behind 
the Eastern Front lines, the closely related, in fact conditional war against the Soviet 
Union remained marginal much longer. Political leaders such as Adenauer and Heuss, in 
general, accepted German guilt but they were unwilling and/or unable to escape the 
political and ideological needs of the day. In light of the Cold War and confronted with 
Soviet expansionism, they largely neglected the conflict’s dramatic prehistory. With the 
ascendancy of the Cold War, the old enemy Soviet Union became the new enemy. Thus, 
democratic anticommunism and the political realities of the bloc confrontation long 
hindered a sincere reckoning with the Eastern Front war legacies. Even after the era 
Brandt had shifted political memory towards a more conciliatory tone in the 1960s/70s, it 
took another twenty years to permanently shatter the “myth of the clean Wehrmacht” in 
(West) German society.
The memory of the Eastern Front war in postwar Germany was political because its 
core touched on the nature of German-Soviet relations, it is a key chapter in the post-
1945 history of the “Russia Complex.”
3
 In the GDR, Ulbricht, Norden and other 
communists excelled in putting this event happening in the past into the service of the 
present. In several crucial moments in East German history – the “building of socialism” 
campaign in 1952, the June uprisings in 1953, the creation of the armed forces, and the 
building of the wall in 1961 – they invoked the Eastern Front memory in order to rally 




Cold War had cooled down in the wake of Détente, Honecker’s politics of memory 
interpreted the war against the Soviet Union less instrumentally and rather canonized its 
content. The rapprochement between Bonn and Moscow called for a more sophisticated 
“history propaganda,” one still capable of unmasking reactionary anti-Soviet tendencies 
in the West, but also of solving the ideological dilemma posed by Ostpolitik. Yet, 
towards the end of the 1970s, during the crisis of the Euro Missiles the old stereotypes 
seemed to make sense again. Once again, albeit with lesser propagandistic zeal and 
creativity as Ulbricht, Honecker invoked the “lessons of Barbarossa” in order to 
denounce the West’s stand against the Soviet Union.
In West German political culture, the criminal legacy of the Eastern Front war 
remained long neglected. This has been observed before but this study has fully 
illustrated the degree and severity of this denial. Under Adenauer, in context of severe 
Cold War tensions and firmly rooted in the antitolitarian consensus, West German 
politics mostly refused even to address the fact that Nazi Germany’s war had claimed 20 
million lives in the Soviet Union, two thirds of which civilian. Although Adenauer was 
aware of the “war thing” and its role in Soviet memory, and although president Heuss
included “Russian mothers” among the mourners of the war’s dead in his speeches, the 
crimes committed in Eastern Europe, and in the Soviet Union in particular, were absent 
from the political memory of the Eastern Front until the mid-1960s. Instead, the 
unresolved issue of the remaining German POWs, the fate of the German population 
fleeing the Red Army in the last year of the war, and the continuous presence of Soviet 
forces in East Germany dominated the discourse about the war’s legacy. This selective 
Eastern Front memory was a central feature shaping the West German victimization 
667
discourse during the 1950s. Likewise, in the realm of military and defense policy, 
political leaders were not inclined to discuss the current situation – a divided Germany –
and current Soviet security concerns in context of the recent burdensome past. During the 
remilitarization debates in the Bundestag none of the key speakers discussed the 
problematic nexus between “Operation Barbarossa” and a new German “Wehrmacht.” 
The desire to move on, to become a permanent and respected member of the Western 
“free world,” both required and facilitated the marginalization of the Eastern Front war. 
Only in the wake of Brandt’s Ostpolitik, the political leadership brought the reality 
and legacy of this war (back) on the political agenda. Ostpolitik’s success depended on 
the ability of the Bonn administration to convince the Soviet leaders of a sincere change 
in the political memory of the German-Soviet war. Without the acknowledgment of the 
Soviet Union’s role and sacrifices in World War II, a rapprochement between Moscow 
and Bonn was unthinkable. Yet, the continuous Cold War divide limited this 
reconsideration. Schmidt, the only postwar German chancellor to have fought on the 
Eastern Front – his veteran experience is comparable only to Ulbricht’s NKFD activities 
– semi-publicly reflected on his war memories in his conversations with Brezhnev. In his 
political speeches, however, he was far from addressing the Eastern Front war as the 
main site of German war crimes. His conviction that the Wehrmacht as he knew it had 
been the “last decent organization” in the Nazi Reich contributed no less to the 
persistence of a selective, basically still uncritical Eastern Front memory. This memory 
also ignored the connection between “Operation Barbarossa” and the “Final Solution.” 
Only in 1988, a leading West German politician, president of the Bundestag Philipp 
Jenninger, publicly discussed this link in his controversial speech commemorating the 
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pogroms of November 9, 1938. And it took until after the fall of the wall for a German 
chancellor to refer specifically, not without pointing to Stalingrad first, to one of the most 
horrible episodes in the war against the Soviet Union: the siege of Leningrad. And not 
even at this point has the political memory of the Eastern Front reached a level of 
historical specificity and clarity that has come to characterize West German reflection on 
the Holocaust. In pointing to the overbearing Cold War context and to the intricate 
connection between history, memory and politics, the preceding pages indicate why the 
relatively clear and precise memory of the Holocaust emerged far sooner and more 
powerfully than did the memory of the crimes of the Nazi regime on the largest front of 
the Second World War.
It has been demonstrated that the respective founding narratives – German-Soviet 
friendship in the East, antitotalitarianism in the West – as well as the dominant mutually 
hostile Cold War context allowed the political elites to evade the question of individual 
guilt and to neglect the nexus between genocidal war and the Holocaust. The “myth of a
clean Wehrmacht” facilitated in both Germanys the lasting separation of those two 
central lieux de mémoire which to this day embody the tremendous German sufferings 
and the unprecedented German crimes committed during World War II: Stalingrad and 
Auschwitz.
Aside from reconstructing in which ways the Eastern Front memories were 
motivated by contrasting ideological and political interests, this study has also attempted 
to consider the biographical factor as many postwar politicians were also the children of
war. Ulbricht’s front experience, his personal memories of the battle of Stalingrad, and 
his commitment to writing history after the war, reveals the intricate link between 
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wartime experience and postwar politics. It was not only his world view, his ideology, his 
political calculations which motivated his Eastern Front memory but also his veteran 
biography. He firmly believed in the righteousness of his interpretation of history and the 
position he deduced from it for himself as the leader of a socialist Germany. After all, he 
had been on the “right” side of history, the victor’s side, all along. Ulbricht, Pieck, 
Norden, Abusch, Becher and others believed they were entitled to lead the mission for 
Germany’s antifascist reeducation; their historical experiences had a tremendous impact 
on their self-understanding as political avantgarde of the “better Germany.” The 
“Hegelian moment” (Jeffrey Herf) they were referring to constituted the formative 
experience of their lives, empowering them to lead future generations, a phenomenon 
comparable to the role the October Revolution played in the lives and minds of the Soviet 
Bolsheviks during the 1920s. Just as to these “revolutionaries, whose entire adult lives 
had been devoted to enlightening the dark masses with the revolutionary message,” to 
Ulbricht and his comrades, writing and disseminating the lessons of “Barbarossa” meant 
“not a mere description of events but an argument about their transcendent significance.”
4
To a lesser extent this is also true for a number of other Stalingrad veterans such as 
Adam, Homann, Korfes or Steidle attained important political, administrative and 
military positions in the SED state. Claiming to have experienced a cathartic 
transformation in Soviet captivity, these “Stalingraders” also aligned with the “better 
Germany” and were even able to preserve their soldierly identities to a large extent: they 
continued the fight – only now as “good soldiers,” as militant pacifists in the fight for 
4
Corney, Telling October, 45.
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peace. Hundreds of former rank-and-file soldiers returning from Soviet captivity, claimed 
having passed through a similar transformative process of “reflection and return.” They, 
just as their West German counterparts, seemed to have been able to forge ultimately 
liberating, redemptive narratives which explains why many of them willingly joined in 
the socialist project in the GDR. Not only that their practical employment, for example in 
the police apparatus, contributed to the stabilization of the Stalinist one-party-state; their 
ideological commitment to the German-Soviet friendship project was a crucial 
contribution to the SED’s quest for legitimacy – and in turn liberated every one of them 
from the burden of historical guilt.
Much like in the East, veterans in West Germany also sought to make sense of their 
wartime experience; they too forged “redemptive memories” (Frank Biess) or “legitimate 
narratives” (Joanna Bourke) of war. By freely communicating their soldierly experience
in veteran journals they contributed to the discourse of a democratic anti-totalitarianism 
in the early Federal Republic – naturally without being convinced democrats in any case. 
Yet, the degree of denial with regards to the criminal nature of the Eastern Front war 
points to the questionable side-effects of the anti-totalitarian consensus. It allowed former 
Wehrmacht officers to publicly ponder over the lessons to be drawn from the war against 
the Soviet Union only in order to improve the odds of a new “Wehrmacht” to win its 
relaunch. 
It was thus less surprising to discover that a more sincere and reflective confrontation 
of the Eastern Front war, the ambivalent role of the soldier as victim and perpetrator, and 
the human suffering it entailed for millions of civilians, took place in the early postwar 
literature. In spite of the ideological bias of the East German literature, and the outcast 
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position of many West German writers in the Adenauer era , both literary scenes 
produced a number of works which offered a medium for meditating the personal and 
historical legacies of this war. 
A similarly nuanced conclusion derives from the analysis of the East and West 
German historiography on the Eastern Front war. Even though history was a “weapon” 
for Ulbricht, and the SED utilized this weapon constantly for its “history propaganda,” a 
number of East German historians have early on addressed crucial aspects of the Eastern 
Front history, for example the profitable complicity of many German businesses in the 
Holocaust, or the OKW’s deep involvement with the planning and execution of the “war 
of extermination” in the Soviet Union. Western historiography started to grapple with 
these issues much later. In turn, GDR accounts of World War II singularized the war to 
its effects on the Soviet Union, to the Red Army’s “war of liberation” in the East, and to 
the sufferings of a limited group of people (German communists, Soviet civilians, and 
POWs). The mass murder of the Jews, and the Western Allies’ contribution to the victory 
over Nazism were long downplayed, at least until the early 1980s. In fact, historiography 
and the SED’s “history propaganda” emphasized June 22, 1941 to such an extent that it 
often seemed World War II had broken out only then, and not on September 1, 1939. The 
preceding events, including the invasion of Poland and France, were relegated to the 
status of the war’s pre-history. It is no less disconcerting to realize how long it took West 
German historians to address the nature of the Wehrmacht’s warfare, its complicity in 
war crimes and genocide, and to write the history of the millions of Soviet POWs who 
perished in German captivity. Similarly to the initially reluctant confrontation of the 
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Holocaust among West German historians, German crimes on the Eastern Front war long 
remained a subject of ignorance.
5
My study has explored the intricate relationship between war, memory and politics, 
and even though its focus was on the political memory of the Eastern Front war, it has 
occasionally ventured into the realm of individual memories. It has unearthed the 
connections between the politics of memory and veteran attempts to make sense of war. 
Yet, political memory pervades the political culture of a society, shaping collective 
memory, imbuing it with a sense of a common past and identity. At the very end of my 
analysis, I therefore would like to address – at least partially – the question of how the 
political memory of the war against the Soviet Union shaped German public opinion until 
the fall of the wall. 
The concept of “public” or “popular” opinion is debatable; occasionally, scholars 
prefer to refer to a “second public” (zweite Öffentlichkeit) in dictatorial societies, thus 
stressing the absence of basic conditions for the emergence of something like a “popular 
opinion,” namely freedom of speech and a free press.
6
 One must also be aware of the 
methodological pitfalls of comparing statistical polls taken in the Federal Republic with 
centralized “public opinion research” in the GDR. Nonetheless, I propose to draw on both 
sources albeit with equal critical care. Especially the latter, the polls taken by the 
“Institute for Public Opinion Research” (Berlin) and the “Central Institute for Youth 
5
 Cf. Nicolas Berg’s controversial, Der Holocaust und die westdeutschen Historiker.
6
 See for example Katja Naumann, Eine zweite Öffentlichkeit?: Zur Verbreitung von Untergrundliteratur 
während der 80er Jahre in Leipzig (Leipzig: Edition Leipziger Kreis, 2004). A less critical approach to the 
concept is Mark Allinson’s Politics and Popular Opinion in East Germany, 1945-1968 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2000).
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Research” (Leipzig) between 1964 and 1990 in the GDR, are a valuable, hitherto largely 
neglected source for the extent of support (and dissent) for the SED regime.
7
 For the 
study of West German public opinion about the Soviet Union I rely on the Allensbach 
Institute’s quantitative analyses as well as on scholarly research.
8
 In order to extract what 
is most relevant for my topic from these sources the focus rests on polls addressing 
German views of the Soviet Union, and for the East German case, on data dealing with 
the “historical conscience” (“Geschichtsbewußtsein”) of the population.
Already in 1965, Walter Laqueur aptly summarized the West German position 
towards the Soviet Union. For most of the FRG’s history, the attitude of the government 
and of the public was one of “fear and resentment.”
9
 While over time, West German 
political culture acknowledged the Holocaust as one of Nazi Germany’s worst crimes, 
7
 On the IfM see Heinz Niemann, Meinungsforschung in der DDR. Die geheimen Berichte des Instituts für 
Meinungsforschung an das Politbüro der SED (Köln: Bund-Verlag, 1993). Idem, Hinterm Zaun. Politische 
Kultur und Meinungsforschung in der DDR – die geheimen Berichte an das Politbüro der SED (Berlin: 
edition ost, 1995). For a critical review of the social sciences in general, and public opinion research in 
particular, in the GDR, see Heinrich Best, ed., Sozialwissenschaften in der DDR und in den neuen 
Bundesländern. Ein
Vademecum (Bonn: Informationszentrum Sozialwissenschaften, 1993). Gesellschaft 
Sozialwissenschaftlicher Infrastruktureinrichtungen e.V. (GESIS) et.al., eds., Materialien zur Erforschung 
der DDR-Gesellschaft. Quellen. Daten. Instrumente (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1998). Evelyn Brislinger, 
Brigitte Hausstein, Eberhard Riedel, Jugend im Osten. Sozialwissenschaftliche Daten und Kontextwissen 
aus der DDR sowie den neuen Bundesländern (1969-1995) (Berlin: trafo verlag, 1997). And Walter 
Friedrich, Peter Förster, Kurt Starke, eds., Das Zentralinstitut für Jugendforschung Leipzig 1966-1990. 
Geschichte, Methoden, Erkenntnisse (Berlin: edition ost, 1999). Peter Förster has demonstrated the value of 
this research for assessing public opinion in East Germany – and for the comparative perspective as well, 
cf. Peter Förster, „Die deutsche Frage im Bewußtsein der Bevölkerung in beiden Teilen Deutschlands: Das 
Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl der Deutschen; Einstellungen junger Menschen in der DDR,“ in Materialen 
der Enquete-Kommission „Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland, vol. 
5: “Deutschlandpolitik, innerdeutsche Beziehungen und internationale Rahmenbedingungen” (ed. 
Deutscher Bundestag, Berlin, 1995), 1212-1380.
8
 Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, Erich Peter Neumann, eds., The Germans. Public Opinion Polls 1947-1966 
(Allensbach, Bonn: Verlag für Demoskopie, 1967), Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, Edgar Piel, eds., 
Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie (München: Saur, 1976ff.). Arnold Sywottek, “Die Sowjetunion in 
westdeutscher Sicht seit 1945,” in Niedhart, ed., Der Westen und die Sowjetunion, 289-362. And Walter 
Laqueur, Russia and Germany. A Century of Conflict (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1965), esp. 271-287.
9
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even reflected “some remorse about the murder of millions of the Jews,” there were “no 
guilt feelings with regard to Russians, Poles and Czechs.” Memory of the victims of 
Nazism differentiated between the cold blooded murder of the Jews and the Eastern 
European nations who were commonly remembered as enemies in the war. And since 
these countries had retaliated against the Germans by expelling, robbing and murdering 
many of them towards and after the end of the war, “the account seemed settled in 
German eyes.”
10
A number of oral history studies have confirmed this assessment. Based on hundreds 
of biographical interviews with elder Germans in the Ruhr area and in the some parts of 
the late GDR, Lutz Niethammer concluded that especially West Germans had only a 
“short-term memory” of the “Russians.” Their losses, as well as “the Russians as enemy 
and as prisoner in general have no faces in German memory.”
11
 In contrast to many East 
German interviewees whose memories included for example the murderous treatment of 
Soviet POWs and forced laborers – displaying a degree of reflection and empathy which 
should in Niethammer’s view not simply be attributed to the SED’s “brain washing” 
attempts – Niethammer stresses the West German preoccupation with Russia as “threat,” 
not the least a legacy of Nazi ideology and propaganda.
12
 On the whole, the “brutality of 
the Russians seems to have been a grandiose a priori anticipation at the end of the war,” 




 Lutz Niethammer, “Juden und Russen im Gedächtnis der Deutschen,” in Walter H. Pehle, Der 





The “vastly evident scandal” of the crimes committed in the wake of “Operation 
Barbarossa” against Soviet citizens was not perceived as such in postwar West 
Germany.
13
Ever since the Allensbach Institute started conducting polls among West Germans, 
views of the “Russians” have been largely reported as negative. Throughout the Cold 
War, the percentage of West Germans who perceived them as threat ranged between 44 
percent (1980) and 66 percent (1952).
14
 In 1982, 57 percent said that they found the 
“Russians” “unsympathetic.”
15
 In 1988, certainly due to Gorbachev’s positive image in 
the West, only 29 percent said they “didn’t like the Russians very much.”
16
 Only 25 
percent viewed the Soviet Union as threat in the same year.
17
 The most astounding result, 
however, derives not from the responses to the Allensbach studies on the Soviet Union 
but from the design of these polls: in all the years, Allensbach asked one question 
pertaining to the Eastern Front war. As late as 1992, a poll included a question on 
whether Germans “had heard about the many German POWs who had been sentenced to 
long prison terms in order to keep them longer in the Soviet Union” (54 percent said 
“yes”), and whether they had personally had heard of such persons (15 percent “yes”).
18
13
 Ibid., 119. Niethammer’s interviews instead confirm the „divided memory“ of the Holocaust: while in 
East Germany „Jews were no social factor any more,“ and thus also their suffering vanished, West 
Germans underwent a „thorough process of recalling“ the Nazi crimes against the Jews resulting in an 
empathetic acknowledgment of the Jewish fate and German guilt. Ibid., 121ff.
14
Allensbacher Jahrbuch, vol. VIII, 626.
15
 Ibid., 582. Followed by East Germans whom 46 percent of West Germans disliked, and Czechs (32 
percent).
16




 Ibid., 989. In 1955, in context of Adenauer’s visit to Moscow, Allensbach asked one question which 
somewhat implicitly addressed the past. The way the question was phrased suggested they the Soviets were 
blamed for the current hostile situation: “Do you believe that Russia now has the good will to co-operate 
with us?” [Emphasis added] – 23 percent “yes” in Sept. 1955, 34 percent “to some extent,” 27 percent “no” 
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Thus, it remains impossible to discern how West Germans evaluated the legacies of the 
war against the Soviet Union as they were never asked for their opinion on this issue. 
If we shift focus to East Germany, the political memory of the war against the Soviet 
Union generated very different views about the past among the East German population. 
One direct result of the SED’s monopoly over “history propaganda” in general, and the 
Eastern Front memory in particular, was that East German polls actually addressed the 
war against the Soviet Union as historical event, the Soviet Union’s role in the defeat of 
fascism, as well as the roots of the GDR-USSR alliance. The already mentioned Institute 
for Opinion Research (IfM) was established by the SED Politburo in 1964 in order to 
systematically evaluate the “effectiveness and persuasiveness of [the party’s] 
propagandistic and agitation work as well as the effect of enemy propaganda.” It was to 
provide the “party leadership with a fast and operatively reliable, scientifically-exact 
material about the development of the mass mood (Massenstimmung) and the state of 
conscience (Bewußtseinsstand) in the population which is untainted by subjective 
opinions and interests.”
19
 The results were kept secret from the public. Subsequently, a 
number of polls conducted by the IfM dealt with a range of issues which the Politburo 
deemed relevant to its policy and propaganda, among them questions of foreign policy 
(compare the much worse numbers for October 1955, after Adenauer’s return: 11, 17 and 57 percent). In 
1960 and 1965, a similar question was asked: “Do you feel that, deep down, the Russians have the good 
will to seek a reconciliation with the West, or do you think not so?” 57 percent (1960) and 56 percent 
(1965) said they “do not think so,” 17 percent/23 percent responded “think so.” Cf. Noelle-Neumann, 
Neumann, eds., The Germans, 554.
19
 Draft of a Politburo decree on the „Ausarbeitung und Schaffung eines ihm unmittelbar unterstellten 
zentralen Systems wissenschaftlicher exakter sozialistischer Meinungsforschung,“ April 27, 1963. 
BA/SAPMO, NY 4182, 897, fiche 1, 38f. See also the relevant Politburo decision in „Protokoll Nr. 49/63 
Sitzung des Politbüros des Zentralkomitees am 17. Dezember 1963,“ BA/SAPMO, DY 30 J IV 2/2, 915, 
fiche 1.
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(e.g., the West, Israel and the Arab countries), national security and defense (NATO, 
NVA, Warsaw Pact), military training, historical-political conscience, leisure and cultural 
activities, women’s rights, social services, or the economy.
20
 Since the archive of the 
Institute was destroyed after Honecker decreed its closure in 1979, estimates based on 
surviving poll materials deposited in other divisions of the party apparatus count 183 
polls between 1965 and 1978.
21
 The polls were conducted anonymously; IfM staff 
workers handed out questionnaires to participants who were asked to fill them out 
(usually in a group setting in factories, schools or universities), and to return them to a 
staff member on the spot, or to mail it back to the Institute.
According to these polls, a majority of East Germans – not surprisingly in view of 
the official propaganda – were in favor of the Soviet Union, believed overwhelmingly in 
the military and ideological superiority of the “socialist camp” and supported the 
unconditional “brotherhood in arms” with the Soviet Union. Yet even if one takes into 
account that a significant number of participants might have feared ramifications for 
critical answers or might have questioned the formally guaranteed anonymity, the 
numbers are staggeringly high.
22
 With regards to the memory of the Second World War, 
20
 A good overview is Niemann, Meinungsforschung in der DDR.
21
 Ibid., 15. So far it is mere speculation that Honecker was annoyed by increasingly critical results the 
polls rendered and therefore ordered the termination of the project. 
22
 The questionnaires contained no hint at the IfM’s institutional position as directly subordinated to the 
SED’s ZK. The letter head contained a mail box address in Berlin. See for example a surviving copy of the 
Poll on the Letter Exchange between the SED’s ZK and the SPD (1966), in BA/SAPMO, DY 30/5200, 64f. 
Similarly, the number of critical answers is surprising in some cases: for example, in a 1966 poll on 
„Questions of the Securing of Peace,“ item 7 asked: It is internationally common that each state secures and 
protects its borders. Is, in your view, the violation of the state border between the GDR and the FRG, resp. 
West-Berlin, a criminal act?“ 71 percent responded „yes,“ 20 percent said „no.“ Yet, the next item asked 
„Do you in this context consider it right to use fire arms against border violators (Grenzverletzer)?“ 45 
percent approved, but no less than 40 percent answered „no“! BA/SAPMO, DY 30/5199, 143. Or even 
more astounding results came in with polls addressing the economy: asked whether they would buy the 
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the polls revealed that the SED’s “history propaganda” was rather successful: in 1965, 90 
percent of East Germans saw May 8, 1945 as a “day of liberation,” ten years later the 
number rose to 92 percent.
23
 In the Federal Republic, the day was until 1985 largely 
viewed in terms of defeat. Interestingly, a post-unification poll asking the same question 
found that this view had reversed: in 1995, more East Germans saw May 8, 1945 as day 
of defeat, than as day of liberation; only about 17 percent of West Germans but 34 
percent of East Germans saw it as day of defeat.
24
Especially among the youth in the GDR, the positive picture of the Soviet Union was 
connected with the memory of the Eastern Front war. In a 1969 poll, 90 percent said that 
“cooperation with the Soviet Union is very important for the GDR;” 60 percent said that 
they “liked the Soviet people.”
25
 In 1975, 97 percent agreed that “the Soviet Union is 
important for us because it has liberated us and others from fascism.”
26
 Another poll asked 
in 1978, whether the “Soviet Union is our best friend.” 50 percent fully agreed, 40 
percent agreed “with limitations.” The same poll asked those same 90 percent why the 
Soviet Union was “our best friend,” to which 96 percent responded “because it has 
clothes produced in their own factory, more than 70 percent responded „no“ or „rather no.“ DY 30 IV 
A2/9.02/31.
23
 1965: Poll based on 1083 submitted questionnaires from all Kreisen of eight Bezirke  in the GDR. The 
participants were selected randomly from the central Einwohnermeldekartei. BA/SAPMO, 30/5188, 32-62, 
esp. item 9 on page 62. 1975: nationwide poll among several groups: young men shortly before being 
drafted to the NVA, reserve soldiers, a sample of the general population and a sample of male workers aged 
30 to 45 from 10 factories. BA/SAPMO, DY 30/5208, 36-48, esp. 43.
24
 Classen „Vom Anfang im Ende: ‚Befreiung’ im Rundfunk,” 117, fn. 105.
25
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liberated us and other peoples from fascism.”
27
 These numbers decreased in the course of 
the 1980s; in 1985, only 25 percent felt “fully bonded with the Soviet Union,” 52 percent 
with “limitations.” Yet, again, 95 percent of both groups claimed that they felt so because 
the Soviet Union had liberated the world from fascism.
28
The way these opinions were asked speaks to the heavy bias of the studies. Yet, they 
also reflect the wide dissemination of the SED’s master narrative of the Eastern Front 
war. A poll conducted in 1983 among the workers in Berlin and Bezirk Neubrandenburg 
asked participants to date important historical events in German and European history. 
Aside from events such the Thirty-Years War, the Reformation, the French Revolution, 
the Napoleonic Wars and the 1918 “bourgeois-democratic” revolution, the poll asked 
only one date pertaining to World War II: “the attack of Hitlergermany against the Soviet 
Union.” 71 percent of the respondents knew the right answer, the highest score of right 
answers compared to the other historical events on the list.
29
These findings seem to confer with findings stemming from the post-unification era, 
and they thus also speak to the longevity of the SED’s historical world view. When 
Allensbach asked Germans in East and West in 1995 “who played the decisive role in the 
Second World War, in the victory over Fascism?,” the astoundingly disparate response 
showed that the divided memory of the Eastern Front war still dominated Germans’ view 
of World War II: while 69 percent of West Germans responded “the United States,” 87 
27
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28
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29
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percent of East Germans said that “Russia” had played the decisive role in defeating Nazi 
Germany.
30
How severely divided German memory remains even after the end of its division 
should finally be highlighted with a brief look at the controversy surrounding the 
Wehrmacht exhibits “War of Extermination. Crimes of the Wehrmacht 1941-1944.”
31
 It 
was one of the milestones in the post-unification process of all-German 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung. This exhibit addressed three aspects of the Wehrmacht’s 
“war of extermination.” It detailed crimes committed in the partisan war in Serbia in 
1941, crimes of the Sixth Army on the road to Stalingrad in 1941-1942, and crimes of the 
occupation regime in occupied Belorussia 1941-1944. Aside from documenting the 
criminal orders, front letters describing the “daily life of the crimes,” and military records 
demonstrating the Wehrmacht’s complicity on every level, the exhibit relied heavily on 
visual evidence as it displayed hundreds of photographs taken mostly by German 
soldiers. Eighty percent of them were amateur shots found in the pockets of dead or 
30
 Quoted in Michael Mertes, “Die Gegenwart der Vergangenheit. Zur außenpolitischen Relevanz von 
Geschichtsbildern,” Internationale Politik, no. 9 (Sept., 2000), 1-8, quote on 7. In recent years, a number of 
fascinating oral history studies have appeared which explore the cross-generational, communicative 
memory of the Nazi past in East and West German families. All come to similar conclusion with regards to 
the persistence of the Nazi past’s divided memory. See for example Bernd Faulenbach, Annette Leo, Klaus 
Weberskirch, Zweierlei Geschichte. Lebensgeschichte und Geschichtsbewußtsein von Arbeitnehmern in 
West- und Ostdeutschland (Essen: Klartext, 2000). Nina Leonhard, Politik- und Geschichtsbewußtsein im 
Wandel. Die politische Bedeutung der nationalsizialistsichen Vergangenheit im Verlauf von drei 
Generationen in Ost- und Westdeutschland (Münster: Lit, 2002). Sabine Moller, Vielfache Vergangenheit. 
Öffentliche Erinnerungskulturen und Familienerinnerungen an die NS-Zeit in Ostdeutschland (Tübingen: 
edition diskord, 2003). And Harald Welzer, Sabine Moeller, Karoline Tschuggnall, “Opa war kein Nazi”: 
Nationalsozialismus und Holocaust im Familiengedächtnis (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 2002), especially 
chapter 7: “Die eine und die andere Welt. Das Geschichtsbewußtsein vom Nationalsozialismus im Ost-
West-Vergleich,” 162-194. In so far Herf’s conclusion in 1997 that “in the fall of 1990, German political 
unification arrived and the era of divided memory enden,” was premature. Herf, Divided Memory, 366.
31
 See the catalogue of the exhibit Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 1941-1944. 
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captured German and Austrian soldiers, 20 percent were professional pictures taken by 
the propaganda division of the Wehrmacht. These photographs of crime scenes, of 
victims before and after their murder, and of often cheering executors had a shocking 
effect on the German public. 
Entries in the guestbook of the exhibit in Dresden (January 18 until March 1, 1998) 
reinforce the above conclusion that East Germans indeed had a better knowledge and 
more empathetic understanding of the crimes on the Eastern Front. Many of the 53,000 
visitors who came to see the exhibt within in only six weeks left commentaries to that 
effect in the guestbook or wrote letters to the organizers. A 60-year old men wrote that 
“as a former GDR citizen interested in history the exhibit was no surprise to me because I 
knew about many crimes of the Wehrmacht, for example in Minsk, Serbia and in the 
Ukraine. But with these pictures showing innocent people before and after their murder, 
one asks oneself what these people went through. German guilt can never be redeemed.” 
Another visitor of the same age noted that he knew much already from his history classes 
in school, yet he disagreed with the “thesis” that this was a “Western exhibit for West 
Germany:” “My father said very little about the war in the East … he never spoke about 
the times in between military operations! … In so far the silence of the soldiers after this 
war in both Germanys is comparable.”
32
Looking back on the public reactions to his exhibit, Hannes Heer, one of the 
initiators and co-authors, said that he had thought he was producing a West German 
32
 All quoted in Petra Bopp, „’Wo sind die Augenzeugen, wo ihre Fotos?,’“ in Hamburger Institut für 
Sozialforschung, ed., Eine Ausstellung und ihre Folgen. Zur Rezeption der Ausstellung 
„Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944 (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1999), 
198-229, quotes on 199. 
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exhibit because in his perception the “myth of the clean Wehrmacht” was an exclusively 
West German phenomenon.
33
 Yet, reactions in East German cities proved him wrong. 
While in West Germany, especially after the exhibit was on displayed in Munich 
(February-April 1997), a fierce controversy ensued over the character of the Wehrmacht, 
the individual “guilt” and “honor” of the German soldiers, and the responsibility of the 
German army as a whole, East Germans reacted quite differently. The exhibit was indeed 
perceived as a scandal in the West because it once and for all shattered the “myth of a 
clean Wehrmacht.”
34
 In the East, as the Dresden example shows, the scandal was that 
many visitors felt the exhibt subtly dismantled the GDR’s antifascist legacy.
35
 The exhibit 
emphasized the individual soldiers’ brutalization and it revealed how little actual justice 
had been done in the “better Germany” with regards to the crimes of the Wehrmacht. 
Most visitors who addressed the issue of the GDR’s handling of war crimes ended up 
defending the SED’s practiced antifascism. One visitor wrote in a letter to the 
organizers:
36
 “I am no ex post defender of the former GDR – to the contrary. But the war 
was always presented as what it was – something terrible. (Whether they acted according 
33
 Interview with the organizer of the exhibit in Dresden, Jens Hommel, November 15, 2006. 
34
 The West German debate has been studied extensively by historians, see for example Hamburger Institut 
für Sozialforschung, ed., Eine Ausstellung und ihre Folgen, Heer, “The Difficulty of Ending a War,” and 
Heribert Prantl, Wehrmachtsverbrechen. Eine deutsche Kontroverse (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 
1997). The special East German side of the controversy has not been addressed yet.
35
 Interview with the organizer of the exhibit in Dresden, Jens Hommel, November 15, 2006. Hommel 
reported that especially during the many concurrent events such as round-table discussions the most 
controversial issue was the GDR’s (failed) mastering of this past, and the comparison of the two Germany’s 
handling of the war’s legacies. 
36
 The organizers distributed leaflets among the visitors of the exhibt asking them to send in comments, 
suggestions, and/or personal documents from the war. Hommel reported that old women came to see him 
and handed him loads of pictures and documents of their deceased husbands, saying „keep it all, I don’t 
want to see that anymore.“
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to this insight is a whole different question).”
37
 Thus this legacy was rather praiseworthy, 
especially compared to the alleged complete failure to confront the Eastern Front crimes 
in the “post-fascist society in the [old] FRG.”
38
Yet, some differentiated between the facts the SED “history propaganda” had 
presented about the criminal warfare in the East, and the unsatisfying answers it gave to 
the question how this all could have happened. A younger man, twenty years old in 1989, 
recalled his history lessons in a GDR high school: he had learned much about the 
criminal orders, and the war of extermination, but “it remained unclear how the 
population saw fascism, and how the soldiers saw war. The question whether it could 
happen again did not exist in light of the state-ordered antifascism.”
39
 Others felt that after 
almost ten years after the end of the GDR, the time had come to overcome the SED’s bias 
for the Soviet Union’s sufferings during World War II – and to finally address Soviet 
crimes, too.
40
This brief look into East Germans’ minds after the end of the SED regime underlines 
the profundity of the impact the political memory of the Eastern Front war had on this 
part of German society. That the search for a common, in the best sense “legitimate 
narrative of war” in post-1989 Germany has just begun is vividly manifested in the 
reactions to the Wehrmacht exhibit. It remains to be seen whether the Eastern Front war 
37
 Letter from a man residing in Dresden, born 1923, served one year at the Eastern Front („from Charkov 
to Stalingrad“), dated March 6, 1998. In my personal archive.
38
Entry in the Dresden guestbook dated January 22, 1998. Copy of the guestbook in my personal archive. 
39
 Letter dated February 1998, in my personal archive.
40
 See for example a letter with an attached article depicting the Katyn Massacre, dated January 28, 1998. 
The sender stressed the need to condemn war in all its variations and regardless of who has started it – a 
recurring theme in many letters and comments reflecting the long-term effects of the SED’s militant 
pacifism. 
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will receive an adequate place in the political culture of the “Berlin Republic.” Only a 
narrative that is able to bear out the ambiguity of Germany’s experience with war and 
mass death in the twentieth century, to integrate the divided memory of the war among 
East and West Germans and to accept the “stigma of violence” which will remain 
ingrained on German memory as a consequence of particularly those heinous crimes 
committed in the war on the Eastern Front, will make it possible for the victims and 
survivors of Nazi Germany’s wars to receive the empathetic respect they have thus far 
largely been denied. 
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Glossary
ACC Allied Control Council
AeO Working Group of former Officers (Arbeitsgemeinschaft ehemaliger 
Offiziere)
BDO Association of German Officers (Bund ehemaliger Offiziere)
BND Federal Secret Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst)
CDU Christian-Democratic Union (Christlich-DEmokratische Union)
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSCE Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
DSF Association for German-Soviet Friendship (Gesellschaft für Deutsch-
Sowjetische Freundschaft)
FDP Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei)
FHQ Fuhrer Headquarters (Führerhauptquartier)
FRG Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesrepublik Deutschland)
GDR German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik)
Gestapo Secret State Police (Geheime Staatsppolizei)
GST Society for Sports and Technology (Gesellschaft für Sport und Technik)
ICD Information Control Division, U.S. War Department 
IfM Institute for Public Opinion Research (Institut für Meinungsforschung)
IMT International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
KB Cultural Union for the Democratic Renewal of Germany (Kulturbund für 
die demokratische Erneuerung Deutschlands)
KPD Communist Party of Germany (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands)
KVP Quartered People’s Police (Kasernierte Volkspolizei)
KZ Concentration Camp (Konzentrationslager)
MfS Ministry for State Security (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit)
NATO North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDPD National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei
Deutschlands) 
NKFD National Committee Free Germany (Nationalkommittee Freies 
Deutschland)
NS National Socialism
NVA National People’s Army (Nationale Volksarmee)
OKW Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht)
OMGUS Office of the Military Government of the United States in Germany
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
Pgs nominal members of the Nazi Party not accused of any crimes (Parteigenossen)
SD Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst)
SSC Society for the Study of Soviet Culture (Gesellschaft zum Studium der 
Kultur der Sowjetunion)
SED Socialist Unity Party
SPD Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands)
SS Protective Squadron (Schutzstaffel)
SVAG Soviet Military Administration in Germany 
VOKS All-Union Society for Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries
VP People’s Police (Volkspolizei)
ZK Central Committee (Zentralkommittee)
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